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Aristotle is working out the characteristics of the discipline of rhetoric 
(ῥητορική), when he makes a sharp distinction about those attending a 
speech: ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτήν, “The listener 
must be either a spectator or a judge” (Rhet. 1.3.2.1358b2–3). He then 
divides judges into those who judge about the future, as in the Assembly, 
and those who judge about the past, as jurors in court, but reckons specta-
tors as those who judge merely a speaker’s ability. He delves at length into 
the mechanisms at play in persuading judges, but spectators disappear from 
his analysis. According to Aristotle, then, spectators play only a superficial 
role in the Assembly and courts. In using this terminology, knowingly or 
not, Aristotle shuts down and dismisses what had been a lively debate two 
generations earlier, a debate about the deliberative process not only in the 
Assembly and courts, but also in the Athenian democratic Council and in 
another venue where spectators routinely rendered judgments—the theater.1
 This debate suffused discussion in a range of genres and public venues 
for decades, but the year 427 b.c.e. was pivotal. Events of that year proved 
 1. For a broad discussion about the governing and efficacy of Athenian democracy and delib-
eration, see Ober (2008). For surveys of the discussions about modern “deliberative democracy,” see 
Elster (1998) and Gutmann and Thompson (2004). For these issues applied to Aristophanes, see 
Zumbrunnen (2012).
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seminal for the history of (comic) drama and of rhetoric, but equally for the 
history of the Greek world, especially for Athens and its ill-fated imperial 
ambitions. Two ancient historical accounts of the year, separated by time and 
perspective, differ in some details but agree that fascination with language in 
performance shaped the way the Athenians forged their political decisions. 
The earlier account appears in Thucydides, who wrote his history after his 
exile from Athens, and with a decade or two of hindsight, but he would still 
have resided in the city in 427.2 The later version Timaeus of Tauromenium 
composed in the late fourth or early third century b.c.e., thus with no first-
hand experience of the events, but bringing a perspective from his native 
Sicily, a major player in 427, and being able to reflect on the consequences 
of the year’s events for the political and military history of both Athens and 
Sicily. He also wrote after Aristotle had composed his Rhetoric. Timaeus’ 
interpretation lies behind the account preserved in Diodorus, who wrote his 
version some two centuries later, in the first century b.c.e., by which time 
rhetoric was a well-established technical industry central to elite education.
 The accounts agree that by the end of 427 b.c.e., the Athenians were 
engaged in a rare winter military campaign, their first military engagement 
with Sicilian forces, on the Aeolian islands just north of Sicily. Likewise they 
agree that the campaign was precipitated earlier that year by the city of Leon-
tini seeking support from the Athenians against the domination of Syracuse. 
Thucydides ascribes the success of the Leontines’ appeal to nascent Athenian 
imperial ambitions in Sicily (3.86). The account of the embassy in Diodorus 
agrees with the motive offered by Thucydides but adds that the Leontine 
embassy succeeded because the famous speaker and intellectual Gorgias was 
the premiere ambassador.3 In Diodorus’account, a dazzling oration in favor 
of the alliance enthralled the Athenians:
οὗτος οὖν καταντήσας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ παραχθεὶς εἰς τὸν δῆμον 
διελέχθη τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις περὶ τῆς συμμαχίας, καὶ τῷ ξενίζοντι τῆς 
λέξεως ἐξέπληξε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὄντας εὐφυεῖς καὶ φιλολόγους. 
πρῶτος γὰρ ἐχρήσατο τοῖς τῆς λέξεως σχηματισμοῖς περιττοτέροις 
καὶ τῇ φιλοτεχνίᾳ διαφέρουσιν, ἀντιθέτοις καὶ ἰσοκώλοις καὶ παρί-
σοις καὶ ὁμοιοτελεύτοις καί τισιν ἑτέροις τοιούτοις, ἃ τότε μὲν διὰ 
τὸ ξένον τῆς κατασκευῆς ἀποδοχῆς ἠξιοῦτο, νῦν δὲ περιεργίαν ἔχειν 
δοκεῖ καὶ φαίνεται καταγέλαστα πλεονάκις καὶ κατακόρως τιθέμενα. 
 2. Ober (1998, 94–104) analyzes Thucydides’ presentation of the debate in terms of the ten-
sions between democracy and tyranny.
 3. [Plato,] Hippias Major 282b also mentions this trip and Gorgias’ success. This would be more 
valuable testimony if Platonic authorship were secure, but, if nothing else, it is likely an early specimen 
of the perspective that the embassy was a triumph for Gorgias himself.
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τέλος δὲ πείσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους συμμαχῆσαι τοῖς Λεοντίνοις, οὗτος 
μὲν θαυμασθεὶς ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ῥητορικῇ τὴν εἰς Λεοντί-
νους ἐπάνοδον ἐποιήσατο.
Now when he [Gorgias] came down to Athens and was introduced to the 
people, he engaged in conversation with the Athenians about the alliance, 
and by the exotic manner of his speech stunned the Athenians, who are 
clever and love speeches. For he was the first to use structures of speech 
that were rather unusual, yet lovingly crafted in their unorthodoxy, such 
as antitheses, equal and balanced clauses, similar endings, and other such 
things, all of which at that time were received positively because of the 
exotic nature of the tricks being delivered, but now come across as pre-
cious and silly in their fullness, especially when employed excessively. In 
the end he persuaded the Athenians of an alliance with the Leontines, and, 
having made his impact in Athens for his rhetorical skill, made his return 
to Leontini. (12.53.3–5)4
 Thucydides does not mention Gorgias in his account of the embassy, but 
his history of the year does include comment on the Athenian mania for 
the spectacle of a good orator. Following a revolt at Mytilene, debate ensues 
in Athens about punishment for the rebels. The Assembly voted to execute 
the entire male population and enslave the rest, but the next day brought 
renewed debate about the decision. Thucydides here introduces the original 
bill’s sponsor, Cleon, “the most violent of citizens in other respects and by 
far the most persuasive with the Demos at the time” (ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαιότα-
τος τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος, 
3.36.6).5 Thucydides has Cleon, in defending his motion, sharply criticize 
the Athenian fascination with performed speeches:
αἴτιοι δ᾽ ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες, οἵτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν 
τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα 
ἔργα ἀπὸ τῶν εὖ εἰπόντων σκοποῦντες ὡς δυνατὰ γίγνεσθαι, τὰ 
δὲ πεπραγμένα ἤδη, οὐ τὸ δρασθὲν πιστότερον ὄψει λαβόντες ἢ τὸ 
ἀκουσθέν, ἀπὸ τῶν λόγῳ καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων καὶ μετὰ καινό-
 4. All translations are my own, except where indicated.
 5. Throughout this book I leave the Greek word δη̑μος untranslated, or more accurately, just 
transliterated as “Demos.” I do this because I want to be clear and consistent about when Greek 
sources use the term, and because no English word corresponds to the sense of the Demos as both 
the mass populace and the franchised citizen body of Athens. Greek at this time of course has no or-
thographic means (such as capitalization) to distinguish a generic instance of the word from a formal, 
legal designation.
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τητος μὲν λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι, μετὰ δεδοκιμασμένου δὲ μὴ 
ξυνέπεσθαι ἐθέλειν, δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων, ὑπερόπται δὲ 
τῶν εἰωθότων, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος βουλόμενος 
δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι τοῖς τοιαῦτα λέγουσι μὴ ὕστε-
ροι ἀκολουθῆσαι δοκεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ, ὀξέως δέ τι λέγοντος προεπαινέ-
σαι, καὶ προαισθέσθαι τε πρόθυμοι εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ προνοῆσαι 
βραδεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποβησόμενα, ζητοῦντές τε ἄλλο τι ὡς εἰπεῖν 
ἢ ἐν οἷς ζῶμεν, φρονοῦντες δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἱκανῶς· 
ἁπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες 
καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις.
You are to blame for setting up these contests; you are accustomed to being 
spectators at speeches, mere hearers of deeds. As for deeds to be done, you 
determine their possibility on the basis of someone’s capable speaking, while 
for what has already been done, you do not consider your sight more reliable 
than what you have heard, on the basis of someone honoring the past with a 
pretty speech. Superb at being deceived by the strangeness of an argument, 
unwilling to agree with a decision even after it has been approved; slaves 
to the eternally eccentric, despisers of the ordinary, absolutely everyone 
wants to speak first himself, or if not, to struggle to seem to follow the 
ideas of those saying all this, to declare praise sooner than someone can 
say anything, and yet preferring to be eager for what’s said while also to 
be slow about the consequences of it. You seek out something other, so to 
speak, than the world in which we live; you give insufficient thought to 
your circumstances. Completely dominated by the pleasure of sound, you 
resemble seated spectators before performers more than those deliberating 
about their city. (3.38.4–7)
 While there is no doubt that there was a cultural fascination among the 
Athenians for oratory, these historians differ sharply in tone and context. For 
Thucydides, the fondness for dynamic public speaking eviscerates the intel-
ligent deliberative process that should guide the city.6 Writing with at least 
some perspective of the later consequences of the events of 427, Thucydides 
tacitly embeds the idea that the stakes are high. Five seasons into war with 
Sparta, scarcely two years after the death of Pericles, the Athenians are finally 
experiencing a reprieve from the plague (which will surge again later in the 
year) and making decisions that will shape their long-term policies in the 
 6. For analysis of Thucydides’ models of deliberation and democracy, see Pope (1988), Yunis 
(1991), Zumbrunnen (2008) and Foster (2010, 119–220). For debate about this passage’s relevance 
to deliberation on the tragic stage, see Hesk (2011, 121–27) and Heath (2011, 167–69).
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war and their relations with the rest of the Greek world. While he is nar-
rowly defeated in his appeal to sustain his motion in favor of executing the 
Mytilenians, Cleon himself will come to dominate Athenian war policy and 
lead the city all but irrevocably on a path toward more blunt pursuit of 
empire. The alliance with Leontini will mushroom into the monstrous and 
disastrous expedition against Sicily a dozen years later, arguably the decisive 
turn in the entire Peloponnesian War.
 For Timaeus and Diodorus, the embassy from Leontini in 427 not only 
foreshadows the later Athenian expedition to Sicily but also showcases a 
fellow Sicilian, and historical hindsight allows them some perspective on 
Gorgias, specifically that he was a pioneer in the techniques of rhetoric, but 
his style seemed dated and primitive in a world where education and prac-
tice in formal rhetoric was highly technical and professionalized. Still, the 
later account recognizes the impact that Gorgias’ unusual methods of speech 
making must have had on the Athenians and the long-range legacy of the 
fascination of Athenian audiences, or spectators, for inventive oratory.
 Another Athenian, however, also put on a show for those crowds of 
spectators in 427 and also commented explicitly and forcefully on the issues 
raised in both historical accounts: the functioning of the Athenian democ-
racy, the policies Athenians should pursue in war and empire building, the 
role of public oratory in both, the influence of intellectualism via foreigners, 
and the flowering of unorthodox language. A young Aristophanes made his 
debut at the Theater of Dionysus with Banqueters (frr. 205–55) that same 
year, prior to both the debate over Mytilene and the embassy from Leon-
tini. The play involved two young men of markedly different character, 
“a decent one and a butt-fuck,” as he would refer to them a decade or so 
later (ὁ σώφρων τε χὠ καταπύγων, Clouds 529).7 The repugnant youth 
competes with an older man regarding language usage. In one fragment, 
the adolescent challenges his elder on the meaning of words in Homer and 
Solon (fr. 233). In another (fr. 205), the older man picks at unusual words 
in the young man’s speech and connects them to problematic speakers in 
the public sphere in Athens.8 Some terms he says belong to speakers in the 
Assembly and courts (ῥητόρων and ξυνηγόρων). Other terms he links 
to particular speakers. Alcibiades makes an early appearance here, a decade 
before his crucial role in the Sicilian expedition (cf. fr. 244), as does Thrasy-
machus, a shadowy figure for modern scholars (aside from the fiery character 
Plato makes of him in the Republic), but repeatedly cited in ancient accounts 
 7. Clouds was originally put on in 423 b.c.e., but this line comes from a section securely as-
signed to the revision of the play in ca. 417. See Kopff (1990), Storey (1993) and Henderson (1993).
 8. See Chapter 2 and the Appendix for text, translation and discussion of this fragment.
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of pioneers who developed rhetoric.9 Also cited is Lysistratus, but, whatever 
his reputation in 427, he is almost totally obscure now, even if he is to be 
identified with other scattered jokes about a Lysistratus in other plays.10
 The obscurity of these references does not reduce the significance and 
seriousness of the matters Aristophanes addresses. It only reminds us that 
Aristophanes was writing and reacting to events and people before he could 
have the historical perspective of Thucydides and other sources years and 
centuries later. Gorgias had yet to visit Athens, and Aristophanes could not 
know that the strange turns of language he had already heard and dramatized 
would come to be reckoned the beginnings of an institutionalized program 
that would dominate education for more than a millennium. And yet the 
issues embedded in the brief fragments of Aristophanes’ debut signal the 
same concerns as Thucydides’ Cleon, as there is anxiety that showy, trouble-
some verbiage makes so marked an appearance in the language of public 
deliberation at Athens. Unfortunately, the remains of Banqueters do not 
permit productive speculation about how far Aristophanes dramatized and 
commented on the political and cultural stakes at risk in the deployment 
of this language, but his later career confirms these risks were consistently 
critical topics for him. After the military season of 427 and after Gorgias’ 
visit, Aristophanes returned to the stage the next year with Babylonians (frr. 
67–100), which, according to ancient testimony, in some form addressed 
the issue of Athens’ governance of its empire and reportedly drew the ire 
of Cleon himself. How far and how directly Aristophanes staged and com-
mented on the political institutions of Athens in these first two plays is not 
clear.11 Based on the eleven surviving plays over the next four decades, it 
would not be surprising if Aristophanes had earlier dramatized and com-
mented explicitly on the political bodies of the Athenian democracy and 
what role the new, unorthodox language played in them. Indeed, no extant 
play fails to address the bundle of issues raised by the historical accounts of 
427.
 In contrast to the historians, comic playwrights in Athens had to react, 
comment and develop their perspectives virtually in real time, very much as 
 9. AS.6–7, 10–11 and 13). Storey (1988) argues that the Thrasymachus of this fragment is not 
the same man cited in later sources. Cf. the Appendix and Aristotle, Rhet. 3.1.7.1404a12–16, where 
Aristotle says Thrasymachus commented on acting.
 10. See Olson (2002, 285–86, on Ach. 855) for a survey of the problem; cf. the entry in the Ap-
pendix.
 11. Σ Ach. 378 says Cleon brought Aristophanes before the Council. If, as some think, the 
scholiast had access only to other plays, this report might relate to events in Babylonians rather than to 
historical reality. Banqueters (fr. 216) and Babylonians (fr. 75) hint at trials in court. For a reconstruc-
tion of the feud between Aristophanes and Cleon, along with a helpful survey of relevant bibliography, 
see Storey (1995).
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the speakers and the language were evolving to become, only after Aristo-
phanes’ lifetime, a specialized professional discipline and mainstay of politi-
cal discourse. Such is the paradox and value of Aristophanes as witness and 
source for the early years of the development of rhetoric: he composed plays 
about the language without the benefit or restriction of a historical narrative 
to orient his observations; he embedded the phenomenon in the politics 
and culture of democratic Athens; he engaged in spectacle of the sort that 
Thucydides’ Cleon finds contemptible; yet his comedies remain the most 
extensive explicit commentary contemporary with the crucial, but shadowy, 
invention of rhetoric across the first century of its development.
 Thus the historical narratives are fundamentally unlike the testimony of 
Aristophanes’ plays, but the account in Diodorus also typifies a perspective 
found in almost all surviving testimony about the oratory, speakers and theo-
rizers of rhetoric from Aristophanes’ lifetime, a narrative structured accord-
ing to an Aristotelian template: initial creation followed by selective accretion 
and refinement as a discipline matures into a stable and sophisticated system. 
Thus Gorgias is a pioneer in some techniques, while other techniques are 
deprecated as rhetoric advances toward the system later authors could take 
for granted. By contrast, the attack Aristophanes mounts in 427 takes place 
well before our major sources composed their characterizations of Gorgias 
and his contemporary intellectuals, characterizations that became canoni-
cal. Plato, for example, was still an infant, decades away from launching his 
own historical narratives, which would relegate the thought and expression 
of Gorgias, Protagoras and others to the margins, and beyond, of produc-
tive intellectual pursuit. It is after Aristophanes’ career is over that Plato, 
Isocrates, Alcidamas and others define and marginalize “Sophists” as those 
engaged in ephemeral verbal trickery.12 Still later, when Aristotle composes 
the Rhetoric and includes an anthology of the development of rhetorical the-
ory and practice, he inherits this formulation, new and old written sources 
are available to him, and he can take for granted that rhetoric is a disci-
pline of fundamental civic and pedagogical importance. While Aristotle cites 
scripts of some plays for examples of rhetorical tropes, he scarcely looks to 
fifth-century Greek comedy for examples of rhetorical language, and never 
for historical context.13
 12. On Plato’s separation of “rhetoric” from philosophy, see McCoy (2007); and on Plato’s 
engagement with drama and other genres in demarcating philosophia, see Nightingale (1995). On 
the way Plato construes drama as public rhetorical performance, see D. Carter (2011). For analo-
gous studies of Isocrates and Aristotle, see McCabe (1994), Schiappa (1999, 162–201) and Haskins 
(2004). For Alcidamas in this context, see Muir (2001, vii–xv). On the issue more broadly, see Wardy 
(2009).
 13. Aristotle cites Babylonians (fr. 92) for diminutives (Rhet. 3.2.15.1405b28–32) and a line 
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 Except for imaginative extrapolations, scholarship during the Hellenis-
tic, Roman and Byzantine periods hewed closely to Aristotle’s narrative of 
rhetoric’s birth and first century of development.14 Until recently, modern 
scholarship maintained this allegiance to Aristotle, both in the way scholars 
narrated the development of techniques and in the way they evaluated and 
characterized early practitioners, as well as the exclusion of comedy, except 
for comparison of Aristophanes’ Clouds to Plato’s narrative of the antinomy 
between Socrates and the now so-called early Sophists.15 In recent decades, 
however, scholars have engaged in a substantial revision of Aristotle’s narra-
tive and of his evaluation of intellectual activity in the fifth century.
 The intellectuals now termed the Older Sophists have enjoyed a consid-
erable rise in their stock.16 Many hands have contributed to this resurgence, 
but G. B. Kerferd’s work provides a sober review of the vicissitudes of the 
Sophists’ reputation and has generated pragmatic approaches for subse-
quent study. As Kerferd illustrates, the Sophists long suffered at the hands 
of scholars and philosophers whose axiomatic precepts made them predis-
posed to fall in line with the criticisms leveled by Plato and Aristotle.17 Con-
versely, in the last two decades, the ideas of the Sophists have benefited from 
recent schools of thought that allow greater interface with the intellectual 
challenges posed by Gorgias and others. In part, this has fostered a cot-
tage industry in using the fragmentary, but provocative, remains of the 
Sophists’ writings to articulate a sort of “sophistic rhetoric” for the mod-
ern, or post-modern, world.18 The current study, however, seeks rather to 
from an unspecified play of Aristophanes (fr. 649) for an antithesis (3.9.9.1410a28–29). Cf. Chapter 
2 on Pericles for Aristotle’s swipe at comic poets generally. 
 14. Cicero (De inv. 2.2.6) says that in his day, because of the success of Aristotle’s summary 
history of early rhetoric, nemo illorum praecepta ex ipsorum libris cognoscat, sed omnes, qui quod illi 
praecipiant velint intellegere, ad hunc quasi ad quendam multo commodiorem explicatorem revertantur, 
“No one learns the precepts [of Aristotle’s predecessors] from their own writings, but those who wish 
to know what principles they espoused come back to him [Aristotle] for a far more amenable explana-
tion.” Extant references to the early history of rhetoric are consistent with Cicero’s characterization. 
Cf. Cole (1991b).
 15. For typical examples of citing Aristophanes with respect to Plato’s disparagement of Sophists, 
see McCoy (2007, 12, 39, 79 and 165, in contrast to Plato) and Romilly (1992, 83–89 and 134–43, 
supporting Plato). For an example of using Aristophanes to construct a modern critique of Socrates, 
see Nussbaum (1980).
 16. The issue of who was a “Sophist” in antiquity is fraught with controversy, on which see 
Kerferd (1981, 42–58) and Schiappa (2003, 3–12). Because this study focuses on comedy’s reaction 
to rhetoric, I am less concerned with whether any given individual should properly be reckoned a 
Sophist, although I will analyze comedy’s use of the term σοφιστήs in Chapter 2 and the Appendix. 
In any case, my aim is to cite and discuss any individual identified in comedy with speech making and 
language theory, regardless of whether the label “Sophist” applies.
 17. Kerferd (1981, 4–12).
 18. On the strengths and weaknesses of this approach, see Schiappa (1990b) and (1991). For an 
example of an updated version of this approach applied to democratic theory, see Crick (2010).
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delineate the impact of intellectual investigation into language, including 
the techniques used in practical settings, against the political and cultural 
background of democratic Athens in the fifth century b.c.e. The contribu-
tions of this study to the reconstruction of a “sophistic rhetoric” should 
be construed as limited to two areas: making the evidence of Aristophanes 
and other fifth-century comic texts available and accessible for use in such 
reconstruction, and, in the process, clarifying the limits of historical recon-
struction, since the study of the fragmentary remains of the Sophists’ writ-
ing sometimes leads to claims that in the fifth century certain topics and 
techniques abided, when consulting other ancient sources strongly argues 
against such claims.19
 When it comes to historical reconstruction, however, no component of 
the study of the Sophists has perhaps undergone so extensive a revision as 
that of the early history of rhetoric. The key points of the birth and devel-
opment of rhetoric, from the mid-fifth century down to the mid-fourth 
century, that is, prior to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, remained remarkably consis-
tent from antiquity through most of the twentieth century.20 The narrative 
begins on Sicily in the middle of the fifth century, where Corax and Tisias, 
in response to the pragmatic needs of the political environment, began lay-
ing out the precepts of speech composition and persuasive speaking. These 
precepts migrated to Athens via traveling teachers and intellectuals like Gor-
gias, along with a philosophical view that effective persuasion was an accept-
able goal in itself, even at the expense of truth or justice. Plato reacted to 
this emerging tradition by separating rhetoric from philosophy proper and 
undermining the Sophists’ claims to philosophical coherence. Later, Aristotle 
would acknowledge the risk of rhetoric, if someone “bent the ruler” (εἴ τις 
ᾧ μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν, Rhet 1.1.5.1354a) 
to deceive a jury (by making them angry, for example), but nevertheless 
offered a historical model for the development of rhetoric and an elaborate 
taxonomy of techniques, a summation of three generations of speakers refin-
ing various techniques and strategies.21 For scholars following and detailing 
 19. An argumentum ex silentio is always difficult, but even so, reasonable caution and precision 
can be expected. For example, Consigny (2001, 43–44) makes a claim for the centrality of kairos to 
Gorgias’ thought, but none of the texts he cites even use the term. It is one thing to acknowledge that 
ancient testimony indicates that Gorgias wrote about kairos (82 B13 DK), and even to attempt to 
reconstruct how such an idea fit into Gorgias’ thought, but it is quite another to operate as if we have 
any text where Gorgias discusses the concept or even deploys the term. The presence, absence and 
limitations of meaning of key terms will be a recurring topic in this study.
 20. Schiappa (1999, 3–10) catalogues seventeen points of agreement in the “standard” or “tradi-
tional” scholarly account of rhetoric prior to Aristotle.
 21. On the unity of the Rhetoric, see Gross and Dascal (2001). On the problematic history of 
scholarship on the purpose and unity of the Rhetoric, see Poster (1997).
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this scenario, the teaching of persuasive rhetoric was reckoned central to the 
Sophists’ mission and fundamental for their popularity and success.
 Since 1990, however, a new narrative has emerged. First, the central-
ity of rhetoric to the Sophists’ teaching vanished with the recognition that 
there was effectively no evidence that the group of fifth-century intellectuals 
agreed on much of any central doctrine, that some of them were not known 
to have explored anything that could be construed as rhetoric, and that they 
did not promote doctrines consistent with what their later detractors held 
them responsible for. Indeed, the very word “rhetoric” (ῥητορική) was not 
available until well into the fourth century.22
 A much less centralized and more diverse picture of the intellectual 
debate about language in the fifth century was now possible. Independently 
of each other, in 1991 Thomas Cole and Edward Schiappa offered funda-
mentally revised versions of the development of rhetoric prior to Aristotle.23 
Each in different ways saw Plato as a key figure in declaring rhetoric a focal-
ized point of inquiry, not as reacting to an established discipline. For both 
scholars, Aristotle was thus capitalizing on a relatively recent development 
in having the techniques of speech composition and language manipula-
tion formalized, but more importantly, in writing the Rhetoric, more than 
cataloguing established practices, Aristotle was actively shaping the history 
and methods of rhetoric into a system.24 Thus, prior to Plato’s inventive 
conceptual work (especially in Phaedrus), the study of “rhetoric” was fun-
damentally distinct from what followed and not simply a rudimentary core 
of what would become the taxonomy promulgated by Aristotle. For Cole, 
the explorations into language were “proto-rhetorical” at most and involved 
much more basic experiments with language against the backdrop of a tran-
sition from orality to literacy.25 For Schiappa, the fifth century was an open 
marketplace of ideas in competition to determine the scope and methods 
for language exploration. Inspired by Kuhn’s analysis of the way scientific 
research programs develop, collapse and reconstitute, Schiappa reckons Plato 
and Aristotle as key figures in establishing the “normal” research protocols 
for a new discipline, “rhetoric,” but that the generation prior to Plato was 
engaged in much different work, reacting against their own predecessors 
 22. Schiappa (1990a), pace the objections of O’Sullivan (1993); cf. Schiappa (1994) and Pen-
drick (1998).
 23. Cole (1991a) and Schiappa (2003, revised from 1991 edition).
 24. See Wise (2008) for an analysis of Aristotle’s Poetics that similarly finds him reacting to drama 
more as it was practiced in his own day than to fifth-century practice. Cf. the response to this thesis 
in Hanink (2011).
 25. Cole (1991a, esp. 71–94). For convenience, I adopt his term “proto-rhetorical” for the cul-
tural investigation into language that Old Comedy dramatizes and satirizes (cf. the Appendix).
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(pre-Socratics like Parmenides, for example), and pursuing a wide range 
of intellectual exploration, much of it tied to the limits and capabilities of 
human speech.26
 The reaction to Cole’s and Schiappa’s work has been debate and division, 
with scholars acknowledging, extending or rejecting the new narrative. Thus 
some engaged in the process of reconstituting the significance of what was 
rhetoric for the Sophists continue to push their characterizations beyond the 
traditional narrative, even if they do not necessarily follow Cole and Schiap-
pa.27 Some persist with the traditional model.28 Others extend the new ideas 
into new areas, such as Ekaterina Haskins, who revisits the role of orality and 
literacy in Isocrates and Aristotle, and Michael de Brauw, who wrestles with 
the consequences of the new model for technical aspects of speeches, while 
David Timmerman, Schiappa and Christopher Tindale extend the theoreti-
cal discussion and probe the analytical consequences for our understanding 
additional fourth-century texts about rhetoric and the Sophists.29
 Any stand in this debate involves characterizing what was transpiring 
with “rhetoric” (however defined) and language in the decades immediately 
prior to Plato’s writings on the subject.30 As productive as the discussion 
has been, it has remained limited in some respects. While an increasing 
number of texts have been brought to bear, these have been limited almost 
entirely to prose writings by and about the intellectuals in the debate. This 
choice already critically circumscribes the debate, since the choice to write 
technical prose in the fifth and fourth centuries was to declare allegiance 
to a certain range of cultural priorities.31 So in some ways modern scholars 
work with a more limited type of sources than even Aristotle did, for drama, 
historiography and oratory play limited or no roles as resources for current 
attempts to understand the theory and practice at the time.32 Needless to 
say, Aristotle’s disregard for comedy persists. Once again, then, the testimony 
of Aristophanes is critical but underutilized, although his career, indeed the 
entire heyday of Old Comedy, spans exactly the period when rhetoric was 
 26. Schiappa (2003, esp. 77–81, 157–62) and (1999, esp. 10–13).
 27. See Poulakos (1995) in general; Consigny (2001) and McComiskey (2002) on Gorgias; 
Mendelson (2002) on Protagoras.
 28. Wardy (1996); Usher (1999); Pernot (2005).
 29. Haskins (2004); Poulakos and Depew (2004); de Brauw (2007); Timmerman and Schiappa 
(2010); Tindale (2010).
 30. For various recent perspectives on this debate and time frame, see Schiappa and Hamm, 
Gagarin, and Bons, all in Worthington (2007).
 31. Cole (1991a, 115–38).
 32. For some surveys, see Roisman (on Homer), Clay (on Hesiod), McDonald (on tragedy) and 
Fox and Livingstone (on historiography), in Worthington (2007). For Hubbard’s contribution on 
comedy in the latter volume, see below.
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said to have been birthed and developed. Unlike other authors of the period, 
however, he discusses the phenomenon explicitly and as it happens.
 Scholarship on Aristophanes, in turn, has made limited exploration of 
the importance of rhetoric in his plays. Well before the sea change in the 
appreciation for the Sophists and the revision of the historical narrative of 
early rhetoric, Charles Murphy contributed some initial analysis of rhetoric 
in Aristophanes.33 Consistent with the prevailing narrative of early rhetoric 
at the time, Murphy studies Aristophanes’ plays for evidence of core tech-
niques and structures from canonical rhetoric, quadripartite division and 
so on. He offers the provisional conclusion that Aristophanes was aware of 
basic core techniques and deployed them, and Murphy appends schematics 
of speeches from the plays to illustrate his point. No one continued Mur-
phy’s work for fifty years, until Maria de Fátima Sousa e Silva explored the 
topic again.34 While she brings more text to bear, including fragments, her 
analysis and conclusions effectively repeat Murphy’s tentative conclusions.
 In the wake of the challenge of Cole and Schiappa, there has been an 
uptick in attention paid to rhetoric in Aristophanes, but of a limited or 
reactionary nature. D. M. MacDowell’s survey of Aristophanes was the first 
to include a section about rhetoric in Aristophanes, however brief.35 Neil 
O’Sullivan has been aggressive not only in rejecting challenges to the tradi-
tional narrative but also in contending that Greek comedy deployed formal 
critical terminology with regard to rhetoric and literary language, terminol-
ogy that persisted in Hellenistic scholarship.36 Subsequently Thomas Hub-
bard has come out upholding the idea that comedy reflects formal, organized 
rhetorical practice.37
 O’Sullivan and Hubbard each approach the challenges of Cole and Schi-
appa by analyzing comedy of the fifth century to cull evidence for active 
rhetorical theory and practice reflected in the plays. In doing so, they share a 
methodology that skews their selection of comic material and their interpre-
tation of the evidence in the plays. Both work backward from later models 
and theories of rhetoric and formal criticism, from periods when the termi-
nology, infrastructure and evidence are much more detailed and extensive 
than they are for the fifth century, the period of the comic sources they mine. 
Focusing on somewhat different details, each cites terms and other supposed 
 33. Murphy (1938).
 34. Sousa e Silva (1987–88).
 35. MacDowell (1995, 131–32).
 36. O’Sullivan (1992), (1993); cf. Rosen (2004), Hunter (2009, 10–52) and Pontani (2009). 
Bers (1997) provides some close technical readings on the reproduction of speech in drama.
 37. Hubbard (2007).
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parallels in Aristophanes, which they claim illustrate that components of 
rhetorical theory or analogous tools of rhetorical analysis are referred to in 
the plays. Such vestiges then become evidence for some disciplinary activity 
in the fifth century comparable to post-Aristotelian activity.
 The issue of terminology encapsulates the debate, in that all sides agree 
that the presence and usage of formal terminology, sometimes called “meta-
language,” is crucial for arguing the presence or absence of formal analytical 
activity. O’Sullivan argues at length that comedy, and Aristophanes’ Frogs 
in particular, feature terminology that has a long tail of influence in later 
stylistic criticism, itself under the umbrella of rhetorical theory. Hubbard 
asserts that theoretical analysis could have been conducted that would not 
likely have survived in our written sources but that nonetheless “comedy 
clearly shows speakers engaged in self-conscious linguistic and discursive 
strategies.”38 The weakness of Hubbard’s position becomes clear when he 
discusses specific terminology. He concedes there is nothing in Aristophanes 
comparable to the jargon found a century later in comedy.39 Among words 
in comedy that “probably refer to current rhetorical terms,” he finds only 
four, and only one holds up under scrutiny. Hubbard cites προοίμια from 
Knights 1343, but the context makes clear that it refers not to the first sec-
tion of a speech (its meaning in canonical rhetorical theory later), but to a 
greeting, its standard meaning in the fifth century. The Sausage-Seller (now 
revealed as Agoracritus) is describing the earlier behavior of the Demos:
πρῶτον μέν, ὁπότ’ εἴποι τις ἐν τ’ ἠκκλησίᾳ,
“ὦ Δῆμ,’ ἐραστής εἰμι σὸς φιλῶ τέ σε
καὶ κήδομαί σου καὶ προβουλεύω μόνος,”
τούτοις ὁπότε χρήσαιτό τις προοιμίοις,
ἀνωρτάλιζες κ’ἀκερουτίας.
First, whenever someone in the Assembly said,
“O Demos, I am your lover and I love you,
And I care about you and I’m the only one who cares for your welfare,”
Whenever anyone used greetings like this,
You would flap your wings and shake your horns. (Kn. 1340–44)
 38. Hubbard (2007, 491) presents this argument as if it were one Cole and Schiappa would 
dispute; in fact, both agree that speakers engaged in techniques of persuasion, but each in his different 
way (despite Hubbard conflating them) finds this activity fundamentally distinct from the industry of 
rhetorical analysis a century later, a distinction Hubbard denies but does not discuss.
 39. Hubbard (2007, 503); cf. Cratinus Jr. fr. 7.
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Another term, τεκμήριον, is not technical at all. It is the word rhetori-
cians and orators use for “evidence,” but it is the only noun available (as 
opposed to a number of verbs meaning “show,” “demonstrate,” etc.) and as 
such not formal or technical, but simply the standard word for referring to 
evidence. Nothing in its usage suggests it has a more restricted meaning in 
rhetorical contexts or that untrained speakers and audiences would have 
used any other, nontechnical word in its place. Hubbard speculates that 
Aristophanes in Banqueters (fr. 205) satirizes a term associated with Thrasy-
machus, ὑποτεκμήριον. The term is merely an inference from the verb in 
the fragment; the noun is unattested and the verb, ὑποτεκμαίρῃ, is scarcely 
attested except in this passage, which suggests that it is, like other words 
in the same passage, a coinage by Aristophanes mocking the unorthodox 
vocabulary of certain notorious speakers.40 No one denies that intellectuals 
of the time deployed language in unorthodox ways and that comic poets 
took note of these eccentricities. Nonetheless, just because language use is 
unorthodox or speakers are talking about the differences does not mean their 
analysis of language corresponds to rhetorical theory of a century later. In all 
of surviving fifth-century comedy, only one word potentially corresponds to 
its usage in canonical rhetoric, ἀντίθετον.41
 O’Sullivan makes a more complex argument, but with the same funda-
mental flaws. He seizes mostly on metaphors used in comedy to describe 
language, speaking and style. Terms describing loud and boisterous speak-
ers also turn up in later authors describing style (e.g., ψόφος, “noisy,” and 
variations on βρεντᾶν, “thundering”), from which O’Sullivan concludes 
the key terms in such metaphors were in fact nascent critical terminology 
that later rhetoricians and scholars inherited and used as formal analytical 
vocabulary. This conclusion goes well beyond the evidence. O’Sullivan does 
identify some parallels in terminology and metaphor between Aristophanes 
and rhetoricians of later times, but he never addresses the limitations of 
such parallels. It does not require formal critical analysis for a comic poet, 
or a Hellenistic scholar for that matter, to describe the language of a ver-
bose speaker as some sort of storm or concise language as “thin” (λεπτός).42 
D. Müller, by contrast, makes the case that much metaphorical language 
in Aristophanes is parody, posing a fundamental challenge to O’Sullivan’s 
 40. Pollux 9.151 uses the verb, but it does not illuminate this passage. Cf. Bonanno (1983, 
62–63).
 41. Aristophanes fr. 341 (not antithesis, as Hubbard quotes it). The fragment might be a later 
gloss and not fifth-century language at all. See the entries in the Appendix for this and the other terms 
discussed here.
 42. O’Sullivan (1992, 107–23).
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argument, in that Aristophanes’ metaphors thus have a consistent, immedi-
ate referent in the dramas and orators being parodied, not in a system of 
formal vocabulary for criticism.43 More recently, Andreas Willi probes the 
nature and limits of “technical language” in Old Comedy and finds that the 
technical vocabulary of literary criticism, even in Frogs, is all but lacking.44 
Ultimately, O’Sullivan has no more explicit or direct evidence than Hub-
bard that references to language or style in fifth-century comedy imply a 
formal analytical system. The persistence of some of the metaphors isolated 
by O’Sullivan can indicate that later critics used at least some of these meta-
phors to the point that they became ossified as technical terms,45 but as far 
as fifth-century comedy is concerned, O’Sullivan’s parallels at most suggest 
that later rhetoricians and scholars, because of their familiarity with classi-
cal texts, invoked, and expected their readers to recognize, metaphors culled 
from Aristophanes.
 The arguments of O’Sullivan and Hubbard perhaps gain some traction 
among scholars because their conclusions are attractive. Proposing a direct 
parallel in comedy to canonical rhetoric offers greater hope of understand-
ing and systematizing the interpretive work taking place in Aristophanes, 
in drama in general and in fifth-century Athens more broadly, and if that 
system has direct descendants in later writings, then the system and the 
diachronic progression of it offer more intelligibility for scholars. Moreover, 
with fragmentary material, such a model offers hope that we can organize 
scattered terminology in a systematic way and that fragments can be placed 
in some kind of relation to each other in the large puzzle of ancient com-
edy, drama and antiquity. This is much more appealing than the image of 
terminology that is simply not part of a larger system, which was deployed 
ad hoc and for a much more immediate and irrecoverable cultural context, 
and with no demonstrable Nachleben.
 What hurts the efforts of O’Sullivan and Hubbard most is that they 
comb through comedy searching for and selecting material that fits the 
more familiar systems from later periods. Neither seeks to establish how 
fifth-century comedy treats the developments in language, the manners of 
speakers and the contexts in the plays, before they build a case around par-
 43. Müller (1974). O’Sullivan (1992, 123 n. 112) finds Müller’s conclusions “questionable” but 
offers no reason his own method is more reliable.
 44. Willi (2003, 51–95, esp. 87–94). Willi responds to Denniston (1927) rather than to O’Sul-
livan, but the principle is the same. Willi concludes: “On the whole very little supports the claim 
that Frogs makes much use of an established technical language of literary criticism” (92). For a more 
sophisticated view of the genesis of literary criticism, see Ford (2002, esp. 188–208).
 45. Hunter (2009) pursues this idea.
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ticulars. Playwrights of all places and times, of course, dramatize events to 
reflect and comment on the world they experience. Aristophanes and his 
contemporaries dramatized trials, debates and other occasions where speak-
ers employed persuasive language, but doing so does not require an estab-
lished or nascent formalized system of critical terminology to describe speech 
making. Aeschylus dramatized persuasive speech making in the Eumenides in 
458 b.c.e., and no scholar seriously contends that these speeches correspond 
to the canonical methods of a rhetorical speech, but, even though nothing 
in comedy corresponds any better, the idea that comedy must reflect formal 
rhetoric persists, primarily because the (inaccurate) historical progression 
promulgated by Aristotle contends it should.
 Integrating Aristophanes’ testimony into the narrative of early rheto-
ric requires analyzing his examples and comments in the context of his 
dramatization of the sociopolitical life of the Athenian democracy, for all 
his comments come in this context.46 In this area, scholarly debate about 
Aristophanes’ role, oriented with respect to the ideology of the Athenian 
democracy, has become lively. The same year Murphy’s article on rhetoric 
in Aristophanes appeared, A. W. Gomme declared politics in Aristophanes 
a “threadbare topic,” but the following decades have found scholars ever 
increasingly taking stands and elaborating reasons for and against claiming 
Aristophanes’ allegiance to some political orientation.47 While scholars in 
antiquity could associate Aristophanes’ harsh treatment of public figures 
with the freedom of democracy, modern scholarship began by aligning Aris-
tophanes with oligarchic and antidemocratic sympathies.48 Jeffrey Hender-
son proposed a model wherein stage comedy serves as a safe venue to voice 
ideas fraught with ideological and political tension in the democracy.49 In 
this sense, Aristophanes plays a role in the democratic process rather than 
criticizes it.50 Into this fray Malcolm Heath issued a bracing and valuable 
 46. See Rhodes (1986, esp. 140–41) for the significance of speech making in Athenian politics in 
the later decades of the fifth century.
 47. Gomme (1938).
 48. For ancient examples of testimony that Aristophanes and Old Comedy represented democra-
cy, see T62, 65–67, 80, 83b in PCG. Müller-Strübing (1873) is the starting point for modern discus-
sion of Aristophanes’ political orientation as oligarchic, but the most-often-cited modern expression 
of the idea is Ste Croix (1972); cf. the surveys in Henderson (1990), Walsh (2009) and Olson (2010a). 
For a refutation specifically of Ste Croix, see Pritchard (2012).
 49. Henderson (1990).
 50. Henderson (1998b) revisits and amplifies his model. Burian (2011) focuses on tragedy (cf. 
Chapter 6) but offers a generalized model comparable to Henderson’s. Cf. Christ (1998, 104–17) on 
sycophancy in comedy, which, while playing on class tensions and aristocratic criticisms of democracy, 
nonetheless belongs to the broader civic ideology of Athens. Konstan (2010) analyzes Aristophanes’ 
critique of Athens’ war policy along the same lines. Rothfield (1999) argues, primarily out of passion, 
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critique of the criteria and argumentation employed by many in the debate, 
and pointed to several areas where the discussion merits more sustained 
and coherent analysis: comparison between public speakers on Aristophanes’ 
stage and evidence from extant oratory, the presence or lack of discernible 
policies advocated or deprecated in Aristophanes’ plays, and the imprecision 
of declaring the cultural and historical context for the reception of com-
edy by Aristophanes’ audiences.51 More recently, scholars have capitalized 
on work involving ideology, rhetoric and the ritual construction of citi-
zenship.52 Here again disparate conclusions continue. James McGlew finds 
comic protagonists, in pursuing their individual desire for pleasure,53 oppose 
the aristocratically imposed ideal of physical and ethical self-restraint, while 
D. Rosenbloom finds comedy a component of criticism of democratic hege-
mony because it marginalizes the “new elite” as ponēroi.54
 The focus on how citizens individually and collectively defined them-
selves through civic processes finds overlap with scholarship on rhetoric. 
Drawing on sociology and anthropology, scholars have constructed nuanced 
models for how citizens in democratic Athens, by participating as a group in 
ritualized collective decision making, both in political institutions (Assem-
bly, Council, court) and theater, established, maintained and perpetuated 
the democracy. Josiah Ober and Barry Strauss provide a useful paradigm for 
comparing such rituals in the form of courtroom oratory and stage drama, 
even from different periods, leading to a productive cross-examination of 
each.55
 The performance of ritual also requires a link to one more emerging 
strand in scholarship on ancient drama, that of performance criticism. Espe-
cially for tragedy, scholars have become increasingly imaginative with, and 
for democratic partisanship. Sidwell (2009) proposes a democratic Aristophanes on the strength of an 
elaborate sequence of comic poets manipulating each other’s identities in their plays, a scenario that 
strains credibility. Cf. Storey (2003, 281–88).
 51. Heath (1998). Sommerstein (2005) responds to one of Heath’s challenges by articulating 
practical enactments preferred in Aristophanes’ vision of an “anti-democracy.” Heath’s critique is es-
pecially sharp toward Goldhill (1991, 167–22) and relevant to supporters of the idea of comedy in an 
insulated “carnival” environment. On the “carnival” model, see the survey in Reinders (2001, 10–14). 
Spielvogel (2003) attempts to make Aristophanes a moderate between the extremes of the Old Oli-
garch and radical democrats. B. Zimmermann (2005) tries to redefine the question with Freudian 
theory. Robson’s (2009, 162–87) introductory essay on Aristophanes may suggest that currently the 
view of Aristophanes as antidemocratic still predominates. For orators’ use of comedy, see Harding 
(1994) and Pontani (2009).
 52. For example, Davidson (1997) and Zumbrunnen (2012).
 53. McGlew (2002).
 54. Rosenbloom (2002).
 55. Ober and Strauss (1990), which builds on Ober (1989); cf. the overview of this sort of work 
in Wohl (2009).
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sensitive to, the degree and manner in which ancient Greek playwrights con-
structed meaning on stage in addition to, and even in contradiction to, the 
direct verbal expression preserved in our scripts. Comedy has come rather 
later to the game, but full-length treatments of performance in comedy by 
Martin Revermann and Alan Hughes indicate much productive work is 
to come.56 Such analysis will be critical for full description and analysis of 
Aristophanes’ treatment of rhetoric and speakers in his plays. His comedies 
feature far more than verbal examples of political and rhetorical speech mak-
ing. In four of the extant plays, Aristophanes stages parodies of the Assem-
bly in action: Acharnians, Knights, Thesmophoriazusae and Ecclesiazusae. The 
deliberations of the Council constitute a reported scene in Knights, and the 
authority of the Council is crucial for the plots of Peace, Lysistrata and Thes-
mophoriazusae. The courts are the subject of routine jokes, in addition to 
generating virtually the entire plot of Wasps. Most famously and notoriously, 
Aristophanes builds most of an entire play, Clouds, around the perpetuation 
of such language. Indeed, every single extant play comments on speakers 
and language in relation to the function of the Athenian polis as a political 
and cultural system.57 Aristophanes is not shy about blurring the distinc-
tion between the activity on stage and the functioning of these institutions 
outside the theater, such as when the personified Theoria in Peace is restored 
to the members of the Council seated in their prescribed area in the theater 
itself.
 This study aims to weave together all these strands of scholarship to argue 
three overlapping points. (1) The references to orators and theorizing about 
rhetoric in Old Comedy confirm the newer paradigm of the early develop-
ment of rhetoric, namely, that in the fifth century there was competition 
among intellectuals to determine the modes of formal analysis of language, 
not yet focalized under the rubric “rhetoric,” but that rival models did not (as 
traditional histories do) concentrate on the arrangement of parts of speeches 
and the like. (2) Aristophanes and some other comic playwrights, initially 
at least, considered the use of proto-rhetorical language as inimical to the 
democratic process, but, following the challenges to the Athenian democracy 
in the wake of the disaster of the Sicilian expedition, Aristophanes reframes 
the problem as what formal rhetorical techniques the Demos should allow as 
a component of democratic debate. (3) Aristophanes’ stance toward proto-
rhetorical devices, and his depiction of Athenian democratic institutions 
more broadly, indicate he fundamentally operates within the mechanisms 
 56. Revermann (2006); Hughes (2012); and cf. Scharffenberger (2008).
 57. See the Appendix for a catalog of these scenes.
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of internal criticism of the Athenian democracy and not external, oligarchic 
opposition to it. These arguments unfold over six chapters, which proceed 
chronologically.
 In the first chapter, “Sicilian Pioneers of Comedy and Rhetoric and Their 
Transmission to Athens,” both stage comedy and rhetoric are reputed to have 
their earliest expression in the cities of Sicily in the mid-fifth century. Reli-
able information about the importance of developments on Sicily for the 
exponents of both rhetoric and comedy in Athens is scarce, but some links 
and parallels are worth exploring. The tradition of the Sicilians Corax and 
Tisias as “inventors” of rhetoric is now mostly discredited, but the intellec-
tual milieu of Sicily certainly had an impact on Athens when Gorgias made 
his famous visit in 427 b.c.e. The relationship between Sicilian comedy and 
Athenian comedy is even less clear, but writings of the comic playwright Epi-
charmus would eventually reach Athens, at least in the form of philosophical 
forgeries. Among the genuine fragments of Epicharmus’ comedies, there is 
at least one example of a play staging the deployment of subversive reason-
ing (of a type later linked with “rhetoric”) used by a character in a sympotic 
and then forensic context. The forgeries under the name Epicharmus can 
explain why in fourth-century Athens there were also hesitant references to 
Tisias as a pioneer of rhetoric.
 In Chapter 2, “Old Comedy and Proto-Rhetoric in Athens before 425 
b.c.e.: The Age of Pericles,” a survey of the fragments confirms the revised 
history, which expects that there is no established technical vocabulary refer-
ring to rhetoric and speech making. References to oratory in the fragments 
of Athenian comedy are dominated by Pericles. The references to him as a 
powerful, booming Olympian all turn on his speech making. Consistently 
in comedy, Pericles’ effective use of public speaking marks a contravention 
of the democratic process rather than a component of it. By 426 b.c.e., 
Pericles is dead, new politicians are on the rise, Gorgias has made a success-
ful and popular visit delivering speeches in his new, unorthodox prose style, 
and Aristophanes recognizes that quirky new language in public speaking is 
having a cultural impact on Athens.
 The next chapter, “The Young Comic Playwrights Attack, 425–421 
b.c.e.,” capitalizes on the survival of a complete extant play of Aristophanes 
for each year in the period 425–421 b.c.e. (Acharnians, Knights, Clouds, 
Wasps and Peace) and a handful of suggestive fragments, which constitute the 
most thoroughly documented period for tracing how stage comedy reacted 
to the emerging changes in public speaking and how Aristophanes portrayed 
that language in operation in the democratic institutions of Athens, at a time 
of considerable internal debate and stress. In Acharnians, before his protago-
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nist Dicaeopolis departs from the daily reality of Athens, Aristophanes stages 
the dysfunctional deliberations of the Assembly and has his chorus make 
sharp comments about the new aggressive and unfair language being used 
by young prosecutors in the courts. While scholars have previously focused 
on Diceaopolis’ speech to the chorus as an example of a formally arranged 
specimen of rhetoric, it does not in fact conform to canonical principles. 
The real lesson in oratory is that when Dicaeopolis engages in the proper 
democratic deliberative process, he succeeds wildly, but he must conduct 
deliberations outside of their proper venue (the Assembly) to do so. The 
next year, in Knights, Aristophanes stages the action of the Assembly and 
analyzes the relationship between deceptive public speech and the proper 
decision-making process of the Demos. Crucial in the play is that, unfet-
tered by deceptive and undemocratic speech, the judgment of the Demos 
will be sound, and the city will prosper. Next, Clouds turns to the under-
pinnings of the theorizing behind the new formal language. Aristophanes 
puts two Logoi on stage (in a way implicitly linked to Protagoras’ famous 
opposing logoi) in order to reveal the moral damage caused by them (rather 
than allowing them to be morally neutral accounts of experience). Although 
the morally dubious qualities of the reasoning of the Sophists were estab-
lished topoi later, Clouds in fact is our earliest example of transforming an 
idea of the Sophists from one morally neutral to one morally threatening 
to the community. Aristophanes returns to the language of political institu-
tions in Wasps, where he again asserts that the judgment of the Demos, and 
hence the operation of the courts, will function properly once “rhetorical” 
and undemocratic speech making is removed from the equation. Finally, in 
Peace, Aristophanes celebrates the removal of the very sort of speakers whose 
deceptive and destructive speech making has hurt the city, and dramatizes a 
functioning Council and a prosperous city.
 For the next chapter, “The Years of Confidence, 420–412 b.c.e.,” only 
one complete play and a number of fragments are available, but they sug-
gest a turn in the comic poets’ perception of public speech. Eupolis in 
Demes reconstitutes Athenians of the past, notably including now a positive 
reference to Pericles as a powerful speaker (fr. 102). In the present, Alcibi-
ades is now the speaker with an eerie ability to inspire Athenians with his 
speech, but references in comedy are too scanty to assess the early reaction on 
the comic stage. More important is the aggressive persuasion of Peisetaerus 
in Birds, where flattering speech considered undemocratic in the previous 
decade is now positive, because it is congruent with the imperial ambitions 
of the Athenian Demos.
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 In Chapter 5, “Crawling from the Wreckage, 411 b.c.e.,” following the 
disaster in Sicily, the judgment of the Demos comes under new suspicion 
and threats. The Demos allows for the creation of the committee of Probou-
loi to rein in the Demos’ own power. Oligarchic factions gain momentum, 
culminating in the violent coup of 411. The Probouloi and the various 
incarnations of the short-lived oligarchy all had a central ideological core: 
that the decision-making process for Athens should be restricted to fewer 
hands than that of the entire collective Demos. In this environment, Aristo-
phanes stages Lysistrata, which supports expanding, rather than contracting, 
the number of those entrusted with contributing to the deliberative process. 
Women, legally barred from participating as citizens, appear as sober, devout 
and responsible administrators. Lysistrata’s central speech calls for casting an 
even wider net to draw in as many people as possible to guide the city. The 
Proboulos, the official symbolizing the bottleneck in the deliberative process, 
is ridiculed and drummed off the stage. Lysistrata’s speech making calls for 
the Demos’ renewed authority. Then Thesmophoriazusae dramatizes a parody 
of the Athenian Assembly. Now formal speech in the Assembly functions in 
support of democratic decision making. In the atmosphere of the oligarchic 
government, Aristophanes dramatizes the functioning Assembly only among 
women at a closed festival, but it is a smoothly functioning democratic insti-
tution, not an oligarchic one.
 In Chapter 6, “Tongues, Frogs, and the Last Stand,” on the eve of the end 
of the Peloponnesian War, the ensuing reign of terror of the Thirty and the 
reconstituted democracy, Aristophanes staged another play that probed the 
foundations of public language in theory and practice, and specifically the 
moral hazard involved. Before Frogs, Euripides, while not a threatening fig-
ure, was long linked with sophistic reasoning and language in Aristophanes 
and other comic playwrights, but his recent departure from Athens, and 
the democracy’s renewed interest in tragedy as its ritual core, made him a 
newly controversial and problematic figure. Once again, as in Clouds, Aris-
tophanes exposes the problem, identifying it not as the language itself but 
as the underlying threat language poses to the spiritual health of the Demos. 
Whether it is Euripides or the leading politicians of the day, Aristophanes 
explicitly links the surface qualities of a speaker to his ability to contribute 
to the health of the Demos. With twenty years of support for the Demos 
behind him, Aristophanes can now even call for the support of the exiles 
from the coup of 411 and be rewarded with a crown from the Demos.
 Despite his early antagonism to the formal prose techniques of public 
speaking in the 420s and the reservations that resurface in Frogs, Aristo-
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phanes lives to see just such language become not the antithesis of demo-
cratic decision making, but the very language of democratic institutions after 
the democracy is renewed in 403 b.c.e. Aristophanes was right that elite 
speakers could, and at times did, use their access to this specialized language 
to achieve ends contrary to the best interests of the Demos, but he comes to 
reconcile that the elites can deploy such techniques in democratic institu-
tions and the Demos can still sit in collective judgment and lead Athens to 
prosperity.
 The Appendix itemizes the following: (1) formal terminology and tech-
niques pertaining to rhetorical theory and oratorical practice (a crucial cata-
log, since much of the revision of the history of fifth-century “rhetoric” 
hinges on the presence and absence of specific terms); (2) portrayals of and 
references to historical figures, both intellectuals associated with new trends 
in language (i.e., the “Older Sophists”) and public figures in Athens deploy-
ing such language; (3) representations in comedy of democratic institutions 
(Assembly, Council, courts), which are particularly important to an analysis 
of comedy’s portrayal of rhetoric, in theory or practice, as the context of its 
commentary, and often the dynamic of a scene, convey as much meaning 
as any explicit statements within comedy.
 The conclusions reached in this study will not, of course, settle the wide-
ranging debates in any of the major areas of scholarship it addresses, but it 
is my hope that the analysis provided here will prove greater than the sum 
of its parts. The evidence of Aristophanes and Greek Old Comedy has a role 
to play in the ongoing revision of the early history of rhetoric. The political 
allegiances of Aristophanes will assuredly remain a contentious topic, but it 
is, in my opinion, healthy and productive that this is so. I hope everyone 
can agree that Aristophanes did not intend his plays merely to reinforce the 
status quo, in his own day or for anyone coming to his work in other times 
and places. His treatment of language and his staging of the political insti-
tutions in his own community merit consideration, as does his staging of 
the city of Athens, both as a physical space and as an ideological construct. 
Whether for the purpose of reconstructing Aristophanes’ original spectacle 
or of preparing a performance for modern audiences, an improved grasp of 
the stage dynamics of Aristophanes’ most topical material helps achieve the 
immediacy and impact for which he strove. Finally, however valuable the 
current study may be, I hope that research into Greek comedy, itself such a 
madcap blend of traditions, will continue to combine knowledge, insights 
and contributions from diverse explorations to create a fruitful and enter-
taining revue.
Both comedy and rhetoric have Sicilian pioneers who preceded the better-
preserved and better-known later Athenian practitioners. Also common to 
the early history of both comedy and rhetoric is that recovering the accom-
plishments of these pioneers is hobbled by limited fragmentary remains and 
by later pseudographic sources that distort what little information has been 
preserved. These difficulties raise substantive issues for reconstructing and 
understanding the transmission of Sicilian traditions to Athens, with conse-
quences for the revised history of early rhetoric and how Athenian comedy 
responded to it.
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Sicilian Pioneers of 
Comedy and Rhetoric and 
Their Transmission to Athens
1
· · ·
εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀντιθέσεις, οἷον καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐποίει·
τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγὼν ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοις ἐγώ.
There are also false antitheses, such as when Epicharmus wrote,
“Sometimes I was among them, and other times I was with them.”
  —Aristotle, Rhet. 3.9.10.1410b3–5, quoting Epicharmus fr. 145
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ThE SICIlIAn FoundERS oF 
RhEToRIC In ThE FIFTh CEnTuRy
The reputed founders of the discipline of rhetoric were Sicilians from the 
middle of the fifth century named Corax and Tisias. Ancient sources recite 
that, after the Sicilians had thrown out their tyrants and began establishing 
democracies, especially in Syracuse, there grew a need for effective speech 
making in public debate, and one source links this need to the disputes 
over the distribution of property.1 This scenario would put their activity in 
the 460s and 450s. From this start, then, would develop an environment 
in which persuasive speech was paramount, methods to that end increas-
ingly valuable, and in turn from this environment would arise a speaker and 
thinker like Gorgias, who then makes his famous embassy to Athens in 427 
b.c.e. Other links can be inferred for the transmission from Sicily to Athens. 
Cephalus, father of the orator Lysias, for example, was a wealthy immigrant 
in Athens but was originally from Syracuse.
 Much of this early Sicilian narrative is insecure and controversial. First, 
the historicity of Corax has fallen into doubt. He is not attested in the earli-
est sources, and patterns in later sources indicate that he may be a doublet 
or nickname (“crow”) for Tisias.2 In any case, most of the post-Aristotelian 
accretions to the story of these founders can be dispensed with for pur-
poses of historical reconstruction. The limited references just to Tisias even 
in the classical period are problematic in themselves. He is first named in 
Plato’s Phaedrus (266e–67e), of the fourth century, linked to arguments 
from probability. One difficulty is a comment Plato adds at one point about 
Tisias: ὁ Τεισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δή ποτ᾽ ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει 
ὀνομαζόμενος, “Tisias, or whoever else he might be and wherever he might 
take his name from” (273c). If Tisias already had the nickname Corax, per-
haps this is an oblique reference to it, but it also suggests Plato is aware of 
a slipperiness with regard to Tisias’ name and ideas. Later, Aristotle makes 
him the first name among pioneers of rhetoric, but not the first overall, 
being Τεισίας μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, “Tisias after the first ones” (Soph. 
el. 33.183b31), the others not being named, again a hint that, even for 
Aristotle, Tisias was not simply “the founder” of rhetoric. Because Aristotle 
has just been talking about the growth, through accretion, of the skills of 
rhetoric, scholars used to take Aristotle to mean that Tisias established the 
basic division of speeches (a claim later scholars of antiquity were happy to 
 1. AS (AV.6–11).
 2. Cole (1991b).
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infer as well), but in the wake of the work of Cole and Schiappa, this claim 
does not hold.3 Taking a fresh look at what Plato says of Tisias in Phaedrus, 
Michael Gagarin makes a strong argument that the significant development 
associated with Tisias was not speech division or just probability arguments, 
but specifically the reverse-probability argument (e.g., a smaller man argues 
that it was improbable that he would attack a larger man, but the larger man 
counters that, because he would likely receive blame, it is improbable that he 
would have started a fight).4 This would be a significant step toward applying 
arguments to either or both sides of a dispute and thus represents substantial 
progress toward more sophisticated, and sophistic, argumentation. Even if 
Gagarin is right, though, it does not explain why Plato and Aristotle are 
vague about Tisias as an individual or why his contribution would become 
a topic of interest and debate roughly a century after he supposedly laid the 
foundation for rhetorical speech making, points that will be taken up again 
later in this chapter.
SICIlIAn ComEdy In ThE FIFTh CEnTuRy
Sicily was a creative center for drama in the early and middle fifth century, 
attracting Aeschylus early on to the court of Hieron of Syracuse, where he 
staged new plays. Sicily developed its own brand of stage comedy, but, as 
with rhetoric, its relationship to later Athenian productions is unclear and 
still debated.5 Of the handful of names known of these early Sicilian comic 
playwrights, only the fragments of Epicharmus provide more than the slight-
est material for study. The limited testimony points to a career including, but 
not necessarily limited to, the 480s and 470s and  also including a probable 
meeting with Aeschylus. It is possible that his life and career extended into 
the 460s and beyond, but no surviving fragment or testimony requires a date 
beyond the 470s.6 Consequently, while it would be illuminating if Epichar-
mus’ comedy reflected the activities of Tisias, the burgeoning democracies, 
or rhetorical practice and theory as they were developing in Sicily, there are 
no sure indications of this activity. The paucity of fragments means it is 
imprudent to draw any conclusions from this absence of evidence, but there 
 3. See Roberts (1904) for an example of how this framework can affect historical reconstruc-
tion. Roberts argues that the fragmentary rhetorical treatise on POxy. 410 was authored by Tisias 
himself in the 420s.
 4. Gagarin (1994) and (2007).
 5. Kerkhof (2001, 133–77).
 6. See Olson (2007, 6–12) and Rusten (2011, 59–60) for an overview.
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is one provocative fragment that raises issues for the legacy of both Sicilian 
rhetoric and comedy for later Athenian practice.
 In the interest of thoroughness, what follows presents everything from 
Sicilian comedy that pertains to speakers and language. In terms of speak-
ers, no fragment or testimony names or describes someone using rhetorical 
language or refers to someone otherwise linked with the history of rhetoric. 
Aristotle cites Epicharmus himself, but only to quote a single line as an 
example of a false antithesis (Rhet. 3.9.1410b3 = Epicharmus fr. 145, quoted 
above).
 Because a crucial part of the revision of the history of early rhetoric 
focuses on the development of specifically technical vocabulary for rhetoric, 
it would be helpful to know if early Sicilian comedy reflected knowledge 
of any technical vocabulary with regard to rhetoric. No such vocabulary 
appears, and this is consistent with the arguments of Cole and Schiappa 
that such terminology develops a century later, but remains are too scanty 
for this argument from silence to constitute certainty.7 Epicharmus did title 
one of his plays Λόγος καὶ Λογίνα (The Word and the Female Word).8 
The three brief fragments of the play, however, give no help with the title or 
much of the content of the play. The longest fragment, at three lines, refers 
to Zeus ordering a meal for Pelops, which suggests that, like the majority 
of Epicharmus’ fragments, this one has a mythological setting (fr. 76). One 
fragment, a single line, lists seafood (fr. 78). The last fragment, a couplet, 
mentions another Sicilian comic poet, Aristoxenus, introducing iambic verse 
(fr. 77). The single line of Aristoxenus’ writing to survive mentions the word 
ἀλαζονία, which is later applied to orators and rhetoricians, among others, 
but here modifies prophets (μάντεις).9
 Epicharmus did use dialogue and thus opened the door to scenes of 
debate, although there is almost never enough of a fragment to indicate 
scene or context. Athenian drama makes extensive use of formal debate, and 
Athenian comedy in particular will explicitly link debate to philosophical 
and political institutions, but there are only potential hints at such mate-
rial in Epicharmus. Five brief fragments, none linked to named plays, are 
consistent with the staging of discussion or debate within a play, but none 
requires that such a scene occurred:
 7. Cf. Schiappa (1999, 3–84) on the importance of stable terminology for focalizing a disci-
pline.
 8. Readers may be alert to the gender bias in this translation, which, however, reflects the gender 
bias in the Greek; λόγος is grammatically masculine and would culturally be read, unmarked, as 
masculine, while the neologism λογίνα would be read as marked, for indicating female gender; how 
Epicharmus handled the gender dynamics is completely unknown.
 9. See MacDowell (1990) on the history and use of ἀλαζών and related words.
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Fr. 144 (unmetrical)
ἀρτίως τε γὰρ λέλεκται, καὶ εὐθέως φαίνεται οὐ καλῶς ἔχον.
As soon as it has been said, it immediately seems to be wrong.
Fr. 161
τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δύ’ ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἷς ἐγὼν ἀποχρέω.
For what two men said before, I myself am sufficient.
Fr. 163
ἀλλὰ καὶ σιγῆν ἀγαθόν, ὅκκα παρέωντι κάρρονες.
But it’s good to be silent, when your betters are present.
Fr. 175
ἅμα τε καὶ λόγων ἀκούσας ἁδύμων
at the same time listening to sweet words
Fr. 184
οὐ λέγειν τύ γ’ ἐσσὶ δεινός, ἀλλὰ σιγῆν ἀδύνατος10
You are not inspiring at speaking, but incapable of staying quiet.
 Nothing in these statements allows inferences about context, so there 
is no way to determine if such comments occurred in the topical political 
atmosphere found in Aristophanes and other Athenian comic poets. While 
in general most of the fragmentary quotations from Epicharmus have myth-
ological contexts, there is some evidence that he explored more topical issues 
and set them in less remote settings. Among direct quotations, one fragment 
could require a more immediate setting and address civic life: the speaker 
charges the addressee with making the city uncultured (ἀγρὸν τὰν πόλιν 
ποιεῖς, fr. 219).
 Beyond these isolated lines, the extant fragments are too brief to convey 
how Epicharmus staged scenes or constructed plots. The papyrus remains 
 10. This line, preserved in Gellius, might be the earliest appearance of the phrase δεινὸς λέγειν 
“awesome at speaking”, which was used pejoratively of court speakers in Athens in the fourth century 
(e.g., Plato, Apol. 17b; Lys. 12.86; Isoc. 21.5; Dem. 22.66). The notoriety of the phrase, however, also 
makes the line a reasonable candidate for forgery (a problem to be addressed later in this chapter).
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of Pyrrha and Prometheus (fr. 113) offer strands of hundreds of lines and, 
while not complete enough to provide coherent flow, do confirm the use 
of dialogue between characters and, so far, no participation by a chorus. 
The most extensive evidence, however, for what sort of scenes Epicharmus 
staged arrives yoked with a perennial philosophical problem and the most 
important extant link between him and the Athenian intellectual milieu.
 As with the pioneer in rhetoric, Tisias, the earliest references to Epichar-
mus come in mid-fourth-century Athenian authors (e.g., the gnomic frr. 236 
and 271 from Xenophon Mem. 2.1.20). By far the most important comes 
from Plato’s Theaetetus (152e), where Socrates and Theaetetus are discussing 
the philosophical problems of perception and change, and whether change 
over time makes an individual a being distinct from who he was at an ear-
lier time. Socrates groups Epicharmus with thinkers who agree that identity 
changes over time. A fragmentary commentary on papyrus explains Epichar-
mus’ position on this issue in large part by summarizing how he dramatized 
the problem (fr. 136):
Ἐπίχαρμος, ὁμιλήσας τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ἄλλα τέ τινα εὖ  .  .  .  κεν 
δράματ  .  .  .  οῦ αὐξομένου, ὃ λόγῳ ἐφοδικῷ καὶ πιστῷ ἐπέραινε. 
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὡς ἄφοδοι γίνονται πρόσοδοί τε ἐναργές, εἰ οὐχ 
ἑστώς τις γίνεται μείζων ἢ ἐλάττων· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐσίαι ἄλλοτε 
ἄλλαι γίνονται διὰ τὴν συνεχῆ ῥύσιν. καὶ ἐκωμῴδησεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ 
ἀπαιτουμένου συμβολὰς καὶ ἀρνουμένου τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὲν 
προσγεγενῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀπεληλυθέναι, ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ἀπαιτῶν ἐτύπτησεν 
αὐτὸν καὶ ἐνεκαλεῖτο, πάλιν κἀκείνου φάσκοντος ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τὸν 
τετυπτηκότα, ἕτερον δὲ τὸν ἐγκαλούμενον.
Epicharmus, through his association with the Pythagoreans, in plays well 
explored (?) issues, including the problem of growth, which he accomplished 
with a methodical argument and proof. It is not obvious how approach 
becomes departure, if someone fixed does not become bigger or smaller. 
But if this happens, essences sometimes become different through constant 
flux. And he made comedy of this by having the same man requested to 
pay his share at a symposium and then refuse on the basis of becoming and 
departing, and, when the one who invited him struck him and was indicted, 
he in turn claimed to be someone other than the one who did the beating 
and who was indicted.
 The commentary suggests six actions: (1) one man invites another to a 
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symposium, and (2) when the guest refuses to pay his share, (3) he argues 
that he is no longer the same man who accepted the invitation; (4) the host 
in turn beats the guest, and (5) when indicted for battery, (6) he argues 
that he is no longer the man who did the beating. Plutarch alludes to these 
events in Epicharmus briefly, but perhaps with additional information (De 
Sera num. vind. 15.559a–b, also cited in fr. 136):
ταῦτά γε τοῖς Ἐπιχαρμείοις ἔοικεν, ἐξ ὧν ὁ αὐξόμενος ἀνέφυ τοῖς 
σοφισταῖς λόγος, ὁ γὰρ λαβὼν πάλαι τὸ χρέος νῦν οὐκ ὀφείλει, 
γεγονὼς ἕτερος, ὅ τε κληθεὶς ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἐχθὲς ἄκλητος ἥκει τήμερον· 
ἄλλος γάρ ἐστι.
It’s like this with the Epicharmians, among whom the argument arose about 
growth: for the one who owed a debt now does not owe it back, because he 
is someone else, and the one who was called to dinner yesterday is uninvited 
today, for he is someone else.
 Plutarch’s reference is brief but adds the additional element of someone 
refusing to pay back a debt by the same reasoning (he is no longer the same 
individual who incurred the debt). Aristotle also cites Epicharmus briefly in 
the context of repaying debts (NE 9.7.1167b17 = fr. 142). It is possible that 
Plutarch and Aristotle allude to an element from the plot of Epicharmus’ 
play. The two pieces of testimony together strongly suggest that Epicharmus 
treated the issue at some length. At a minimum, the plot developments 
require some extended narration. If the storyline was not staged in the play, 
but only reported or narrated within a monologue, the entire sequence of 
events would still require a long-enough speech to explain who the two 
men are, and relate the invitation, the subsequent refusal, the violence, and 
the dialogue after the violence. A fully staged version of the events would 
contain the meal, potentially the invitation earlier in the play, certainly the 
slapstick, and potentially also a separate, subsequent scene in court playing 
out the indictment. Taken together, these scenes could make up a substantial 
portion of a play or an entire short one.
 Supporting the idea of a staged version of events is fragment 146 (= 
Olson A15), which indicates that Epicharmus did stage sympotic scenes 
with dialogue in them. A short dialogue features two characters talking 
about behavior at symposia, with one character articulating how drunk-
enness leads to violent behavior and thence to legal trouble and finally to 
punishment.
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 † ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θοίνα
ἐκ δὲ θοίνας πόσις ἐγένετο.
(B.) χαρίεν, ὥς γ’ ἐμοὶ <δοκεῖ>.
(A.) ἐκ δὲ πόσιος κῶμος, ἐκ κώμου δ’ ἐγένεθ’ ὑανία,
ἐκ δ’ ὑανίας δίκα, <‘κ δίκας ἐγένετο καταδίκα>,
ἐκ δὲ καταδίκας πέδαι τε καὶ σφαλὸς καὶ ζαμία
 †A sacrifice leads to a feast,
and feast leads to drinking.
(B.) Sounds good to me, at least!
(A.) But drinking leads to wandering the streets drunk;
 wandering the streets drunk leads to acting like a pig;
acting like a pig leads to a lawsuit;
 <a lawsuit leads to being found guilty;>
and being found guilty leads to shackles, stocks and a fine.
(following the supplements of Dindorf in line 2 and Meineke in line 4, as 
printed and translated by Olson)
 This fragment has a certain sociopolitical content, insofar as it expresses, 
in a compressed form, causality between unrestrained symposiastic behavior 
and punishment for that behavior meted out by established legal institu-
tions. It is tempting to say that the scenario fits a democratic environment, 
since punishment is meted out through lawsuits and courts, with no ref-
erence to a local ruler, but such a suggestion is speculative. Nonetheless, 
combined with the summary testimony, this fragment makes a case that 
Epicharmus devoted a substantial portion of at least one comedy to dra-
matizing philosophical, civic and political tensions. It is thus the closest 
to evidence that Sicilian comedy, or at least Epicharmus, incorporated the 
issue of sophistic reasoning in a sociopolitical context, including political 
institutions like courts. Only the reasoning is highlighted in the testimony, 
however. No reference points to the particular manner or techniques either 
party used when constructing a speech in support of their position. Thus 
while the evidence is valuable in several ways, and the silence about speech-
making techniques is not at all proof that Epicharmus did not raise the 
issue, there is no reference to any activity that would match any definition 
of “rhetoric.”
 Scholarship for the most part has studied this evidence with an eye 
toward parallels in later Athenian dramatic technique. Epicharmus was not 
the last comic poet to stage satire of communal and even political insti-
tutions through a sympotic situation. R. Kerkhof looks to Strepsiades in 
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Clouds and Philocleon in Wasps as potential Nachleben.11 Likewise scholars 
have been drawn to other fragments for the speech of a parasite and various 
aspects of mythological parody in Epicharmus as direct predecessors of such 
material in later Athenian comedy.12 With regard to the symposiastic setting, 
Kenneth Rothwell provides much evidence that many core techniques of 
Athenian comedy had their origins in performances at symposia.13 If there 
is any direct link between Epicharmus and Athenian comedy, the institution 
of the symposium might provide it.14 This is not to claim additional influ-
ence for Epicharmus on Athenian comedy except to suggest that it could 
be valuable to see this scene in Epicharmus as fundamental for Greek stage 
comedy’s method of engaging its audiences with topical and cultural issues.
 The philosophical issue debated here also has a legacy that raises further 
issues for the links between Sicily and Athens, with suggestive parallels to 
the transmission of early rhetoric. A series of forged writings in Epicharmus’ 
name circulated and became popular. The date and origin of the various 
forgeries can be determined only within general limits, but Aristotle’s pupil 
Aristoxenus is the earliest person we know of who specifically identified 
one of these works as a forgery (by identifying its true author, Athenaeus 
14.648d = Aristoxenus fr. 45 Wehrli and cited in PCG as Epicharmus Ψευ-
δεπιχάρμεια Ti). Circulation of these forgeries in the late fourth and early 
third centuries would also be consistent with a reference in Alexis to writings 
of Epicharmus (fr. 140 = Olson G3).
 Among the forgeries was a work by an otherwise unknown Alcimus 
entitled To Amyntas. Alcimus evidently claimed that Plato had plagiarized a 
significant amount of doctrine from Epicharmus, and cited forged Epichar-
mic writings to make his case. One of these doctrines was Plato’s position 
on the problem of growth and change.15 Diogenes Laertius (3.11) preserves 
 11. Kerkhof (2001, 171–73) explores this topic with particular reference to the influence of 
Epicharmus for the rustic characterization of Strepsiades in Clouds.
 12. See Olson (2007, 55) for bibliography.
 13. Rothwell (2007, 6–35).
 14. The possibility of a genetic link from sympotic scenes in Epicharmus to those in Athenian 
comedy also suggests that symposiastic contexts were core to comic performance, and it is worth 
exploring if it remained so more than has been appreciated to date. We are relatively well equipped to 
explore this possibility, since, because of Athenaeus, our remains of Greek comedy derive overwhelm-
ingly from sympotic scenes. This is not to say that every symposium was the topic of philosophical or 
topical debate, or that every list of fish hints at intellectual discourse, but there might be more there 
than we realize if we are not just looking for civic, public contexts such as we are accustomed to in 
Aristophanes, or domestic scenes such we are accustomed to in New Comedy. Translocation of civic 
debate will be crucial in Aristophanes’ plays (see Chapters 3–6). Cf. Wilkins (2000, 320–31) and 
Carrière (2003).
 15. See Prot. 356e for the simile of odd/even and lesser/greater numbers, likely the reference for 
the forgery.
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the forgery from Alcimus, which provides a glimpse of how Epicharmus’ 
dramatic writings could be later reconstituted (Pseudepicharmia fr. 276):
(A.) αἰ πὸτ’ ἀριθμόν τις περισσόν, αἰ δὲ λῇς πὸτ’ ἄρτιον,
ποτθέμειν λῇ ψᾶφον ἢ τᾶν ὑπαρχουσᾶν λαβεῖν,
ἦ δοκεῖ κα τοί γ’ <ἔσθ’> ωὑτὸς εἶμεν;
(B.)  οὐκ ἐμίν, γα κα.
(A.) οὐδὲ μὰν οὐδ’ αἰ ποτὶ μέτρον παχυαῖον ποτθέμειν
λῇ τις ἕτερον μᾶκος ἢ τοῦ πρόσθ’ ἐόντος ἀποταμεῖν,
ἔτι χ’ ὑπάρχοι κῆνο τὸ μέτρον;
(B.) οὐ γὰρ.
(A.)  ὧδε νῦν ὅρη
καὶ τὸς ἀνθρώπους· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὔξεθ,’ ὁ δέ γα μὰν φθίνει,
ἐν μεταλλαγᾷ δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον.
ὃ δὲ μεταλλάσσει κατὰ φύσιν κοὔποκ’ ἐν τωὐτῷ μένει,
ἕτερον εἴη κα τόδ’ ἤδη τοῦ παρεξεστακότος.
καὶ τὺ δὴ κἀγὼ χθὲς ἄλλοι καὶ νὺν ἄλλοι τελέθομες,
καὖθις ἄλλοι κοὔποχ’ ωὑτοὶ καττὸν αὐτὸν αὖ λόγον.
(A.) Then if someone to an odd number, or to an even one if you want,
wants to add a pebble or to take one away that is lying there,
does it seem to stay the same to you?
(B.)  Certainly not to me.
(A.) Nor, if to a thick measure someone wants to add
an additional amount, or to cut away from what is present,
would that measure remain?
(B.) No.
(A.)  So now look at
people: one grows and another shrinks,
and they are all in the process of change all the time.
But what changes naturally never remains in the same state:
it would be something other than that from which it transformed.
Even you and I were one thing yesterday but now become different,
and will never be the same again by the same reasoning.
 The testimonia in fr. 136, the example of fr. 146 (cf. fr. 147 = Olson 
A14 for another snatch of dialogue in a sympotic setting) and the text of 
this forgery encapsulate the difference between fifth-century stage comedy 
and later writings under the influence of the Platonic style of promulgat-
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ing philosophical doctrine. The speakers in the forgery bluntly lay out the 
philosophical topic with no hint of the stage action implied in frr. 136 and 
146. This forgery served the purpose of trying to discredit an Athenian 
philosopher, but Epicharmus did dramatize the topic, and Plato seems to 
have been aware of the original dramatization. This gives some idea of how 
complex and problematic the reception of Sicilian influence in Athens could 
be, more so now through the fragmentary state of all these sources.
ThE RECEPTIon oF 
SICIlIAn ComEdy And RhEToRIC In AThEnS
Comparison of the evidence for the Sicilian pioneers of comedy and rhetoric 
does not yield certainty about the interrelation of the two genres, but it is 
suggestive and allows for some provisional conclusions. A chronology com-
bining the two will be helpful. Aristotle would have Epicharmus established 
as early as the sixth century, nearly back to the time of Pythagoras, but other 
evidence points to a floruit in the 480s and 470s (not entirely incompatible 
with Aristotle, but it suggests his chronology should not be pushed to expect 
too much precision). Tradition, presumably Aristotelian, held that, following 
the overthrow of tyrants in the 460s, Tisias was a critical pioneer in develop-
ing techniques for speech making in the new democracies. Aristotle claims 
that Epicharmus and Sicilian comedy were the first to incorporate μῦθοι, 
“stories,” into their comedies, and then cites Crates, active in the 450s and 
440s, as the first Athenian comic playwright to do so (Poetics 1449b5–9). 
As noted above, Aristotle is circumspect in citing Tisias, and scholars have 
been rightly cautious with regard to how accurate Aristotle could have been 
about Epicharmus. Even the idea that Sicilian comedy was a crucial influ-
ence on Athenian comedy by the time of Crates is only an inference from 
Aristotle’s brief statement.
 The relevance of Tisias or the comic playwrights for Athenian practice, 
in either comedy or rhetoric, in the fifth century is not clear. Despite efforts 
to discern Sicilian influence on Athenian drama, “no positive evidence exists 
to suggest that Sicilian comedy (or other texts assigned to Sicilian comic 
playwrights) directly influenced any Attic author before the time of Plato 
and Xenophon.”16 Much the same is true for Tisias. Even if Gagarin is right 
about Tisias’ importance for the development of the reverse-probability 
 16. Olson (2007, 11).
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argument, its impact in Athens was limited at best until the time of Plato.17 
The early attempts at defining the proper components of a speech and their 
order, which the traditional narrative of the early development of rhetoric 
ascribed to Sicilian pioneers, is not yet in evidence in Athenian oratory from 
the fifth century.18
 In Plato’s Phaedrus, Tisias emerges as a topic of contemporary debate. 
Both Plato and Aristotle are cautious in referring to him. Around this same 
time, Plato cites Epicharmus in Theaetetus.19 Aristotle cites and discusses 
Epicharmus in a limited way, but by this point Epicharmus was a poet of 
the distant past. If there was some chain of influence on Athens, direct or 
indirect, at the latest by the generation after Aristotle, Epicharmus’ com-
edies were not circulating sufficiently to prevent the drastic rewrites of them. 
Rather than present an archaic Doric Sicilian comic scene, Alcimus presents 
a rewrite to make it contemporary and modern by fourth-century stan-
dards. Alcimus and others took the authentic fifth-century Sicilian Epichar-
mus and reinvented him as an authoritative ancestor in the development of 
fourth-century Athenian philosophy. Likewise, for both Plato and Aristotle, 
whatever circulated under Tisias’ name in the fourth century was problem-
atic enough for each of them to be circumspect in the way they referred to 
him, but they, too, faced the prospect of an authoritative mid-fifth-century 
Sicilian predecessor to Athenian achievement. There is no way to determine 
if the stories or writings attributed to Tisias were bald forgeries, rewrites 
of real material, or in fact authentic, but the coexistence of authentic and 
forged writings for Epicharmus, some used explicitly to discredit Plato, 
indicates there were parties ready, willing and able to insert Sicilian prede-
cessors, of dubious veracity, into the narrative of the history of ideas, and 
specifically to try to claim credit for fundamental ideas prior to Athenian 
contributions.
 Whatever the historical Tisias said, did or wrote to be invoked as a 
Sicilian founder of rhetoric is now beyond productive speculation, but the 
scenario reinforces Cole’s and Schiappa’s contention that formalized dis-
ciplinary study of rhetoric originated in fourth-century Athens, not fifth-
 17. The First Tetralogy (Antiphon 2.2.3 and 2.2.6) makes use of the reverse-probability argu-
ment, but whether this results from a connection to the historical Tisias cannot be determined. See 
Gagarin (1997) 14.
 18. Timmerman and Schiappa (2010, 153–70).
 19. The date of composition of Phaedrus is still a matter of some dispute, but most evidence 
favors a late composition, close in time to Theaetetus. See Rowe (1986, 120–21). In the context of the 
idea that Sicilian influence is suddenly the rage near the mid-fourth century, while it is too much to 
say it is additional evidence, it is interesting that Phaedrus makes much of the oratory and rhetoric of 
Lysias, the son of a Syracusan.
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century Sicily. Such a conclusion should not be taken as a disparagement of 
Sicilian accomplishments in speech making in the fifth century, but merely 
a lament that we can no longer recover what those accomplishments were. 
Had we access to even the slimmest of references to Tisias prior to his res-
urrection in the fourth century, we might find, as with Epicharmus, a vital 
and creative force, though perhaps in a rather different form than extant 
testimony leads us to expect. The diversity of the surviving fragmentary 
evidence is, however, perhaps a reminder of the wild and woolly ways that 
drama and oratory can intertwine in the milieu of the Greeks in the classical 
period.
 In Athenian comedy, scenes that can seem like elaborations on the one 
found in Epicharmus do exist, such as the elaborate trial and Philocleon’s 
subsequent disruptive behavior at a symposium in Wasps. Still, nothing 
allows us to confidently infer that Aristophanes or other Athenian comic 
playwrights reacted to or incorporated either comic or rhetorical traditions 
as Sicilian. For the purposes of the rest of this study, then, in analysis of 
Athenian comedy of the fifth century and for the duration of Aristophanes’ 
career, Sicilian predecessors for both comedy and rhetoric will be consid-
ered beyond the playwrights’ line of sight, except for individuals and ideas 
for which there is other evidence of links to Athens. Thus Gorgias’ visit and 
reputation in the city provide a demonstrable link to Sicilian tradition, but 
the point is that Gorgias developed a distinct presence and reputation in 
Athens, as did other non-Athenians, and similarities to Sicilian rhetoric or 
comedy do not have resonance simply because of the pioneering creativity 
that flourished there. The next chapter, then, turns to Athenian stage com-
edy prior to the availability of the first complete extant comedy in 425 b.c.e., 
focusing on the fragmentary evidence for its engagement with intellectuals 
and their pursuit of language, along with testimony about the effects of these 
pursuits on the language used in public discourse.
ToPICAl And hISToRICAl SCoPE
The historical range for this study in general is the fifth century down to 
404 b.c.e., the year of Athens’ surrender to Sparta at the end of the Pelopon-
nesian War and the year of the encore performance of Aristophanes’ Frogs. 
The following year saw the reconstitution of the Athenian democracy, and 
subsequent comedy sees changes in form and topic; thus the fourth century 
merits a separate study utilizing criteria appropriate to the times and generic 
differences.1 The aim of the current chapter is to survey and analyze evidence 
for comedy’s reaction to proto-rhetorical and linguistic phenomena in Ath-
ens prior to 425 b.c.e. It is impossible to marshal all the relevant evidence 
and be absolutely strict about chronological borders. All evidence from com-
edy during this period is fragmentary, and while a number of fragments 
can be roughly assigned to the fifth century, it is frequently impossible to 
determine whether they originated before or after 425. By default this float-
ing material will be cited in this chapter. In addition, several authors have 
careers that span both sides of the 425 divide, and again it is not always, or 
often, possible to place fragments within their career. Generally speaking, 
 1. See Ober (1989, 35–38) for the period 403–322 b.c.e. as suitable for synchronic study. On 
fourth-century comedy in general, see Arnott (2010).
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however, Crates and Cratinus will be the focus of this chapter, even though 
Cratinus’ career extends a few years beyond 425. On the other hand, Eupo-
lis will appear in subsequent chapters for the most part, although his career 
begins a few years before 425.2 Fragments of still lesser-attested playwrights 
of the time (most notably Hermippus, Pherecrates and Phrynichus), even if 
their careers spanned 425, are included in this chapter.3 In some cases, the 
main text discusses fragments on a topic, and a note will discuss parallels that 
must belong to later years, although there is no noticeable change because 
of the chronological difference. For the most part, references to historical 
individuals in the comic fragments tend to be linked to later periods, so there 
is little discussion of them here, aside from Pericles. Fragments utilizing 
specific terminology, which are especially likely to be difficult to date, find 
a home in this chapter by default. This placement should not meaningfully 
distort the analysis and conclusions here. The chapter does not argue that 
comedy’s treatment of proto-rhetoric fundamentally changed in or around 
425; the arrangement merely reflects the state of the evidence. Subsequent 
chapters will be able to capitalize and focus on Aristophanes’ extant plays, 
although they will incorporate evidence from contemporaneous fragments 
where available and relevant.
 Following these principles, this chapter proceeds through the evidence 
for comedy’s reaction to burgeoning rhetoric roughly as follows: (1) the ter-
minology in comedy referring to language and speakers, primarily in public 
political discourse, but also with reference to developments in intellectual 
pursuits; (2) references to groups and individual speakers characterized in 
some way by their language or their link to developments in language study; 
(3) references to the public institutions in Athens where oratory and public 
displays of language took place, namely, the Assembly, Council, and courts; 
(4) comedy’s depiction of language and speakers in the “Age of Pericles,” 
since some distinctive issues arise with regard to Pericles himself.4
TERmInology
Consistent with recent research into the development of early rhetorical 
theory, and as with Sicilian comedy, the fragments of Old Comedy do not 
 2. The career of the comic playwright Plato falls wholly later, however, so he will be discussed in 
Chapters 4–6, on the last two decades of the fifth century.
 3. On Pherecrates’ dates, see now Olson (2010b).
 4. The Appendix has entries for most of these items but groups all the fifth-century evidence 
topically rather than chronologically.
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include the word ῥητορική or any of the formal terms canonized in the 
curriculum of rhetoric from the late fourth century onward, such as names 
for parts of speech.5 The comic Phrynichus mentions τῇ διαθέσει τῶν 
ἐπῶν (“the arrangement of words,” fr. 58), but there is no context. Some 
words appear that in the next century and later have different connotations 
for rhetoric and so merit glossing for their usage in the fifth century. Chief 
among these is the term σοφιστής, which at this point refers broadly to 
performers and to those who have some prestige for their wisdom.6 In Old 
Comedy it never refers to the intellectuals now known as the Sophists.7 Cra-
tinus calls a group of poets a swarm of sophists (σοφιστῶν, fr. 2). Eupolis 
applies the term to a rhapsode (fr. 483). A σοφιστής is addressed in Eupolis 
fr. 388, but given parallel usage, this is most likely someone who in modern 
terms would be identified as a poet or performer.8
 Another key term associated with the sophistic movement in the fifth 
century is εἰκός, which carries the overlapping meanings of both “proper” 
and “probable.” Arguments based on the principle of probability were a 
hallmark of fifth-century thinkers and speakers engaging in the new, rational 
means for constructing arguments, examples being best preserved in the 
speeches of Antiphon.9 Consistent with Old Comedy’s antagonistic stance 
toward the new intellectuals and their distinct language, comic idiom never 
uses εἰκός in an argument built on probability. The term always carries the 
value-laden, more traditional sense of “proper.” Thus Pherecrates deploys the 
term in a fragment probably spoken by a young man to an elder, perhaps 
his father: “it is proper (εἰκός) for me to be in love but past your season” (fr. 
77). Cratinus says the tragedian Acestor will get a beating unless he tidies 
 5. On the chronology of ῥητορική in particular, see Schiappa (1990a). Cf. the entries in the 
Appendix for προοίμιον and ἀντίθετον, and the Introduction, 13–14.
 6. Kerferd (1950).
 7. Plato anachronistically retrofits the term to fifth-century intellectuals, most notably at Prot. 
311e–12e, dramatically set in the 430s but composed ca. 380 b.c.e. In this passage he takes care to 
debate and define the term, since it is a contentious term in the mid-fourth century. This distinction 
can still be underappreciated, as shown by Tell (2009), who seems not to understand fifth-century 
usage. Tell (2011, 21–38) does subsequently recognize and explore the problem. Athenaeus records 
that the term was also commonly used to refer to comic performers (14.621d–e), but the source and 
dating for the reference is unclear.
 8. Plato the comic playwright wrote a Σοφισταί, in which he identifies Bacchylides (a flute-
player, not the choral poet) as a σοφιστής (fr. 149).
 9. Whether or not the attribution to Antiphon is correct, the Tetralogies make considerable use 
of probability arguments and come closest to this time period; see Zuntz (1949). Antiphon 5 and 6, 
belonging to the 410s, also incorporate this manner of argumentation. The defense speech of Palam-
edes attributed to Gorgias also makes much use of this type of argumentation. See Schiappa (1999, 
36) on this term in early rhetoric and some scholars’ speculative use of it. Cf. Tindale (2010, 69–82).
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up his business, where εἰκός could yield either sense, but certainly there is 
some hint of propriety (“he deserves it,” fr. 92).10
 In general, Old Comedy does not describe speeches with technical 
vocabulary, nor does it ever respect or praise a formal or ornate speech that 
would later be deemed “rhetorical.” Positive references to speech making 
do not involve formal or sophisticated rhetoric. Other qualities or purposes 
are required for a positive evaluation. Serving the public good is a laudable 
goal for a speech, so Cratinus fr. 52 wishes victory to whoever speaks best 
(λέγων τὸ λῷστον) for the city.11
 Any speech is likely to provoke a response. Debate and competition 
were long ingrained in Greek culture, and speakers paired in debate were 
enshrined in the legal and political system of democratic Athens. Whatever 
the reputation of sophistic debate, refusal to engage in dialogue is unhealthy 
in comedy. The standard term for responding in a debate is ἀντιλέγειν, and 
that for engaging in conversation is διαλέγεσθαι.12 A participant should 
also “listen back” (ἀντακούειν), as the speaker in Crates fr. 45 commands 
someone to do.13 A fragment on a strip of papyrus seems to trace the contrast 
between the good old days and current decadence (adesp. 1095; note the 
arrival of cosmetics, symposia and dancing in lines 15–16). Near the end of 
the fragment, the speaker says someone does not (if the supplement to the 
damaged text is correct) reply, possibly in debate at a symposium. Two lines 
later a character emphasizes, and laments, a respondent’s complete silence 
(σιγᾷ κοὐδὲν γρύζει;).14 In Phrynichus fr. 19 (= Olson B21), the recluse 
is characterized in part by not engaging in conversation (ἀδιάλεκτον).15
 10. Cf. the entry for εἰκός in the Appendix.
 11. Similarly, Aristophanes describes a manner of speaking that avoids the extremes of urban 
decadence and slavish crudeness (fr. 706):
  διάλεκτον ἔχοντα μέσην πόλεως,
  οὔτ’ ἀστείαν ὑποθηλυτέραν
  οὔτ’ ἀναλεύθεραν ὑπαγροικοτέραν
  He keeps his dialogue with the city moderate,
  neither urbanly submasculine
  nor too crude like those not freeborn.
  Along analogous lines, the speaker of Eupolis fr. 108 promises to stop using circular talk (τοῦ 
κύκλῳ . . . λόγου). For an overview of the problematic phrase διὰ τῶν χωρίων in the next line, see 
Telò (2007, 606–8). “Talking around” is attested in Hermippus (fr. 89 περιλέγειν) and is potentially 
negative.
 12. Cf. adesp. 572, where λεσχαίνειν is equated with διαλέγεσθαι.
 13. Cf. similar commands in Euripides at Supp. 569 and Hec. 321.
 14. Cf. Wasps 741, Peace 96–97, and Crates fr. 4 for similar phrases; however, they do not illumi-
nate the current passage.
 15. On the broader history of citizens not engaging in Athenian democracy, see L. B. Carter 
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 When speakers do engage each other, in lieu of technical vocabulary, 
comedy opts to describe and characterize rhetorical speech with colorful 
metaphors. In Pherecrates fr. 56, an unidentified speaker is silent, until the 
verbal torrent has poured out (χαράδρα κατελήλυθεν). Another voice 
breaks out sharply and loudly (ὥστ’ ἀνέρρωγεν τὸ φώνομ’ εὐθὺς ὀξὺ καὶ 
μέγα, Pherecrates fr. 153). In Phrynichus fr. 3 (= Olson J14), an old man 
fears younger men who scratch up their elders with words, although they 
speak sweetly (τούτοις οἷς ἡδυλογοῦσι μεγάλας ἀμυχὰς καταμύξα-
ντες). Other passages find something “hard to reckon” (adesp. fr. 587, 
δυσλογεῖν, or perhaps “to speak harshly of ”). Cratinus fr. 476 has speak-
ers “talk to the details” (μικρολογεῖσθαι).16 More common than getting lost 
in the details is sheer vapidity. Hermippus fr. 21 has λεπτολογία, “refined 
talk,” glossed as the equivalent of ἀδολεσχεῖν; and Cratinus fr. 342 has 
ὑπολεπτολόγος (here applied to Aristophanes for resembling Euripides), 
which covers similar territory.17
 The tongue (γλῶττα), as the organ of speech and synecdoche for lan-
guage, generates its own group of metaphors. In these metaphors, the tongue 
consistently implies negative or less than candid speech (which will be sig-
nificant for its use with reference to Pericles; see below), in contrast to the 
mouth (στόμα).18
 Comedy indulges in creating neologisms, even as it criticizes other speak-
ers for using unorthodox language. The longest fragment from Aristophanes’ 
first play, Banqueters, hinges on the issue of orthodox language. A delinquent 
son is using unusual terminology, and at each phrase the father angrily iden-
tifies contemporary individuals associated with the phrasing. The passage (fr. 
205) begins with the son calling his father old-fashioned by using a unique 
diminutive of σόρος (any sort of container for the dead; this along with the 
other items means his father is material for a funeral):19
—ἀλλ’ εἶ σορέλλη καὶ μύρον καὶ ταινίαι.
—ἰδοὺ σορέλλη· τοῦτο παρὰ Λυσιστράτου.
—ἦ μὴν ἴσως σὺ καταπλιγήσῃ τῷ χρόνῳ.
(1985), Christ (2006) and, for Old Comedy in particular, Ceccarelli (2000). Storey (2011, 3: 399) 
wonders if this fragment belongs to Eupolis’ Kolakes.
 16. So also Eupolis fr. 469.
 17. Eupolis uses κενολογήσω, “I will talk empty” (fr. 456). Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 1393a17, where 
he is bringing subjects to a close and saying it would be pointless to say more.
 18. See entry for γλῶττα in the Appendix for examples. 
 19. Cf. Bonanno (1983) for a detailed analysis of the rare words in this fragment. Adesp. fr. 932 
records other compounds of σόρος used as insults to the elderly, both σορόπληκτος and σοροπλήξ 
meaning “coffin-striker.” Cf. Pollux 10.150.
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—τὸ καταπλιγήσῃ τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν ῥητόρων.
—ἀποβήσεταί σοι ταῦτά ποι τὰ ῥήματα.
—παρ’ Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦτο τἀποβήσεται.
—τί ὑποτεκμαίρῃ καὶ κακῶς ἄνδρας λέγεις
καλοκἀγαθίαν ἀσκοῦντας; —οἴμ’ ὦ Θρασύμαξε,
—τίς τοῦτο τῶν ξυνηγόρων τερατεύεται;
Son: You’re just a coffinette, sweet oil and wreaths.
Father: Look at that “coffinette”! That’s from Lysistratus!
Son: I bet you’ll be tripped down in time.
Father: “Tripped down”! That’s from those rhetores [see below for more  
 on this term].
Son: These very speeches will get away on you.
Father: That “will get away on” is from Alcibiades!
Son: Why do you evidence against and disrespect men
Cultivating gentlemanliness?
Father: Ahh! Thrasymachus,
Which of those legal types talks such hocus-pocus?
 Another fragment (fr. 233) features part of the same debate, but about 
words in older authors such as Homer and Solon, still a type of discus-
sion associated with the new intellectualism, since it hinges on the idea of 
analyzing language. Nonetheless Aristophanes and other comic playwrights 
themselves coin words and phrases to condemn the unusual language of 
speakers associated with the new intellectualism. Cratinus fr. 381 coins 
λυπησιλόγος for someone who causes pain with their words, and describes 
running down someone with words like running over them with a horse (fr. 
389, ἐφιππάσασθαι λόγοις).20 Such mouthings at a symposium might 
come from στωμυλῆθραι δαιταλεῖς, “mouthy banqueters” (adesp. fr. 115 
dub.). Suetonius (adesp. frr. 930–31) collects several heavy compound cre-
ations used to characterize busybodies in the agora, some attested from Aris-
tophanes’ extant plays but also others not known from other comic remains, 
including πολυκαλινδήτους, “lots of rolling.” It is important to keep in 
mind that these more isolated items could apply equally well to speakers or 
situations quite apart from those using formal rhetoric (e.g., to a lyric poet). 
It is also telling that such vocabulary tells us little about comedy’s character-
ization and evaluation of a speaker. Aeschylus, Cratinus and Cleon, accord-
 20. Such might be the goal of a politician engaged in knock-down politics (πολιτικοκοπίαν in 
Sannyrio fr. 7 and πολιτικοκοπειν̑ f glossed at Plato fr. 113 as λοιδορειν̑ and κωμdορειν̑).
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ing to comedy, all use torrential language, but this does not imply any more 
broadly what a comic poet says about the individual speakers.21
PRACTITIonERS
As it happens, of all the fragments securely dated before 425 b.c.e., aside 
from those connected to Pericles, only Aristophanes fr. 205 names speakers 
linked to unorthodox language.22 First is Lysistratus. There may be multiple 
men named Lysistratus referred to by Aristophanes in various plays and 
by Antiphon and Andocides in speeches, but there is no definitive way to 
separate them or establish them under a single identity.23 None of the other 
references play on Lysistratus’ manner of oratory or speaking. Fr. 205 also 
provides the earliest reference to Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, unless Ian 
Storey is correct that this Thrasymachus is not the famous Sophist.24
 The generic term for a speaker, ῥήτωρ, had a broader range than English 
“orator” (as a professional speaker or someone especially skilled in delivering 
speeches), often corresponding more to “politician” in the sense of someone 
publicly engaged in policy debate. The early sense of ῥῆσις as communal 
judgment or decree, going back to Homer but also in early comedy (Crates 
fr. 59), perhaps also contributes to the sense of ῥήτωρ as politician.25 The 
early references to ῥήτορες in Old Comedy do not mention them in the act 
but refer to them more as a species. Crates wrote a play entitled Ῥήτορες, 
but the sole surviving line mentions only a simile about Cephisian turnips 
(fr. 30). The passage from Aristophanes’ Banqueters quoted above (fr. 205) 
links them directly with strange, new phrasing.26 Another fragment uses the 
 21. Note O’Sullivan (1992, 106–29) on this metaphor, but these passages do not imply, as 
O’Sullivan argues, a coherent, formal system of vocabulary for such metaphors. Cf. Scharffenberger 
(2007, 232–36) on the metaphors used of Aeschylus in Frogs, and see the Introduction, 14–16.
 22. Alcibiades will be discussed in Chapter 4, in the context of his prominent role in the events 
of the 410s.
 23. MacDowell (1971, 238).
 24. Storey (1988). Cf. the entries for practitioners in the Appendix.
 25. Connor (1971, 116 esp. n. 51).
 26. Later, the comic playwright Plato uses the heads of the mythological Hydra to comment on 
their ever-growing numbers:
   ἢν γὰρ ἀποθάνῃ
  εἷς τις πονηρός, δύ’ ἀνέφυσαν ῥήτορες·
  οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῖν Ἰόλεως ἐν τῇ πόλει,
  ὅστις ἐπικαύσει τὰς κεφαλὰς τῶν ῥητόρων.
  κεκολλόπευκας· τοιγαροῦν ῥήτωρ ἔσῃ.
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metaphor of “knocking them out” (ἐκκροτεῖν, adesp. fr. 596) in the sense 
of crafting rhetores with tools, but no surviving reference describes them as 
the product of a school or particular training.27
 In addition, there is the strictly pejorative term ἀλαζών (“faker”), which 
in the fifth century is applied to a range of characters employing pretentious 
quackery, but all of whom use decidedly verbal trickery, whereas in later 
periods it is used of a wider range of braggarts and fools. Cratinus might, 
appropriately enough, pair it with κομπός, “noise” (fr. 375), while adesp. 
fr. 438 mentions a λόγων ἀλαζόνα (“faker in his words”).28
InSTITuTIonS
While Aristophanes’ extant plays amply demonstrate that fifth-century 
comedy dramatized political and social institutions, the fragments of earlier 
times are too brief or too obscure to allow analysis of their broader depic-
tion of intellectual and political life and the role of formal oratory within 
it. Nonetheless, the shards from such depictions at least confirm some of 
the general trends in Aristophanes’ complete plays. Aristophanes dramatizes 
directly or reports explicitly on the three main institutions of the Athenian 
democracy (the Assembly, the Council and the courts), and he projects an 
anxiety about the role of the new intellectual style of speech in each of them. 
The fragments of Old Comedy are too slight to assert definitively that other 
comedies dramatized these institutions and incorporated the role of rhetori-
cal speech in their presentation. It seems likely, however, that when Thugen-
ides composed a play called Δικασταί (Jurors) and someone asks, τί, ὦγάθ’ 
ἀντιδικοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις ἔτι; “Sir, why do we keep suing each other?” (fr. 
1; cf. Phrynichus fr. 89, which uses the same verb), it is quite reasonable to 
believe that the play staged issues in the court and addressed issues of how 
citizens spoke there, but no details are available. A more colorful version 
of the comment comes in Telecleides (ἀλλ’ ὦ πάντων ἀστῶν λῷστοι 
  If just a single rascal dies, two rhetores grew in their place,
  because we don’t have an Iolaus in the city
  to cauterize the rhetores’ heads.
  You’ve been butt-fucked, so you’ll end up a rhetor. (fr. 202 = Olson E9)
  Plato, Euthydemus 297c uses the image of the Hydra as a mistress of sophistry (σοφιστρία), 
whose κέφελαι τοῦ λόγου (“heads of speech”) grow back.
 27. This is true even in Clouds, where training in the new philosophy and way of speaking is a 
major concern; pace, for example, Piltz (1934). Cf. Chapter 3.
 28. MacDowell (1990), and cf. the entry in the Appendix.
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σεῖσαι καὶ προσκαλέσασθαι,/παύσασθε δικῶν ἀλληλοφάγων, “You 
who are the best of all cities at shakedowns and indictments, stop the can-
nibalistic lawsuits,” fr. 2), which probably represents the chorus addressing 
the spectators, but whether the issue was part of the fabric of the play or 
belonged only to an isolated passage is unrecoverable now. Cratinus pun-
ningly expresses concern for justice in the courts when someone worries 
ὥστε δίκας τ’ ἀδίκους νικᾶν ἐπὶ κέρδεσιν αἰσχροῖς, “that the result be 
unjust cases winning for shameful profits” (fr. 353).
 Consequently this survey ends by noting a few isolated words that are 
suggestive of the broader issues comic playwrights adduced when address-
ing issues germane to the democracy, including what form the functional 
language of that democracy should be. The adespota include δικομήτρα 
glossed as “the mother and generator of cases and sycophants” (fr. 590), 
δικολύμης “pain-of-a-lawsuit” (fr. 591) and πυθμὴν δικῶν “root of law-
suits, i.e., a sycophant” (fr. 649).29 We end at the beginning, where a char-
acter wonders how a speech will begin: ἄγε δή, τίς ἀρχὴ τῶν λόγων 
γενήσεται; “Come on, what will be the beginning of the speech?” (Cephi-
sodorus fr. 13).
PluTARCh, ComIC PlAywRIghTS And PERIClES
καὶ οἷς ἡ διατριβὴ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πέλας ἀμαρτίαις, οἷον χλευσταῖς καὶ 
κωμῳδοποιοῖς· κακολόγοι γάρ πως οὗτοι καὶ ἐξαγγελτικοί.
And [there are] those who spend their time on the faults of those around 
them, such as comedians and comic playwrights, since they are sort of gos-
sips and muckrakers. Aristotle, Rhet. 2.6.20.1384b9–11
So runs Aristotle’s only discussion of comic playwrights in his Rhetoric, as he 
is explaining the benefits of circumscribing the use of rhetoric, especially in 
a political environment.30 This contempt for comic playwrights has a long 
history and is crucial for understanding the evidence for comedy’s treatment 
of Pericles. Ancient sources waver between the idea of Pericles as inspiring 
leader and imperious bully.31 Comedy, however, overwhelmingly fronts the 
 29. Cf. τριπτὴρ δικῶν, “mortar for pounding lawsuits” (Ach. 937) of the sycophant Nicarchus; 
Christ (1998, 54).
 30. On the political tensions in the Rhetoric, see Berlin (1992), Most (1994), Sprute (1994) and 
Jacob (1996).
 31. Connor (1971, 119–28) and Stadter (1989, xxxviii–xliv).
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latter image but is also nearly the only contemporary source referring to 
him.32 The bias in, and the necessity of, referring to these sources were evi-
dent to Plutarch, and thus sources of frustration for him. When discussing 
the scandals surrounding Phidias, he comments (13.15–16.160e):
[10] δεξάμενοι δὲ τὸν λόγον οἱ κωμικοὶ πολλὴν ἀσέλγειαν αὐτοῦ 
κατεσκέδασαν,  .  .  . καὶ τί ἄν τις ἀνθρώπους σατυρικοὺς τοῖς βίοις 
καὶ τὰς κατὰ τῶν κρειττόνων βλασφημίας ὥσπερ δαίμονι κακῷ τῷ 
φθόνῳ τῶν πολλῶν ἀποθύοντας ἑκάστοτε θαυμάσειεν . . . ; οὕτως 
ἔοικε πάντη χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ δυσθήρατον ἱστορίᾳ τἀληθές, ὅταν 
οἱ μὲν ὕστερον γεγονότες τὸν χρόνον ἔχωσιν ἐπιπροσθοῦντα τῇ 
γνώσει τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν βίων ἡλικιῶτις 
ἱστορία τὰ μὲν φθόνοις καὶ δυσμενείαις, τὰ δὲ χαριζομένη καὶ κολα-
κεύουσα λυμαίνηται καὶ διαστρέφῃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
The comic playwrights picked up the story and splattered Pericles with 
charges of great corruption, . . . and why should anyone be astonished that 
men who live like satyrs offer up sacrifices of slander of their betters, as if to 
the evil deity of jealousy . . . ? In this way, it seems the truth is entirely dif-
ficult and hard to capture by research, since later writers find that time cov-
ers over and blocks their knowledge of events; while contemporary research 
into the deeds and lives, both because of jealousy and hostility and through 
favoritism and flattery, damages and distorts the truth.
 Rhetoric poses a fresh set of problems for Plutarch, though ones inter-
twined with comedy.33 Pericles had a reputation for powerful oratory, among 
both supporters and detractors, but Plutarch wrestles with this component 
of Pericles’ leadership, sensitive to the morally gray area involved in over-
whelming a citizen audience with the power, rather than the substance, of a 
speech. The tension surfaces, for example, when Plutarch discusses Pericles 
being termed an Olympian god. Plutarch asserts that the reputation reflects a 
range of Pericles’ accomplishments, but concedes that in comedy the epithet 
referred specifically to his oratory (8.2–3, partly cited as adesp. 701):
 32. Podlecki (1998, 169–78) surveys the references in comedy to Pericles. Sidwell (2009, 147–
53) and Bakola (2010, 181–208, 213–20) provide more extensive readings of Pericles in the frag-
ments.
 33. See Stadter (1989, xxxviii–xliv, lxiii–lxx) for Plutarch’s rhetorical dilemma and his use of 
comic sources. Cf. Yunis (1991) for an analysis of how Thucydides puts a positive spin on Pericles’ 
rhetoric.
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διὸ καὶ τὴν ἐπίκλησιν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι λέγουσι· καίτοι τινὲς ἀπὸ τῶν 
οἷς ἐκόσμησε τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ ταῖς στρα-
τηγίαις δυνάμεως Ὀλύμπιον αὐτὸν οἴονται προσαγορευθῆναι· καὶ 
συνδραμεῖν οὐδὲν ἀπέοικεν ἀπὸ πολλῶν προσόντων τῷ ἀνδρὶ τὴν 
δόξαν. αἱ μέντοι κωμῳδίαι τῶν τότε διδασκάλων σπουδῇ τε πολλὰς 
καὶ μετὰ γέλωτος ἀφεικότων φωνὰς εἰς αὐτόν, ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μάλι-
στα τὴν προσωνυμίαν γενέσθαι δηλοῦσι, “βροντᾶν” μὲν αὐτὸν καὶ 
“ἀστράπτειν,” ὅτε δημηγοροίη, “δεινὸν δὲ κεραυνὸν ἐν γλώσσῃ 
φέρειν λεγόντων.”
So they say he had his surname: although some think it was from the means 
by which he beautified the city, and others from his ability as a statesman 
and a general, that he was called Olympian, it is not unlikely that his reputa-
tion resulted from many things associated with the man. But the comedies 
of the playwrights at the time who let loose lots of sounds, both seriously 
and to get a laugh, show that he got this surname primarily because of his 
speech: they spoke of him as “thundering” and “lightning” [Ach. 531] when 
he spoke to the people publicly, and as “carrying an awesome thunderbolt 
on his tongue.”
 A little later Plutarch again addresses Pericles’ success as an orator, this 
time in laudatory terms. To offset the association of his rhetoric with tyr-
anny, and criticism from the comic playwrights, he cites new authorities and 
reframes Pericles’ accomplishments (15.2–3):
ἔδειξε τὴν ῥητορικὴν κατὰ Πλάτωνα ψυχαγωγίαν οὖσαν καὶ μέγι-
στον ἔργον αὐτῆς τὴν περὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ πάθη μέθοδον, ὥσπερ τινὰς 
τόνους καὶ φθόγγους ψυχῆς μάλ᾽ ἐμμελοῦς ἁφῆς καὶ κρούσεως δεομέ-
νους. αἰτία δ᾽ οὐχ ἡ τοῦ λόγου ψιλῶς δύναμις, ἀλλ᾽, ὡς Θουκυδίδης 
φησίν, ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον δόξα καὶ πίστις τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἀδωροτάτου 
περιφανῶς γενομένου καὶ χρημάτων κρείττονος.
He demonstrated that rhetoric is, to use Plato’s words, “a leader of the 
soul” [Phaedrus 261a, 271c] and that its paramount task is pursuit of the 
character and emotions, as if they were the strings and sounds of the soul, 
in need of harmonious touch and fingering. The cause was not simply the 
power of his speech, but, as Thucydides says [2.65], the reputation of his 
life and the trust placed in the man as one who was utterly free of corrup-
tion and beyond bribes.
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 The strategy Plutarch employs here typifies much reception of the inter-
play between comedy and rhetoric. Where comic playwrights of the time 
linked Pericles’ speech to power and imperiousness, Plutarch reconstructs 
the effectiveness quite differently. By citing Plato (albeit from a passage, and 
using a term, that was not necessarily laudatory), Plutarch enlists an impor-
tant ally, because Plato was such a critic of rhetoric. If Plutarch can find a 
way to harmonize Pericles’ rhetoric with something Plato approves, then 
clearly Pericles’ oratory is to the good and not of a sophistic variety. Plutarch 
follows this by invoking Thucydides and concluding that Pericles led in fact 
by his individual moral authority, not by the techniques of his speech mak-
ing. In the process, Plutarch nullifies the criticism of comedy. The comic 
authors were jealous entertainers who did not appreciate the noble superior-
ity of Pericles and thus did not recognize the true cause of the success of his 
oratory. Plutarch accomplishes this reinterpretation by invoking Plato and 
Thucydides as canonical authorities, and also the tradition from the fourth 
century onward of subjecting rhetoric to higher pursuits such as philosophy. 
In this way, Plutarch belongs to the long tradition of dismissing fifth-century 
accomplishments in language and oratory, along with comedy’s voice in the 
debate, by invoking fourth-century critiques.
 Nearly all of comedy’s extant reaction to Pericles derives from Plutarch’s 
biography, but it is still possible to make discerning observations despite 
this filtering. Modern scholars have especially seized on the statement in 
the hypothesis for Cratinus’ Dionysalexandros that κωμῳδεῖται δ’ ἐν τῷ 
δράματι Περικλῆς μάλα πιθανῶς δι’ ἐμφάσεως ὡς ἐπαγηοχὼς τοῖς 
Ἀθηναίοις τὸν πόλεμον, “In the play, Pericles is satirized very felicitously 
by innuendo as having brought the war upon the Athenians” (44–48, trans. 
Bakola).34 E. Bakola soberly reviews the history of allegorical readings of 
Pericles that have flowed from this statement, although, after solid crit-
icism of such efforts, he offers an overly confident reading of the play’s 
remains.35 Stimulating as many interpretations of the Dionysalexandros have 
been, Bakola’s careful study of how limited an application such statements 
in ancient hypotheses generally have to comic plots and content in general 
indicates that many of these readings are primarily speculative.
 34. McGlew (2002, 25–56) uses this statement to, in a sense, invert Plutarch’s criticism of com-
edy’s criticism. McGlew sets Cratinus’ satire of Pericles against the ideals for the citizen in Thucydides’ 
version of Pericles in the Funeral Oration. Where Thucydides’ Pericles has citizens subordinate their 
individual desires to Athens and to the state’s goals, comedy celebrates and promotes the individual 
citizen’s desire in a way that becomes paradigmatic for the comic protagonist. Cf. Davidson (1997) 
and Farenga (2006, 424–70).
 35. Bakola (2010, 180–208).
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 When it comes to Cratinus’ and other comedians’ characterization of 
Pericles’ rhetoric, a limited but substantive conclusion emerges. The evi-
dence consists of only a handful of lines, but they are consistent, as Plutarch 
admitted was broadly true, in reckoning Pericles’ oratory as the embodi-
ment of him as an imperious, superhuman tyrant. Two fragments contain-
ing images similar to that of oratory as thunder and lightning (Telecleides 
fr. 48 and adesp. 288) might refer to Pericles’ oratory, but their context has 
not been preserved. Fragments of Cratinus confirm that he employed the 
characterization of Pericles as Zeus (frr. 73, 118 and 258 = Olson E12). For 
speech, Cratinus draws on the metaphor of the tongue as an instrument 
of troublesome speech when he calls Pericles “the greatest tongue of the 
Greeks” (μεγίστη . . . γλῶττα τῶν Ἑλληνίδων, fr. 324).36 Another frag-
ment of Cratinus might elaborate on what Pericles can do with his tongue 
(from Dionysalexandros, possibly Athena’s offer in the parody of the judg-
ment of Paris):
γλῶττάν τε σοι
δίδωσιν ἐν δήμῳ φορεῖν
καλῶν λόγων ἀείνων,
ᾗ πάντα κινήσεις λέγων.
.  .  .  gives you a tongue of beautiful eternally flowing words to bring to 
the Demos with which you will move them all when you speak. (fr. 327 
= Olson B16)
 Cratinus likewise has Pericles lead with words (λόγοισι προάγει, about 
building the Long Walls) but move nothing in fact (fr. 326). Another frag-
ment criticizes him as “king of the satyrs,” for Pericles does not raise a 
spear himself but nonetheless provides bold speeches about the war (ἀλλὰ 
λόγους μὲν/περὶ τοῦ πολέμου δεινοὺς περέχῃ, Hermippus fr. 47 = 
Olson E14).37
 For Plutarch and modern historians, it is a source of frustration that 
events from the comic stage infiltrated the historical record, but it can be 
illuminating for understanding comic practice. Anecdotes about Pericles’ 
companion Aspasia, of dubious historical value, might have their origins in 
depictions of the couple on the comic stage. Plutarch reports that the comic 
poet Hermippus prosecuted Aspasia for impiety and operating a brothel, but 
 36. Cf. entry for γλῶττα in the Appendix and above.
 37. “King of the satyrs” can refer to the perennially cowardly Silenus who regularly graces the 
stage in satyr plays. On satyrs in Cratinus’ Dionysalexandros, see Bakola (2010, 81–117, esp. 84 n. 8).
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that Pericles’ weepy appeal in court saved her (Pericles 32, partly quoted as 
Hermippus T2 in PCG). Depending on how garbled this report is, it could 
mean at least that in a play of Hermippus, he had the chorus or a char-
acter relate a satirical trial and acquittal of Aspasia. If Hermippus actually 
included a scene or more of such a trial, including actors portraying Pericles 
and Aspasia, it would be the earliest known example of the staging of an 
Athenian political institution at work, the earliest staging of public figures 
in this way, and possibly of staging speeches and oratory. Another report has 
Aspasia assist Pericles in composing his orations (Callias fr. 21; cf. Cratinus 
fr. 259 [= Olson E13]), which again reads like stage satire, though there is 
no indication whether it was more than a passing comment.38 When discuss-
ing Aspasia’s trial, Plutarch adds that a certain Diopeithes brought a bill in 
support of public prosecution of atheists (32.1). Whether this brief reference 
recalls history, comedy, or a blend of the two, Diopeithes was a known name 
on the comic stage.39
 Plutarch was well aware that appraisal of Pericles changed over time 
and that he had a reputation in retrospect that turned many of his nega-
tives, such as his penchant for imperiousness, into virtues, such as integrity 
in leadership (39.4–5).40 Plutarch does not apply this perspective to the 
comic sources he cites, but his observation holds true for them. All the 
comic fragments from Pericles’ lifetime are negative. Only a decade or more 
after his death comes the famous laudatory description of the power of his 
speaking, from Eupolis’ Demes, where Pericles was one of four figures from 
Athens’ past to reappear.41 If the passages in Acharnians (524–33) and Peace 
(603–28), where Pericles even after death is an imperious Olympian bully 
responsible for the war, are any indication, however, it did take some years 
for Pericles’ stock to rise.
ConCluSIon: 
ComEdy And RhEToRIC bEFoRE 425 b.c.e.
The above surveys lead to two generalizations. First, as is consistent with 
the revised history of early rhetoric, comedy does not reflect the use of the 
technical vocabulary or techniques documented from the fourth century 
 38. On the depiction of Aspasia in Greek comedy, see Henry (1995, 19–28).
 39. See the entry in the Appendix.
 40. Cf. Gorgias 518e1–19d5 for Plato’s more cynical take on the idealizing of leaders of the past, 
including Pericles.
 41. See Chapter 4 for discussion.
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onward. The terminology found in early Athenian comedy for “rhetorical” 
language, speaking and its practitioners is not technical vocabulary, the core 
of which was canonized a century later and subsequently expanded and 
elaborated, nor is it even a direct forerunner of such terminology. Rather the 
fragments of Old Comedy, like Aristophanes’ complete extant plays, employ 
comic and satirical terms, highly evaluative, almost exclusively pejorative, 
and often also drawing on comedy’s own tradition of colorful, creative meta-
phors and neologisms to attack sophistic language.42 Instead, comic criticism 
addresses unusual language and oratory deployed for negative purposes, but 
does so by creating comic neologisms to identify critical issues. As such, it is 
a comic playwright’s means for asserting the superiority of the comic stage’s 
own language, backed by comedy’s distinct cultural authority, as superior to 
the emerging prose rhythms that will, nonetheless, come to dominate the 
discourse of the democracy in the coming generations.43 Once again, the 
source of comic vocabulary resides not in a formal system of criticism, but 
in a tradition opposed to such systems.44
 Second, comedy’s aggressive stance toward speakers and their speeches 
appears in a political context. The sharp attacks on Pericles, including a 
substantial portion aimed at his oratory, establish that comedy was in the 
business of policing politics and the beat included oratory, comprising its 
manner, technique and purpose, for improper use of oratory was embedded 
in tyranny and was a fortiori antidemocratic. Unfortunately, the fragments 
prior to 425 b.c.e. provide almost no coherent sense of how scenes and 
actions in the lost comedies dramatized the workings of this activity in the 
mechanisms of the democracy to supplement what we have in Aristophanes’ 
extant plays. Only the garbled testimony about Hermippus’ prosecution of 
Aspasia might provide a glimpse of a more extended report or scene devoted 
to a dysfunctional political institution. In this sense, the fragments of Aris-
tophanes’ Banqueters that deal with language use (frr. 205 and 233) are not 
so novel, except that the debate transpires between a father and son, with 
no indication that their dialogue takes place in a public, political space. 
Translocation out of appropriate public space will be a crucial device in the 
complete plays for cornering and exploring issues involved with public ora-
tory and language exploration in general, however, beginning in 425 b.c.e., 
in Acharnians, in the next chapter.
 42. Müller (1974).
 43. Ober (1989).
 44. See the Introduction, 12–16 on how this contradicts the positions of O’Sullivan (1992) and 
Hubbard (2007); cf. Bakola (2010, 24–29).
Aristotle laments the role of rhetoric in political deliberation and even ide-
alizes political decision making that is devoid of rhetoric, but when Aristo-
phanes composed comedies for performance in the 420s b.c.e., he had no 
reason to reckon the novel turns in language of the time as fundamentally 
distinct from political discourse. Indeed, the presence of unorthodox lan-
guage in public debate and Gorgias’ speech making, successful both as per-
formance and for its political achievement, could only have testified that the 
language that came to be called “rhetoric” was enmeshed in the deliberations 
of the Athenian democracy. Since for Aristophanes it was also established 
that comedy engaged the political environment of the democracy, includ-
ing the language of its prominent citizens (Chapter 2), it is no surprise that 
Acharnians of 425 b.c.e. dramatizes the language of democratic debate not 
in terms of adherence to the formalized system of “rhetoric” of the next 
century, but in terms of the current debate about spectators, deliberation 
and democracy.1
 1. Athenian theater’s relationship to democratic deliberation is much debated. For study of 
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· · ·
ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ ῥητορική.
Rhetoric puts on the appearance of politics.
  —Aristotle, Rhet. 1.2.7.1356a27–28
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 It is telling, by contrast, that when scholars have searched Aristophanes’ 
Acharnians for examples of speech making under the influence of rhetoric, 
they have turned to Dicaeopolis’ speech to the chorus (496–556), several 
episodes into the play, and bypassed completely the opening scene, set in 
the Assembly of Athens, where speeches about public policy would normally 
take place.2 It is logical to turn to Dicaeopolis’ speech, of course, since the 
scene in the Assembly does not feature, and indeed cuts off, any debate or 
opportunities for speech making. Instead, the type of debate that belongs 
in the Assembly, about public policy, takes place near Dicaeopolis’ home. 
Racing ahead to the full speech overlooks this translocation, overlooks that 
Aristophanes makes an issue of the fact that speech making and delibera-
tion do not take place in the Assembly, where they should. This emphatic 
absence means spectators of the play have reason to be watching for a speech, 
and that the speech finally arrives in an unexpected locale is significant. It 
is a repeated and core argument of this study that Aristophanes is purpose-
ful in transferring the setting of speeches and oratory and that restoring 
the deliberative process to its normal location is equally meaningful. The 
plays of 425 to 421 b.c.e. not only involve translocation of the delibera-
tive process, and of the act of speech making within it; such transfers are 
central to the action and the basic cause-and-effect of each play. Acharnians, 
Knights, Clouds and Wasps all feature processes central to the democracy 
(public debate, trial by jury, education) stalled in their normal and proper 
locations and translocated to other environments. In each play, the under-
lying assumption, usually explicit, sometimes implicit, is that a normal and 
healthy process takes place in its proper public democratic institution. In 
this sense, Aristophanes’ comedies are grounded in an ideology consistent 
with a functional and empowered democracy, and criticisms of its failures 
or errors should be construed in this context. Moreover, the translocation 
process works both ways. When Aristophanes celebrates the happy restora-
tion of Athens in Peace, he translocates authority and the deliberative process 
away from its nontraditional location back to its proper democratic home, 
in this case the Council. In Acharnians, however, Aristophanes carefully and 
consistently dramatizes and emphasizes translocation away from the tradi-
tional and proper location for deliberation, the Pnyx, and the traditional and 
proper occasion, the Assembly.
modern theories about democratic deliberation and Aristophanes, see Zumbrunnen (2012), and for 
tragedy’s engagement with this issue, see Goldhill (2009), Hall (2009) and Hesk (2011), with the 
important response by Heath (2011). Cf. the Introduction.
 2. Murphy (1938, 101–4); Harriott (1986, 27–36); Sousa e Silva (1987–88, 99–102).
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ThE ASSEmbly In AchArniAns
At the original performance of Acharnians in 425 b.c.e., the set in the 
Theater of Dionysus, before any performers appeared, might or might not 
have signaled to the spectators that the setting is the Pnyx, but the script 
is unambiguous that this is the setting. In the same scene that indicates 
this setting, however, the play repeatedly sounds notes of dislocation and 
frustration. Throughout the monologue that opens the play, Dicaeopolis 
harps on the theme that the deliberative process is occurring in the wrong 
places (1–39). His first example, Cleon coughing up money to the Knights 
(5–8), is predicated on an attempt by Cleon to short-circuit deliberation, 
but an attempt that rebounds on its instigator. Unfortunately, Dicaeopo-
lis does not specify the location of this example, presumably because the 
audience would have known it without prompting. If, as many scholars 
have argued,3 the passage refers to a scene in Babylonians of the previous 
year, then this first event, a public political action, “a worthwhile thing 
for Greece” (ἄξιον γὰρ Ἑλλάδι, 8), takes place not where it should (a 
court, or perhaps the Council and Assembly), but in the theater. The next 
events, good and bad (a tragedy by Theognis, the music of Moschus, Dex-
itheus and Chaeris, 11–16), all take place in the theater.4 If political jus-
tice has taken place in the theater, and otherwise the theater is the site of 
pleasure and pain, what is happening in the political arena? Dicaeopolis 
soon explains: nothing, because the Pnyx is deserted when it should be in 
session (19–20). Instead, the spectators are in the Agora, not deliberating 
or giving speeches but engaging in talk without substance (λαλοῦσι, 21; 
cf. the Appendix). They specifically stay out of the physical space of the 
Assembly (22).5
 Even the Prytaneis are not present in the Assembly (23). When they do 
arrive, late, they are coming not to engage in the business of the Assembly 
but instead to scramble for the seats that will provide the best view (23–26).6 
 3. Olson (2002, 66–68) provides a survey of the issues. On the thorny issues the passage raises 
about the censorship of Old Comedy, see the debate in Sluiter and Rosen (2004).
 4. Brockmann (2003, 27–41) argues that Theognis was directing a revival of Aeschylus’ Persians 
here. Sidwell (2009, 293–95) incorporates this notion into a chain of antidemocratic targets from 
Pericles to Eupolis. If by chance the lines do refer to a revival of Persians, there could be a political 
alignment at issue, but the evidence is slight at best. Cf. Chapter 6.
 5. How the σχοινίον . . . μεμιλτωμένον functioned is not certain, for which cf. Olson (2002, 
73); but the metaphor is clear: people are actively avoiding the border that would have them in the 
physical space of the Assembly and engaged in its processes. Shear (2011, 131–34, 269–85) analyzes 
the conversion of the Agora into markedly democratic space in the fourth century, but Acharnians 
long predates this transformation.
 6. See Olson (2002, 75) for a survey of the textual and interpretive problems in these lines, but 
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The absence of substantive deliberation in contrast to eager viewing recalls 
the criticism found in Thucydides, where Cleon rebukes the audience at the 
Assembly along analogous lines: σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις 
μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις (“You resemble seated spectators 
before performers more than those deliberating about their city,” 3.38.7).7 
The Prytaneis race to be seated spectators rather than civic deliberators. Thus 
Aristophanes, in his satire of the deliberative processes, maintains the same 
contrast as Thucydides.
 Next Dicaeopolis makes explicit that the proper business of the Assem-
bly, deliberating about peace, has no value (27), and he invokes the entire 
political community (ὦ πόλις πόλις), but in vain, for at this point there is 
no place where the desired process is taking place. Now Dicaeopolis begins 
reconstituting the Assembly and attempting to create a space for the process 
he desires.8 In contrast to the Prytaneis, he himself always attends the Assem-
bly ahead of everyone and then sits alone (28–29). With no deliberative 
process transpiring, Dicaeopolis feels the pull of other locations, his deme 
in particular, which is notably free of the invitations and sales pitches of the 
Agora (32–36). Lest this wistful thinking suggest that Dicaeopolis is merely 
at the Pnyx to get the best seat as a spectator of the oratorical displays, he 
explains his purpose exactly (37–39):9
νῦν οὖν ἀτεχνῶς ἥκω παρεσκευασμένος
βοᾶν ὑποκρούειν λοιδορεῖν τοὺς ῥήτορας,
ἐάν τις ἄλλο πλὴν περὶ εἰρήνης λέγῃ.
So consequently, I’ve come totally prepared
to shout, interrupt and abuse the speakers,
if anyone speaks about anything except peace.
 As for formal rhetorical technique, in modern terms, Diceaopolis’ mono-
logue to this point can be labeled a priamel, but this structure does not 
correspond to any outline or component in ancient Greek rhetoric and is 
not geared to resemble or recall a piece of oratory.10 It does, however, set 
the purpose of the Prytaneis’ actions seems clear.
 7. Cf. the Introduction, 3–5.
 8. Cf. McGlew (2002, 57–78), for whom it is crucial that Dicaeopolis here pursues personal 
desire rather than state-sanctioned sacrifice.
 9. Cf. the entries on shouting and screaming in the Appendix.
 10. Edmunds (1980, 26–33) analyzes Ach. 1–39 as a priamel, setting up the opposition between 
poetry and politics. Race (1982, x; cf. 36 n. 11) notes that no ancient rhetorician describes a figure 
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up the expectation that there should be a functional Assembly and that the 
spectators should be fully engaged in the deliberative process. Aristophanes, 
having built up this expectation, establishes suspense and tension until the 
anticipated speech making takes place. That he delays the speech and the 
deliberative process until well after the Assembly is adjourned says as much 
about the absence of functional process at the Assembly as it does about the 
functional deliberations once they occur.
 After Dicaeopolis’ initial monologue, the Assembly does begin (with 
the Prytaneis entering just as Dicaeopolis describes, 40–42, confirming 
Dicaeopolis’ reliability as an interpreter of events), and Aristophanes con-
tinues to set the expectation of deliberation against the frustration of this 
expectation. The herald confirms that parties are now within the physical 
space of the meeting (43–44).11 One citizen, Amphitheos, is present and 
immediately ready to initiate the deliberation about peace (45), as Diceaopo-
lis earlier called for, but he is just as quickly removed from the space (54). 
When Dicaeopolis objects to the failed attempt at deliberation, the herald 
responds by telling him to sit down and be quiet (κάθησο, σίγα, 59), an 
inversion of the behavior Dicaeopolis came ready to engage in and which 
he has established as proper engagement in the deliberative process. For 
the rest of the proceedings of the Assembly, Dicaeopolis comments but 
cannot participate (60–166).12 Forced ironically to be a spectator of what 
is said, he now offers perspective for the benefit of the spectators of the 
play, but his comments only reinforce the distance between the activities 
around the Pnyx and the proper business of the Assembly (note especially 
101–7, where Dicaeopolis literally interprets the speech of Pseudartabas).13 
Eventually, the language of the Assembly proves functional only to termi-
nate dialogue entirely. Addressing the Prytaneis, Dicaeopolis shuts down the 
Assembly (169–72; Dicaeopolis’ call, ἀπαγορεύω μὴ ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν, 
in 169 mirrors the herald’s question at the beginning of the meeting, τίς 
ἀγορεύειν βούλεται, 45).
comparable to the priamel. Compton-Engle (2001) compares this speech with Silenus’ opening cata-
log of πόνοι in Eur. Cyc. 1–40 against the backdrop of tragic priamels. Motifs like ὦ πόλις πόλις 
(27) have their parallels in drama rather than extant oratory (cf. the same phrase in Eupolis fr. 219 and 
Sophocles, OT 629). For two quite different analyses of the entire prologue, see Gordziejew (1938) 
and Platter (2007, 42–62).
 11. The script does not specify whom the herald moves inside the area, but the key point is that 
participants are now explicitly within the borders of the functional territory of the Assembly, and the 
deliberative process should follow.
 12. See Buis (2008, 250–62) for a close reading of the tensions in the diplomacy with foreign 
nations in this scene.
 13. See Slater (2002, 42–49) on Dicaeopolis as actor, spectator and liaison with the audience.
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 With the dysfunctional Assembly ended, paradoxically, the deliberative 
process Dicaeopolis has sought now begins almost immediately. Amphitheos 
returns and Dicaeopolis quickly negotiates his thirty-year peace (175–203). 
While about the Pnyx deliberation and dialogue result in no consequence, 
now cause and effect take place. The peace treaty brings on both the chorus 
of Acharnians (204–36) and Dicaeopolis’ celebration of the rural Dionysia 
(237–79). The confrontation between them begins with the chorus refus-
ing to listen at all (280–327, esp. 295, 298, 303, 323–24). Dicaeopolis will 
manage to compel a deliberative process, but he still cannot use what should 
be the appropriate institution and venue, so he turns to the resource he has 
invoked several times already: tragedy.
 As Helene Foley has argued in detail, Aristophanes has Dicaeopolis 
invoke tragedy through much of Acharnians to bolster the play’s broader 
political themes.14 The protagonist finally engages in the deliberative pro-
cess that was a nonstarter in the Assembly and opposed by the chorus of 
Acharnians. Armed by Euripides and clothed in tragedy, Dicaeopolis finally 
compels permission from the chorus to address them, ἄνδρες οἱ θεώμενοι, 
“gentlemen spectators” (496), and begins his speech (497). This form of 
address can appear metatheatrical or in some way discordant with the illu-
sion of the environment of the play, but it is not, really. It simply resumes 
and maintains a metaphor that was already implicit in Dicaeopolis’ mono-
logue at the beginning of the play, when he criticizes the Prytaneis for their 
lackadaisical commitment to deliberation, combined with their enthusiasm 
for a good show of speeches (again cf. the rebuke of Thucydides’ Cleon 
of those at the Assembly as mere spectators of speeches: θεαταὶ .  .  . τῶν 
λόγων, 3.38.4). Dicaeopolis was reduced to such a spectator during the 
Assembly in the play, and so the spectators of Acharnians have at least some 
reason to expect, and some of them even to look forward to, an occasion 
finally to watch someone in the play deliver a speech.
dICAEoPolIS’ SPEECh (496–556)
The speech Dicaeopolis gives here serves as a good example of how previous 
attempts to align speech-making practice in Aristophanes’ plays with the 
dictates of later rhetorical theory can look logical in their bare outline but 
not hold up under closer examination. Charles Murphy’s 1938 article is the 
 14. Foley (1988) closely analyzes this dynamic. Biles (2011, 56–96) concentrates on the poetic 
allegiances Aristophanes builds through Dicaeopolis to achieve victory. Cf. P. Wilson (2007) on the 
issues related to victory in competition in this model.
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most often cited study of rhetoric in Aristophanes, and he devotes his most 
detailed analysis to this speech.15 His scheme is the following:
1. Προοίμιον, 496–512
2. Πρόθεσις, 513–14
3. Πίστεις, 513–54
 a.  515–22. The Athenian sycophants were unjust to Megara in the 
matter of confiscation.
 b.  523–29. The rape of the harlots, begun by the Athenians, led 
directly to the war.
 c.  530–34. Pericles introduced the Megarian decree for personal rea-
sons.
 d. 535–39. We refused to reconsider the decree.
 e.  540–54. (Refutatio) “What should you have done under similar 
circumstances?”
4. Ἐπίλογος, 555–56
 Murphy’s scheme relies on the axiom that the canonical divisions of 
speech (prologue, narrative, proof, epilogue) are already fixed and widely 
accepted.16 Even without this underlying assumption, however, the scheme 
does not match Dicaeopolis’ speech. Murphy describes the proem as “unusu-
ally elaborate,” as he must, since it includes many statements not required, 
and not typical, of a προοίμιον. It certainly does not resemble a προοίμιον 
as given as an example in Knights 1344 (see below), which is an initial state-
ment of praise and flattery. When Dicaeopolis says (496–98):
μή μοι φθονήσητ᾽, ἄνδρες οἱ θεώμενοι,
εἰ πτωχὸς ὢν ἔπειτ᾽ ἐν Ἀθηναίοις λέγειν
μέλλω περὶ τῆς πόλεως. 
Don’t bear me ill will, gentlemen spectators,
if I am a beggar and yet among the Athenians I
intend to speak about the city.
Murphy finds here the device of diminution (ἐλάττωσις), but these lines 
are also a direct parody of lines from Euripides’ Telephus (fr. 703), so we 
 15. Murphy (1938, 101–4).
 16. Usher (1999, 22), who persists in propping up the older model, offers a taxonomy like that 
found in Murphy, except in even stronger terms, saying that the divisions here “one may assume to 
have been available to a speechwriter plying his trade from about 420 b.c.”
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would have to accept that Aristophanes is borrowing the device from Eurip-
ides’ original speech.17 Even if we accept this identification, it seems that the 
lines do more to establish Dicaeopolis in his parodic character than repeat 
any rhetorical device from Euripides. If there is any establishment of rhetori-
cal formality here, it disappears entirely in the next few lines as Dicaeopolis 
(and in some fashion Aristophanes) declares the authority of comedy to 
speak on justice (499–501). This statement and the following lines on the 
environment at the Lenaea (502–8), far from continuing in the manner of 
a properly formal rhetorical speech, instead emphasize that we are anywhere 
but in a location typical for a forensic speech.
αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν οὑπὶ Ληναίῳ τ᾽ ἀγών,
κοὔπω ξένοι πάρεισιν· οὔτε γὰρ φόροι
ἥκουσιν οὔτ᾽ ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οἱ ξύμμαχοι
ἀλλ᾽ ἐσμὲν αὐτοὶ νῦν γε περιεπτισμένοι·
τοὺς γὰρ μετοίκους ἄχυρα τῶν ἀστῶν λέγω.
For it’s just us, and it’s the contest at the Lenaea,
And there’re no foreigners yet. Neither the tribute
Nor the allies from the other cities have arrived.
But at this point we are the processed grain,
Because the immigrants are the bran. (504–8)
Murphy labels the last line here a προκατάληψις,18 as it preempts a poten-
tial objection from the audience, but there is no reference to such an objec-
tion, as opposed to later in the speech when Aristophanes is perfectly willing 
to refer to such objections (540). Rather the line is the last detail in his 
description of the gathering.
 The next section in the scheme (513–14) is the following:
 17. For formal rhetorical technique in Euripides’ agons, see Lloyd (1992, 19–36). Scholarship on 
rhetoric in tragedy has yet to recognize the developments in the recent research on the development 
of fifth-century rhetoric. Gallagher (2003) attempts a detailed linkage of the agon in Electra with the 
Sophists’ rhetorical doctrines. For an analysis of “rhetoric” in Euripides, very broadly defined, see 
Mastronarde (2010, 207–45). For Euripides’ appropriation of late fifth-century philosophy generally, 
see the extensive catalogs in Egli (2003) and the survey in Dillon (2004). More superficially, see Co-
nacher (1998). Cf. Chapter 6. Sansone (2012) explores drama (primarily tragedy) and the invention 
of rhetoric. I regret that it arrived too late for me to engage with its novel thesis. 
 18. This line is deleted by N. G. Wilson, because of the difficulty of the metaphor. See White-
head (1977, 39–41) and N. G. Wilson (2007a, 26). This is not germane to my discussion of Murphy’s 
analysis, but I agree with Wilson that the line and its characterization of metics is entirely inconsistent 
with other statements in Aristophanes. On the issue of inclusion in deliberation with regard to for-
eigners and others, see below on Knights (72–73), and Chapter 5 on Lysistrata’s central speech.
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ἀτὰρ, φίλοι γὰρ οἱ παρόντες ἐν λόγῳ,
τί ταῦτα τοὺς Λάκωνας αἰτιώμεθα;
Since everyone here at the speech is friends,
Why do we blame the Spartans for this?
Murphy calls this is a πρόθεσις, a declaration of the subject of the speech, 
but the couplet is barely even that. The first line has nothing to do with 
such a declaration, and the second line simply picks up the thought in the 
few previous lines, still part of Murphy’s προοίμιον, where Dicaeopolis 
cites the damage the Spartans inflicted on his own farm. Murphy elides the 
problem by saying the section “continues the attempt to win favor” (102) 
and invoking the authority of the Rhetoric to Alexander that a πρόθεσις 
should come at the end of a προοίμιον when the speaker faces prejudice 
(29.1437b34–38a2).
 Murphy does not point out, however, his unorthodox privileging of the 
πρόθεσις, for he elevates it to the status of the second section in the speech, 
when it is not normally a division at all. Why he does so becomes evident 
with the next section of his scheme. Because there is nothing that corre-
sponds to the narrative (διήγεσις) and proofs (πίστεις) to yield a quadripar-
tite division of the speech, Murphy elevates the πρόθεσις, declares the third 
section the πίστεις, and, to cover the διήγεσις, says: “The proofs consist 
mainly of a narration of certain facts.” This makes the section seem more 
like a narrative than a set of proofs. Whether the section is a narrative, a set 
of proofs or both at the same time, it violates the canonical quadripartite 
division of a speech by not having separate sections devoted to narrative 
and proof, to say nothing of being in canonical order. Murphy’s scheme 
downplays this problem and reckons the πρόθεσις a full division to mask 
the deficiency.19
 The scheme ends with a two-line so-called ἐπίλογος (555–56):
ταῦτ᾽ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι ἂν ἐδρᾶτε· τὸν δὲ Τήλεφον
οὐκ οἰόμεσθα; νοῦς ἄρ᾽ ἡμῖν οὐκ ἔνι.
I know that’s what you would have done. And we don’t think
so of Telephus? Then we’re really out of our minds.
 19. The underdifferentiation of narrative and proof is a notorious problem for those insisting 
that the canonical principles of classical rhetoric were in force in the fifth century. Even Usher (1999, 
23–24) has to acknowledge the nebulous evidence for narrative sections in early speeches. See Tim-
merman and Schiappa (2010, 137–70) for attempts to analyze early oratory using established fifth-
century narrative patterns instead of fourth-century ones.
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Like the first lines of the speech, these are direct parodies of Telephus’ speech 
in Euripides (fr. 710) and signal the conclusion to Dicaeopolis’ parody more 
than constituting any formal peroration. If Dicaeopolis’ speech resembles 
any formal oratorical structure, it is that more common of fifth-century 
speeches, loosely inspired by ring composition from oral poetry and with a 
body containing a sequence of arguments.20
 More important than the structure of Dicaeopolis’ speech is its effect: the 
members of the chorus react to what he has said. Some members stand their 
ground and remain opposed to Dicaeopolis’ position, but others defend both 
his position and his right to speak (557–65). In this way, even those opposed 
to Dicaeopolis are at least involved in the process on the terms Dicaeopolis 
described them (ready to insult and stop any speaker not addressing the 
topic he wishes; cf. lines 37–39). Far from mere spectators, the full chorus 
is now active deliberators.
 Cause and effect are important here. Once Dicaeopolis engages in the 
deliberative process after disbanding the Assembly, from the moment he 
begins negotiating with Amphitheos, his speech has real effect. Once he 
completes his speech, half of the chorus joins him; when the other half 
invokes Lamachus, Dicaeopolis repels him, too, and the full chorus explic-
itly acknowledges that his speech has proven successful deliberation for the 
people of Athens (627–28):
ἁνὴρ νικᾷ τοῖσι λόγοισιν, καὶ τὸν δῆμον μεταπείθει
περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν.
The man has won with his speeches and convinced the Demos
about his treaty.
Dicaeopolis remains dominant throughout the rest of the play, easily repel-
ling challengers and unwanted visitors. The process that brought him to 
this point, however, is exactly the one he came to the Assembly to enact: 
engagement with speakers and deliberation about policy. When it cannot 
take place at the Pnyx, Aristophanes shows that the appropriate location 
does not support the process, but that the democratic process itself does 
function, and exceptionally well. Dicaeopolis enacts it, and all benefits flow 
to him as a result.21
 With this fundamental point established, that the democratic process 
 20. Timmerman and Schiappa (2010, 157–67).
 21. P. Wilson (2007) elegantly explores the tension between Dicaeopolis’ success, Aristophanes’ 
victory in festival competition and the prosperity of the community at large.
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does work but it is currently not operational in the appropriate and estab-
lished political institution, Aristophanes has his chorus deliver the parabasis, 
wherein he can discourse more on the deliberative process. Addressing the 
spectators seated in the theater (πρὸς τὸ θέατρον, 629), an area where the 
deliberative process remains functional, the chorus says (630–32):
διαβαλλόμενος δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ταχυβούλοις,
ὡς κωμῳδεῖ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν καὶ τὸν δῆμον καθυβρίζει,
ἀποκρίνασθαι δεῖται νυνὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους μεταβούλους.
Slandered by the Athenians who are quick in their deliberations,
on the charge that he mocks the city and degrades the Demos,
he must answer now, before the Athenians change their judgments.
He raises the issue of the Athenians’ rush to judge and the instability of their 
judgment with two hapax epithets, ταχυβούλοις and μεταβούλους.22 
Nonetheless, Aristophanes and his chorus are engaging in the delibera-
tive process by presenting policy recommendations in a public speech. The 
speech raises two issues with regard to the deliberative process: attention 
paid to outside influence, and simple flattery (633–35):
φησὶν δ᾽ εἶναι πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄξιος ὑμῖν ὁ ποιητής,
παύσας ὑμᾶς ξενικοῖσι λόγοις μὴ λίαν ἐξαπατᾶσθαι,
μήδ᾽ ἥδεσθαι θωπευομένους, μήδ᾽ εἶναι χαυνοπολίτας.
The poet says he deserves rich compensation,
because he stopped you from being too much deceived by foreign speeches,
and from enjoying being flattered and from being gape-open citizens.
 Aristophanes has dramatized this deceptive influence earlier in the play, 
the scene of the Assembly, where such deliberation as there was consisted of 
flattery and deception by ambassadors and foreigners. Now he gives exam-
ples, and these are examples of προοίμια as Aristophanes knows the term, 
flattering prefaces to a speech (635–40):
πρότερον δ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων οἱ πρέσβεις ἐξαπατῶντες
πρῶτον μὲν ἰοστεφάνους ἐκάλουν· κἀπειδὴ τοῦτό τις εἴποι,
 22. Reinders (2001, 156–59) studies these terms in the context of Aristophanes’ vocabulary for 
the Demos and class distinctions in general.
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εὐθὺς διὰ τοὺς στεφάνους ἐπ᾽ ἄκρων τῶν πυγιδίων ἐκάθησθε.
εἰ δέ τις ὑμᾶς ὑποθωπεύσας λιπαρὰς καλέσειεν Ἀθήνας,
ηὕρετο πᾶν ἂν διὰ τὰς λιπαράς, ἀφύων τιμὴν περιάψας.
Previously ambassadors from the allied cities tricked you,
first by calling you “violet-crowned”: at the moment anyone said that,
just “violet-crowned,” you’d sit at the tips of your asses.
And if anyone really buttered you up by saying “Glistening Athens,”
he’d get anything for that “glistening,” wrapping you in honor worthy of 
 sardines.
Aristophanes returns to the value of what he does and explains what is and 
what should be happening: he is demonstrating how democracy functions, 
so the allied states will learn about democracy, too, not flatter the Athenians 
in a dysfunctional deliberative environment (641–42):
ταῦτα ποιήσας πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος ὑμῖν γεγένηται,
καὶ τοῖς δήμοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, δείξας ὡς δημοκρατοῦνται.
For doing this, he deserves rich compensation,
and for showing the Demoi in the allied cities how democracy works.
After an extended example of the value that foreigners like the King of Persia 
recognize in the comic poet, he again declares how the deliberative process 
works (656–58):
φησὶν δ᾽ ὑμᾶς πολλὰ διδάξειν ἀγάθ᾽, ὥστ᾽ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι,
οὐ θωπεύων οὐδ᾽ ὑποτείνων μισθοὺς οὐδ᾽ ἐξαπατύλλων,
οὐδὲ πανουργῶν οὐδὲ κατάρδων, ἀλλὰ τὰ βέλτιστα διδάσκων.
He says he’ll teach you plenty of valuable things, so you’ll prosper,
Without flattering or dangling rewards or diddling you
Or resorting to any means or sprinkling you, but just teaching you the best.
For the pnigos, the chorus taunts Cleon and dares him to do what he can 
(659–64). Naming Cleon now identifies him as a bottleneck in the delib-
erative process, one who engages in the sort of flattery and deception Aris-
tophanes has been criticizing.
 It is ironic in retrospect that Thucydides puts in Cleon’s mouth some of 
these same metaphors to describe and berate the dysfunctional deliberative 
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process, but the parallel imagery toward different ends suggests the possibil-
ity that the terminology of spectators and dysfunctional deliberation was 
not original with either Thucydides or Aristophanes and, more significantly, 
that the authors had quite different perspectives on the nature of, and solu-
tion to, the problem of the deliberative process not yielding positive results. 
Although Thucydides does not explicitly state a solution to the problem, 
he offers a positive portrait of Pericles and his domination of the political 
processes, praising the fact that he led the Demos rather than the other way 
around (2.65.8–9). As we have already seen, comedy did not react to Pericles 
this way, indeed quite the opposite. Moreover, Aristophanes in Acharnians 
continues depicting Pericles as a damaging arrogant tyrant (524–34), con-
sistent with comedy’s criticisms during Pericles’ lifetime, so there is addi-
tional reason to believe that Thucydides and Aristophanes diverged in their 
representation and evaluation of politics and individuals. That both of them 
despised Cleon does not mean they did so from a similar political orienta-
tion. Thucydides describes Periclean democracy as such in name only, with 
the man himself prudently guiding Athens, but characterizes Cleon as an 
ignorant, violent fool, with the two leaders having in common only their 
ability to criticize the Demos and yet to compel it to act.23 Aristophanes 
finds the deliberative process in the Assembly (and the Council, as other 
plays show) to be the key to the democracy and trusts the Demos’ judgment. 
Dicaeopolis narrates Pericles’ role in the war as resulting from petty personal 
vengeance (524–30). Personal aggrandizement will be core to Aristophanes’ 
charges against Cleon in Knights, too. Both Pericles and Cleon eviscerate 
the deliberative process by driving the Demos along with flattery and con-
tempt rather than discussing policy. And while Aristophanes (at least satiri-
cally) promotes himself as a teacher of integrity and respect, and although 
Thucydides nowhere explicitly refers to comic playwrights, it seems a safe 
conclusion that the historian did not consider comedy a source of valuable 
advice for Athens in times of crisis.
 In the remaining sections of the parabasis, Aristophanes turns to the pro-
cesses in another anchor of democratic institutions, the courts. The elderly 
chorus members first complain about the rough and unjust treatment they 
suffer from young prosecutors. As is typical of comedy of the fifth century, 
rhetores are a sort of species of creature unleashed by the spectators (ὑπὸ 
νεανίσκων ἐᾶτε καταγελᾶσθαι ῥητόρων, 680), but in turn the prosecu-
 23. Pope (1988) argues that Thucydides criticized factionalism in Athens rather than democracy 
as an ideology or government. Yunis (1991) argues that Thucydides equates Periclean rhetoric with 
instruction of the Demos, in contrast to demagoguery, which is negative for the Demos and therefore 
criticized by Thucydides.
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tors hunt the weak old men with verbal round rocks and traps tripped with 
words (στρογγύλοις τοῖς ῥήμασιν . . . σκανδάληθρ᾽ . . . ἐπῶν, 686–88). 
After the generic criticism, Thucydides son of Milesias becomes the exam-
ple, again a reminder that Aristophanes and comedy stand in opposition to 
Pericles and his brand of politics, here to the point of sympathizing with 
Pericles’ most prominent opponent. As regards terminology, as in Banqueters 
(fr. 205), there seems no particular distinction between ῥήτορες (680) and 
συνήγοροι (685, 705), and Thucydides’ prosecutor uses substanceless talk 
(λάλῳ, 705), as does Alcibiades (καὶ λάλος χὠ Κλεινίου, 716).24 Aristo-
phanes will flesh out the issues in the courts fully three years later in Wasps.
 But for his play of the next year, Aristophanes keeps his focus on the 
Pnyx, the functioning of the Assembly and the man who wielded his power 
there.
RulIng dEmoS: Knights
Knights concentrates on the tensions and failures in the deliberative process 
every bit as much as, indeed more than, Acharnians, and Aristophanes is 
more emphatic about the key to successful deliberation, and the benefits 
that result from it. The focus is different, though, in that Knights bores in 
on components and participants who received only passing attention in 
Acharnians. Whereas in Acharnians the Prytaneis are tagged as the failures 
of the Assembly for being mere dithering spectators, now the collective 
will of the Demos becomes central to restoring the process. Cleon’s flattery 
and deception of the Demos is a topic the chorus mentions obliquely in 
the parabasis of Acharnians, but now Cleon becomes the critical barrier to 
a functional democracy. Success in the deliberative process for Dicaeopolis 
meant prosperity for him. Now the functional judgment of the Demos, not 
only at the Assembly but also in the Council, means Athens restored to the 
imperial greatness of its pre-Periclean days.
 The location of the deliberative process also remains crucial in Knights, 
and activity on the Pnyx in particular. Demos is introduced as belonging to 
the Pnyx as his deme (Δῆμος Πυκνίτης, 42).25 Cleon is projected as a giant 
monster with one leg in the Assembly (76). The dynamic of deliberation is 
 24. Cf. the entries for all these terms and individuals, plus that for Euathlos, in the Appendix. 
Like most editors, I follow Hamaker’s emendation of Κεφισοδήμῳ to Κεφισοδήμου in line 705.
 25. See Reinders (2001, 61–70, 123–30) for a breakdown of Aristophanes’ characterization of 
the Demos.
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problematic in ways similar to that described in Acharnians. Where there 
the Athenians are quick to judgment, quick to change their minds and easily 
deceived by flattery, in Knights, Demos is (41–43)
 ἀκράχολος,
Δῆμος Πυκνίτης, δύσκολον γερόντιον
ὑπόκωφον.
 quick to anger,
Demos of Pnyx, cranky, a little old man
and deaf.
The barrier to the deliberative process is the same deceptive flattery drama-
tized and criticized in Acharnians, but here it is Cleon in the form of the 
Paphlagonian slave who embodies this problem (ᾔκαλλ’ ἐθώπευ’ ἐκολάκευ’, 
ἐξηπάτα, “He fawns, sucks up, flatters, deceives” 48). There is no delibera-
tion or debate, not even from the race of rhetores, for Cleon stands ready 
and flicks them away (ἑστὼς ἀποσοβεῖ τοὺς ῥήτορας, 60). The slaves 
Demosthenes and Nicias are reduced to deliberating about the best way to 
commit suicide (80–100). Demosthenes’ solution is to get drunk, because 
then the rewards of good deliberation follow (90–94):
οἶνον σὺ τολμᾷς εἰς ἐπίνοιαν λοιδορεῖν;
οἴνου γὰρ εὕροις ἄν τι πρακτικώτερον;
ὁρᾷς, ὅταν πίνωσιν ἄνθρωποι, τότε
πλουτοῦσι διαπράττουσι, νικῶσιν δίκας,
εὐδαιμονοῦσιν, ὠφελοῦσι τοὺς φίλους.
You dare to dispute that wine leads to thinking?
Could you find anything more effective than wine?
You see, when people drink:
They get wealthy. They prosper. They win their cases.
They’re blessedly happy. They help their friends!
Lubricating the deliberative process yields victory and success. To make suc-
cess appear simultaneously traditional and democratic, Aristophanes makes 
it come in the form of the traditional formula of helping one’s friends and 
harming one’s enemies. He explicitly includes the ability to help friends, 
while harming enemies comes in the form of winning court cases against 
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them, using an established process via a democratic institution. Even drunk-
enness is a virtue if it leads to deliberation, and just starting to drink starts 
the mind on the process (99–100):
ἢν γὰρ μεθυσθῶ, πάντα ταυτὶ καταπάσω
βουλευματίων καὶ γνωμιδίων καὶ νοιδίων.
If I get drunk, I’ll sprinkle everything here
with little resolutions, thoughts and ideas.
Once again, deliberation is stalled in the Assembly but the process itself 
emerges elsewhere: for the moment, in the drunken talk among slaves in 
the house of Demos. Again as in Acharnians, once the deliberative process 
begins, translocated and wine-addled as it is here, progress begins immedi-
ately. Fortified with drink, Demosthenes has Nicias steal the Paphlagonian’s 
oracles. The oracles describe the succession of “sellers” who control the affairs 
of the city (ἕξει τῆς πόλεως τὰ πράγματα, 130). Cleon is characterized 
substantially by his speaking (137):26
ἅρπαξ, κεκράκτης Κυκλοβόρου φωνὴν ἔχων
A thief, a shrieker, with the voice of roaring Cycloborus.
When Cleon’s successor, the Sausage-Seller, arrives, Demosthenes describes 
his future as a decidedly antidemocratic leader (164–67):
τούτων ἁπάντων αὐτὸς ἀρχέλας ἔσει,
καὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καὶ τῶν λιμένων καὶ τῆς Πυκνός·
βουλὴν πατήσεις καὶ στρατηγοὺς κλαστάσεις,
δήσεις φυλάξεις, ἐν πρυτανείῳ λαικάσει.
You will be the “Commander of the People” for all of them,
over the Agora, the harbors and the Pnyx.
You’ll smash the Council! You’ll cut down the generals!
You’ll lock ’em up! You’ll jail ’em! You’ll suck cock in the Prytaneum!
 26. There may be vestiges of allusions to Cleon’s oratory earlier in the play. In 103, he is licking, 
λείξας, a common metaphor for embezzlement but also an easy pun on forms of λέγω (λείξας/
λέξας). In 115 he farts and snores, πέρδεται καὶ ῥέγκεται, sometimes a metaphor for oratory; cf. 
Major (2002). On the terms here, cf. the entry for the tongue in the Appendix.
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Succeeding Cleon means continuing the status quo, only more so. This sta-
tus quo, with Cleon flattering and deceiving the Demos, while he keeps any 
other deliberative input at bay, points the way to monarchy and tyranny. 
Aristophanes reinforces the undemocratic direction in tone and content. The 
unique form ἀρχέλας means “commander of the host,” but Aristophanes 
has just used τὰς στίχας  .  .  . τὰς τῶνδε τῶν λαῶν, “the rows of this 
host” (163), to refer to the spectators of the play in the theater, so the title 
here more likely is just picking up on λαῶν to say that he will be ruler of 
the assembly present.27 The reference to abusing the Council and imprison-
ing people emphasizes the antidemocratic nature of the power described, 
since the oath for the Council specifically forbade imprisoning Athenians 
(Dem. 24.14). Adding the Prytaneum to this sequence, when Cleon had just 
recently been granted seating and meals there, associates his privileges with 
aristocratic monarchy rather than with democratic reward.
 The conversation soon turns to the credentials of the rising star. Here a 
crucial new term makes its earliest appearance (191–93):
ἡ δημαγωγία γὰρ οὐ πρὸς μουσικοῦ
ἔτ’ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲ χρηστοῦ τοὺς τρόπους,
ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀμαθῆ βδελυρόν.
Leadership of the Demos doesn’t belong to the educated
man anymore or one beneficial in his manner,
but instead to the ignorant and disgusting.28
After working through the details of an oracle, Demosthenes echoes the 
sentiment (217–19):
τὰ δ’ ἄλλα σοι πρόσεστι δημαγωγικά,
φωνὴ μιαρά, γέγονας κακῶς, ἀγοραῖος εἶ·
ἔχεις ἅπαντα πρὸς πολιτείαν ἃ δεῖ.
You have the rest of what it takes to lead the Demos:
 27. Raaflaub (2003, 80) observes that the political associations of ἀρχή at this time are positive 
compared to those of tyranny, but the non-Attic contraction to –α throws the word into a different 
register; see, for example, Aeschylus, Persians 297, where it is used by the Persian Queen of Persian 
leaders.
 28. N. G. Wilson 2007a, 42 rightly obelizes line 193, and I have no better solution to offer, but, 
if his suspicion is right that a line has dropped out here, nothing suggests that an addition would alter 
the connotation of the key term under discussion here, δημαγωγία.
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a polluted voice, bad family, a background in the Agora.
You have everything necessary for civic life.
It seems that δημαγωγία and related terms are new at this time, in fact 
being attested for the first time in these two passages.29 The term does not 
surface in Aristophanes again until Frogs, nearly twenty years later, where 
it is linked to the unpleasant Archedemus (419). The only other instances 
in Greek comedy provide little help. First is someone who is “worthy to be 
a demagogue” at Eupolis fr. 99.23 from Demes. The identity of this dema-
gogue here and in the following lines remain the subject of much debate and 
uncertainty.30 The other instance is far from certain. Adesp. fr. 1094 consists 
of two strips of papyri containing the middle of some thirty-five lines, not 
enough to allow for continuous sense. The words that survive point to politi-
cal content (repeated use of πολίτης, δῆμος, etc.). Line 4 begins ]αγωγός, 
and δημ]αγωγός seems a reasonable restoration. This would be the only 
attested use of this exact noun in Old Comedy, but, in fact, it is not certain 
that this fragment comes from comedy at all.31
 The two instances in Knights do not come loaded with the negative con-
notation that the word later acquires of “demagoguery.” Rather, the appear-
ances seem to expect that the terms are neutral or even slightly positive and 
that Aristophanes is redefining them in a sharply negative way. The devel-
opment from and contrast with ἀρχέλας earlier is also significant. The two 
terms are parallel in one sense (ἀρχ- and -αγω indicating leadership; λάος 
and δῆμος indicating the communal body they lead). Aristophanes sets up 
ἀρχέλας as distinctly lofty and antidemocratic, which can then suggest an 
aristocratic leadership. The cynical definition of δημαγωγία is still operat-
ing in the context of antidemocratic leadership, but it additionally removes 
any possibility of aristocracy.
 Thus Aristophanes further denigrates Cleon’s influence. Pericles’ aristo-
cratic arrogance was bad enough for democracy, but Cleon has all the bad 
traits and represents nothing more than an ever-spiraling kakocracy. Such is 
the outcome in the absence of democratic deliberative process. Until Demos 
finally makes a meaningful judgment, Knights steams ahead in pursuit of the 
painfully logical ramifications of Cleon’s influence. The Knights, good and 
noble citizens who hate Cleon, along with the spectators, and even the gods 
will support the Sausage-Seller out of opposition to Cleon (225–29). Such 
 29. See Connor (1971, 109–10) for the history of δημαγωγός in the politics of Athens in the 
last third of the fifth century.
 30. Storey (2003, 149–60).
 31. Gigante (1957), but Austin notes in PCG that the extant text suits trochaic tetrameters, leav-
ing the possibility open for the text to belong to comedy.
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support seems paradoxical until one realizes Aristophanes’ underlying thesis: 
the only remedy for kakocracy is to restore the process. Without restoring 
the judgment and integrity of the deliberative process, overthrowing Cleon 
or any other poor leader will just result in even worse leadership, because 
that is all the current dysfunctional system permits. More than permitting 
the downward spiral, the current situation promotes and accelerates the ruin 
of Athens.
 The outsized agon that consumes much of the play from this point 
onward is devoted to dramatizing this point. Currently the system leads to 
ever-worsening leadership; only an alert Demos will stop the cycle. When 
the moment comes, it more than stops the cycle; it completely reverts 
Demos and Athens to the mighty city that repelled the Persians and amassed 
an empire without suffering the tyranny of Pericles.
 Once Cleon (nominally as the Paphlagonian) and the chorus of Knights 
arrive on stage (235–72), sparring in violence, flattery and deception domi-
nates the debate between the Sausage-Seller and Cleon. Distorted public 
language forms an intrinsic part of the problem.32 A number of comments 
address speaking, oratory and their role in the democratic process. One 
exchange confirms Cleon using shrieks and shouts to lead the city (the 
Sausage-Seller asks: καὶ κέκραγας, ὥσπερ ἀεὶ τὴν πόλιν καταστρέφεις; 
“So you shriek, as you always do when you tear the city down?” and Cleon 
responds: ἀλλ’ ἐγώ σε τῇ βοῇ . . . , ”I’ll use my shouting . . . ,” 274–75; 
cf. the same threat at καταβοήσομαι βοῶν σε, 286, and the entry in the 
Appendix). Demosthenes adds a comment that Cleon represents a decline 
even from Pericles (οὗ Περικλέης οὐκ ἠξιώθη πώποτε, “Even Pericles 
never deserved this,” 283).33 Another exchange indicates that deliberation 
will not be allowed to rise even to a verbal level (294–95):
Πα.
διαφορήσω σ’ εἴ τι γρύξει.
αλ.
κοπροφορήσω σ’ εἰ λαλήσεις.34
 32. See Simmons (2012) for more on the terminology Aristophanes uses to characterize Cleon 
here.
 33. On the points of contact between references to Cleon’s honor in Knights and inscriptional 
evidence, see Rhodes (2010, 160).
 34. Wilson (2007a, 45) follows Blaydes’ emendation to λακήσει here in place of λαλήσεις, say-
ing: “I prefer to see in the text a more vigorous term that can be traded as an insult.” As a principle, 
this is fine, but it does not suit the context here, where the verb should be parallel to γρύξει in the 
previous line. Moreover, λακάω is not attested with reference to aggressive or insulting behavior 
in Aristophanes. In line 167 above, it is part of the Sausage-Seller’s imagined luxurious life in the 
Prytaneum, and at Th. 57, it is something Agathon enjoys doing. The point here should be that, if 
70 Chapter 3 
Paphlagonian
I’ll plunder you, if you just gurgle.
Sausage-Seller
I’ll shit you under, if you babble.
Cleon’s nonverbal shrieking replaces even any vocalizing aimed toward delib-
eration. The chorus provides a vivid image, amplifying Cleon to a supersized 
monster over the Greek world (303–12):
ὦ μιαρὲ καὶ βδελυρὲ κρᾶκτα,35 τοῦ σοῦ θράσους
πᾶσα μὲν γῆ πλέα, πᾶσα δ’ ἐκκλησία,
καὶ τέλη καὶ γραφαὶ καὶ δικαστήρι,’ ὦ
βορβοροτάραξι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἅπασαν ἡμῶν ἀνατετυρβακώς,
ὅστις ἡμῶν τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐκκεκώφωκας βοῶν.
You polluted, disgusting shrieker, with your boldness
the whole earth is full, the entire Assembly,
the taxes, the lawsuits, the courts.
Mudthrasher, you’ve churned our whole city into chaos.
You’ve made Athens deaf from your shouting!
They continue shortly, inverting a crucial bit of political terminology 
(324–25):
ἆρα δῆτ’ οὐκ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἐδήλους ἀναίδειαν, ἥπερ μόνη
προστατεῖ ῥητόρων;
From the start, didn’t you show shamelessness,
The only “Protector of the Politicians”?
Given that Cleon earlier was swatting rhetores away from Demos, it seems 
odd that here it is a problem for them to be protected or that Cleon might 
be party to shielding them. The key to the chorus’s charge, however, is the 
perversion of the title, which should be προστάτης τοῦ δήμου, “protector 
of the Demos.” W. R. Connor argues that the term was fresh in the 420s and 
Cleon even tries to engage in his normal blabber, the Sausage-Seller will stop him. Accordingly, I have 
retained the MSS reading here.
 35. See Parker (1997, 160–63) for the metrical problems here with the MSS’s καὶ (κε)κράκτα, 
for which Meineke’s κρᾶκτα is an imperfect emendation. Depending on the depth of the corruption 
here, it is possible that the -κρα- root is itself corrupt, which would affect my reading slightly, but no 
satisfactory solution is available.
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one a leader like Cleon could use to suggest he was more devoted to the city 
than to his circle of friends, as an aristocrat was prone to be, but the term 
nonetheless nervously has associations that such a “protector” could leap 
for monarchy or tyranny.36 If Cleon used the term positively of himself, as 
seems likely, Aristophanes has reason not to use it, or rather to use it only 
in a negative form. Having the Knights make this charge and making them 
criticize the lack of a προστάτης τοῦ δήμου also draws support for the 
Demos from an aristocratic class. This is shrewd, for it gives the Knights 
more than a personal motivation for objecting to Cleon, and thus Aristo-
phanes depicts an allegiance between the Knights and the mass Demos but 
does so without denigrating their nobility or elite status. Once again, then, 
Aristophanes embeds the idea that restoring the authority of the Demos is 
the goal, while Cleon is an impediment to such restoration.
 In lieu of προστάτης τοῦ δήμου, tainted by its association with 
Cleon, Aristophanes seems to prefer a more venerable variation on it, the 
ἐπίτροπος τοῦ δήμου, “trustee of the people,” implying that a leader 
should be a trusted administrator of the will of the Demos.37 The Sausage-
Seller is amazed at the idea that he might undertake such a responsibility 
(212), and the phrase anchors the mock solemnity of the prophecy that the 
Sausage-Seller will one day guide the city (427). Later in the play, Demos for 
the first time threatens to discharge Cleon, saying he will no longer be the 
Demos’ steward (ταμίας, 948), and Cleon, now in the presence of Demos 
and hoping to conceal his true ambitions, tries to hold onto the position by 
using the same subservient language (εἰ μή μ’ ἐάσεις ἐπιτροπεύειν, 949).38
 But earlier in the play, as the agon mounts, the Knights raise the stakes 
still more with their next charge against Cleon (326–27):
ᾖ σὺ πιστεύων ἀμέργεις τῶν ξένων τοὺς καρπίμους,
πρῶτος ὤν· ὁ δ’ Ἱπποδάμου λείβεται θεώμενος.
Trusting in that shamelessness, you milk the fruitful of the foreigners,
You, “Number One,” while the son of Hippodamus39 is left watching.
 36. Connor (1971, 110–15).
 37. Connor (1971, 127 n. 68). Thrasymachus (85 B1 DK) uses the term favorably when referring 
to the good government of Athens by its elders in the past. Cf. the praise of the past rule of Athens 
by the chorus at Knights 565–80. Aristotle, Rhet. 3.8.1408b25 has children cry out that a freedman 
will choose Cleon as his ἐπίτροπος. In the Council, there was the presiding but limited office of 
ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων (Arist. Ath. Pol. 44.1); cf. Rhodes (1972, 23–24).
 38. Cf. Peace 648, where the city misses its ἐπίτροπος.
 39. N. G. Wilson finds the metrical responsion here and the identification of Hippodamus prob-
lematic (2007a, 45–46), but Sommerstein (1980, 47–48) makes a convincing case for the identifica-
tion.
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Several strands are woven together here, each belonging to broader ideo-
logical preferences Aristophanes trumpets more explicitly in other passages. 
First, the son of Hippodamus, Archeptolemus, is elsewhere in the play cited 
for proposing peace with the Spartans (794). In addition, although Archep-
tolemus was of non-Athenian extraction (for this and probably for lobbying 
efforts on behalf of other foreigners, he is linked to them here), he was a 
rare case of a foreigner holding citizenship in Athens. As Aristophanes does 
regularly, he expects that advice and deliberation from an inclusive body, 
including the voices of non-Athenians, are beneficial to Athens.40 Finally, 
Archeptolemus is marginalized as a spectator, the recurring metaphor of 
an individual who is present but plays no meaningful role in policy delib-
erations, although here prevented against his will. Having tacitly lamented 
the absence of the authority of the Demos and implied the need for more 
inclusive deliberation, the chorus can cheer the only option left, the Sausage-
Seller as the new leader. “Show us how worthless a decent upbringing is” 
(νῦν δεῖξον ὡς οὐδὲν λέγει τὸ σωφρόνως τραφῆναι, 332), they com-
ment sardonically.41 The Sausage-Seller and Cleon in turn spar for the right 
to speak and over the ability to do so (335–43). Cleon offers a dismissive 
image of someone trying to participate in the deliberative process (344–50):
ἰδοὺ λέγειν. καλῶς γ’ ἂν οὖν σὺ πρᾶγμα προσπεσόν σοι
ὠμοσπάρακτον παραλαβὼν μεταχειρίσαιο χρηστῶς.
ἀλλ’ οἶσθ’ ὅπερ πεπονθέναι δοκεῖς; ὅπερ τὸ πλῆθος.
εἴ που δικίδιον εἶπας εὖ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου,
τὴν νύκτα θρυλῶν καὶ λαλῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς σεαυτῷ,
ὕδωρ τε πίνων κἀπιδεικνὺς τοὺς φίλους τ’ ἀνιῶν
ᾤου δυνατὸς εἶναι λέγειν. ὦ μῶρε, τῆς ἀνοίας.
Look at that “speaking”! It’d be just great if some issue fell to you.
You’d get it all torn up and raw and treat it just fine!
You know what I think happened to you? What happens to the masses.
If you do a good job speaking for some little case sometime against a 
 resident foreigner,
chattering all night and blathering to yourself in the streets,
 40. Cf. Chapter 5 on Lysistrata for a more extended example of this principle. Sommerstein 
(1980, 48) also notes that Archeptolemus is a rare politician whose actions elicit sympathy from Aris-
tophanes, the others being Demosthenes (whom even Sommerstein acknowledges seems to have been 
a democrat, if anything) and possibly Thrasybulus.
 41. On the aristocratic associations of σωφρών, see Neil (1901, 204), Dover (1974, 56–60, 
66–69, 119–21) and Papageorgiou (2004a).
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drinking water, rehearsing, annoying your friends,
you think you’re capable of giving a speech! You moron! What an idea!
The passage provides a rare vivid image of a speaker preparing, and also a 
rare acknowledgment of the craft and preparation involved. Aristophanes 
also laces it with antidemocratic expressions. Rather than δῆμος, Cleon uses 
πλῆθος, consistent with an oligarch’s view of the Demos.42 He describes a 
minor case against a metic, when the chorus has just recently established 
and defended the role of foreigners in advising Athens.43 In general, Cleon 
dismisses the ability of anyone to speak meaningfully on public policy, a 
right central to the democracy and one defended by Aristophanes (e.g., 
Ach. 557–65) and enshrined in the twin democratic principles of parrhesia 
and isegoria.44 The Sausage-Seller responds to this image by denigrating the 
substance of Cleon’s own oratory and reiterating the antidemocratic result 
(351–52):
τί δαὶ σὺ πίνων τὴν πόλιν πεποίηκας, ὥστε νυνὶ
ὑπὸ σοῦ μονωτάτου κατεγλωττισμένην σιωπᾶν;
So what do you drink to handle the city and make it so that now
It’s silent from being tongued down by your singularity?
A silent city means the democratic deliberative process is not taking place, 
the only noise coming from Cleon, and his weapon of choice, the tongue, 
regularly indicates poor or troublesome language.45 To outdo Cleon, the 
Sausage-Seller boasts he will use his throat instead to dominate the rhetores 
(λαρυγγιῶ τοὺς ῥήτορας, 358).
 So far the contested space for deliberation is the Pnyx and the occasion 
the Assembly. In Acharnians, the Prytaneis from the Council received criti-
cism for their apathy toward the business of the Assembly, but the Council 
itself was never mentioned. In Knights, the rivalry between Cleon and the 
Sausage-Seller now expands beyond the Assembly. “I’ll jump on the Council 
and stir it by force” (ἐγὼ δ’ ἐπεισπηδῶν γε τὴν βουλὴν βίᾳ κυκήσω, 
363), promises Cleon as part of his assurance he will dominate the city 
more than the Sausage-Seller can (cf. the promise at 166 that the Sausage-
 42. Connor (1971, 203); Reinders (2001, 39–55).
 43. Whitehead (1977, 39–41) surveys Old Comedy’s references to metics, limited as they are, 
and finds them, on balance, benevolent.
 44. On these terms, see Raaflaub (1980, 11–23).
 45. See Chapter 2 and the Appendix.
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Seller will dominate the Council). In the midst of ever-mounting threats of 
physical domination from the Sausage-Seller, Cleon claims protection in his 
control of the Council (395–96):
οὐ δέδοιχ’ ὑμᾶς, ἕως ἂν ζῇ τὸ βουλευτήριον
καὶ τὸ τοῦ Δήμου πρόσωπον μακκοᾷ καθήμενον.
I’m not afraid of you as long as the Council House lives
And the face of the Demos sits booby-faced.
Cleon has now laid claim to two of the three democratic institutions where 
the Demos is supposed to promulgate its will, the Council and Assembly. 
After more sparring, Cleon again invokes the Council as the agon is about 
to move there (475–79):
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὐτίκα μάλ’ ἐς βουλὴν ἰὼν
ὑμῶν ἁπάντων τὰς ξυνωμοσίας ἐρῶ,
καὶ τὰς ξυνόδους τὰς νυκτερινὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει,
καὶ πάνθ’ ἃ Μήδοις καὶ βασιλεῖ ξυνόμνυτε,
καὶ τἀκ Βοιωτῶν ταῦτα συντυρούμενα.
Right now I’ll go to the Council!
I’ll tell them about all y’all’s conspiracies,
the nighttime meetings against the city,
and everything you swore to the Persians and their King,
and being thick in cheese46 with the Boeotians!
 As the Sausage-Seller and Cleon leave the stage to resume their conflict at 
the Council itself, the chorus of Knights devotes part of its parabasis to praise 
of their ancestors for their military glory on behalf of Athens (565–80). They 
add specifically that the generals of old would never have stooped to ask-
ing Cleon’s father for state maintenance in the Prytaneum. In addition to 
attacking Cleon’s privilege yet again, they set up the image of the glorious 
ancestors who will be invoked at the end of the play when Demos is restored 
and rejuvenated.47
 46. Pollux 6.130; among many phrases Pollux lists to provoke the Demos (πρὸς τὸν 
θορυβοῦντα τὸ δημόσιον), he objects to this metaphor when Demosthenes uses it (19.295), as 
here, to indicate sedition.
 47. See Edmunds (1987a 253–56 = 1987b, 39–41) and Hubbard (1991, 78–83) for more de-
tailed analyses of the ideological dynamics in this section.
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 Meanwhile, the contest before the Council might inspire hope that some 
substantial deliberation will ensue. The Demos is absent from the proceed-
ings, however, and the Prytaneis behave very much as they did at the Assem-
bly in Acharnians: responsive only to deception and flattery, taken in more 
by show than by discussion and deliberation. Within the Sausage-Seller’s 
report of the meeting are some important characterizations of speaking and 
oratory. When Cleon arrives, he is letting loose with thundering words, 
reminiscent of the negative portrayal of Pericles as an arrogant, domineering 
Olympian (ὁ δ’ ἄρ’ ἔνδον ἐλασίβροντ’ ἀναρρηγνὺς ἔπη, 626). It is no 
surprise that, in order to outdo Cleon, the Sausage-Seller prays for boldness 
(θράσος, 637; cf. the chorus’s image of Cleon’s θράσος filling the world at 
304) and a tongue (637; cf. 352 of Cleon using his tongue to subdue Ath-
ens, Chapter 2 and the Appendix). For his first utterance, the Sausage-Seller 
shrieks (ἀνέκραγον, 642; cf. 137, 274 and 303 of Cleon). He wins the 
Council’s attention, not with policy or discussion, but by deception in the 
form of good news about cheap sardines. The Council responds by gaping 
(ἐκεχήνεσαν, 651), just as the parabasis of Acharnians described the Athe-
nians doing in response to flattery (635). Like the Prytaneis at the Assembly 
in Acharnians, the members of the Council are more interested in trivialities 
and corruption, so when Cleon desperately tries to regain the attention of 
the Council by saying a Spartan ambassador comes to seek a peace treaty, 
the members remain fixated on the sardines and make their own shriek this 
time, for the Prytaneis to adjourn the meeting (ἐκεκράγεσαν, 674). By 
these means, supplemented by tossing in a bribe of coriander to season to 
sardines, the Sausage-Seller declares victory. It is a victory over the Council 
as much as it is over Cleon.
 Cleon returns unfazed, and more sparring ensues as the competition 
staggers toward the next phase of the agon. Cleon swears he will ruin the 
Sausage-Seller, invoking the honorary seating he enjoys because of his vic-
tory at Pylos (702). The Sausage-Seller retorts (703–4):
ἰδοὺ προεδρίαν· οἷον ὅψομαί σ’ ἐγὼ
ἐκ τῆς προεδρίας ἔσχατον θεώμενον.
Privileged seating! I look forward to seeing you
out of the front row and watching from the back!
In response to Cleon enjoying the sort of seats even the Prytaneis scramble 
for and being a leading participant in activities, the Sausage-Seller inverts 
both privileges by sending him to the back and making him a spectator, 
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a nonparticipant. The citation of Cleon’s privileges, again mentioning the 
Prytaneum in a few lines (709), heightens the distance between Cleon and 
the humble service and victory of the Knights’ ancestors celebrated in the 
parabasis. Immediately, the rivalry turns to the Demos (710–23). After the 
keenly felt absence of the Demos and the consequences of the absence of 
his judgment, this section of the battle promises to be the climax. Whoever 
holds sway over the Demos undeniably holds the power.
 When Demos emerges, both rivals immediately engage in the flattery 
that has so far proven effective in place of deliberation. Familiar character-
izations of the broken deliberative process recur here, from the shouting 
(728) typical of Cleon to Cleon’s claim he is being bullied by the younger 
generation (731). Cleon calls for a meeting of the Assembly so Demos can 
judge his most devoted lover: Cleon or the Sausage-Seller. Translocation is 
again an issue. In Acharnians the deliberations of the Assembly at the Pnyx 
were dysfunctional, but deliberations could occur outside of it, such as at 
Dicaeopolis’ home. The Sausage-Seller indicates the same dynamic holds 
now. The collective judgment of the Demos is operative at home but not 
on the Pnyx (752–55):
οἴμοι κακοδαίμων, ὡς ἀπόλωλ’. ὁ γὰρ γέρων
οἴκοι μὲν ἀνδρῶν ἐστι δεξιώτατος,
ὅταν δ’ ἐπὶ ταυτησὶ καθῆται τῆς πέτρας,
κέχηνεν ὥσπερ ἐμποδίζων ἰσχάδας.
Oh poor me! I’m dead. The old man
At home is the smartest man around,
But when he’s sitting on that rock there,
He gapes48 like he’s mashing dried figs.
The discursive debate that follows on the Pnyx fails as substantive delibera-
tion and reiterates the established cancers on the political process.49 Cleon 
brags of the violent and distorted public service by which he dominates 
the Council (774–76). In response, the Sausage-Seller reminds Demos how 
he won victory at Marathon, which should have provided better material 
 48. “Gaping” is a repeated metaphor for lack of meaningful participation in the deliberative 
process. See Ach. 635, 651 above; and Kn. 1119 and Wasps 695 and 1007 below.
 49. Rhodes (2010) details the points of contact between this scene and documentary evidence for 
the procedures of the Assembly, establishing both that Aristophanes was familiar with the actual pro-
ceedings of the Assembly and that the scene reflects events there. Cf. Chapter 5 and Haldane (1965) 
for an even more detailed example from Thesmophoriazusae.
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for tongues now (782). Cleon keeps any overtures for peace away from the 
Demos (794–96). Out of jealousy, Cleon investigates the activities of ass-
holes to prevent active ones from generating rhetores (878–80). Conversation 
with a pressed olive leads to clearer thinking than do the corrupt proceedings 
on the Pnyx (805–8).
 On the other hand, a few lines begin to reveal the true principles of suc-
cess, as Aristophanes depicts them, which consistently refer to the glory days 
of Athens’ ascendancy as the democracy that repelled the Persians and built 
an empire, featuring the heroes of the pre-Periclean age. When the Sausage-
Seller invokes the martial prowess of Marathon and Salamis, the Demos asks 
if he belongs to the family of the tyrant killer Harmodius (781–86). While 
tyranny and monarchy are the enemies of democracy, for the Demos to rule 
all of Greece is a positive and laudable goal (797–801). Both Cleon and the 
Sausage-Seller agree on Themistocles as a figure who benefited Athens greatly 
(812–19).50
 After the contest in oracles comes to a draw (997–1108), Demos declares 
that he will hand the reins of the Pnyx over to whichever of them can do 
more for him (ὁπότερος ἂν σφῷν εὖ με μᾶλλον ἂν ποιῇ, / τούτῳ 
παραδώσω τῆς Πυκνὸς τὰς ἡνίας, 1108–9). As a setup for this last 
round in the contest, Aristophanes reinforces some basic vocabulary for the 
popular political order. The chorus of Knights addresses the Demos, making 
explicit that the absolute power of the Demos is a good thing (1111–14):
ὦ Δῆμε, καλήν γ’ ἔχεις ἀρχήν, ὅτε πάντες ἄνθρωποι δεδίασί σ’ 
 ὥσπερ ἄνδρα τύραννον.
Demos, your rule is glorious when all people fear you like a tyrant.
The problem is not the rule of the Demos, only the obstructions to the 
Demos’ good judgment (1115–20):
ἀλλ’ εὐπαράγωγος εἶ,
θωπευόμενός τε χαίρεις κἀξαπατώμενος,
πρὸς τόν τε λέγοντ’ ἀεὶ
κέχηνας· ὁ νοῦς δέ σου
παρὼν ἀποδημεῖ.
But you tend to lose your way,
 50. Cf. the discussion of Braun (2000) in Chapter 4.
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when you enjoy being flattered
and deceived.
You always gape when someone is speaking,
away from home when you are right there.
The deception, flattery and gaping are familiar motifs by this point, and the 
closing words pick up the metaphor of translocation. The pun on the word 
Demos (ἀπο-δημ-εῖ) reinforces the idea that the judgment of the Demos is 
missing from the location where productive deliberation is supposed to take 
place. For the first time, however, Aristophanes turns the tide by dramatiz-
ing the will of the Demos as superior to the “protector of the Demos” who 
seems to be in power (1121–30):
νοῦς οὐκ ἔνι ταῖς κόμαις
ὑμῶν, ὅτε μ’ οὐ φρονεῖν
νομίζετ’· ἐγὼ δ’ ἑκὼν
ταῦτ’ ἠλιθιάζω.
αὐτός τε γὰρ ἥδομαι
βρύλλων τὸ καθ’ ἡμέραν,
κλέπτοντά τε βούλομαι
τρέφειν ἕνα προστάτην
τοῦτον δ,’ ὅταν ᾖ πλέως,
ἄρας ἐπάταξα.
You’ve lost the brains under your hair
if you don’t recognize I’m sane. I willingly
act stupidly like this.
Because I like
crying for my daily sustenance
and I want to fatten up the thief,
that singular “Protector.”
And when he’s full,
I’ll sacrifice him on the altar.
Commentators have rightly found this sudden assertion surprising, because 
Demos has not hinted at this awareness previously, and because Demos will 
again have to shake off his doldrums later in the play, but they have missed 
how the statement is crucial and logical in the resolution to the problem 
Aristophanes has presented.51 Repeatedly, in different ways, Aristophanes has 
 51. Reinders (2001, 170–92) reviews the problem and concludes, like many scholars, that Aris-
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stated and dramatized that the only means to Athens’ prosperity is rule by 
the judgment of the Demos via the deliberative processes of the democracy. 
He has been paving the way for the play’s conclusion where the rejuvenated 
Demos will restore Athens’ pre-Periclean, pre-demagogic, pre-“Protector” 
glory. At some point, the Demos needs to participate and lead by rendering 
his judgment, so Aristophanes simply has Demos assert his awareness and 
leadership. It may not be fine dramatic construction, but it is ideologically 
consistent and logical. Next, the second half of the exchange reinforces the 
idea and the vocabulary. The chorus of Knights praises the shrewdness of 
Demos with a pun (πυκνότης, 1132, punning on πυκνίτης, the mock 
demotic from line 42) and alludes to the title of προστάτης τοῦ δήμου, 
which Demos had invoked, but here they praise his fattening up of supposed 
public servants (as if they were literally slaves of the Demos) on the Pnyx 
(δημοσίους τρέφεις/ἐν τῇ πυκνί, 1136–37). Demos then again asserts his 
awareness of the politicians’ larceny and that he will use audits to force 
return of their ill-gotten gains (1145–50).
 For the next stage of the agon, even when Demos does not make explicit 
his awareness of the flattery of the competitors, every line is consistent with 
being delivered ironically, sardonically and knowingly. As the agon resumes, 
Cleon and the Sausage-Seller engage in a contest of flattery (1151–1208).52 
After a series of spiraling offers, Demos resets the decision for the final time 
(1209–10):
τῷ δῆτ’ ἂν ὑμᾶς χρησάμενος τεκμηρίῳ
δόξαιμι κρίνειν τοῖς θεαταῖσιν σοφῶς;
So now, what evidence seems best to the spectators for me to use to judge 
you wisely?
 For the first time in either Acharnians or Knights, all the elements are 
together for proper and successful deliberation. There are spectators to the 
speeches, but now the Demos will render wise judgment on the Pnyx. In 
rapid succession, Demos investigates what each suitor holds back in his bas-
ket for himself (1211–25), ignores Cleon’s defense that he stole for the good 
of the city (1226–29), and the oracle about Cleon’s downfall is confirmed 
(1230–52). The Sausage-Seller takes the crown from Cleon, but the real 
tophanes voices serious criticism of the Demos but mutes and calibrates it.
 52. Note that at 1196–98 the Sausage-Seller distracts Cleon by imagining some foreign ambas-
sadors are nearby, ready for robbing, again playing on Cleon’s propensity for abusing, rather than 
capitalizing on, the contributions of foreigners in the deliberative process.
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climax is the assertion of, and subservience to, Demos and his judgment. 
The Sausage-Seller explains his role this way (1261–63):
καὶ μὴν ἐγώ σ’, ὦ Δῆμε, θεραπεύσω καλῶς,
ὥσθ’ ὁμολογεῖν σε μηδέν’ ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ
ἰδεῖν ἀμείνω τῇ Κεχηναίων πόλει.
But now I will serve you well, Demos,
so you can agree that you have never seen anyone
better for the city of Gawkers.
Aristophanes shifts the vocabulary now. Rather than flatter (θωπεύω, e.g., 
Ach. 635–39; Kn. 48, 1116), the Sausage-Seller will serve the Demos (θερα-
πεύσω, which Cleon laid sole claim to doing at 59 and 799), but with the 
crucial difference that the Demos’ judgment is the ultimate arbiter, even if 
the Athenians are still, satirically, the same passive gawkers at the Assembly.
 The final scene in the play displays the thoroughly positive results from 
the restoration of Demos’ judgment to the deliberative process. The Demos 
is now the peer of Aristides and Miltiades of the old days of Marathon (1325, 
1334).53 Athens can now be violet-crowned without flattery (ἰοστέφανοι, 
1329). Monarchy or tyranny in an individual is to be fought and resisted, 
but tyrant, monarch and king are welcome attributes of Demos ruling 
Greece (τύραννον, 1114; τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑμῖν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆσδε 
μόναρχον, 1330; ὦ βασιλεῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, 1333).54
 Because the language of public discourse was the primary sign of the 
dysfunctional deliberative system, it is the first item to distinguish the newly 
rejuvenated and restored Demos from his former failures. In response to 
Demos’ initial inquiry about how he used to behave, Agoracritus explains 
with a by-now familiar image of flattery (1340–44):
πρῶτον μέν, ὁπότ’ εἴποι τις ἐν τ’ ἠκκλησίᾳ,
“ὦ Δῆμ’, ἐραστής εἰμι σὸς φιλῶ τέ σε
καὶ κήδομαί σου καὶ προβουλεύω μόνος,”
τούτοις ὁπότε χρήσαιτό τις προοιμίοις,
ἀνωρτάλιζες κἀκερουτίας.
First, whenever anyone in the Assembly said,
 53. On such invocations generally, see Rhodes (2011a).
 54. The view presented here generally agrees with those of Henderson (2003, esp. 168) and Kal-
let (2003). For a contrary view (that Demos as Tyrannos is pejorative), see Raaflaub (2003).
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“Demos! I’m your lover and I love you,
and I’m the only one who worries and makes your proposals!”
Whenever someone used these types of greetings [prooimia],
you’d flap your wings and shake your horns.
Agoracritus goes on to reprise the issues of deception (1345, 1357) and 
deafness to reason (1347–48), familiar from earlier passages in the play and 
in Acharnians. Now, under the rejuvenated Demos, rhetores and synegoroi 
will no longer ply their deceitful ways, not because they will be blocked 
from speaking, but because Demos will render sensible judgment on them 
(1350–63). A series of policy reforms follows (1364–95). One specifically 
addresses the shifty talk of young provocateurs (1375–80):
τὰ μειράκια ταυτὶ λέγω τἀν τῷ μύρῳ,
ἃ τοιαδὶ στωμύλλεται καθήμενα
“σοφός γ’ ὁ Φαίαξ δεξιῶς τ’ οὐκ ἀπέθανεν.
συνερτικὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ περαντικός,
καὶ γνωμοτυπικὸς καὶ σαφὴς καὶ κρουστικός,
καταληπτικός τ’ ἄριστα τοῦ θορυβητικοῦ.”
I mean those punks there in the myrrh,
who sit and mouth off like this:
“That really wise Phaeax avoids death so cleverly.
Because he’s cooperative, conclusive,
idea-impressitive, clear, strikitive,
and most repressative of the provocative.”
Little is known of Phaeax,55 but the repeated application of the termination 
-ικός is typical of comedy’s method for dealing with unorthodox language. 
While the termination is an established and productive one in Greek, most 
authors apply it to inanimate or abstract nouns, while comedy applies such 
words derogatorily of people.56 The next few lines further illustrate how 
the language of the Demos differs from that of uppity, elite young speakers 
(1381–83):
Ἀλ.
οὔκουν καταδακτυλικὸς σὺ τοῦ λαλητικοῦ;
 55. On Phaeax, see Eupolis frr. 2 and 116; cf. Storey (2003, 73) and the entry in the Appendix. 
On λαλοί young men among the myrrh, see also Pherecrates fr. 70.
 56. Peppler (1910).
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Δημ.
μὰ Δί’ ἀλλ’ ἀναγκάσω κυνηγετεῖν ἐγὼ
τούτους ἅπαντας, παυσαμένους ψηφισμάτων.
Agoracritus
So you’re going to be fingerative up their talkative?
Demos
No, I’ll make them go hunting
and keep them all from their propositions.
Finally, Demos welcomes in the Thirty-Year Peace Treaties, quite the oppo-
site of Cleon keeping peace offers out of reach of deliberation, and terms 
which, in Acharnians, Dicaeopolis could negotiate only outside the Assem-
bly. Where Dicaeopolis reaped the benefits of his peace negotiations indi-
vidually, now the collective Demos will take them to the entire countryside 
(1394). A democratic deliberative process, clear speaking, and widespread 
peace: such are the benefits of the Demos asserting its proper judgment in 
the Assembly. And finally, in the last lines of the script as we have it, there 
is a final translocation: Cleon will be relegated to outside the city’s gates in 
view of the foreigners he once tried to mutilate (1407–8).
goIng To ThE SouRCE: 
lAnguAgE And SChoolIng In ThE clouds
Aristophanes devoted at least a fair share of the plays of the first five years of 
his career to the nature and purpose of civic language, especially in the delib-
erative process.57 It is logical enough, then, that he should focus a play on 
the anterior processes that promoted such language and prepared speakers 
for deliberative occasions. Aristophanes lays claim to novelty in his play on 
the topic, Clouds, though not specifically for exploring language education. 
A number of plays from the same few years that seem to involve teachers 
 57. Banqueters of 427 certainly explored the issue (fr. 205). Babylonians of 426 may well have, 
but the fragments are too scanty and unclear to determine this. Merchant Ships cites the prosecutor 
Euathlos (fr. 424) and could come from this period. Farmers, which also seems to belong to these 
years, mentions Gorgias and Philippus (fr. 118). A bit of dialogue (fr. 101) reveals that singing (ᾄδειν) 
can mean a poor defense in court. Cf. Polyzelus fr. 13, “but a voice neither too bitter (τρυγερούς) or 
too sweet,” which seems to have more to do with drama than with rhetoric. See Hall (2006, 328–35) 
on τρύξ in drama.
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and students could suggest that education was in vogue as a topic among 
comic playwrights in the late 420s.58
 The revised history of early rhetoric has meant reconfiguring the context 
of language training in fifth-century Athens.59 First, the new history makes 
clear that there was no institutionalized training in formal speaking, whether 
called ῥητορική or not, nor was there an expectation or requirement of 
such training for elite public life.60 Because of the lack of a more traditional 
aristocratic education, knowing art and letters (μουσική and γράμματα) 
was an issue, as it is for the Sausage-Seller in Knights (188–89), but adding 
the new wave of rational, clever speech techniques was a prompt for comic 
ridicule, not a reflection of the new expected or required training. In this 
sense, the depiction of Socrates’ Phrontisterion in Clouds can be deceptive. It 
is a home and location for Socrates and his esoteric followers, but it is not an 
institution, any more than is the house of Callias, sponsor of itinerant intel-
lectuals stopping over in Athens, in Eupolis’ Kolakes or Plato’s Protagoras. 
Typical instead is the specialized διδάσκαλος, such as Prodamus (Eupolis 
fr. 17 from Aiges; cf. the metaphor of the grammatodidaskalon at Eupolis fr. 
192.13–15) or the unidentified διδάσκαλος in Aristophanes’ Banqueters 
(frr. 206, 225). In the fourth century comedy will reflect recognized stereo-
types of students of philosophical schools such as the Pythagoreans or Cyn-
ics, and institutions like the Academy and Lyceum.61 In the meantime there 
are enough individual thinkers and teachers to form a chorus in Amipsias’ 
Konnos (fr. 11), but the institutions where the emerging rhetoric appears on 
the comic stage remain those of the political arena. In Clouds in particular, 
Aristophanes explores language training en route to his full-fledged satire of 
the court system in Wasps of the following year.
 While Aristophanes’ claims to novelty should be interpreted with cau-
tion, some aspects of the creative novelty of Clouds have been underappreci-
ated by scholars, especially when it comes to “rhetorical” language.62 Already 
in Knights Aristophanes engaged in transforming terms for politically promi-
nent speakers, with an end toward redefining them as ethically desirable 
or undesirable.63 He engages in the same process in Clouds but on a larger 
 58. On Eupolis’ Aiges, Clouds, and comedies about education at this time, see Storey (2003, 
67–74).
 59. Schiappa (2003, 157–71).
 60. Morgan (2007, 304–8).
 61. Olson (2007, 238–51).
 62. See Major (2006) on Aristophanes’ claims to novelty, among other things, in the revised por-
tion of Clouds’ parabasis (518–62). Cf. Platter (2007, 84–107) and Biles (2011, 167–210).
 63. See discussion above of prostates, epitropos, etc.
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scale and so thoroughly that it can seem as though he is straightforwardly 
dramatizing or reflecting established usage, when in fact he is reconstitut-
ing terminology and reevaluating people involved in the exploration of, and 
training in, language use.
 Aristophanes’ depiction of Socrates and the Sophists in Clouds is almost 
always treated as ancillary evidence for a characterization of the Older Soph-
ists derived primarily from other sources, mostly Plato. Even in studies sym-
pathetic to the Sophists’ projects, the dynamic transformation in the play 
is underappreciated.64 Since an overwhelming majority of the testimony 
about the Older Sophists derives from sources a generation later at the ear-
liest, there is little to provide precise cultural context for the impact of the 
Sophists in the late 420s. Still, this is not sufficient reason to consider Aris-
tophanes’ depiction primarily as a mirror of popular perception or even of 
a widespread one. In fact, the internal dynamic of the play suggests that 
Aristophanes was working against a less hostile perception of them. At the 
very least, we should, with the benefit of hindsight, realize that Clouds is 
the earliest extant example of the perspective that the Sophists engaged in 
morally destructive projects.
 In general, of course, Aristophanes is rarely restrained or subtle when 
introducing the ethical character of his targets. When his protagonist Strepsi-
ades initially describes the activity of the residents of the “Thinkery of Wise 
Souls” (ψυχῶν σοφῶν τοῦτ᾿ . . . φροντιστήριον, 94), he does not refrain 
from including the moral dynamic of their vocation (97–99):
οὗτοι διδάσκουσ᾿, ἀργύριον ἤν τις διδῷ,
λέγοντα νικᾶν καὶ δίκαια κἄδικα.
They teach, if you give them money,
how to win by speaking both justly and unjustly.
No teachers in Athens at the time, of course, baldly claimed to teach the 
ability to obtain victory by unjust means if a disciple spoke as taught, 
any more than Cleon would claim to be a successful thief (as his charac-
ter does in Knights) or than real-world Prytaneis would fall victim to the 
blunt flattery and deception their stage counterparts do in Acharnians and 
Knights. Aristophanes is taking the trouble to spell out their moral deprav-
 64. Cf. the Introduction, 7–18. For recent attempts to distinguish Socrates in Clouds from other 
sources, see Patzer (1994), Noël (2000) and Cavallero (2007). Mitscherling (2003) makes a rather 
too blunt attempt to recover Aristophanes’ culpability for Socrates’ trial. Whitehorne (2002) explores 
Aristophanes’ visual representation of intellectuals.
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ity, because he is engaged in persuasive characterization rather than using 
an established stereotype.65 Only after the initial mold is set does Aristo-
phanes permit debate. The ensuing dialogue between Strepsiades and Phei-
dippides contrasts these devious thinkers in terms of their respectability. 
Strepsiades tries to insist on their fundamental nobility and venerability 
(μεριμνοφροντισταὶ καλοί τε κἀγαθοί, 101). Pheidippides immediately 
identifies them as quite the opposite (πονηροί γ᾿, . . . κακοδαίμων, 102–
4), specifying them as verbal con artists (ἀλαζόνας, 102)66 and naming 
names (Chaerephon and Socrates, 104).
 Aristophanes stacks the deck in the same way when he introduces the 
primary intellectual project to be analyzed in the play. When Strepsiades 
insists his son go for an education at the Phrontisterion, he explains what 
he is to learn (112–18):
εἶναι παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς φασιν ἄμφω τὼ λόγω,
τὸν κρείττον᾿, ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα.
τούτοιν τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν λόγοιν, τὸν ἥττονα,
νικᾶν λέγοντά φασι τἀδικώτερα.
ἤν οὖν μάθῃς μοι τὸν ἄδικον τοῦτον λόγον,
ἃ νῦν ὀφείλω διὰ σέ, τούτων τῶν χρεῶν
οὐκ ἂν ἀποδοίην οὐδ᾿ ἂν ὀβολὸν οὐδενί.
They say that both logoi are in there with them,
the stronger, no matter what that is, and the lesser.
This other of the two logoi, the lesser,
they say wins by speaking more unjustly.
If you’ll learn this unjust logos for me,
then these debts I owe now because of you,
I wouldn’t have to pay back an obol to anyone.
Aristophanes does not assume the spectators know what these kreitton and 
hetton logoi are, and does not so much explain them as define them. He does 
not provide a positive, or even neutral, definition that will then be revealed 
as masking an undesirable reality later in the play.67 He quite forcefully 
 65. Of course, Aristophanes is otherwise willing to let characters show unforeseen characteristics, 
as he does with Demos in Knights and the chorus in Clouds. Compare the dynamic change Aristo-
phanes engages in to transform Euripides into a villain in Frogs (see Chapter 6).
 66. Cf. MacDowell (1990).
 67. The use of φασι in 112 and 115 does not require that these are standard definitions in Athens 
at the time. Rather it sets up the fantastic fable quality of the logoi to come (cf. a similar use at Kn. 
1300).
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equates the hetton logos with injustice. This insistence makes sense inso-
far as Aristophanes needs to emphasize the immorality, because he cannot 
take for granted that the audience will recognize it. Strepsiades’ statement 
unequivocally states that the two logoi are kreitton and hetton and then 
defines the hetton logos as unjust (only by implication is kreitton logos just, 
as no logos is described as just anywhere in the play).68 That Aristophanes 
is defining the two logoi in terms of justice is crucial to what he is doing, 
yet the significance of it has been underplayed since antiquity, under the 
influence of a tradition hostile to the Sophists, which takes it as axiomatic 
that the idea of binary logoi is ethically perverse. The referent for these two 
logoi is certainly Protagoras’ concept of binary logoi, but no source of the 
fifth century or earlier, except Aristophanes, treats kreitton and hetton as 
morally superior and inferior.69 Indeed, Clouds features the earliest charac-
terization of either of the two logoi as explicitly unjust. Such is the power of 
Aristophanes’ characterization and its congruence with the later criticisms 
of Protagoras’ idea by Plato, Aristotle and others that the novel dynamic in 
Clouds is overshadowed.
 Indeed, the logoi in Strepsiades’ introduction, and the personifications 
who come on stage for the agon later in the play, have been characterized 
ever since antiquity in moral terms. The scholarly equipment with the script 
(the hypotheses, scholia, etc.) refers to the two logoi in the agon as Dikaios 
and Adikos Logos, although the characters refer to each other explicitly only 
as Kreitton and Hetton.70 Although a scholar like Kenneth J. Dover acknowl-
edges the names Dikaios and Adikos do not go back to Aristophanes, he still 
translates their names in morally evaluative terms, “Right” and “Wrong.” 
Translations of their names routinely work on this analogy, the most popu-
lar being “Better” and “Worse” Arguments, which frontloads Aristophanes’ 
conclusion rather than reflecting the dynamic process by which Aristo-
phanes takes the neutral terms and transforms them into moral adversaries.
 While it is impossible to be certain that Aristophanes is the first or cru-
cial figure to reinvent Protagoras’ opposing logoi as moral adversaries, the 
 68. Cf. Euripides frr. 189 and 206 (Antiope) and Suppliant Women 487 for nearly contemporary 
deployment of these terms on stage. Cf. Chapter 6 for dating Antiope to the 420s rather than after 
411.
 69. Schiappa (2003, 103–10). Aristophanes also subtly implies that the logoi are mutually ex-
clusive as well as opposed to each other. Whereas Protagoras seems to envision accounts of the same 
experience and bolstering one logos to the status of the other, Aristophanes begins with the embedded 
premise that the two represent opposite and irreconcilable descriptions of an objective (making it easy 
to conclude that one is true and one is false).
 70. Limited scholia (ΣRVE 889) are the only external ancient texts to call them Kreitton and Het-
ton. See Dover (1968, lvii–viii).
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mechanism and steps he takes to facilitate the transformation are clear and 
recognizable. Aristophanes uses a distinctive literary technique to effect his 
translation of opposing logoi, from names that are devoid of moral termi-
nology into a value-laden vision of subversion. This technique, first docu-
mented in detail by Hans-Joachim Newiger, consists of a three-stage series 
of transformations through metaphors.71 First comes a commonplace expres-
sion containing a latent metaphor. Next, the metaphor takes concrete form 
on stage. Finally, the concrete form emerges in a new form that defines it 
ethically in the comic world. The classic example comes from Acharnians, 
in the sequence during which Dicaeopolis secures a peace with the Spar-
tans. The key word here is spondai, simultaneously “libations” and “peace 
treaty.”72 This is the word containing the latent metaphor. Dicaeopolis sends 
Amphitheos to pursue terms with the Spartans, and he returns with the 
requested spondai (129–34, 175–86). Now the transformation into concrete 
form takes place, for Amphitheos has brought the spondai in the literal form 
of libations, that is, three samples of wine, each one representing a treaty 
of a certain number of years. Dicaeopolis tastes each sample and describes 
it with a mix of descriptions appropriate for the wine and for life under a 
peace treaty for the specified period of time (187–99). Dicaeopolis settles 
on the thirty-year spondai and then proceeds to usher in the third phase. 
Dicaeopolis settles in at his home in the country and uses the spondai as 
libations to celebrate the rural Dionysia (201–2). Now Aristophanes has the 
spondai right where he wants them. From an object of wrangling military 
negotiations, the spondai have become part of a morally desirable, peaceful, 
rural celebration.
 The logoi in Clouds pass through these same three stages. The early con-
versation between Strespsiades and Pheidippides introduces the logoi, with 
the latent metaphor and moral coloring, but the transformation to concrete 
form and full moral explication comes later. When Socrates accepts the 
young Pheidippides as a student in place of the boy’s befuddled father, he 
announces that Pheidippides will learn his lessons directly from two logoi 
(886). What Socrates means by this statement remains unclear until two 
characters step out onto the stage to initiate the play’s formal agon. These 
two characters promptly introduce themselves to each other, and to the spec-
tators, as Kreitton Logos and Hetton Logos (894). These introductions fit 
into a dynamic process running through the play, a process through which 
Aristophanes begins with logoi as little more than the colloquial equivalent of 
 71. Newiger (1957, esp. 119–22); cf. Edmunds (1980, 4).
 72. On the dynamics of the stage properties used in this transformation and throughout Achar-
nians, see English (2007).
88 Chapter 3 
speeches or arguments, moves on to the concept of paired logoi as mutually 
opposing experiences—the basic concept associated with Protagoras—and 
during the course of the agon transforms the logoi into rival competitors for 
cultural supremacy. In doing so, Aristophanes charges that the basis for the 
novel language of the early Sophists is ethically deviant and a gateway to 
political subversion.
 Further explication of Aristophanes’ transformation requires looking 
back at Protagoras’ concept of the two logoi and then following the path 
Aristophanes takes to set up and manipulate the concept in Clouds. Crucial 
again here is the work of Thomas Cole and Edward Schiappa, which reevalu-
ates rhetoric as practiced and taught by the Sophists in the fifth century.73 
Both believe that rhetoric in the hands of the early Sophists was fundamen-
tally a different pursuit from the formal discipline of rhetorike developed 
and refined in the hands of Plato, Aristotle and others during the course 
of the fourth century. Schiappa in particular groups this instruction with 
the philosophical speculation of the Sophists under the banner of inquiry 
into the fundamental concept of logos, logos as the object of thought and an 
elusive implement for communication. Logos in this environment, then, is 
not a static item but a point at which to begin framing questions and con-
structing definitions.
 In this context, when Protagoras explains his philosophical system of the 
fundamental dichotomies of experience in the universe, he expresses it in 
terms of logoi. Schiappa has analyzed the details of several of Protagoras’ key 
precepts and shown how later interpreters have colored, usually negatively, 
the essence of Protagoras’ original statements. Two famous and notorious 
sayings of Protagoras especially concern us here. The first is the so-called 
“Two-Logoi fragment” (δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος, fr. 
80B6a). Scholars have often taken this as a statement applying to rhetoric, 
translating it to the effect that it is possible to debate both sides of any issue. 
Schiappa makes the case that the fragment is not fundamentally a state-
ment about principles of debating, but a declaration about the relationship 
between the direct experience of external reality and the human capacity to 
communicate something about that reality. For every pragma, every experi-
ence, says Protagoras, there lie two logoi, attempts to communicate some-
thing about that pragma or experience, and these two logoi are mutually 
opposed to each other.74
 73. See the Introduction, 1–12. For broad readings of Clouds with attention to the dynamics of 
logos, see O’Regan (1992) and Freydberg (2008, 11–54). For an application of Bakhtinian dialogics to 
the play, see Platter (2007, 42–62).
 74. Schiappa (2003, 98–100).
 The Young Comic Playwrights Attack 89
 Another fragment builds on this very model. This is the “Stronger and 
Weaker” logoi fragment (τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτ’ 
ἔστιν, fr. 80B6b). This is the fragment sometimes translated as “making 
the weaker argument appear the stronger” or the like. Protagoras speaks of 
making a kreitton logos into a hetton logos. As Schiappa again illustrates, this 
statement has a long history of pejorative interpretation when restricted to 
principles of rhetoric or debate. In this tradition, the saying refers to mak-
ing a deficient argument prevail over a more sound argument. Without 
this negative overlay, the fragment again is a statement about the nature of 
experience. As Schiappa summarizes, the fragment advocates “the substitu-
tion of a preferred (but weaker) logos for a less preferable (but temporarily 
dominant) logos of the same experience.”75
 Protagoras thus does not advocate the promotion of a deficient, infe-
rior, or unethical procedure at the expense of a superior action. But at least 
as early as Aristotle, Protagoras has suffered the charge that he advocates 
the devious use of inferior reasoning. In fifth-century comedy, Protagoras 
also was the object of mockery, such as when Eupolis caricatures him as a 
philosopher of humbug (fr. 157, from Kolakes).76 Aristophanes takes Pro-
tagoras to task on a much grander scale. He manipulates and, as he sees it, 
exposes Protagoras’ concepts of paired and opposing logoi, specifically the 
kreitton and hetton. After the resolution of the agon, the product of this 
training, Pheidippides, uses an ἀκατάβλητος λόγος, an “un-knock-down-
able logos” (1229), probably with reference to Protagoras’ own Καταβάλ-
λοντες Λόγοι, “Knock-down Logoi ” (80 B1 DK).77 In Clouds generally, 
Aristophanes charges Protagoras with being ethically irresponsible, much as 
later tradition does. Aristophanes makes his charges by framing questions 
and constructing definitions of logos in ways that evoke Protagoras, but he 
goes on to dramatize undesirable consequences resulting from Protagoras’ 
concepts.
 In this way, the three-stage transformation of logoi in Clouds is a progres-
sive exposé of Protagoras’ concepts of kreitton logos and hetton logos. The two 
logoi first appear in the script when Strepsiades characterizes them as just 
 75. Schiappa (2003, 113).
 76. For the treatment of Protagoras and other intellectuals in Eupolis’ Kolakes, see Storey (2003, 
192–97).
 77. Sutton (1987, 137–39) and Gallego (2005–6) recognize the Logoi as deriving from Protago-
ras’ binary logoi, but Gallego tends to treat Protagoras’ concept as flawed and thus exposed by Aristo-
phanes, and neither sees Aristophanes’ treatment as a new dynamic. Papageorgiou (2004b) argues that 
the moral dimension of the two Logoi is derived from Prodicus’ parable of Virtue and Vice. He might 
be right that Aristophanes is conflating Prodicus’ metaphor here, but the explicit, primary target is 
Protagoras.
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and unjust (112–18). The unsophisticated Strepsiades mentions the logoi 
explicitly and by name but treats them more like “arguments” or “speeches.” 
He vaguely gives them speaking ability and, more significantly, introduces 
a strong moral flavor by equating hetton logos with “an unjust argument.” 
Strepsiades again mentions the two logoi when he meets Socrates, asking 
to learn the logos that never pays debts (245). So far the idea of logoi refers 
at most to a technique of debate, if an underhanded one. The mention of 
the paired logoi has the capacity to refer to the more broad-based sophistic 
concept of antithetical accounts of experience, but this identification takes 
the stage only later.
 Further on in the play, when Pheidippides is entering Socrates’ school, 
Strepsiades reviews the idea of the logoi. He asks Socrates to teach Pheidip-
pides the two logoi, kreitton and hetton, or at least hetton, he says, the one 
that speaks injustice and trips up the kreitton logos (882–85):
ὅπως δ᾿ ἐκείνω τὼ λόγω μαθήσεται,
τὸν κρείττον᾿, ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα,
ὃς τἄδικα λέγων ἀνατρέπει τὸν κρείττονα
Just so he learns those two logoi,
the Stronger, no matter what it is, and the Lesser,
which speaks unjustly and trips up the Stronger one.
In response, Socrates ushers in the next transformation, that of the logoi into 
concrete form. Socrates declares that Pheidippides will learn directly from 
the logoi themselves, and promptly the two logoi walk out on stage, in as 
concrete and physical a form as the wine in the spondai metaphor.
 The two newly personified logoi identify each other explicitly as Kreitton 
Logos and Hetton Logos (894; cf. 1338).78 Despite all of Socrates’ humbug 
so far in the play, it is only at this point that Aristophanes begins to dem-
onstrate how education at the Phrontisterion, in the form of Hetton Logos, 
imbues its students with qualities of moral decadence. The Logoi are now 
far more than the debating techniques Strepsiades was seeking earlier. They 
become entire life experiences and incarnations of cultural perspectives. Just 
as Protagoras’ conception of logoi embraces more than simply words, Aris-
tophanes’ conception expands to cover not just legal wrangling, but also a 
physical form and a model for responding to experience of the world. But 
Aristophanes finds the experiences encapsulated in the Kreitton and Hetton 
 78. Schiappa (2003, 110–13).
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Logos quite different from those proposed by Protagoras. True to their identi-
ties as mutually opposing logoi, the two characters argue, counterargue, and 
contradict one another. As the agon proceeds, Hetton Logos stands revealed 
as a shameless pervert, a clown, a parricide and an adulterer. He openly 
preaches decadence and perversion. Where Protagoras speaks of changing 
a hetton logos into a kreitton logos, Aristophanes has Hetton overwhelm Kre-
itton. Hetton persuades Kreitton Logos, the upholder of Athens’ glorious 
past, that Athens is indeed already composed of deviants (1088–1101).79 In 
a sense, Kreitton does become Hetton (ἡττήμεθ’ . . . , 1102–4) as he strips 
off his clothes and races out into the spectators to join his soon-to-be fel-
low perverts. This extended characterization goes beyond comic caricature. 
Aristophanes has recast Protagoras’ notion of battling logoi entirely in the 
morally evaluative terms of the comic stage. A statement of the abstract 
principle of cosmic dynamics becomes a declaration of political and cultural 
values.
 With this transformation complete, one more transformation is neces-
sary, one that plays out the dramatic consequences of the cultural threat. 
Pheidippides, after his training with Hetton Logos, dramatizes this transfor-
mation. Strepsiades has Socrates confirm that Pheidippides learned the very 
logos that had been on stage. It soon becomes evident what a change to hetton 
logos really means. Pheidippides is capable of warding off debts, but he also 
listens to Euripides and righteously beats up his own father (1172–1201, 
1321–1439). At the climax of the play, Pheidippides patently invokes the 
hetton logos (1444–45) to argue that beating his own mother is proper, the 
final outrage that leads Strepsiades to repent and burn Socrates’ Phrontiste-
rion to the ground.
 With these developments, Aristophanes brings a stinging indictment. 
Protagoras’ definition of the logoi may not be predicated on assigning ethi-
cal weight to one or the other of contradictory accounts of the world. The 
Sophists may provide instruction as a practical matter or as an intellectual 
pursuit. The comic stage, however, colors all human activity in terms of 
ethical and moral values. Make no mistake, warns Aristophanes, these logoi 
will lead to personal depravity and cultural subversion.
 In the next century, Plato and Aristotle have similar anxieties about the 
practice and teaching of rhetorical ploys. Progressively they work to separate 
 79. Papageorgiou (2004a) emphasizes that Kreitton here stands up for aristocratic restraint, ob-
jecting to Dover’s thesis that the character’s sexual obsessions undercut his position. The sexual politics 
of the scene are surely not so simple as Papageorgiou attempts to make them, and he leaves little 
explanation for how or why Hetton dominates.
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the tools of rhetoric from its distasteful moral baggage, and eventually these 
efforts culminate in the focalized discipline of rhetorike, which Aristotle can 
dissect, albeit with ambivalent concerns about its ethically undesirable side 
effects.
 The critique presented in Clouds is therefore important both because it 
offers a rare explicit characterization of sophistic rhetoric from a contempo-
rary source, and because it preserves one of the earliest criticisms of the very 
principles that eventually allowed classical rhetoric to emerge as an impor-
tant discipline in its own right. Although the philosophical underpinnings 
and craft of rhetoric would change and become more complex, Aristophanes 
had already isolated the ethical conundrum that would haunt future phi-
losophers and orators alike.
 The series of transformations by metaphor does not override Aristo-
phanes’ other techniques for orienting education in language within the 
civic space of Athens, but one such technique is deployed in delayed fashion 
compared to other plays. Unlike in Acharnians and Knights, Aristophanes 
does not emphasize any translocation with respect to the proper venue for 
the debate between the two logoi. The location is nominally near Socrates’ 
Phrontisterion, and initially, when the chorus sets the parameters of the 
debate, they do not point to any potential impact for public deliberation 
but characterize it as for the benefit of Pheidippides (934–38):
παύσασθε μάχης καὶ λοιδορίας.
ἀλλ᾿ ἐπίδειξαι σύ τε τοὺς προτέρους
ἅττ᾿ ἐδίδασκες, σύ τε τὴν καινὴν
παίδευσιν, ὅπως ἂν ἀκούσας σφῷν
ἀντιλεγόντοιν κρίνας φοιτᾷ.
Stop fighting and wrangling.80
Instead, you describe what you taught
in the old days, and you the new
education, so that he can hear both of you
debating and then decide to join.
In response, Hetton Logos declares he will overwhelm Kreitton Logos and 
leave him in helpless silence, a goal cited also by Dicaeopolis in Acharnians 
and the rivals in Knights, but here not yet applied to Athens more broadly 
(941–49):
 80. On λοιδορία, see the Appendix.
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κᾆτ᾿ ἐκ τούτων ὧν ἂν λέξῃ
ῥηματίοισιν καινοῖς αὐτὸν
καὶ διανοίαις κατατοξεύσω,
τὸ τελευταῖον δ᾿, ἢν ἀναγρύζῃ,
τὸ πρόσωπον ἅπαν καὶ τὠφθαλμὼ
κεντούμενος ὥσπερ ὑπ᾿ ἀνθρηνῶν
ὑπὸ τῶν γνωμῶν ἀπολεῖται.
And then from what he says
with new phrases and ideas
I shoot him down.
In the end, if he makes so much as a grunt,
his whole face and eyes
will be like he was stung by hornets,
he’ll die from the thoughts.
Aggressive as this description is, zero-sum debate is not undesirable in 
Aristophanes’ conception of deliberation. He does not wish such debate 
short-circuited, but he trusts the judgment of the Demos and has no com-
punction about drumming out inferior and destructive ideas, in the appro-
priate place.81 The chorus indeed announces the stakes and gives a favorable 
introduction to Kreitton Logos, but they do not disparage Hetton Logos’ 
methods or goal (950–60):
νῦν δείξετον τὼ πισύνω
τοῖς περιδεξίοισιν
λόγοισι καὶ φροντίσι καὶ
γνωμοτύποις μερίμναις,
λέγων ἀμείνων πότερος
φανήσεται. νῦν γὰρ ἅπας
ἐνθάδε κίνδυνος ἀνεῖται σοφίας,
ἧς πέρι τοῖς ἐμοῖς φίλοις
ἐστὶν ἀγὼν μέγιστος.
ἀλλ᾿ ὦ πολλοῖς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἤθεσι χρηστοῖς στεφανώσας,
ῥῆξον φωνὴν ᾗτινι χαίρεις καὶ τὴν σαυτοῦ φύσιν εἰπέ.
Now both of them will rely on their roundly clever
speeches and thoughts and meticulous thought-strikes
 81. Plato, Prot. 319b–c takes it as standard practice that the Athenian Assembly shouts down the 
testimony of some advisers.
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and show which one can show off the better speech. For all
wisdom is at stake here.
For that, my friends, is what this contest is ultimately about.
But, you who crowned our ancestors with valuable character,
speak your voice, rejoice in it, and tell of your own nature.
 The chorus gives a positive introduction to Kreitton Logos, invoking 
Athens’ glorious ancestors and calling on him to use his φωνή, “voice,” 
rather than his γλῶττα, “tongue” (cf. Chapter 2 and the Appendix). At 
the climax of the debate, however, Aristophanes elides the judging of the 
debate in the theater with the spectators’ identity as the Demos in the Athe-
nian democracy. When Hetton Logos is making his case that taking it up 
the ass is nothing bad (1085), he refers to those who play a leading role 
in the public deliberative process (συνηγοροῦσιν, 1089; δημηγοροῦσι, 
1093) and the bulk of the spectators in the theater (τῶν θεατῶν ὁπότεροι 
πλείους, 1095–6). When Kreitton Logos concedes that these are all devi-
ants (εὐρυπρώκτους, 1098) and runs to join them, the reason Aristophanes 
leaves the location general becomes evident. He wants to dramatize the effect 
and impact of the education on the deliberative process but without actu-
ally making it take place in the proper prescribed locations of the Assembly, 
Council or courts. Indeed, as it is, the revelation applies to any or all of 
them, but Aristophanes does not have to subject the Demos to the results 
directly.82 Rather he shows the cause-and-effect dynamic and, at the fiery 
conclusion of the play, the proper location and action to be taken to prevent 
the undesirable results.
 The subsequent debate between Pheidippides and Strepsiades gradually 
unleashes the consequences of Hetton Logos in ever-widening civic are-
nas.83 This debate begins, like the contest between the Logoi, and despite 
Strepsiades’ disbelief, as a healthy exchange, even if Pheidippides, like Het-
ton Logos, is bold in his prediction (1335–44). As the contest proceeds, 
however, Aristophanes pushes the consequences of Hetton Logos beyond 
domestic disputes. The chorus expects the younger generation in their bab-
ble (λαλῶν) will be energized in their abuse of their elders (1391–96), a 
contrast that implicitly parallels the young prosecutors who abuse older 
men (Ach. 676–702; Wasps). Pheidippides makes explicit how the energized 
younger generation can overhaul the political arena (1421–24):
 82. See Roselli (2011, 19–62, esp. 31–32) for a strong analysis of the dynamic of Old Comedy 
in engaging and managing spectators.
 83. For a detailed analysis of the way the terminology in this scene develops from that earlier in 
the play, see Kloss (2001, 116–31).
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οὔκουν ἀνὴρ ὁ τὸν νόμον θεὶς τοῦτον ἦν τὸ πρῶτον,
ὥσπερ σὺ κἀγώ, καὶ λέγων ἔπειθε τοὺς παλαιούς;
ἧττόν τι δῆτ᾿ ἔξεστι κἀμοὶ καινὸν αὖ τὸ λοιπὸν
θεῖναι νόμον τοῖς υἱέσιν, τοὺς πατέρας ἀντιτύπτειν;
Wasn’t it a man who made this law in the first place,
just like you or me, and spoke to persuade people in the old days?
Is it somehow less possible for me in the future
to make a new law for sons so they can beat up their fathers?
 Strepsiades responds to these arguments and concedes the justice of 
them. Using language loaded with terms of moral evaluation, he concedes 
(1437–39):84
ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦνδρες ἥλικες, δοκεῖ λέγειν δίκαια,
κἄμοιγε συγχωρεῖν δοκεῖ τούτοισι τἀπιεικῆ·
κλάειν γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἰκός ἐστ᾿, ἢν μὴ δίκαια δρῶμεν.
Gentlemen of my generation, it seems to me he speaks justly,
and it seems to me right to agree with what is fair:
it’s fair that we should suffer if we commit a wrong.
 Crucial here is that Strepsiades respects the deliberative process as long 
it adheres to justice, even when he loses an argument and can suffer for 
his loss. Implicitly, it is as if, once again, the logos Pheidippides uses were 
not morally loaded, whether “worse,” “bad” or “injust,” but merely hetton, 
“lesser,” and so Strepsiades submits to it. It is only when Pheidippides goes 
on to make a manifestly unjust claim, explicitly relying on hetton logos to do 
so, that the consequences become unacceptable for civic life. At this crucial 
juncture Aristophanes emphasizes that that Hetton Logos is the instrument 
that leads Strepsiades to change his mind (1444–51):
Φε.
τί δ᾿ ἢν ἔχων τὸν ἥττω
λόγον σε νικήσω λέγων
τὴν μητέρ᾿ ὡς τύπτειν χρεών;
 84. Editors have repeatedly noted the weakness of these lines, but N. G. Wilson goes too far in 
deleting them, for there is no plausible explanation for their addition by a later hand (unlike actors’ 
interpolations in tragic scripts, and it cannot be based on a gloss). Among the more likely explanations 
are that it belongs elsewhere or that it is a consequence of the partially revised state of the script.
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Στ.
Τί δ᾿ ἄλλο γ᾿ ἤ, ταῦτ᾿ ἢν ποιῇς,
οὐδέν σε κωλύσει σεαυτὸν ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὸ βάραθρον
μετὰ Σωκράτους
καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν ἥττω;
Pheidippides
What if I use the hetton
logos to defeat you by saying
I must beat my mother?
Strepsiades
The only thing that will happen if you do that
is I’ll throw you into the pit
with Socrates
and the Hetton Logos.
To reset the deliberative process, Strepsiades takes Hermes on as an adviser 
in the deliberative process, rather than Hetton Logos (1478–85):
ἀλλ᾿, ὦ φίλ᾿ Ἑρμῆ, μηδαμῶς θύμαινέ μοι,
μηδέ μ᾿ ἐπιτρίψῃς, ἀλλὰ συγγνώμην ἔχε
ἐμοῦ παρανοήσαντος ἀδολεσχίᾳ
καί μοι γενοῦ ξύμβουλος, εἴτ᾿ αὐτοὺς γραφὴν
διωκάθω γραψάμενος, εἴθ᾿ ὅ τι σοι δοκεῖ.
ὀρθῶς παραινεῖς οὐκ ἐῶν δικορραφεῖν
ἀλλ᾿ ὡς τάχιστ᾿ ἐμπιμπράναι τὴν οἰκίαν
τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν.
My beloved Hermes, don’t be angry with me,
and don’t crush me. Instead forgive
me my insane actions because of their blather.
And be my adviser about what you judge best.
You rightly recommend that I not stitch together a lawsuit,
but as soon as possible set fire to the home
of the blatherers.
In a way, Strepsiades stays true to the deliberative process by taking the 
advice of divine counsel, a culturally established, traditional and venerable 
way to come to judgment about the well-being of Athens. Furthermore, the 
debates in the play have taken place outside the civic areas for political delib-
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eration, but the results threaten the processes in those areas, so Strepsiades 
and Aristophanes proceed to an extrapolitical solution to remove completely 
the source of the threat: physical destruction of the Phrontisterion.
A dAy In CouRT: 
ThE dElIbERATIvE PRoCESS In WAsps
Aristophanes focused on the Assembly and Council in his first plays but also 
touched on the functioning of the courts in democratic Athens. In Wasps he 
puts the courts at the center of his focus but couches his analysis repeatedly 
in terms of the broader needs of democratic deliberation and in contrast to 
the needs of the Assembly and Council. Although Acharnians, Knights and 
Clouds focus on other arenas for public deliberation, each references the 
functioning of the courts. The elderly chorus of Acharnians sounds what is 
the most prevalent complaint (679–80, 685–86):
οἵτινες γέροντας ἄνδρας ἐμβαλόντες ἐς γραφὰς
ὑπὸ νεανίσκων ἐᾶτε καταγελᾶσθαι ῥητόρων,
 . . . 
ὁ δέ, νεανίας ἑαυτῷ σπουδάσας ξυνηγορεῖν,
ἐς τάχος παίει ξυνάπτων στρογγύλοις τοῖς ῥήμασιν
You throw old men into lawsuits
to be ridiculed by young rhetores . . . 
The young man, eager to be the synegoros against him,
knocks him to the wall and beats him with rounded words.
 In comedy generally, as in this passage, there seems to be little difference 
between a ῥήτωρ and a συνήγορος.85 A fragment of Banqueters men-
tions both ῥήτορες and συνήγοροι, without any indication that they are 
meaningfully different groups (Aristophanes fr. 205.6–9; cf. Chapter 2). 
 85. See Connor (1971, 108–19) for the history of ῥήτωρ and related terms in the politics of 
Athens in the last third of the fifth century. For a similar account of συνήγορος, see Carter (1985, 
120–25). The position of συνήγορος changed in the coming years, but a fragment from the third 
century suggests their reputation only worsened (Philemo Jr. fr. 3 dub.):
  μόνῳ δ’ ἰατρῷ τοῦτο καὶ συνηγόρῳ
  ἔξεστιν, ἀποκτείνειν μέν, ἀποθνῄσκειν δἐ μή.
  It’s possible only for a doctor and a synegoros
  to commit murder and not die for it.
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More often than ῥήτωρ, however, a συνήγορος appears to refer to young, 
aggressive prosecutors, a group likely, as comedy depicts them, to use the 
new dubious style of speaking to achieve their ends.86 One more fragment 
assumes the idea (Aristophanes fr. 424):87
ἔστι τις πονηρὸς ἡμῖν τοξότης συνήγορος
ὥσπερ Εὔαθλος παρ’ ὑμῖν τοῖς νέοις.
We have a rascal archer prosecutor,
like you young ones have Euathlos.
 The drive of young prosecutors against their venerable elders is not the 
only pernicious influence on the courts. The chorus of Knights cites the 
impact of Cleon among experienced prosecutors and the resulting turmoil 
in the courts and the city (973–84):88
ἥδιστον φάος ἡμέρας
ἔσται τοῖσι παροῦσι καὶ
τοῖσι δεῦρ’ ἀφικνουμένοις,
ἢν Κλέων ἀπόληται.
καίτοι πρεσβυτέρων τινῶν
οἵων ἀργαλεωτάτων
ἐν τῷ δείγματι τῶν δικῶν
ἤκουσ’ ἀντιλεγόντων,
ὡς εἰ μὴ ‘γένεθ’ οὗτος ἐν
τῇ πόλει μέγας, οὐκ ἂν ἤστην
σκεύη δύο χρησίμω,
δοῖδυξ οὐδὲ τορύνη.
For those here and traveling to here,
the light of day will be sweetest
if Cleon is destroyed.
Although some old men,
of the most painful sort,
 86. This is not a rule, however. Knights 1358–61 uses συνήγορος where otherwise ῥήτωρ more 
often appears.
 87. The fragment comes from Merchant Ships, which is usually, but not securely, dated to the year 
or two before Wasps. Euathlos is also named by the chorus of Acharnians as a young, vicious prosecu-
tor (703–4).
 88. Buis (2005) explores the role of aggressive litigiousness in Knights more broadly.
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in the Lawsuit Bazaar,
I heard them talking back and forth,
that if the man hadn’t become
so important in the city, there wouldn’t be
two useful tools:
the pestle and ladle.
 Cleon is thus means for stirring up troublesome forensic activity in the 
courts. Accordingly, when Cleon is at bay and Demos is restored to his 
proper judgment, Agoracritus announces the rejuvenated Demos by first 
calling for quiet in the courts (1316–18):
εὐφημεῖν χρὴ καὶ στόμα κλῄειν καὶ μαρτυριῶν ἀπέχεσθαι,
καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια συγκλῄειν οἷς ἡ πόλις ἥδε γέγηθεν,
ἐπὶ καιναῖσιν δ’ εὐτυχίαισιν παιωνίζειν τὸ θέατρον.
It is required to maintain silence, close mouths and refrain from testimony,
to close up the courts, which the city enjoys,
and for the spectators to sing for new good fortune!
Closure of the courts and celebration by the spectators in a legitimate way 
summarize the goals of Aristophanes’ last two plays of the 420s: Wasps and 
Peace.89 Moreover, all the basic principles laid out in the brief statements in 
Acharnians and Knights play out on a large scale in Wasps: the abuse of elders 
by the young, the manipulation of the courts by Cleon, and the apparent 
lack of any significant role of the courts when the judgment of the Demos 
and the deliberative process are restored.
 Aristophanes uses the prologue of Wasps to make the transition from his 
dramatizations of the Assembly to his upcoming analysis of the courts. The 
slave Sosias has a riddling dream that refers to the Assembly. The dream is a 
big, important one for the ship of state, says Sosias (28–29). He describes a 
whale presiding over sheep on the Pnyx (31–36), and once Xanthias inter-
prets the monster as Cleon, Sosias adds Cleon’s supporter Theorus as well 
as the lisping Alcibiades to the picture (42–45). With this oblique reminder 
of Aristophanes’ past treatment of these issues, Xanthias immediately turns 
to explicating the current play to the spectators (54), although he says that 
Cleon will not be the subject of another slicing attack (62–63). It turns out, 
 89. Carrière (2004) argues that Wasps continues themes of education, politics and nomos vs. 
phusis from Clouds.
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of course, that the issue this time is addiction to jury service. The problem 
is immediately set up as a conflict between the elderly Philocleon and his 
son Bdelycleon, and Aristophanes waits (other than the punning names on 
Cleon) until the parodos to broaden the political issues at stake.
 After some shenanigans involving Philocleon trying to escape from his 
house, the chorus of elderly jurors arrives to rescue their besieged comrade. 
At this point, Aristophanes weaves in the political issues he will develop 
as the play unfolds. First, the chorus mentions their eagerness for a trial 
wherein Cleon will prosecute Laches, who was an opponent of Cleon as well 
as linked to the peace process, whereby Aristophanes foreshadows the trial 
he will put on stage later in the play. Aristophanes is more nuanced now in 
his manipulation of political terminology. He again obliquely refers to, but 
avoids, Cleon’s epithet of προστάτης, “protector,” by using κηδεμών of 
him instead (242). Thus the chorus simultaneously refers to him positively 
(as they should in character, since they are his supporters) but undercuts 
him as well, as they will do more than once. A short time later, in dialogue 
with Philocleon, the chorus disparagingly refers to Bdelycleon as Δημολο-
γοκλέων (342), which on the one hand invokes Cleon as a “demagogue,” 
not necessarily a negative term at this time, but also distorts the title.
 When analyzing the dysfunction of the Assembly and Council in Acha-
rnians and Knights, Aristophanes dramatized a faith in the deliberative pro-
cess: if the Demos asserts its proper judgment in the processes in these 
venues, success and prosperity will result. He does not assert comparable 
faith in the courts. The problems with the courts in Wasps are the same as 
those he pointed out in earlier passages: aggressive prosecutors and Cleon 
using lawsuits to his own end, but whereas with the Assembly and Council, 
deliberation translocated elsewhere is successful and the Demos rendering 
its judgment in these institutions rectifies them, the best court seems to be 
no court at all.90 The chorus of Wasps complains simply that Bdelycleon 
objects to trials at all (409–14):
 . . . Κλέωνι ταῦτ᾽ ἀγγέλλετε,
καὶ κελεύετ᾽ αὐτὸν ἥκειν
ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἄνδρα μισόπολιν
ὄντα κἀπολούμενον, ὅτι
 90. Hansen (1978) demonstrates that the Demos was identified with the authority of the As-
sembly but not readily with that of the dikasterion, so perhaps the perspective in Aristophanes’ plays 
reflects a viewpoint that the sovereignty of the Demos resides primarily in the Assembly and Council, 
while the Demos’ role in the courts could be reckoned as something apart.
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τόνδε λόγον ἐσφέρει,
μὴ δικάζειν δίκας.
 . . . report this to Cleon,
and tell him to come,
to face a man who hates the city
and who’s going to die, because
he’s introducing this argument
not to judge cases!
When Bdelycleon arrives, he takes on the chorus as if he were already fight-
ing Cleon. He asks them not to shout (Cleon’s regular modus operandi in 
Knights) but to listen to the issue at stake (415). The chorus responds with 
shouting and charges of tyranny, as they invoke the city and Theorus again, 
as an ally of Cleon (417–19; cf. 42–43 for Theorus). This latest charge raises 
an issue Bdelycleon will address explicitly later in the play, but also marks 
another difference from Aristophanes’ analysis of the Assembly and Coun-
cil. In the context of the democratic process in those institutions, tyranny 
was not inherently a problem; it just had to be the political tyranny of the 
Athenian Demos. The chorus’s hollow cries of generic tyranny ignore this 
possibility and put the problem in a separate category from the logjam in 
the other institutions. When the chorus repeats the charges of tyranny and 
monarchy a little later (463–70), Bdelycleon makes explicit that they are 
just shouting rather than deliberating and reaching reconciliation (471–72):
ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως ἄνευ μάχης καὶ τῆς κατοξείας βοῆς
ἐς λόγους ἔλθοιμεν ἀλλήλοισι καὶ διαλλαγάς;
Isn’t there some way we can enter into dialogue and reconciliation with 
 each other,
without the fighting and shrilled-out shouting?
After the chorus invokes the charge of tyranny yet a third time, Bdelycleon 
makes clear that invoking tyranny is inimical to the deliberative process, and 
the problem of tyranny is not a part of Athens’ greatness (488–90):
ὡς ἅπανθ᾽ ὑμῖν τυραννίς ἐστι καὶ ξυνωμόται,
ἤν τε μεῖζον ἤν τ᾽ ἔλαττον πρᾶγμά τις κατηγορῇ,
ἧς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἤκουσα τοὔνομ᾽ οὐδὲ πεντήκοντ᾽ ἐτῶν.
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All you have is “tyranny” and “conspiracy,”
if anyone criticizes any issue big or small.
I hadn’t heard the word in fifty years!
Aristophanes refers to a past where the Athenians cast out the tyrants, and 
in the fifty years or so that followed, Athens grew into a rightly successful 
empire, but other than the Demos holding its rightful place as ruler of an 
Athenian empire, the charge of tyranny is meaningless and an obstacle to 
the proper deliberative process.91 Aristophanes next layers on the issue of 
class, which becomes increasingly important in his plays.92 Bdelycleon says 
he wants his father to live an aristocratic life (βίον γενναῖον, 506) but gets 
labeled a tyrant for the attempt. He puts Philocleon’s lot as a juror on the 
same level as slavery (517). To set up the agon, Bdelycleon frames the issue 
in terms of what Philocleon gets from the empire out of this arrangement 
(520), setting up the basic antinomy: slavery vs. king of the world, where 
rightly members of the Athenian Demos should be rulers.93 Lawsuits and 
courts really have no intrinsic role in this scenario. In practice, according 
to Aristophanes, courts only provide occasions for destructive self-serving 
individuals to enslave the Demos against its own interest.
 Accordingly it makes sense that the ensuing agon debates mostly not 
the court system or tyranny, but whether Philocleon is in fact a king or 
not. There is no question that being king is good, only whether Philo-
cleon as a representative of the Demos is in fact one. This is consistent 
with Aristophanes’ support of a dominant Demos: the Demos should be a 
monarch, tyrant, king, whatever, and control Athens, Greece, and Athens’ 
entire empire. The details of the court proceedings are all secondary to this 
commitment.
 To highlight and make explicit the arguments in what follows, Aristo-
phanes has Bdelycleon interrupt Philocleon’s argument in order to highlight 
six crucial issues in his exposé:94
 91. Aristophanes’ characterizations of the threat of tyranny differ significantly in 411 and later, 
under the shadow of the oligarchic coup. See Chapters 5–6.
 92. See Reinders (2001, 28–71) for a survey of the term δῆμος and related class terms in Greek 
literature as a context for Aristophanes’ use.
 93. The analysis by Brock (2009) of the principles that guided the empire provides a useful 
historical backdrop for this scene. He argues that the Athenians, other things being equal, preferred 
democracy, but pragmatism (according to three principles: capacity to interfere, money and security) 
guided policy more than ideology.
 94. Papageorgiou (2004c) finds Bdelycleon’s techniques in the agon comparable to rhetorical 
manipulation found in oratorical texts and concludes that a sinister ambiguity permeates his pre-
sentation. Papageorgiou’s reasoning requires that a substantial portion of the spectators, and perhaps 
Aristophanes himself, must find Bdelycleon’s mathematical calculations disarming and disagree with 
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1. The powerful supplicate the juror (559).
2. Jurors can mock wealth (576).
3. Jurors are not audited (587–88).
4. The Council and Demos hand difficult cases over to jurors (590–91).
5. No one wins with the Demos without reducing the jurors’ workload 
(594–95).
6. Cleon guards them (596ff).
Each one of these points represents an obstacle to Aristophanes’ preferred 
goal of the Demos deliberating, deciding and guiding Athens to peace, pros-
perity and control of its empire.
1. Supplication of the juror sidetracks the normal deliberative process.
2. The mocking of wealth turns out to be inverted and hollow, as Bde-
lycleon shows shortly.
3. The lack of accountability of jurors bypasses the process generally, and 
auditing is an important prerogative of the Demos in holding leaders 
accountable (see Knights 1145–50, where Demos will use auditing to 
rein in misbehaving leaders).
4. The Assembly and Council are actually abdicating their duties by send-
ing cases to the courts.
5. Meanwhile, jurors place self-indulgent restrictions on proper proposals 
to the Assembly.
6. Finally, Cleon gets to wield undue influence and cloud the judgment 
of the masses (plethos).
 Bdelycleon’s interjections and follow-up arguments pertain more to 
the deliberative and political process generally than to the operation of the 
courts and juror behavior. After establishing that jury pay amounts to a pal-
try percentage of the income of the empire, Bdelycleon explains where the 
money goes and why (666–71):
ἐς τούτους τοὺς “οὐχὶ προδώσω τὸν Ἀθηναίων κολοσυρτόν,
ἀλλὰ μαχοῦμαι περὶ τοῦ πλήθους ἀεί.” σὺ γὰρ, ὦ πάτερ, αὐτοὺς
ἄρχειν αἱρεῖ σαυτοῦ τούτοις τοῖς ῥηματίοις περιπεφθείς.
κᾆθ᾽ οὗτοι μὲν δωροδοκοῦσιν κατὰ πεντήκοντα τάλαντα
them. But there is no compelling reason to believe that they should have done so. Bdelycleon is not a 
character without ambiguity, of course, but there is nothing in the script to indicate that what he says 
in the debate is transparently weak, false, or cynically manipulative.
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ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ἐπαπειλοῦντες τοιαυτὶ κἀναφοβοῦντες,
“δώσετε τὸν φόρον, ἢ βροντήσας τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν ἀνατρέψω.”
[The money goes] to those “I won’t betray the rabble,
but I’ll always fight for the masses” people. Because you, father,
choose them to rule you, since you’ve been cooked up by their catchphrases.
And then these same men take bribes on the order of fifty talents
from the subject cities, making threats like this and frightening you with
“Give up the tribute, or I’ll thunder and knock down your city!”
Once again Aristophanes invokes, but twists, the language of Cleon in his 
role of protector of the Demos. With the thundering, his speech resembles 
the arrogant language of Pericles in his Zeus-like caricature from comedy.
 Bdelycleon, and Aristophanes, maintain the argument in the agon in 
terms of the type of deliberation more in keeping with the Assembly and 
Council than the courts. Bdelycleon characterizes Philocleon as “gaping” 
(χασκάζεις, 695) uselessly as a juror, a metaphor Aristophanes uses repeat-
edly of useless spectators at the Assembly. Philocleon and his comrades are 
encircled by “Demos-izing” speakers (δημιζόντων, 699). Bdelycleon con-
cludes with more general attacks on the administration of the Athenian 
empire at the expense of poor jurors, with again no particular comments 
on activity in the courts in particular. Even so, on these grounds, Philocleon 
and the chorus concede that Bdelycleon’s reasoning is persuasive (743–49).
 Now a full-scale translocation of the courts takes place (758ff). The 
translocation itself is not surprising, since Aristophanes had pointedly trans-
located the political process before, in Acharnians and Knights, and once 
again the translocation moves the process from its normal public space to 
the domestic realm. The translocation in Wasps differs in meaningful ways, 
however. First, the translocation is only a concession by Bdelycleon that the 
process continue at all (761–66). Philocleon has submitted himself to Bde-
lycleon’s will and begs only that he be able to be a juror somehow. Unlike 
other translocations, where the deliberative process of the Assembly and 
Council is desirable and will have positive effects even when translocated, 
here the new trial process is a grudging concession, and there is no pressure 
anywhere in the play to have trials resume in the public courts. After the 
makeshift courtroom is set up, the chorus praises Bdelycleon’s support of 
the Demos, in terms of this being the new and proper established system 
(885–90):
ξυνευχόμεσθα ταὐτά σοι κἀπᾴδομεν
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νέαισιν ἀρχαῖς ἕνεκα τῶν προλελεγμένων.
εὖνοι γάρ ἐσμεν ἐξ οὗ
τὸν δῆμον ᾐσθόμεσθά σου
φιλοῦντος ὡς οὐδεὶς ἀνὴρ
τῶν γε νεωτέρων.
We pray with you and sing for you
for this new start, because of what you have stated.
For we are on your side since
we sense that you love the Demos
like no man
of the younger generation.
 Thus the chorus declares resolution to one significant problem in the 
functioning of the courts: aggressive young prosecutors preying on the 
elderly. The solution is to stop these types of cases entirely, with not even 
a worry about the lack of court activity. Bdelycleon is pursuing prosper-
ity for the Demos. The other major source of dysfunction in the courts is 
Cleon’s drive to use lawsuits against his enemies, which the dramatization 
of Philocleon’s domestic court will address. In the enactment of this court, 
Philocleon’s persistence in convicting the defendant dramatizes again the 
dysfunction of the court system and the solution becomes simple trickery 
to force an acquittal. As with removing young prosecutors, once this solu-
tion has been reached (even by deceit and compulsion), the problem is 
solved. The remainder of the play moves on to other issues, and there is no 
suggestion that court cases will or should continue. They simply are not a 
factor.
 The proceedings of the mock trial itself have provided the most persis-
tent example for scholars who insist that the formal divisions of canonical 
rhetorical theory were operative in Aristophanes. Two speeches are at issue, 
the prosecution by the dog, a barely disguised Cleon (907–30), and Bde-
lycleon’s defense on behalf of Labes, a barely disguised Laches, the opponent 
of Cleon cited earlier in the play (950–79; cf. 240 for the earlier reference 
to Laches). Both speeches are interrupted by other characters on stage, so 
the divisions identified do not reflect continuous line numbering. Murphy 
divides the prosecution speech as follows:95
 95. Murphy (1938, 105–6). On the comic technique of interrupted speech (though not in this 
scene in particular), see Kloss (2001, 189–203).
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1. Προοίμιον, 907–9
2. Διήγεσις, 910–14, statement of the crime.
3. Πίστεις, 915–16, “If criminals give me no share of their loot, I cannot 
benefit you jurors.”
4. Ἐπίλογος, 922–30, a direct attack on the defendant and a demand 
for strict punishment
Sousa e Silva cites the speeches for various devices but not necessarily an 
overall scheme, but Hubbard updates Murphy’s scheme:96
1. Προοίμιον, 907–9, summary of the charge and formulaic address to 
the jurors
2. Διήγεσις, 910–14, narration of the event
3. Πίστεις, 915–25, proofs, consisting of the prosecutor’s self-described 
value as a citizen and an attack on the defendant’s character and earlier 
behavior, which are consistent with the present crime
4. Ἐπίλογος, 927–30, reiteration of the prosecutor’s plea for conviction 
and warning of future consequences of acquittal
As with Diceaopolis’ speech in Acharnians, these divisions do not hold up 
under scrutiny. Both Murphy and Hubbard consider this the προοίμιον 
(907–9):
τῆς μὲν γραφῆς ἠκούσαθ᾽ ἣν ἐγραψάμην
ἄνδρες δικασταὶ τουτονί. δεινότατα γὰρ
ἔργων δέδρακε κἀμὲ καὶ τὸ ῥυππαπαῖ.
You have the indictment that I entered
here, gentlemen of the jury. The most frightful
of deeds he committed against me and the “yo-ho”!
This is admittedly the beginning of a speech, but nothing makes it conform 
especially to the requirements of a classical προοίμιον. Indeed, of the two 
sentences, the second sentence could just as easily, but no more helpfully, 
be construed as part of a narrative, since it says the defendant committed an 
act. The narrative itself is minimal, but if Murphy or Hubbard moved the 
second sentence to the narrative, the prooimion would be reduced to a verse 
and a half. Even under Murphy’s and Hubbard’s division, the διήγεσις, ever 
 96. Sousa e Silva (1987–88, 64–68); Hubbard (2007, 500–501); cf. Harriott (1986, 37–43).
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the most ephemeral section of precanonical oratory, is even shorter than the 
προοίμιον (910–11):97
ἀποδρὰς γὰρ ἐς τὴν γωνίαν τυρὸν πολὺν
κατεσικέλιζε κἀνέπλητ᾽ ἐν τῷ σκότῳ—
For he ran off to the corner, and Sicilied
off with a great cheese, and stuffed himself in the dark.
Murphy’s section of proofs consists of this couplet (915–16):
καίτοι τίς ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιεῖν δυνήσεται,
ἢν μή τι κἀμοί τις προβάλλῃ, τῷ κυνί;
And so who will be able to take care of you,
unless someone tosses something to me, your dog?
Hubbard would add four more lines to this (922–25, i.e., those following 
the interruptions by Philocleon and Bdelycleon):
μή νυν ἀφῆτέ γ᾽ αὐτόν, ὡς ὄντ᾽ αὖ πολὺ
κυνῶν ἁπάντων ἄνδρα μονοφαγίστατον,
ὅστις περιπλεύσας τὴν θυείαν ἐν κύκλῳ
ἐκ τῶν πόλεων τὸ σκῖρον ἐξεδήδοκεν.
Don’t let him go now, since by far he is
the most solitary-eating man of all dogs,
who sailed the kitchen island in a circle
and ate the rind off the cities.
Murphy and Hubbard reasonably split on assigning these lines. Murphy sees 
that Cleon is making a summary call and command to the jury.98 Hubbard 
prefers to add this to the list of proofs. Were this sentence a few lines earlier, 
 97. Both Murphy and Hubbard paper over the minimal narrative in different ways. Each lists 
the section as covering lines 910–14, but line 912 to the middle of line 914 is an interruption by 
Philocleon. Hubbard further disguises the weakness of this section by presenting Cleon’s speech (with-
out Philocleon’s interjections) in four parts, as if the parts corresponded to the canonical divisions he 
claims, but the first section, in Hubbard’s own scheme, covers both the prooimion and diegesis and 
totals five continuous lines.
 98. Murphy is in fact reluctant to label anything “proofs” at all, since the facts are admitted by 
both sides, and thinks βεβαίωσις, “confirmation,” is a better characterization of this section.
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however, they could just as easily assign it to the narrative, since it tells part 
of Labes’ criminal activity. This sort of mix of narrative and argumentation 
is exactly what characterizes precanonical oratory, however.
 After yet another interruption by Philocleon,99 Murphy and Hubbard 
agree on the ἐπίλογος (927–30):
πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦτον κολάσατ᾽—οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε
τρέφειν δύναιτ᾽ ἂν μία λόχμη κλέπτα δύο—
ἵνα μὴ κεκλάγγω διὰ κενῆς ἄλλως ἐγώ·
ἐὰν δὲ μή, τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ κεκλάγξομαι.
Accordingly, punish him! For a single bush
could never nourish two thieves,
so I won’t be barking to no end.
But otherwise, I won’t bark in the future.
Much like Dicaeopolis’ speech in Acharnians, the speech here is more a 
cascading parody. Where Dicaeopolis’ speech began and ended with direct 
tragic parody and sandwiched a pastiche of arguments in between, the 
speeches in Wasps consist of opening and closing lines knocking off court 
speeches, and probably Cleon’s style in particular, with a heap of punning 
claims (which are themselves further interrupted by Philocleon) placed in 
between. Bdelycleon’s defense speech has even less organization. After two 
lines of speaking (950–51), Philocleon again interrupts, and the two engage 
in dialogue (952–61), followed immediately by Bdelycleon calling up the 
cheese grater to testify (962–66). After a few lines calling for pity (967–72), 
the lines that Murphy and Hubbard cite as the end of Bdelycleon’s speech in 
fact consist of his calling up the defendant’s puppies (975–79). In response 
to this display, Philocleon begs Bdelycleon to stop, which he does, without 
adding to or concluding his speech (980–81).
 The remainder of the scene consists of dialogue and debate between 
Philocleon and Bdelycleon about the verdict (982–89). Eventually, Bde-
lycleon tricks Philocleon into acquitting (990–94), and this forces another 
moment of desperation and reliance on Bdelycleon (995–1002). As he did 
after his successful speech about the false qualities of a juror’s life, the son 
quickly announces the next activity in his father’s life (1003–7):
 99. Both Murphy and Hubbard gloss over these interruptions, but continuous speech making on 
a much larger scale is amply testified in drama. Cf. the discussion of Thesmophoriazusae in Chapter 5.
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καὶ μηδὲν ἀγανάκτει γ᾽. ἐγὼ γάρ σ᾽, ὦ πάτερ,
θρέψω καλῶς, ἄγων μετ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ πανταχοῖ,
ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, ἐς ξυμπόσιον, ἐπὶ θεωρίαν,
ὥσθ᾽ ἡδέως διάγειν σε τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον
κοὐκ ἐγχανεῖταί σ᾽ ἐξαπατῶν Ὑπέρβολος.
Don’t worry about anything. Father, I’m going to
take good care of you, take you everywhere with me:
to dinner, to parties, to shows,
so you’ll lead a sweet life in the future,
and Hyperbolus won’t trick and gape at you.
Scholars have wondered at times about the ensuing scenes wherein Bde-
lycleon attempts to groom his father for sophisticated life, but the progres-
sion is consistent with Aristophanes’ political ideology.100 In Acharnians, 
once Dicaeopolis found a way to make the deliberative process work, albeit 
outside the Pnyx, he enjoys success and prosperity. In Knights, when Demos 
regains control of the deliberative process in the Assembly, Athens enjoys 
success and prosperity. In Clouds, when Strepsiades has identified and neu-
tralized the growing threat to the democracy, the play is over. Now in Wasps, 
the two reasons the courts obstruct the democracy, aggressive young pros-
ecutors and the suits directed by Cleon against his enemies, are removed, so 
Philocleon can enjoy success and prosperity. Certainly by implication the 
Demos will receive full proper benefits from the administration of empire 
now, but the play does not dwell on that. Bdelycleon wants his father to join 
elite life, but success and prosperity for Philocleon really consist of food, 
drink, sex and the pleasure of the freedom to act as he wishes. That the elite 
life is not a desirable path for the Demos is confirmed in passing by Cleon’s 
presence at an elite symposium (1220–24), but Bdelycleon, who has been 
loyal and a boon to his father in freeing him from two sets of evils, does 
not come in for censure for this attempt. The Demos is simply in for better 
pleasure than the hypocritical, stuffy and mismatched environment of the 
symposium. Bdelycleon’s final project is a failure, but one with no losses or 
criticism. The chorus also makes clear, in their ode celebrating their wasp-
ishness, that the success and prosperity at the end of the play is analogous 
to the success of Athens and her empire in the “good old days” (1106–21).
 100. Reinders (2001, 207–12) reviews political readings of the play. McGlew (2004) expresses 
a similar idea when he recognizes that Wasps problematizes the mechanisms of persuasion in public 
democratic institutions, but finds that Philocleon is restored to an unappealing political animal at the 
end, while I think Philocleon’s failure to function in elite life is celebratory.
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bRIngIng IT All bACk homE: pEAcE
In Wasps, after Philocleon has conceded that the juror’s life does not bring 
the benefits he thought and he has been bamboozled into rendering a judg-
ment of acquittal, his son Bdelycleon offers him a new life (1003–7, quoted 
above). 
 The last episodes of Wasps make a mockery of Philocleon participating 
in banquets and symposia, but Bdelycleon’s promise serves as a template for 
Aristophanes’ play of the next year, Peace. Where Clouds and Wasps each have 
a darkness and even cynicism (neither expresses as much faith in the restora-
tion of Athens as do Acharnians and Knights), as scholars have noted, with 
Athens buoyed by the death of Cleon and nearing treaty with Sparta, Peace 
is lyrical and giddy by comparison.101 Aristophanes also takes the occasion 
to recapitulate his ideological stance on the war and the democracy’s role in 
it, as well as make good on a promise that deliberation restored to its proper 
location means success and prosperity for Athens.
 To this end, once Peace herself has been put on stage after an elaborate 
rescue, Aristophanes has Hermes discourse on the trajectory of the war and 
the future of Athens. This narrative may justly receive criticism as naïve or 
distorted, and the asides by Trygaeus and the chorus indicate it was unortho-
dox at the time (615–18), but it is a legitimate summary of Aristophanes’ 
ideology as it pertains to the war, the functioning of the Athenian democ-
racy and the path to future prosperity. Hermes begins with Phidias’ troubles 
prompting Pericles’ need to do something to divert the bite of the Demos 
(605–8). Aristophanes thus invokes again the negative portrayal of Pericles 
from comedy. Given that all extant testimony from comedy from this date 
and earlier attacks Pericles as a manipulative and capricious ruler placing 
his own needs above those of Athens, it is not surprising that Aristophanes 
maintains this stance toward Pericles. Pericles’ use of the Megarian decree 
and fanning the flames of war with Sparta conflicts with Thucydides’ favor-
able report of him, but it is a natural extension of comedy’s take on the 
dominance of Pericles in Athens (cf. Chapter 2).
 As Hermes continues to tell it, while the war destabilized the Athenian 
empire, corruption affected all sides and the destruction of crops inflamed 
farmers to the cause (619–31), orators (λέγοντες) in Athens fueled the war’s 
momentum (632–37):
 101. Harriott (1986, 119–38); Reckford (1987, 3–52, 93–104).
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κἀνθάδ᾽ ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ξυνῆλθεν οὑργάτης λεώς,
τὸν τρόπον πωλούμενος τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐμάνθανεν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἅτ᾽ ὢν ἄνευ γιγάρτων καὶ φιλῶν τὰς ἰσχάδας
ἔβλεπεν πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας· οἱ δὲ γιγνώσκοντες εὖ
τοὺς πένητας ἀσθενοῦντας κἀποροῦντας ἀλφίτων,
τήνδε μὲν δικροῖς ἐώθουν τὴν θεὸν κεκράγμασιν.
And then when working people gathered from the fields,
they didn’t understand that they were being sold out the same way.
They just didn’t have raisins and loved their figs,
so they looked to the orators: They understood that
the poor were weak and lacked barley grain,
so they shoved this goddess [Peace] away with forked shrieks.
While other comic references to politicians and public speakers refer to 
rhetores and such, who in practice plied their trade by delivering speeches, 
this is the only reference in Aristophanes to this group explicitly as λέγο-
ντες, “speakers.”102 Even so, Aristophanes says nothing about the tricks of 
language, organization of speeches or their mechanics in any way, merely 
that they are manipulating the desperate poor and spreading corruption 
(635–47). The point man for this activity is, of course, Cleon, indicated 
by the shrieking (637) and then alluded to as a tanner (647). Central to 
the story, however, must remain the deliberative process, and Aristophanes 
has Peace, speaking through Hermes, express particular anger on this topic 
(659). Peace was denied three times when she made herself available after 
the events at Pylos (665–67), it is reported. As such, there was a complete 
failure of the deliberative process, and Trygaeus admits that this was wrong, 
blaming the influence of Cleon (668–69). Since Cleon is dead, Peace asks 
who now controls the Pnyx (680). Upon hearing it is Hyperbolus, she turns 
away in disgust (681–84), disapproving of this “protector” of the Demos 
(προστάτην, 684), the mantle that Cleon wore and which Aristophanes 
has alluded to in distorted form several times.103 Trygaeus responds that the 
Demos is merely seeking an ἐπίτροπος, the more venerable and positive 
term, and uses Hyperbolus only as a temporary measure (just as Demos 
says he does with such leaders at Knights 1127–30). “We shall be better at 
deliberating” (εὐβουλότεροι γενησόμεθα, 689), Trygeus assures Peace, and 
after his return to earth, he does consider Hyperbolus dismissed (922 and 
 102. Other instances do not refer to public speakers. Only Kn. 1118 uses the participle of λέγω 
of someone speaking in a political context, but it does not refer to a class of speakers.
 103. Cf. discussion of this title above, 70–72.
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1319). With this assurance, Peace goes on to ask about playwrights rather 
than politics (694–705; cf. Chapter 6).
 With this questioning finished, Hermes turns to the tasks that will enact 
the benefits of Peace. Trygaeus receives the personification of the harvest 
(Ὀπώρα) for his sexual and digestive satisfaction (706–12). The other task 
is to take Theoria to the Council (713–18). “Theoria” seems to refer primar-
ily to public spectacles (so scholia), although it can also refer to a delegation, 
but the key point here is that full restoration of peace means the Council 
will engage in its deliberative and administrative functions, but now focused 
on happy occasions for the Demos to participate in.104 After the parabasis, 
Trygaeus arrives back on Earth, and, once he has explained his mission, his 
first act is indeed to return Theoria to the Council.
 Here, once again, Aristophanes engages in an act of translocation, but 
for the first time he is not transferring deliberative activity away from its 
proper public institution and location but restoring deliberation to it. Such 
a restoration, like all proper deliberation, leads to success and prosperity, and 
Trygaeus enumerates explicitly and at length the many pleasures, sexual and 
otherwise, that will ensue upon Theoria’s return to the Council (894–908).
 To dramatize this particular translocation, Aristophanes engages in 
unique staging.105 Whereas previously he had transformed the space in the 
Theater of Dionysus into the Pnyx while the Assembly was being held (Ach., 
Kn.), or turned the stage into a domestic version of a public court (Wasps), 
the actions of the Council had only been reported (Kn.). This time, rather 
than put the Council on stage, Aristophanes capitalizes on the fact that the 
theater includes the seating of the Bouletikon, where the real-life Prytaneis 
are seated. Trygaeus delivers the personified Theoria directly to the Prytaneis 
(887, 905). In a crucial way, then, the run of plays from Acharnians to Peace 
happens to form a unit, for Acharnians begins with the stage version of the 
Prytaneis being incompetent and corrupt at the Assembly, ignoring or refus-
ing peace and its benefits, and Peace celebrates the real-life Prytaneis happily 
accepting peace and its responsibility for the prosperity of the Demos.
ConCluSIon
The comedies of the late 420s continue the vestiges of patterns and perspec-
tives visible in the fragments of earlier comedies. The formal terminology 
 104. Theoria also appears in the list of activities to which Bdelycleon plans to take Philocleon, 
confirming its role in the happy life of the Demos (Wasps 1005).
 105. Cassio (1985).
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and rules for structuring speeches are still not yet in evidence. Rather, comic 
playwrights continue to satirize prominent individuals who use unorthodox 
language in the public arena and to combat the phenomenon with their own 
creative, comic discourse. The survival of complete scripts allows a much 
broader and deeper analysis of how Aristophanes tackled the issue. His plays 
reflect an abiding faith in deliberation presided over by a sovereign Demos, 
and his concern with language is focused on whether it facilitates or hin-
ders the deliberative process and the ability of the Demos to render sound 
judgment. Aristophanes’ faith in the deliberative process is such that he 
has his protagonist Diceaopolis in Acharnians still use the deliberative pro-
cess, but translocated outside a dysfunctional Assembly, and garner astound-
ing prosperity. In Knights, both the Council and the Assembly are crippled 
by Cleon’s abuse of the deliberative process. Aristophanes’ support of the 
Demos is so strong, however, that when Demos resumes proper judgment, 
Athens returns to its glory days of empire, with Demos as sovereign, before 
prominent individuals like Pericles or Cleon used their vigorous speech mak-
ing to abuse the Demos. In Clouds, Aristophanes turns to the mechanisms 
that generate such speakers, focusing on Protagoras’ model of binary logoi 
in particular. The play emerges as the earliest-known example of the charge 
that the scientific exploration of language blossoming at the time was in fact 
a movement toward cultural decadence. This time the protagonist does not 
translocate the deliberative process but cuts the phenomenon at the root by 
burning down the Phrontisterion wherein a deviant logos could otherwise 
corrupt the future generations of Athens. Having dramatized the deliberative 
processes in the Athenian Assembly and Council in Acharnians and Knights, 
Aristophanes next focuses on the courts in Wasps. The familiar patterns con-
tinue with regard to the details of language (no canonical strictures but con-
tinued comic satire of unorthodoxy), but Aristophanes expresses no vision 
for a corrected system of court trials. Whereas the Assembly and Council 
should continue to operate under the prudent guidance of the Demos, the 
best courts seem to be no courts at all. Finally, in Peace, Aristophanes returns 
the deliberative process, figuratively and literally, to the Athenian Council, 
and the city will prosper.
 Aristophanes’ five extant comedies from 425 to 421 provide the most 
thorough record of dramatic output for any five-year period in the whole 
of antiquity. The arc of these five comedies, from the war-torn dysfunc-
tional Assembly that begins Acharnians to the restoration of prosperity to 
the members of the Council seated in the theater at the end of Peace, cannot 
be replicated anywhere else. Perhaps even if comparable plays survived for 
another five-year period, such an arc would never occur again anyway. After 
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the performance of Peace in 421, the Peace of Nicias was signed, and, as it 
happens, our knowledge of both the history and the dramatic output of Ath-
ens plummets for the next several years. When more detailed sources emerge 
again, the twin specters of the Sicilian expedition and oligarchic revolution 
change the rules of public discourse. The pathway to these changes is the 
subject of the next chapter.
ThE loST yEARS, 420–415 b.c.e.
When Thucydides concludes his account of the ten years of war from 431 to 
421 b.c.e. and embarks on the next stage of his narrative, he argues briefly 
that the period of the armistice, lasting nearly seven years, in retrospect was 
not a period of peace but of low-level hostilities leading to renewed conflict 
(5.26). His compressed survey of events between the Peace of Nicias and 
the Sicilian expedition (5.27–116) thus focuses on the political and military 
events that provide evidence of his thesis, that the period should be reckoned 
an intermediate phase of the war. Consequently, even with other sources 
available, our knowledge of the Zeitgeist of Athens from the summer of 421 
to the winter of 415 is patchy at best when compared to the previous decade 
and the following years.
115
The years of Confidence, 
421–414 b.c.e.
4
· · ·
ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς οἰκείους πολέμους τεθεω-
ρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, πῶς ἀποβαίνουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν 
ὁμοίων τὰ ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν.
And regarding this [war and peace], it is necessary to have watched not only how 
one’s own wars have turned out, but also those of others, for similar results natu-
rally come of similar causes.
  —Aristotle, Rhet. 1.4.9.1360a3–6
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 Thucydides acknowledges that he is looking back from the perspective 
of the end of the war.1 Playwrights writing comedies for the seasons of 
420–415 did not have the benefit of hindsight and so simply kept produc-
ing plays in the environment as they knew it. Unfortunately, no complete 
comedy survives from this period, and the next extant one, Birds, was pro-
duced while the Sicilian expedition was ongoing. Still, this period covers 
the later years of Eupolis’ career and the early years of Plato Comicus, and 
Aristophanes was still active, along with a range of lesser-known playwrights, 
so it is worth charting the evolving commentary of the remains of comedy 
from this period on politics, rhetoric and the trajectory of the Athenians.
 Aristophanes’ plays of the 420s display a consistent interest in the prob-
lem of leadership in the democracy. While Aristophanes in Peace attempts 
to dismiss the importance of Hyperbolus and other popular leaders in the 
wake of the Peace of Nicias, other comic playwrights continued to find the 
topic one of recurring interest. Aristophanes himself complains a few years 
later, in his revised parabasis of Clouds, that his attack on Cleon in Knights 
inspired a string of imitators attacking Hyperbolus (551–59).2 A. H. Som-
merstein rightly points out the exaggeration of Aristophanes’ complaint, but 
it is fair to say that anyone perceived as a leader of the Demos or a com-
manding presence in Athens was likely to be a person of interest for a comic 
playwright. At a minimum, Hyperbolus was a substantial target in Eupolis’ 
Marikas, Hermippus’ Artopolides and Plato Comicus’ Hyperbolus, in addition 
to being at least cited in other plays. Plato Comicus would go on to produce 
at least two more plays named for such individuals, Pisander and Cleophon. 
Alcibiades was prominent in Eupolis’ Baptai and in other plays, noted for 
his distinctive style of speaking.3
 Fragments of these so-called demagogue comedies and similar plays con-
firm only that some motifs found in Aristophanes’ political plays were also 
to be found in other plays. A passage in Eupolis’ Marikas gave an ancient 
commentator reason to reference Cleon sputtering in Knights (fr. 192.135–
36). An unplaced fragment ridicules Cleon himself for the public greeting 
χαῖρε, “Hello! Rejoice!” while he was actually hurting the city (Eupolis fr. 
331 = Olson E17). A vivid and economical sketch of Syracosius as an orator 
appears in Eupolis (fr. 220, from Cities):
 1. See Strauss (1997) on the issue of periodization of the Peloponnesian War.
 2. On this phenomenon generally, see Sommerstein (2000) and Storey (2003, 342–44). Note 
that Aristophanes does not use the term “demagogue” in this passage.
 3. Cf. the Appendix. This leaves aside the cottage industry in hunting for allusions to Alcibiades 
in other plays. See Dover (2004) for a criticism of this approach.
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Συρακόσιος δ’ ἔοικεν, ἡνίκ’ ἂν λέγῃ,
τοῖς κυνιδίοισι τοῖσιν ἐπὶ τῶν τειχίων·
ἀναβὰς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμ’ ὑλακτεῖ περιτρέχων.
Whenever he speaks, Syracosius resembles
little dogs at the walls,
because he walks up to the bema and yaps as he runs around.
 As is true of fifth-century comedy in general, terms for negative speech 
appear, but again none are technical terms, and no passage indicates or 
implies a formal system for instruction or rhetorical composition. More 
often, pejorative terms describe fancy or clever speaking. The harshest of 
these terms is ἀδολεσχεῖν, “blather,” and connected forms.4 Eupolis has 
a line addressing a σοφιστής, probably sarcastically or ironically, to teach 
ἀδολεσχεῖν (fr. 388). Eupolis also applies ἀδολέσχην to Socrates (fr. 386; 
cf. Clouds 1480, of Socrates’ students when Strepsiades is attacking the 
Phrontisterion; on the term σοφιστής, see Chapter 2). Another fragment 
of Aristophanes (fr. 506) points to the corrupting influence of someone 
engaged in ἀδολεσχεῖν:
τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρ’ ἢ βιβλίον διέφθορεν
ἢ Πρόδικος ἢ τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν εἷς γέ τις.
A book has ruined this man,
or Prodicus, or some one of those blatherers.
 Other common terms offer variations on this same theme. While in the 
next century λαλέω becomes an ordinary word for talking, in fifth-century 
comedy it retains its sense of empty chatter. Eupolis succinctly summarizes: 
λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνώτατος λέγειν, “superb at chatter, incapable of 
speaking” (fr. 116, from Demes). A scholiast reports Aristophanes describing 
Gorgias and Philippus as λάλοι (fr. 118, but there is no certainty that the 
scholiast uses Aristophanes’ exact wording). Since Euripides receives as much 
criticism for being a sophist (in the modern sense) as anyone in Greek com-
edy (see Chapter 6), it is unsurprising that his tragedies are not just λάλοι 
but “chatter around” (περιλαλούσας Aristophanes fr. 392) and elsewhere 
need more salt and less chatter (Aristophanes fr. 595; cf. fr. 158 for the salt 
 4. Cf. the entry in the Appendix.
118 Chapter 4 
metaphor). Aristophanes’ use of other words based on the λαλ- stem is also 
recorded (frr. 151, 684, 949).5
 These fragments overlap with a continued interest in education. A phrase 
in Eupolis’ Marikas is a metaphor of a class dismissed by a teacher (gram-
matodidaskalon, fr. 192.13–15). As in Aristophanes, teaching, of language or 
anything else, is the province of an individual instructor with an individual 
or group, but not an institution. Thus there is the teacher Prodamos in Aiges 
who teaches grammar and music (fr. 17). For Eupolis, Socrates is again more 
a charlatan than a philosopher or teacher (fr. 386 = Olson F1 and 395 = 
Olson B2), as is Protagoras (frr. 157–58 from Kolakes). Eupolis’ Kolakes of 
421 places Protagoras and other visiting intellectuals in the home of Callias. 
Decades later, Plato also dramatizes such a gathering at the house of Callias 
but implies a setting in the 430s, when Pericles and his sons are alive, and 
Alcibiades and the playwright Agathon are quite young. In this dialogue, 
Plato includes a debate between Socrates and Protagoras about whether arētē 
can be taught, and he has Protagoras cite the chorus in Pherecrates’ Savages 
(Ἄγριοι) of 420, which might imply the play dealt with educational issues 
(Prot. 327c–d). At a minimum, the play had to deal with what constituted 
civil society.
 The fragmentary remains of these and similar plays reveal some overlap-
ping motifs with Aristophanes’ plays, but not enough material for produc-
tive speculation about the broader ideological stand of Eupolis or other 
comic playwrights, either as congruent or in contrast with Aristophanes, as 
regards rhetorical language and democratic deliberation.6 As the previous 
chapter has shown, much of what Aristophanes’ comedies convey about 
public language and the democratic process unfolds over a number of epi-
sodes and requires context to discern the significance of translocation and 
revelations about characters’ orientation on the ideological grid. No frag-
ments of other fifth-century comedies permit analysis of these types of pro-
gressions or recovery of the necessary types of contexts.
 The most important lost play of the 410s is undeniably Eupolis’ Demes, 
although its famous fragments and papyrus remains raise more problems 
 5. Cf. the entry in the Appendix. For other instances of λαλέω where the context is unclear 
or at least there is no indication of political or philosophical content, see Pherecrates frr. 2, 70, 138; 
Strattis fr. 54; and adesp. 1005. Covering a similar semantic field is ληρέω, for which see Cratinus 
fr. 208 (= Olson B6) and adesp. fr. 174 dub. Pherecrates’ Λῆροι seems to refer to women’s accoutre-
ments, not the verb of empty talk; cf. L. B. Carter (1985, 121).
 6. Storey (2003, 338–48) is rightly cautious about characterizing Eupolis’ political orientation, 
but he is a little eager to downplay Eupolis having an interest in political comedy at all, often trying 
to separate “satire,” “personal attacks,” or “military” jokes from political comedy, although it is not 
clear why there is a firm line between all these. Even Storey must admit at least four of Eupolis’ plays 
engaged in “political comedy” (Poleis, Marikas, Chrysoun Genos and Demes).
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than they solve in understanding the play. While the play has often been 
assigned to 412 b.c.e., Storey makes a compelling case for production ca. 
417.7 The date of 412 rests overwhelmingly on the idea that Eupolis com-
posed the play subsequent to the disaster on Sicily and that the resurrec-
tion of the figures from Athens’ past constituted a reflection, in a time of 
crisis, on what Athens had and now needed. In Knights, Aristophanes was 
already invoking the same figures Eupolis revives in Demes (Solon, Miltiades, 
Aristides) and was revivifying the Athens of the generation of Marathon, 
so there is no requirement that 412 be a necessary or distinct moment for 
such a play. The reference to controversy about the battle of Mantinea in 
418 (fr. 99.30–32) and other komoidoumenoi fit a date ca. 417 far better 
than the date 412. Indeed, if comedy is still in part reeling off jokes about 
demagogues in the wake of Aristophanes’ Knights, Eupolis’ staging a play not 
with an individual representative of the Demos but with a whole chorus of 
“Demoi” is also a possibility.8
 The section of the lengthy papyrus fragment (99.23–34) attacking some 
prominent speaker and political leader indicates the nexus of motifs found 
in Aristophanes’ plays were also found in Demes. While there remain many 
viable candidates for the exact individual vilified here, the specifics of the 
attack find easy parallels elsewhere in comedy. This is someone whose suit-
ability to lead the Demos is in question (ἀξιοὶ δημηγορεῖν, fr. 99.23; once 
again, the term is not yet pejorative, and it makes more sense for it to be 
positive here, since it emphasizes the contrast between the individual and 
what he strives for). His manner of speech is an issue, not because he speaks 
formally but because he does not speak proper Attic (ἠττίκιζεν, 25) and 
thunders like a god (τοῦ θεοῦ βροντῶντος, 31; reminiscent of attacks on 
Pericles). The issue of proper deliberation is embedded in the citation of the 
speaker threatening to lock up generals who object to some sort of motion 
to act at Mantinea (30–32). This action in the Assembly is the climactic 
example of why the individual should not be a leader (ἄρχειν, 33).
 That Eupolis devoted part of a choral ode to criticizing the ambitions of 
a public, political speaker who was boisterous and advised the Demos badly 
does not mean he espouses a faith in the deliberative process and the sover-
eignty of the Demos that Aristophanes illustrates in his plays. The passage 
merely indicates that Eupolis engaged in some of the same issues of public 
language and leadership that Aristophanes does. Indeed, the plot and other 
 7. Storey (2003, 111–14). For support of a date as late as 410, see Telò (2007, 397–401).
 8. Storey (2003, 391–94) makes a good case that Demoi refers to the outlying communities of 
Attica and that the chorus is made up of representatives from there. Even so, it is hard to imagine that 
Eupolis did not make some use of or play on the term corresponding to the Demos itself.
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fragments of Demes suggest that Eupolis presented a significantly different 
view from Aristophanes of a crucial leader and speaker from Athens’ past: 
Pericles.
 The remains of Demes make clear Pericles was one of four figures from 
Athens’ past (the others being Solon, Miltiades and Aristides) to reappear 
in some way. Plutarch says of Pericles’ arrival in the play (Plut. Per. 3.7 = 
Eupolis fr. 115):
ὁ δ᾽ Εὔπολις ἐν τοῖς Δήμοις πυνθανόμενος περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν 
ἀναβεβηκότων ἐξ Ἅιδου δημαγωγῶν, ὡς ὁ Περικλῆς ὠνομάσθη 
τελευταῖος:
 “ὅ τι περ κεφάλαιον τῶν κάτωθεν ἤγαγες.”
Eupolis in Demes inquires about each of the demagogues once they have 
come up from Hades and says, when Pericles is called out last:
 “What you have brought is the headmost of those below.”
 The laudatory introduction of Pericles is probably undercut by yet 
another joke about Pericles’ misshapen skull,9 but Eupolis does seem to 
give pride of place to Pericles by putting him last among revered figures 
from the past. Thomas Braun has observed that this represents a shift in 
perspective on Pericles, since comic references during his lifetime and in 
Aristophanes’ plays of the 420s are uniformly critical.10 Braun further sets 
up a contrast with Themistocles, who would seem a logical candidate for 
resurrection but is absent. Braun argues that, in the case of Themistocles, 
his reputation remained tainted by charges of self-enrichment, and it would 
take until the fourth century for his name to be invoked in a consistently 
positive way. Pericles, by contrast, ultimately had a reputation for personal 
virtue and, once the war was seemingly concluded, became a viable candi-
date for lionization.
 Braun’s argument oversimplifies the situation and papers over testimony 
that does not favor his conclusion. For both Themistocles and Pericles, 
Braun does rightly acknowledge positive and negative testimony in the 
fifth century. Themistocles was undeniably a hero of the Persian Wars but 
his later reputation was hindered by his descendants in Asia Minor who 
were supporting the Persians. For Pericles, Braun acknowledges the criti-
cisms leveled during his lifetime but, in analyzing the passages in Acharnians 
 9. Cf. fr. 325 from Chrysoun Genos, which says only that Eupolis referred to the Odeon in this 
play, but which might indicate a reference to Pericles (cf. Cratinus frr. 73, 118 for the image).
 10. Braun (2000).
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and Peace that fault Pericles posthumously for the war, Braun argues that 
Aristophanes was mostly finding an efficient way to lampoon and criticize 
the start of the war more than directing his attack against Pericles himself. 
Beyond that, Braun claims, fifth-century criticism of Pericles is consistent 
with Thucydides’ praise in that all agree he was beyond personal corruption. 
Consequently, Pericles would be a good candidate for resurrection, while 
Themistocles remained a “hot potato.”
 Braun faces essentially the same bifurcated testimony about Pericles 
as Plutarch millennia earlier, with comic sources criticizing him, and 
Thucydides offering praise. And he reaches a conclusion much as Plutarch 
does, by preferring Thucydides’ portrait of personal virtue over the deroga-
tory claims of comic playwrights. To an extent, however, Braun simply mis-
represents the comic critiques. Hermippus’ characterization of Pericles as a 
do-nothing hypocrite does not imply agreement that Pericles was personally 
virtuous (fr. 47). Aristophanes is obviously satirizing the start of the war, 
but in the passages from both Acharnians and Peace he quite definitely says 
Pericles pursued war because of personal matters (whether his connection to 
Aspasia or Phidias), putting his tyrannical self above the needs of the Demos 
and Athens. These are not portraits that agree that Pericles was personally 
beyond corruption.
 In the broader picture, Braun may simply be trying to make a much 
simpler conclusion and narrative than are possible or desirable. It does seem 
fair to say that by some point in the fourth century both Themistocles and 
Pericles were widely recognized as heroes of Athens’ past.11 Their reputations 
in the last decades of the fifth century seem to have been messier, however. 
Herodotus offers a Themistocles who deserves credit for his accomplish-
ments in the Persian Wars, without hiding his questionable actions later, 
and his history was likely in circulation in some form by the 420s. Aristo-
phanes has two passing references to him in Knights, both invoking him in 
somewhat heroic terms. Themistocles is cited in Demes as clever but thiev-
ing (σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνήρ, τῆς δὲ χειρὸς οὐ κρατῶν, fr. 126), so there was 
at least room for ambivalence. By contrast, all references to Pericles down 
to Aristophanes’ Peace in 421 b.c.e. are negative. Thucydides is laudatory, 
but it is unclear when he puts forth his portrait. It is certainly after Pericles’ 
death and could even be in the last years of the century. Eupolis’ Demes 
offers the first and only positive comment in comedy, but, as it happens, no 
other reference in comedy to Pericles survives from the rest of the century, so 
 11. Isocrates, Aeschines and Lycurgus each cite them as model figures from the glorious past. See 
Braun (2000, 216) for specifics.
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putting the play’s fragmentary references in context is even more difficult.12 
Perhaps the positive portrayal of Pericles was novel and influential. Perhaps 
in the continuing difference of opinion about Pericles, Demes was the first to 
portray him positively on the comic stage. Perhaps Eupolis was out of step 
with the times, and only later, when Pericles’ stock rose, did the play gain 
approval.13 Perhaps with the Peace of Nicias, or even earlier, despite Aristo-
phanes’ protests in Peace, Pericles’ role in the war was being reevaluated and 
his role in Demes reflected his new popularity.
 Whatever the cause and whatever Pericles’ exact role, his oratory was a 
critical part of his characterization (fr. 102 = Olson E10):
(Α.) κράτιστος οὗτος ἐγένετ’ ἀνθρώπων λέγειν·
ὁπότε παρέλθοι δ,’ ὥσπερ ἁγαθοὶ δρομῆς,
ἐκ δέκα ποδῶν ᾕρει λέγων τοὺς ῥήτορας.
(Β.) ταχὺν λέγεις γε. 
  (Α.) πρὸς δέ γ’ αὐτοῦ τῷ τάχει
πειθώ τις ἐπεκάθιζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χείλεσιν·
οὕτως ἐκήλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων
τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις.
A. This man was so powerful a person at speaking.
Whenever he stepped up, just like good runners,
he caught up with rhetores from ten feet back when he spoke.
B. You’re talking about fast there!
A. As well as his speed, 
a certain persuasiveness sat upon his lips.
He was charming that way and the only rhetor
who left a sting in those who heard him.
Other fragments of Demes testify that oratory was a concern not limited to 
this passage. The thundering speech of the demagogue (fr. 99.31), the effec-
tive but criticized speaker nicknamed “Bouzyges” (fr. 103),14 the dismissal 
of Phaeax’s speech (fr. 116), and someone’s “circular talk” (fr. 108) point to 
an interest in public oratory. Again at this point we hit the limits of our 
evidence, for without contexts such as we have for Aristophanes’ plays, the 
ultimate evaluation of such speakers and the role more generally of oratory 
 12. On the supposed allusion to Pericles in the character of Aeschylus in Frogs, see Chapter 6.
 13. See Storey (2003, 111) on the reputation of Demes.
 14. Although a scholiast identifies Bouzyges in Eupolis fr. 103 as Pericles, the point of the com-
ment is the speaker’s inferiority to Pericles; cf. Storey (2003, 134–36).
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in the democracy are beyond recovery. In any case, nothing contradicts the 
broader picture that speakers and speech making did not conform to the 
formal precepts of classical rhetoric from the next century.
 Other potential factors in the production and reception of Demes are 
two areas of tension Thucydides discusses obliquely and cautiously: the fear 
of tyranny among the Demos and the growing influence of Alcibiades. Aris-
tophanes highlights paranoia about tyrants and speakers’ use of this bogey-
man as far back as Wasps in 422, but Thucydides highlights it as productive 
in the interrogations into the scandal over the Mysteries (6.53.3 and 6.60). 
As modern scholars have noted, despite Thucydides’ ridicule of the Demos’ 
ignorance and paranoia, Alcibiades’ influence was at least a legitimate con-
cern for supporters of democracy, and the oligarchic coup four years later 
indicates that the specter of the overthrow of the democracy was not abstract 
fantasy. It is possible, and it would seem logical, that Eupolis incorporated 
these tensions into his Baptai, likely produced within a few years of Demes, 
but the confused and unreliable testimony about the play and Alcibiades’ 
role in it do not allow for much sober discussion. One fragment involves 
reelection (fr. 98), and another mentions a proposal significant for the city 
(προβούλευμα βαστάζουσι τῆς πόλεως μέγα, fr. 76), but otherwise 
only Alcibiades’ supposedly homicidally angry reaction to the play gives any 
hint of the stakes raised in the play.15
 Aristophanes’ output during these same years is even more vestigial. Of 
plays for which there is some reason to date around this period, Seasons 
reportedly put some unorthodox gods on trial and expelled them (Cic. De 
leg. 2.37) and contains some expression of cynicism about utopia (fr. 581), 
foreshadowing the debate about poverty in Wealth at the end of Aristo-
phanes’ career. Heroes mentions part of a klepsydra (fr. 328), so some refer-
ence to a trial may be involved. Amphiareus from the Lenaea of 414 used 
the proverb “Deliberation is sacred” (ἱερὸν συμβουλή, fr. 32), appropriate 
enough for Aristophanes, but by this year a complete play provides direct 
evidence for how Aristophanes portrayed the fears and ambitions of the 
Athenian Demos.
Birds: dElIbERATIon And unIvERSAl EmPIRE
The long, rollicking ride that is Birds incorporates a number of lines, pas-
sages and scenes similar to the isolated fragments of comedies from the 
 15. See Storey (2003, 101–10) and the entry for Alcibiades in the Appendix.
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period. The obsession with tyrants of the distant past, harshly ridiculed by 
Thucydides, finds a quick gibe in the parody of public declamations, offering 
a substantial reward, “if anyone kills one of the dead tyrants” (ἤν τε τῶν 
τυράννων τίς τινα / τῶν τεθνηκότων ἀποκτείνῃ, 1074–75). If Storey 
is right that Eupolis’ Demes began with an episode in which the protagonist 
raises the legendary figures of Athens’ past glory from the dead, Aristophanes 
might be offering a deflated version of such a scene (1553–64):
πρὸς δὲ τοῖς Σκιάποσιν λίμνη
τις ἔστ᾽ ἄλουτος οὗ
ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης·
ἔνθα καὶ Πείσανδρος ἦλθε
δεόμενος ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν ἣ
ζῶντ᾽ ἐκεῖνον προὔλιπε,
σφάγι᾽ ἔχων κάμηλον ἀμνόν
τιν᾽, ἧς λαιμοὺς τεμὼν ὥσπερ
ποθ᾽ οὑδυσσεὺς ἀπῆλθε,
κᾆτ᾽ ἀνῆλθ᾽ αὐτῷ κάτωθεν
πρὸς τὸ λαῖτμα τῆς καμήλου
Χαιρεφῶν ἡ νυκτερίς.
Near the Shade Feet there
is a lake, where unwashed
Socrates makes souls uplifted.
There came Pisander,
asking to see the soul
that abandoned him in life.
With a camel-lamb for a sacrifice,
he cut its throat and,
just like Odysseus, he ran away.
Then toward him from below
toward the gushing of the camel came
Chaerephon the bat!
Whether it is Odysseus interrogating the figures of the mythological past 
on his epic quest or the convention of resurrecting heroic Athenians, here 
the process is reduced to a bogus intellectual, a cowardly politician, and an 
eccentrict local character. The responding ode also fills in an established 
heroic ritual with contemporary low-grade troublemakers (1694–1705):
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ἔστι δ᾽ ἐν Φάναισι πρὸς τῇ
Κλεψύδρᾳ πανοῦργον
Ἐγγλωττογαστόρων γένος,
οἳ θερίζουσίν τε καὶ σπείρουσι
καὶ τρυγῶσι ταῖς γλώτταισι
συκάζουσί τε·
βάρβαροι δ᾽ εἰσὶν γένος,
Γοργίαι τε καὶ Φίλιπποι.
κἀπὸ τῶν Ἐγγλωττογαστόρων
ἐκείνων τῶν Φιλίππων
πανταχοῦ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἡ
γλῶττα χωρὶς τέμνεται.
There is in the Accusa-nation near the
court clock: the evil race of
Tongue Bellies!
Who sow and gather fruit and with their tongues
reap havoc.
They are barbarians by race,
like Gorgias and Philip.
And because of those Tongue Belly
Philippines,
everywhere in Attica,
the tongue is cut out separately.
As always in comedy, the tongue is the vocal tool of malfeasance (see Chap-
ter 2 and the Appendix), here imported from outside Greece to feed bellies 
and be linked vaguely with the practice of cutting tongues out separately 
and prominently at sacrifices.
 These motifs offer little but consistency with other such terms and 
images in comedy. The broader context of Birds has catapulted the play to 
the first tier of disputation among scholars. The leading issue has been what 
to make of parallels between the fundamental plot (and then how details 
square with these broader parallels) and the grand undertaking of the expe-
dition against Sicily.16 Broadly speaking, critics have attempted to map some 
sort of allegory between the characters in the plot and the historical actors in 
 16. Konstan (1998, 3–6) offers a helpful survey of scholarly trends regarding this problem; see 
also note 19 below on other contributions in the same volume.
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the real-life drama of the Sicilian expedition and/or to map the new Cloud-
cuckooland onto Athens. Allegorists have generally struggled because Aris-
tophanes simply does not seem to employ prolonged and detailed allegories. 
A character may have an allegorical dream (e.g., Wasps 13–53), and Aristo-
phanes is not subtle about pointing out thinly veiled allegorical attacks on 
historical figures, but systematic understated allegories either fail to hold up 
at all or are so vague as to command little independent assent. Furthermore, 
allegorists most often seek a narrative parallel to that found in Thucydides, 
which would also require the awareness of hybris and the expectation of 
failure, but such dark tones are difficult to lay claim to in a play that is the 
most joyous of Aristophanes’ extant plays, perhaps excluding Peace. The 
requirement, or at least preference, for a sense of impending doom will be 
an issue revisited later. Allegorizing the bird polis onto historical Athens fares 
little better. The new world is neither consistently a utopia nor consistently 
a dystopia. It parallels, inverts, subverts and emulates Athens without a 
coherent sense of purpose and little more than suits the dynamic of a scene 
or even a one-off joke.
 At the risk of oversimplifying a profoundly ramshackle play, I would like 
to suggest that once again tracing the dynamic of deliberation and trans-
location provides a more coherent and productive focus both for analyzing 
the unfolding of the plot against its historical backdrop and for mental 
peregrinations through Cloudcuckooland. Such a focus will allow for the 
generally aggressive and victorious trajectory of events in the play, along 
with the loose and discursive panorama of the birds’ polis, but it will raise a 
potentially disturbing conclusion about Aristophanes’ depictions of Athens 
and the Demos’ imperial ambitions.
 No deliberative process in any of Aristophanes’ fifth-century plays pro-
ceeds without conflict, but the process in Birds proceeds smoothly in one 
remarkable way. Whereas in Acharnians, Knights and Wasps the process 
utterly fails in its proper civic location and must translocate to become 
successful, in Birds a speaker meets initial hostility, but the deliberative pro-
cess is quickly successful, so prosperity and victory results for all parties 
involved.17 In this sense, the resistance Peisetaerus meets initially from the 
birds (310–405) is no more than Dicaeopolis must overcome to persuade 
the Acharnian chorus of his position. In both cases, prosperity ensues, but 
Dicaeopolis has to endure a failed Assembly before demonstrating the ben-
efits of deliberation. In Birds, when the arriving birds attack the visiting 
 17. Peisetaerus and Euelpides do leave Athens, and thus the deliberative process is translocated, 
but they do not flee a failed site of deliberation, as protagonists do in Acharnians, Knights and Wasps.
 The Years of Confidence, 421–414 b.c.e. 127
humans for what they perceive as betrayal to their enemy, Tereus is able to 
reason with them about the principles of deliberation. Of the human intrud-
ers, he poses the question (371–72):
εἰ δὲ τὴν φύσιν μὲν ἐχθροί, τὸν δὲ νοῦν εἰσιν φίλοι,
καὶ διδάξοντές τι δεῦρ᾽ ἥκουσιν ὑμᾶς χρήσιμον;
What if they are enemies by nature but friendly by intention,
and have come here to teach us something useful?
The chorus of birds is skeptical, yet they do not cut off the prospect of a 
productive assembly but inquire further (373–74):
πῶς δ᾽ ἂν οἵδ᾽ ἡμᾶς τι χρήσιμον διδάξειάν ποτε
ἢ φράσειαν, ὄντες ἐχθροὶ τοῖσι πάπποις τοῖς ἐμοῖς;
How could they ever teach or tell us anything useful,
when they are enemies of our ancestors?
Tereus now sounds a note about the value of open discussion (375–80):
ἀλλ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἐχθρῶν δὴ τὰ πολλὰ μανθάνουσιν οἱ σοφοί.
ἡ γὰρ εὐλάβεια σῴζει πάντα. παρὰ μὲν οὖν φίλου
οὐ μάθοις ἂν τοῦθ᾽, ὁ δ᾽ ἐχθρὸς εὐθὺς ἐξηνάγκασεν.
αὐτίχ᾽ αἱ πόλεις παρ᾽ ἀνδρῶν γ᾽ ἔμαθον ἐχθρῶν κοὐ φίλων
ἐκπονεῖν θ᾽ ὑψηλὰ τείχη ναῦς τε κεκτῆσθαι μακράς·
τὸ δὲ μάθημα τοῦτο σῴζει παῖδας, οἶκον, χρήματα.
But the wise actually learn a lot from their enemies,
for caution keeps everything safe, and from a friend
you wouldn’t learn that, but your enemy immediately makes it necessary.
For example, cities learn from enemy men and not from friends
to build high walls and acquire long ships,
a lesson that keeps children, home and property safe.
It is neither the first nor the last time Aristophanes promotes the idea that 
Athenians should heed advice from those outside the traditional delibera-
tive process. The chorus responds in an approving and open-minded way 
(381–82):
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ἔστι μὲν λόγων ἀκοῦσαι πρῶτον, ὡς ἡμῖν δοκεῖ,
χρήσιμον: μάθοι γὰρ ἄν τις κἀπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν σοφός.
Listening to arguments first, it seems to us,
is useful, because someone wise can learn from their enemies.
And when everyone is ready for Peisetaerus’ speech, the birds indicate that 
they will negotiate in good faith (460–61):
ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὅτῳπερ πράγματι τὴν σὴν ἥκεις γνώμην ἀναπείσων,
λέγε θαρρήσας· ὡς τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ μὴ πρότεροι παραβῶμεν.
But of the affair about which you have come to persuade us of your view,
speak confidently: We won’t break the treaty first.
Confidence is hardly Peisetaerus’ problem, for he is in fact eager to impress 
the birds (465–66):
μὰ Δί’, ἀλλὰ λέγειν ζητῶ τι πάλαι, μέγα καὶ λαρινὸν ἔπος τι,
ὅ τι τὴν τούτων θραύσει ψυχήν. 
By God, I’ve been ready so long to deliver a long speech with some fat 
 verbiage,
that will shatter their souls.
 As with the speeches in Wasps, scholars have at this point summarized 
Peisetaerus’ persuasion of the birds as a formal rhetorical speech, but the spe-
cifics bely the characterization. Murphy’s prooimion (467–70), for example, 
consists of three rapid-fire claims by Peisetaurus, each interrupted by the 
chorus leader. The structure is no different from the “proofs” that follow 
(471–521), except that Euelpides now adds his own asides. The epilogos 
consists mostly of Peisetaerus’ pnigos, as he rounds out his presentation with 
a flourish. Murphy does not even attempt to analyze the remainder of the 
speech (550–626). His description in fact makes the scene seem less like a 
formally organized rhetorical specimen than debate at an assembly, which 
in fact it better resembles.18
 18. Murphy (1938, 107) shows his scheme for the passage, and Sousa e Silva (1987–88, 86–87) 
supports it. Murphy concludes: “What follows is a series of concrete proposals (550–570), and a 
group of refutations. The chorus and Hoopoe offer objections, which Peisthetaerus [sic] answers (571–
585), and the speech ends with a list of the various advantages which men will enjoy if they accept 
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 More than seeing a political assembly, however, scholars have noted the 
echoes of the thought and reasoning of the Sophists in the arguments to 
the birds, used by Tereus and Peisetaerus himself. Employment of such ideas 
can seem paradoxical, sinister or at a minimum satirical given Aristophanes’ 
hostility to such thinking elsewhere in his plays. Once again, however, loca-
tion and purpose are the ultimate criteria. Tereus calls an open assembly 
of the birds, and Peisetaerus makes his case. In terms of cause and effect, 
the closest parallel to Peisetaerus’ accomplishments as far as the delibera-
tive process is concerned is Dicaeopolis’ venture in Acharnians. Both meet 
parties hostile to them at first sight, but once they make their arguments, 
their opponents concede the superiority of the speakers. Wild success and 
prosperity ensue. The biggest difference is that Diceaopolis had already failed 
in the Assembly even to air his ideas, so the benefits of his plan accrue to 
him almost alone. In Birds, since the Assembly allows Peisetaerus to air his 
ideas, and he implements them, the benefits accrue to them all, including 
the Athenian spectators of the play.
 Scholars have explored in detail various ways that Cloudcuckooland 
reconfigures Athens, but the key point here is that, in contrast to Diceaop-
olis’ individual success, in Birds prosperity extends to the Athenian Demos. 
On top of the various intruders Peisetaerus deals with, scenes that redesign 
the polis physically and politically, some passages make the inclusiveness 
explicit. Peisetaerus receives a crown for the benefits he has brought, a rite 
of recognition in Athens done in the name of the Demos. A herald describes 
part of the change (1280–84):
πρὶν μὲν γὰρ οἰκίσαι σε τήνδε τὴν πόλιν,
ἐλακωνομάνουν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε,
ἐκόμων ἐπείνων ἐρρύπων ἐσωκράτουν
σκυτάλι᾽ ἐφόρουν, νυνὶ δ᾽ ὑποστρέψαντες αὖ
ὀρνιθομανοῦσι, . . . 
Before you founded this polis,
all the humans were going Spartan,
with long hair, hungry, dirty, going Socrates,
and carrying little clubs. But now they’ve completely turned around
and gone bird!
the birds as gods (586–626). A more precise division than this need not be given.” He concedes: “The 
many interruptions during Peisthetaerus’ argument in some measure destroy the rhetorical nature of 
the speech.”
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If the Athenians, and other Greeks, had been looking elsewhere to find 
themselves, the new polis of Birds has everyone flocking, literally, back to 
Athens. The extent of this accomplishment reaches its climax when the gods 
send an embassy to negotiate terms. In this sequence, Aristophanes makes 
explicit that the new polis is a victory for democracy over tyranny. The 
most recalcitrant of the divine ambassadors, Poseidon, complains about his 
Triballian companion and makes a sideswipe at democracy in the process 
(1570–71):
ὦ δημοκρατία, ποῖ προβιβᾷς ἡμᾶς ποτε,
εἰ τουτονί γ᾽ κεχειροτονήκασ’ οἱ θεοί;
O Democracy, where are you taking us now,
if the gods elected this!
When the embassy meets Peisetaerus, he makes explicit that the new polis is 
a democracy, when he explains what he is cooking (1583–85):
  ὄρνιθές τινες
ἐπανιστάμενοι τοῖς δημοτικοῖσιν ὀρνέοις
ἔδοξαν ἀδικεῖν.
 Some birds
were rebelling against the birds’ democracy
and have been convicted.
Critics have often found this a satirical or sinister image, but in its histori-
cal context it should have been reassuring.19 Poseidon has just disparaged 
democracy, but Peisetaerus, who has been keeping out troublemakers, who 
has been crowned for the benefits he has showered on everyone, makes clear 
that this new city is a democracy safe from elements who would overthrow 
it. Finding anything sinister here requires speculating that the conviction of 
the birds in question somehow was not the product of due process or that 
Peisetaerus in cooking them is somehow suppressing dissent tyrannically, but 
there is absolutely nothing in the play from any character to support such 
fears. Rather, he is safeguarding the democracy at a time that the Demos 
 19. Hubbard (1998) finds this scene and the play in general a reflection of popular outrage 
against mounting tyranny. For a perspective diametrically opposed to Hubbard, and closer to what I 
propose here, see Dunbar (1997). Romer (1998) leans toward a dark reading but is more sensitive to 
the problems of interpretation.
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was worried about insurrection. It is the power of the gods, meanwhile, that 
resides with Zeus that takes the form of τυραννίς (1605, 1643). The dispute 
between Poseidon and Heracles’ inheritance only reinforces the closed, elite 
nature of the gods’ power.
 After Peisetaerus secures power from the gods, the play closes with a cel-
ebration of his marriage and status as τύραννος (1708). The title can seem 
jarring and has again led critics to spy sinister, underhanded commentary 
on Peisetaerus’ achievement. In more charitable moments, interpretations 
suggest a Periclean democracy, where an elite citizen guides the Demos, but 
such a model is without parallel in Aristophanes. Inevitably, however, schol-
ars have had to acknowledge there is nothing in Aristophanes that remotely 
allows reading this final celebration, a scene that has no hint of irony or 
criticism in an author never shy about either, as cynical. A more coherent 
and consistent interpretation is simply that Peisetaerus is now fully identified 
with the Demos. He has been crowned in a way that reflects the preroga-
tive of the Demos, he protects the democracy and has brought success and 
prosperity to all. The scene in this way reenacts the rejuvenation of Demos 
from Knights ten years earlier. Peisetaerus can thus be τύραννος and marry 
Βασίλεια, and rule all the Greeks, just as the titles of tyrannos, basileus and 
monarchos are positive when applied to Demos in Knights (τύραννον, 1114; 
τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑμῖν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆσδε μόναρχον, 1330; ὦ βασιλεῦ 
τῶν Ἑλλήνων, 1333).
 There are, of course, major reasons critics and scholars have been reluc-
tant to make an equation between Peisetaerus’ imperial success and the 
imperial ambitions of the Athenian Demos at the time. One is the persistent 
idea that Aristophanes is fundamentally a critic of the democracy, and so 
any model he holds up must somehow reflect that fundamental criticism. 
Nevertheless, I hope I have made a case so far that Aristophanes consistently 
dramatizes a faith in the core processes of the Athenian democracy, even 
as he sharply attacks its institutions when they fail to function properly. 
A more serious problem is the implication for Aristophanes’ treatment of 
these imperial ambitions in the concrete form of the Sicilian expedition. 
Thucydides narrates the deliberations about the expedition as a process of 
lunacy compounded by ignorance and incompetence. Euripides had used 
a harsh trilogy to rail against the Athenians for their inhumanity the year 
before Birds.20 It is natural to want to see this awareness reflected in Aris-
tophanes. Even Jeffrey Henderson, who promotes Aristophanes as voice of 
 20. Cf. Chapter 6, but note that Erp Taalman Kip (1987) argues against this reading of the tetral-
ogy of 415.
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the deliberative Demos and who comes closest to acknowledging the cheer-
leading for the Demos in this play, prefers to see some caution here.21 But 
the Sicilian venture was approved with enthusiasm by its supporters, how-
ever foolish and disastrous it became in hindsight, and as problematic as it 
seemed even to some parties at the time. It is an unpalatable idea to say that 
Aristophanes, at least as far as what he projects in Birds, belonged to the 
uncritical supporters and was thus on the wrong side of history. But that it 
is unpalatable does not make it less true, on the best evidence available.
 Three years later, Aristophanes has his protagonist obliquely begin to 
address the staggering losses that did in fact ensue. “Shut up. Don’t bring 
up past trouble” (σίγα, μὴ μνησικακήσῃς, Lys. 590), says the official in 
response, a man charged with bringing better guidance to the Demos. And 
indeed, by the spring of 411 Aristophanes had many other problems he 
wanted to address about the health of the democracy.
 21. Henderson (1998a, 145): “It seems to me that Birds is at once critical and hopeful, with 
the emphasis on hopeful. .  .  . Birds would certainly chide the spectators about their shortcomings, 
including their errors of 415, while still anticipating victory in the West.” Slater (1998), wittily, but in 
parallel, feels obligated to eye fledgling criticisms of the costs of war and democracy.
After the celebration of Peace in 421 and the ebullient confidence of Birds 
in 414, Aristophanes’ next extant play, Lysistrata, of 411, finds Aristophanes 
back in attack mode, and the situation in Athens at the time leaves little 
doubt about why. Externally Athens was engaged again in war operations 
against Sparta, now allied with Persia, and internally major changes were 
taking place. Although Thucydides would in retrospect reckon the years 
between the Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian expedition as a period of low-
level hostilities, and the expedition itself as the resumption of the war, for 
Aristophanes most likely it was only with the battles of the summer of 412 
that he considered Athens once again at war.1 From this perspective, Aristo-
phanes wasted no time in launching a play critical of the war. While nothing 
in Lysistrata even hints that Aristophanes presages the oligarchic coup that 
 1. See Strauss (1997) on the problem of periodization and the Peloponnesian War.
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· · ·
δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνιεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὥστε τέλος ἥξει εἰς 
ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιτεινομένη σφόδρα.
Democracy will weaken and finally become oligarchy, not only when it is too 
loose, but also when it is stretched too much.
  —Aristotle, Rhet. 1.4.12.1360a25–27
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ensued months after the play’s production, the internal changes in Athens 
were sufficient to disturb and inspire him. Aristophanes is no less pointed 
or specific about the times than in any other play.
 While Thucydides devotes most of his history of 413–412 b.c.e. to polit-
ical and military movements, he does comment on other developments. 
When he summarizes the reception in Athens of the news that the expedi-
tion to Sicily was a catastrophe, he says that the first reaction was disbelief, 
then (8.1.1):
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς ξυμπροθυμηθεῖσι τῶν 
ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκπλουν, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισάμενοι, ὠργίζοντο 
δὲ καὶ τοῖς χρησμολόγοις τε καὶ μάντεσι καὶ ὁπόσοι τι τότε αὐτοὺς 
θειάσαντες ἐπήλπισαν ὡς λήψονται Σικελίαν.
Once they realized, they were hard on those of the rhetores who had encour-
aged the expedition, as if they had not voted for it themselves, and angry 
with the oracle-readers and prophets who had used divination to inspire 
hope in them to take Sicily.
The Athenians begin planning what to do next, and Thucydides includes 
this somewhat sardonic account (8.1.3–4):
τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ ἀρχήν τινα 
πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἑλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἂν 
καιρὸς ᾖ προβουλεύσουσιν. πάντα τε πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεές, 
ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν.
In order to bring some economical restraint to the city’s business, they also 
empowered a board of elders to enable proposals about the situation as 
circumstance called for it. As the Demos is inclined to do, at the moment 
of terror, they were ready to put all their affairs in order.
 For a playwright always interested in the role of rhetores in the democ-
racy, the importance of deliberation, the folly of oracles and the benefits of 
peace, it was only a matter of how to dramatize his response. Only one pas-
sage in Lysistrata refers specifically to the deliberations that resulted in the 
Sicilian expedition, wherein one of the venture’s strongest proponents, Dem-
ostratus, advocates proposals in the Assembly, while women shriek inauspi-
ciously during a celebration of the Adonia (388–97). Thus for the first time 
since the 420s, we have a play with a vignette of failed deliberations in the 
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Athenian Assembly, so it should be no surprise that the deliberative process 
will once again be crucial to a play and that it is translocated. The topic plays 
itself out at length in the agon and focuses squarely on the very character 
who actually referred to Demostratus but who embodies the bottleneck in 
democratic deliberation: the Proboulos.
 The office of Proboulos has left little trace in the historical record. 
Thucydides comments on the creation of the board and later mentions how 
an enlarged board cleared the legal hurdles to permit the oligarchic revo-
lution (8.67), a process described more fully in Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 29). 
Other than the names of two of the members (Hagnon at Lysias 12.65 and 
Sophocles at Arist. Rhet. 1419a26–30), nothing more is recorded, and it 
is no surprise that the office did not survive when democracy was restored 
in 410. Still, it is evident from even the sparse evidence that the Probouloi 
represented a significant concession on the part of the Demos. In Lysistrata, 
the Proboulos seems to have independent authority to negotiate and pay for 
war supplies. The very title of the office suggests they have powers to make 
proposals to or set the agenda for the Council. Their later activity indicates 
they were empowered, or at least entrusted, to consider the power structures 
of the democracy at a deep level. In any case, a representative of these elders 
was important enough in 411 for Aristophanes to make him the primary 
antagonist to his heroine in her plot to bring peace to Greece.
IdEnTITy And InCluSIon: lysistrAtA
The Lysistrata is sufficiently rich that, in spite of this prominent choice of 
an immediately topical figure, scholars have mostly focused on other areas, 
from its nearly coherent plot to its play on gender dynamics.2 As with Aris-
tophanes’ politics generally, scholars have debated whether there is much 
seriousness in the play, to the point that H. D. Westlake (1980) had to take 
pains to observe that, while the play’s protest against the war is broad and 
fantastic, Aristophanes embeds sharply focused criticism of Athenian lead-
ers. More recently, James McGlew examines the Lysistrata against the back-
ground of rising oligarchic power.3 He argues that Aristophanes offers up 
two models of citizens, a negative one in the Proboulos and a positive one in 
 2. On gender dynamics, for example, see Byl (1991), Taaffe (1994), Mastromarco (1997), Andò 
(2004) and Faraone (2006), all of which at least touch on the limits gender identities put on Aristo-
phanes’ depiction of political success. See Henderson (1980) on what nearly constitutes a plot in the 
play.
 3. McGlew (2002, 139–48).
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Kinesias, to show the audience that, by grounding their sense of purpose in 
the oikos and restoring their passion for participation in politics, the city will 
prosper through their renewed involvement. Both Westlake and McGlew 
take steps in the right direction. Westlake demonstrates there is pointed and 
trenchant political commentary in the play, and McGlew rightly views the 
Proboulos as an embodiment of a certain trend in civic political behavior.
 The episode of the Proboulos, which consists mostly of the play’s agon, 
is the longest sequence in the play (nearly double the length of the next 
longest episode) and constitutes the central exploration of the current polit-
ical circumstances. The Proboulos tends to be characterized by scholars, 
implicitly and explicitly, as a generalized authority figure, but such a figure 
would be without parallel in Aristophanes. Major political antagonists in 
his plays are attacked either as themselves (Lamachus in Acharnians, Cleon 
in Knights and Wasps) or as personified abstracts (Polemos in Peace, Poverty 
in Wealth). Neither scholiasts in antiquity nor scholars today have access to 
sufficient information to determine whether the Proboulos character in fact 
represents an individual historical holder of the office. Without such infor-
mation, the Proboulos most resembles a certain class of political operatives, 
along the lines of the sycophant in Acharnians, the arms dealer of Peace, 
or the various con artists who visit Peisetaerus in Birds. At a minimum, 
though, the Proboulos represents a more specific political entity than the 
government in general or the supporters of the war. Since the Probouloi 
had the authority to present legislation directly to the Assembly, bypassing 
one bulwark of the democracy, the Council, they effectively set the agenda 
for the democracy. Given Aristophanes’ demonstrated faith in the Demos 
retaining ultimate judgment over the deliberative process, the Proboulos is 
a natural antagonist.
 It is precisely as a figure inimical to the democratic process that Aristo-
phanes portrays his Proboulos. It is customary today, when describing the 
Athenian democracy, to point out that it was less democratic than many 
modern democracies in that it accorded citizenship to a comparatively 
restricted subset of the resident populace, excluding women, metics, and 
slaves. In late fifth-century Greece, of course, the Athenian democracy was 
on the more inclusive end of the political spectrum. The bulk of the ideo-
logical, indeed political and military, tension was not over how much more 
inclusive the democracy could or should be, but whether franchise should 
be restricted to fewer citizens. Democrats invoked the fear of tyranny, should 
such restrictions be put in place. Oligarchs invoked the fear of irresponsible 
mob rule. The vote of the Proubouloi to pave the way for the oligarchic 
Five Thousand clearly places them in the oligarchic camp in favor of further 
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restricting the size of the functional deliberating body of Athens’ govern-
ment. The traumatic news of the failure of the Sicilian expedition provided 
political ammunition for the oligarchs to criticize the judgment of the popu-
lar democracy. Aristophanes invokes just this scenario when he introduces 
the Proboulos. He has the Proboulos, upon entering the stage, discuss the 
deliberations over the Sicilian expedition and emphasize the need to control 
the war effort, when he first arrives to confront the obstructionist actions of 
the women (387ff.).4
 In order to highlight the contrast between the oligarchic movement 
toward restriction, represented and articulated by the Proboulos, versus 
the democratic principle of inclusion, Aristophanes places the moral and 
religious authority for successful political leadership in a group currently 
excluded from deliberations: the women of Greece. Thus Aristophanes uses 
the episode involving the Proboulos to dramatize his criticism of the oligar-
chic agenda. Even as the Proboulos tries repeatedly to silence the women, 
Aristophanes has Lysistrata demonstrate throughout the agon that the 
women possess superior experience and leadership. Lysistrata’s forces twice 
rout the Proboulos’s Scythian archers. After the women dominate militarily, 
the formal agon begins. In debate, Lysistrata quickly declares that the women 
will control the finances, because they can do a better job (486–501). Ques-
tioned further by the Proboulos, Lysistrata cites the failure of men’s earlier 
deliberations, but her solution is quite the opposite of that of the Proboulos 
and the oligarchic factions. In the past, when the women heard about the 
men failing in deliberation about important business (κακῶς ὑμᾶς βου-
λευσαμένους μέγα πρᾶγμα, 511) before the Demos (ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, 514), 
their husbands shut them out of the process (514–22). In the tradition of 
Aristophanes’ protagonists, Lysistrata translocates the deliberative process by 
gathering the women to save Greece (524–25).5 Even the men themselves 
are aware of their own failure, Lysistrata says (522–24). So now, much as 
Dicaeopolis and other comic protagonists before her, she and the women 
are taking control of the deliberative process (527–28):
ἢν οὖν ἡμῶν χρηστὰ λεγουσῶν ἐθελήσητ᾽ ἀντακροᾶσθαι
κἀντισιωπᾶν ὥσπερ χἠμεῖς, ἐπανορθώσαιμεν ἂν ὑμᾶς.
 4. On the significance of the Proboulos’ invocation of the Adonia at his entrance here, see Re-
itzammer (2008). Cf. O’Higgins (2003, 160–68).
 5. Murphy (1938, 107–8) proposes an analysis of lines 507–97 as an organized rhetorical 
speech but concedes: “The dialogue form nearly obliterates the speech of Lysistrata which underlies 
the whole.” I argue that debate and deliberation provide a much more important structure or reference 
point than a single speech.
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So if you’ll be willing to listen back to us while we give useful advice,
And keep silent as we did, we can straighten you out.
 Through Lysistrata’s prescriptions, Aristophanes attempts to swing the 
pendulum away from oligarchic restriction, by calling for broader, not nar-
rower, participation in the deliberative process. The call for listening to and 
embracing the broadest possible coalition climaxes in Lysistrata’s speech 
on wool working as a metaphor for governance (574–86). Lysistrata first 
describes removing the dirty and corrupt factions in the city, via the meta-
phor of culling dirt and knots from raw wool (574–78), along with cutting 
off the “heads” (κεφαλάς, 578). She then calls for metics, allied foreigners, 
debtors and colonists to participate (580–85; cf. Chapter 3 on the treatment 
of foreigners in Knights). The result will be harmonious prosperity, in the 
form of a cloak for the Demos (τῷ δήμῳ χλαῖναν, 586). The thrust of 
her proposal is clear: reject the oligarchic special interests and involve more 
people, not fewer, in the political process. Prosperity of the Demos should 
be the goal and will be the result.
 The ode that follows the dismissal of the Proboulos appears where, in 
other plays, a parabasis appears. In place of a parabasis come rival odes 
between the men’s and women’s semichoruses, but, as would be characteristic 
of a parabasis, Aristophanes reiterates the political point Lysistrata has just 
made. In their odes, the women continue sounding the theme that advice 
from a broader coalition will save Athens. The women establish their own 
civic credentials by citing their participation in the city’s religious festivals 
(638–47). They go on to declare that they have the right and authority 
to advise the polis because they contribute sons to the citizen body and 
because the men have squandered the city’s finances (648–57). In conclu-
sion, the women declare that they, unlike the men, have support throughout 
the Hellenic world, invoking in particular their allies in Sparta and Thebes 
(696–705). Where Lysistrata earlier had demonstrated their commitment to 
bringing Athens’ allies under the political umbrella, the women now assert 
that they can unite even Athens’ enemies in a common cause.
 The resolution of the play’s conflict validates the women’s claims and 
advice. Later in the play, Kinesias meets up with a Spartan ambassador, and, 
after discerning the extent of the women’s plot, they decide to pursue a treaty 
together. Kinesias declares that he will have his companions on the Council 
choose the representative for the negotiations (ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἑτέρους ἐνθένδε τῇ 
βουλῇ φράσω/ πρέσβεις ἑλέσθαι 1011–12), in the process bypassing or 
ignoring the authority of the Probouloi. In the negotiation scene that fol-
lows, the men, of their own accord, request that Lysistrata provide guidance. 
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Lysistrata takes on the role, informed by her experience as a woman, and 
insists on a Panhellenic spirit throughout the proceedings.6
 Familiar principles thus gird the play’s events. No one uses canonical 
rhetorical structures or events in their speeches, but Lysistrata engages in per-
suasive advocacy in support of the Demos. She knows the disastrous results 
of incompetence at the Assembly, so she translocates the deliberative process. 
Spatially she moves it to the Acropolis, but the more important movement is 
one of identity. Unlike previous plays, in this play a protagonist who is not a 
member of the Demos, insofar as she does not have the right to speak or vote 
in the deliberative process of the polis, takes over the process. Crucially, Aris-
tophanes’ long-standing point remains: sound deliberation in service to the 
Demos yields success and prosperity. In this play more than in any previous 
ones, the action during the play directly dramatizes this prosperity for Athe-
nians and other Greeks. Dicaeopolis was prosperous in Acharnians, Demos 
was rejuvenated in Knights, Philocleon was happy in Wasps, the fruits of 
peace were promised in Peace and the benefits of empire were reported and 
implied for the Demos in Birds, but in Lysistrata, citizens like Kinesias, the 
representatives of the Council and the husbands of all the women involved 
in the strike, along with a Panhellenic coalition, all celebrate happiness and 
prosperity by the play’s finale. Thus translocation of the deliberative process 
to marginalized identities becomes the most inclusive and promising mecha-
nism for widespread success and prosperity. In his next play, Aristophanes 
uses this same translocation by identity, but on a still larger scale.
STAndIng uP In ThE ASSEmbly: 
thEsMophoriAzusAE
In rebuffing the Proboulos and referring authority to negotiate peace to the 
Council in Lysistrata, Aristophanes defends the role of the Council in leading 
Athens back to success and prosperity. The other play of 411 effectively does 
the same for the Assembly in ways that are both less and more direct. The 
two plays were first produced within months of each other, and it is reason-
able to expect that their composition overlapped somewhat. There are some 
basic similarities to the two plays. Both make women central and prominent. 
Both begin with a problem and set up a proposed resolution to it. Central 
to each is a lengthy, formal debate, the agon between the Proboulos and 
 6. The finale of the play spotlights two songs sung by a Spartan, underlining in yet another way 
the principle of giving voice to those outside of the current deliberative process. On the uncertainty 
about the end of the script as we have it, see Revermann (2006, 254–60).
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Lysistrata in Lysistrata and the Assembly of women in Thesmophoriazusae. 
Following an ode analogous to a parabasis in each play comes a series of 
episodes prolonging the conflict in a lighthearted way (the escaping women 
and the thwarting of Kinesias in Lysistrata, the series of Euripidean parodies 
in Thesmophoriazusae), before the principal character returns and resolves 
the conflict (Lysistrata and Euripides). Within this comparison, certainly, 
Thesmophoriazusae comes across as the less engaged with the political trem-
ors shaking Athens at the time. It might be, however, the more subversive 
of the two plays.
 Scholars have agreed that some pointed lines in Thesmophoriazusae, where 
Athena is invoked to make an appearance as a hater of tyrants (φάνηθ᾽, ὦ 
τυράννους/στυγοῦσ᾽, ὥσπερ εἰκός, 1143–44), were intended to rever-
berate strongly with spectators in Athens while the movement toward oli-
garchy was ongoing.7 It is the lengthy and detailed staging of the Assembly, 
however, that presents the most sustained challenge to the looming oligar-
chy. Aristophanes is quite willing to dramatize or report a dysfunctional 
Assembly, but neither play of 411 does so.8 The scene of the Assembly 
does experience a translocation, to the women’s festival of the Thesmopho-
ria, and it is a parody insofar as it devotes the occasion to deliberation 
about Euripides’ defamation of the women’s demos, but it hews closer to 
the actual proceedings of a public institution than any other scene in fifth-
century comedy.9 J. A. Haldane finds the scene “one of the most elaborately 
planned and carefully written passages in ancient drama” and details how 
Aristophanes merges language and procedure from the Athenian Assembly 
into this scene and moves from splitting the language evenly between actual 
usage and comic additions to suit the translocation to the Thesmophoria to 
“almost wholly a debating society.”10 Aristophanes also explicitly makes the 
Assembly the one remaining operating body of the democracy. Inlaw, by 
way of explaining how Euripides should have nothing to fear, says: ἐπεὶ νῦν 
 7. Much inevitable uncertainty clings to any sober attempt to match up Lysistrata and Thesmo-
phoriazusae to the developments that culminated in the oligarchic coup in the summer of 411. See 
Shear (2011, 22–41) for an overview of events and sources and Austin and Olson (2004, xxxiii–xliv) 
for a solid overview of the issues pertaining to Thesmophoriazusae.
 8. Lys. 390ff. refers to the Assembly in an unflattering manner, but this reflects the character of 
the Proboulos, who makes the reference and who is being introduced here. The occasion he describes 
also predates the Sicilian expedition and was well before the oligarchic threat became so serious and 
immediate.
 9. Translocation of the area for deliberation was to become a historical reality in Athens shortly 
after the play’s performance, as over the course of the revolution of 411, oligarchs and democrats 
jousted for control and the authority to govern in different locations. See Shear (2011, 36–40).
 10. Haldane (1965, 39, 44). Cf. Chapter 3 and Rhodes (2010) for a similar documentation of 
the references to the Assembly embedded in Knights.
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γ᾽ οὔτε τὰ δικαστήρια/ μέλλει δικάζειν οὔτε βουλῆς ἐσθ᾽ ἕδρα, “since 
the courts are not in session now and the Council is not meeting” (78–79). 
Thus of the three principal political institutions of the Athenian democracy, 
only the Assembly remains open and active.
 When formal proceedings begin, the prose announcement comically 
mixes in some material to suit the women (295–311), but the passage is 
more remarkable for staying on topic and not undercutting the business of 
the Assembly than for satirizing it. A simple invocation for successful delib-
eration and success now seems to bear the weight of the occasion (301–11):
ἐκκλησίαν τήνδε καὶ σύνοδον τὴν νῦν κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα ποιῆσαι, 
πολυωφελῶς μὲν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίων, τυχηρῶς δ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐταῖς. 
καὶ τὴν δρῶσαν καὶ ἀγορεύουσαν τὰ βέλτιστα περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν 
Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸν τῶν γυναικῶν ταύτην νικᾶν. ταῦτ᾽ εὔχεσθε, καὶ 
ὑμῖν αὐταῖς τἀγαθά.
[Pray] to make this current Assembly and meeting most right and good, 
both very beneficial to the city of the Athenians and fortunate for us, and 
she who provides the best counsel for the Demos of the Athenians and of 
the women, that she prevail. For this we pray, and for blessings for you.
 This is not a satire to distort the proceedings but rather a nearly entirely 
straightforward reminder that the mission and activity of the Assembly, as it 
normally runs, are what is needed, and under attack, if not already missing 
in action. Similarly the group of prayers that follows reinforces the proper 
ritual of the Assembly, only with additions specific to the women’s occasion 
(335–39):11
εἴ τις ἐπιβουλεύει τι τῷ δήμῳ κακὸν
τῷ τῶν γυναικῶν, ἢ ‘πικηρυκεύεται
Εὐριπίδῃ Μήδοις τ᾽ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τινὶ
τῇ τῶν γυναικῶν, ἢ τυραννεῖν ἐπινοεῖ
ἢ τὸν τύραννον συγκατάγειν, . . . 
If anyone plots any evil against the Demos
of the women, or makes overtures
to Euripides or the Persians to cause any harm to
 11. On this passage in the context of constitutional debate just prior to the oligarch coup, see 
Shear (2011, 43–44).
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the women, or intends to be a tyrant,
or cooperates in restoring a tyrant . . . 
 Where little over a decade earlier Aristophanes had mocked the Demos’ 
paranoia about tyrants, and even three years earlier had used a similar parody 
to make such prayers against tyranny seem silly (Birds 1074–75), now the 
Demos seems to need a reminder that they are sworn to oppose tyranny. 
After more prayers specific to the women, the chorus emphasizes the point 
(352–67):
ξυνευχόμεσθα τέλεα μὲν
πόλει τέλεά τε δήμῳ
τάδ᾽ εὔγματα ἀποτελεῖσθαι,
τὰ δ᾽ ἄρισθ᾽ ὅσαις προσήκει
νικᾶν λεγούσαις. ὁπόσαι δ᾽
ἐξαπατῶσιν παραβαίνουσί τε τοὺς
ὅρκους τοὺς νενομισμένους
κερδῶν οὕνεκ᾽ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ,12
ἢ ψηφίσματα καὶ νόμους
ζητοῦσ᾽ ἀντιμεθιστάναι,
τἀπόρρητά τε τοῖσιν ἐχθροῖς
τοῖς ἡμετέροις λέγουσ᾽,
ἢ Μήδους ἐπάγουσι τῆς
ἀρχῆς οὕνεκ᾽ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ,
ἀσεβοῦσ’ ἀδικοῦσί τε τὴν πόλιν.
We pray together that this
may be well fulfilled
for the polis and the Demos.
All who deserve the best,
may they prevail in their speeches. And all who
deceive and transgress the
oaths established by tradition,
for profit or to cause harm,
or seek to invert
the laws and legislation
and tell secrets to our enemies,
or invite the Persians in the name of empire
 12. N. G. Wilson deletes this line, but see Austin and Olson (2004, 169 ad loc.) for parallels.
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to cause harm,13
they commit sins and wrong the city!
 The entire meeting proceeds efficiently and effectively, and in a tradi-
tional manner as if to emphasize that the democracy need not, should not, 
be overhauled or dismissed. The Assembly receives its proposal from the 
Council (372–75), and the motion is read. At the open invitation for some-
one to speak on the proposal, Mica puts on a crown and prepares. The cho-
rus is at once respectful and quips (381–82):
σίγα, σιώπα, πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν· χρέμπτεται γὰρ ἤδη
ὅπερ ποιοῦσ᾽ οἱ ῥήτορες. μακρὰν ἔοικε λέξειν.
Shut up and be quiet. Pay attention! She’s clearing her throat now
just like rhetores do. Looks like it’ll be a long one.
 Mica and, in response, the hapless Inlaw give the two longest uninter-
rupted speeches anywhere in the extant plays, forty lines for Mica (383–432) 
and fifty-four for Inlaw (466–519), and, with the addition of a brief second 
bit of support for the prosecution by the Garland-Seller (a mere sixteen 
lines, 443–58), both sides get roughly equal time. While these are indeed 
the longest, most sustained speeches in the plays, and do reflect some parody 
of speech construction, they do not conform to fourth-century standards of 
rhetorical speech structure.14 Even with the comic content (joke after joke 
at the women’s expense), the speeches are a display of continued airing of 
issues in the Assembly, and the ability of the meeting to deliberate is crucial. 
At the conclusion of Inlaw’s ill-conceived defense of Euripides, the chorus is 
stunned and offers (528–30):
τὴν παροιμίαν δ᾽ ἐπαινῶ τὴν παλαιάν·
ὑπὸ λίθῳ γὰρ παντί που χρὴ
μὴ δάκῃ ῥήτωρ ἀθρεῖν.
I like the old proverb:
 13. The text is problematic, and its sense is uncertain. See Austin and Olson (2004, 170–71 ad 
loc.) for details.
 14. See Murphy (1938, 108–9) for his scheme of these two speeches. To compensate for the lack 
of a diegesis, he substitutes prostheses in his analyses of both speeches, as he does for the speech of Di-
caeopolis in Acharnians (see Chapter 3, 56–60). Cf. Sousa e Silva (1987–88, 96–103) for a discussion 
of Ach. and Thesm. together, focusing mostly on the parodies of Telephus.
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you have to look under every rock
so a rhetor doesn’t bite!
 As the women turn hostile, Inlaw invokes his right of free speech to 
defend his stance (εἰ γὰρ οὔσης/παρρησίας, 540–41). Aristophanes has 
long established that the ability to deliberate is crucial and central to success 
and prosperity. He has also been willing for protagonists to take the posi-
tion sharply opposed to the majority, so there is legitimate suspense about 
what will happen. Is the Assembly dysfunctional? Mica and Inlaw debate 
(533–66) and prepare to come to blows (567–70), which would indicate 
a breakdown in the process, before the prytanis of this assembly, Critylla, 
orders them to stop brawling (λοιδορούμεναι, 571), a regular term for 
failed deliberation (cf. the entry in the Appendix). At this moment, Cleis-
thenes arrives, and the debate takes a different turn. When he reports that 
a man has infiltrated the meeting to defend Euripides, the women turn to 
inspecting Inlaw. Once he is exposed, rather than resume the threat of vio-
lence, they prepare to hand him over to the Prytaneis (654). After a search 
by the chorus (655–87), the parodies of Euripides’ plays begin. With Inlaw 
ensconced on the altar playing Telephus (688–764), the women again pre-
pare to report his actions to the Prytaneis (764). As the parodies continue 
(Palamedes 765–84, then Helen 850–928), the women continue to wait for 
the Prytaneis (854). A Prytanis does in fact arrive, scaring off Euripides and 
giving orders for how to detain Inlaw (923–48), for which he explicitly says 
he acts on the authority of the Council (943). It is following the climac-
tic parody (Andromeda 1001–1135), with Inlaw still bound by the right-
ful authority of the Demos, that Aristophanes has the chorus utter its ode 
invoking Athena as protectress of the polis (1140–42) and hater of tyrants 
(1143–44).
 Now Euripides returns and makes a formal proposal to the women, 
which gives them exactly what they want: cessation of the slander against 
them. Euripides and the chorus negotiate in formal terms (1163–64). Eurip-
ides uses the terminology for making an offer (ταῦτ᾽ ἐπικηρυκεύομαι, 
1163) that was used in the invocation at the start of the Assembly ([ἐ]πικη-
ρυκεύεται, 336). That passage invoked death on anyone who made such an 
offer to Euripides or the Persians, overtures undeniably parallel to contem-
porary negotiations between Pisander and the Persians. In the play, however, 
the Assembly has held its debates, stuck with the established authority of 
the Council, and the enemy Euripides has come with his own proposal, 
conceding to the women. A parallel action outside the theater would have 
the Persians making a proposal of concession to the Athenian Demos, rather 
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than the Demos conceding authority to tyrants whom the patron goddess 
of the city despises. The chorus agrees to accept Euripides’ proposal, and 
the conflict is resolved (1170–71). In other plays, Aristophanes displayed 
his faith in the deliberative process by dramatizing it outside the Assembly 
and showing how the process still yielded success and prosperity. Here he 
demonstrates his faith in the democratic deliberative process by having it 
succeed in the Assembly, at a time when the Demos’ reliability for mak-
ing judgments to lead Athens to success and prosperity was under extreme 
pressure. At no time does Aristophanes ever concede with anything less 
than confidence that the Demos’ judgment will lead Athens to maximize 
its potential. Whether it is the demagogues of the 420s or the oligarchs of 
411, they are impediments to Athens’ greatness by obstructing the delibera-
tive process and collective judgment of the Demos. The only change Aristo-
phanes ever promotes for configuring who should participate in the process 
is to expand the range of those advising and deliberating, whether it be the 
allies, metics or women, rather than shrinking the number of voices.
 Thesmophoriazusae suffuses its political commentary with probing depic-
tions of dynamics of gender and tragedy, both in the figure of Agathon who 
simultaneously adopts fully the character and gender of his creation, while 
defying any category himself, and more so in Euripides, who is made parallel 
to the Persian threat, hostile to the citizen body of the play, but ultimately 
reconciled. Six years later, however, in his last play of the era, Aristophanes 
revisits the problems of politics and tragedy, their relation to the Demos, 
and much more besides, but with irreconcilable results.
That’s the basis of some humor: tragedy plus time.
   —Lenny Bruce, ca. 19591
Aristophanes’ plays being ever topical, the breakneck pace of change in Ath-
ens after 411 b.c.e. is crucial for understanding the drive behind, context for 
and reception of Frogs. From 411 to the first production of Frogs, in 405, the 
stability of the democracy and role of tragedy for democracy became increas-
ingly critical topics, with the survival of each at stake in very real ways. 
Despite the surreptitious advice Aristophanes dramatized in his plays of 
411, over the ensuing months, an oligarchic revolution unfolded. Although 
democracy was restored the next spring, the dramatic festivals of the win-
ter of 410 were held under the auspices of the oligarchy. What impact this 
had on the program is far from clear. No known play, tragic or comic, can 
be assigned securely to the schedule for this season. One bit of evidence, 
however, does suggest that the proceedings retained a lingering taint of the 
oligarchy. The litigant (unnamed) of Lysias 21 some twenty-one years later 
is defending himself in a democratic court. He epitomizes the balancing 
act that more than a few families tried to pull off in the years when Athens 
 1. Recorded as part of his appearance on KPIX TV, San Francisco; available on Let the Buyer 
Beware (2004) CD 1, track 3. Carol Burnett is credited with later saying more exactly that comedy 
equals tragedy plus time, but the general truism seems to have been established already when Bruce 
makes passing use of the idea.
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lurched from democracy to oligarchy and back again.2 Like a typical wealthy 
litigant, he lists his liturgies and service to the democracy, but he has to be 
cautious about referring to his contributions under the oligarchy of 411/10 
and the tyranny of the Thirty in 403. He begins his litany of liturgies (21.1), 
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐδοκιμάσθην μὲν ἐπὶ Θεοπόμπου ἄρχοντος, καταστὰς δὲ 
χορηγὸς τραγῳδοῖς ἀνήλωσα τριάκοντα μνᾶς, “I passed my audit 
in the archonship of Theopompus and, assigned as choregus for tragedy, I 
spent thirty minas.” He dodges the oligarchic associations of the timing 
of his liturgy by saying only the amount he spent, although he must have 
been assigned the liturgy under the oligarchy, whether it was in the form 
of the Four Hundred or the Five Thousand at the time.3 He is more expan-
sive when describing his efforts the next year under the restored democracy 
(21.1–2): ἐπὶ δὲ Γλαυκίππου ἄρχοντος εἰς πυρριχιστὰς Παναθηναί-
οις τοῖς μεγάλοις ὀκτακοσίας. ἔτι δ᾽ ἀνδράσι χορηγῶν εἰς Διονύσια 
ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐνίκησα, καὶ ἀνήλωσα σὺν τῇ τοῦ τρίπο-
δος ἀναθέσει πεντακισχιλίας δραχμάς, “And under the archonship of 
Glaucippus [411, I was victorious] in the Pyrrhic dancing at the Greater 
Panathenaea, spending eight hundred drachmas and then in the men’s cho-
rus at the City Dionysia, under the same archon, and I spent, including the 
tripod, five thousand drachmas.” He emphasizes his two liturgies in this 
year, his victories in both (whereas he is silent on this point about his tragic 
liturgy in 410), and the amounts he spent make it clear he spent more dur-
ing the democratic year than the previous year (5,000 plus 800 drachmas 
versus 3,000 in the competitions of 410).
 He had good reason to associate himself with the City Dionysia of 409, 
for it was more than just another festival under the democracy. Peter Wilson 
makes the case that this City Dionysia, and the tragic competition in par-
ticular, was a crucial ritual signaling the newly restored democracy at Ath-
ens.4 Prior to the tragic competition that year, Thrasybulus, assassin of the 
oligarch Phrynichus, was prominently honored with a golden civic crown 
 2. See Lys. 25 for a pragmatic or cynical (depending on one’s perspective) presentation of this 
sort of maneuvering from a litigant, tainted by involvement with oligarchy, now undergoing a doki-
masia.
 3. He names Theopompus, appointed by the Five Thousand but later reckoned as legitimate 
by the democracy, as the archon associated with his audit, rather than Mnasilochus, who was epony-
mous archon under the Four Hundred (Arist. Ath. Pol. 33.1). He similarly dodges naming the archon 
Pythodorus for his service in 404/3 (21.2), and in this he conforms to the democratic practice of not 
naming the archon of that year (Xen. Hell. 3.1.1).
 4. P. Wilson (2009). Rhodes (2011b) challenges many of Wilson’s conclusions but agrees broad-
ly that the City Dionysia of 409 was distinctive for the restored democracy. Shear (2011, 141–54) 
surveys the importance of this Dionysia for the newly reempowered Demos.
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by the Demos (IG 13 102). There could well have been a mass swearing of 
the oath of Demophantus, which called on citizens to kill those attempting 
to subvert the democracy.5 Two years earlier, in the same theater, Aristo-
phanes had dramatized the Assembly urgently invoking curses on would-be 
tyrants, and it takes little imagination to see the actions of the Demos in 
the spring of 409 as an embodiment of the reminder embedded in Aristo-
phanes’ Thesmophoriazusae (see Chapter 5). Aristophanes’ involvement in 
the festivals of 410 and 409, if any, is unknown now, but he must have 
been aware of how crucial tragedy was to the restored democracy. As Wilson 
further observes, the crowning of Thrasybulus is the earliest in an impor-
tant tradition of the Demos recognizing civic benefactors, and the specific 
selection of the tragic performances at the City Dionysia as the occasion 
for this presentation emphasizes the importance of tragedy as symbolic of 
the democracy’s civic identity and return to power. By the time of Frogs, 
then, tragedy was established as of central civic importance for the Demos 
in this critical, tumultuous time, so questions of tragedy’s civic value were 
of immediate relevance. That Aristophanes himself would be awarded a civic 
crown for service connected with a play on this very topic should also be 
interpreted in this ideological environment.
 At that crucial tragic competition in 409, Sophocles took first place with 
a tetralogy that included Philoctetes, which points to another potentially 
remarkable feature of the proceedings. If Sophocles was in fact one of the 
Probouloi who had made the vote that enabled the oligarchic constitution 
two years earlier, his presence and prominence on this occasion are striking.6 
This, along with the litigant of Lysias 21 spending lavishly on a volunteer 
liturgy at the same festival, suggests there were options for at least some of 
those wishing to redeem themselves in the eyes of the democracy. In this 
context, Philoctetes’ story of a diseased exile, broken oaths, betrayal and the 
struggles of a heroic war orphan may have resonated broadly, deeply and 
personally with the spectators.7 Scholars have also looked to Oedipus at 
Colonus a few years later for Sophocles’ reflection on his troubled experience 
at this time.8 Sophocles’ mournful presentation of wounded and morally 
compromised characters seeking redemption may well have contributed to 
his reputation for being affable, including the charitable references to him 
in Frogs.
 5. For text of the oath, see Andoc. 1.97. Cf. Shear (2011, 136–41), who argues for the oath 
being sworn in the Agora.
 6. Aristotle, Rhet. 1419a26–30.
 7. Shear (2011, 154–59).
 8. Markantonatos (2007, 30–40). Compton-Engle (2013) argues that Aristophanes incorpo-
rates the staging of the old, blind Oedipus in Oedipus at Colonus into Wealth in 388 b.c.e.
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 However Philoctetes fit into the precise ideological environment of 409, 
scholars have analyzed how Sophocles here explores issues associated with 
the construal of knowledge, democracy, the intellectual precepts fostered by 
the Sophists and the problematic role of speech and language in a commu-
nity.9 In the play, Odysseus relies on his “tongue” (96–99, 407–9; cf. 440, 
of Thersites; see Chapter 2 and the Appendix for the term’s use in comedy), 
and his character embodies the means a manipulative speaker uses to lead 
a well-intentioned audience to destructive action. Such a character easily 
has parallels with individuals criticized by Aristophanes for swaying the 
Demos away from its intrinsic better judgment. For his last play before the 
democracy is again supplanted, this time by external forces, for oligarchy 
in the form of the Thirty Tyrants, Aristophanes again makes this issue cen-
tral, as well as how tragedy itself approaches these same issues. But it is not 
Sophocles so much as another playwright who becomes the flashpoint for 
this controversy. If Sophocles went from being an instrument that supported 
the oligarchic insurgency to a prominent figure publicly wrestling with his 
conscience, simultaneously defending his decision and acknowledging the 
rueful consequences, Euripides seems to have gone down quite a different 
path, from a beloved supporter of the democracy to someone unworthy of 
the trust of the Demos.
 Aristophanes had long bundled Euripides with issues of tragedy, speech 
and democracy.10 Twenty years earlier, Euripides is the resource for Dicaeop-
olis as he prepares for his speech to the Acharnians, but this support consists 
of dramaturgical tools, and the scene is silent about the tragedian’s ideo-
logical or political orientation. That Dicaeopolis can appropriate the style 
without the substance of Euripides is consistent with other passages where 
Aristophanes distinguishes the two. When Pheidippides sings a passage from 
Euripides, Strepsiades complains about its scandalous content, not its aes-
thetic quality (Clouds 1371–72). Peace sounds a further note of ambivalence. 
Trygaeus says that Peace herself is redolent of songs of Sophocles and “word-
ies of Euripides” (ἐπυλλίων Εὐριπίδου, 532), but Hermes reports that 
Peace objects to the association with Euripides (532–34)11:
 9. Rose (1976); Carlevale (2000); Goldhill (2009).
 10. The bibliography on Aristophanes’ treatment of Euripides is large. Schwinge (2002) probes 
the cultural tensions and contradictions embedded in Aristophanes’ criticism of Euripides. Hunzinger 
(2000), Voelke (2004) and Foley (2008, with helpful references) focus more on literary or genre 
appropriation. For tragedy incorporating comedy, see the survey in Seidensticker (1982) and then 
Schwinge (1997), and on Euripides in particular, Gregory (1999/2000).
 11. For another contrast between the two playwrights, see fr. 682, where Euripides’ skill is στρε-
ψιμάλλος, “wool-tangled,” and fr. 598, where beeswax sits on Sophocles’ lips. For the range of as-
sociations of the stem στρεψ- , see Marzullo (1953, 110–24).
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  κλαύσἄρα σὺ
ταύτης καταψευδόμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἥδεται
αὕτη ποιητῇ ῥηματίων δικανικῶν.
Oh, you’ll regret
lying about her that way: she doesn’t enjoy
a poet of forensic speeches.
In a very compressed form, Aristophanes sets Euripides and litigation in 
opposition to peace but acknowledges the appeal of Euripides’ style. The 
courts are the democratic institution for which Aristophanes shows the least 
support (cf. Chapter 3), and aligning Euripides with language there is con-
sistent with the idea that the courts are inevitably sites of discontent and 
wrangling.12 On the other hand, the words or style of Euripides is sufficiently 
consistent with peace that Trygaeus can make the association. Along these 
lines, an undatable fragment has Aristophanes, apparently in his own voice, 
characterize his relationship to Euripides this way (fr. 488):
χρῶμαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στόματος τῷ στρογγύλῳ,
τοὺς νοῦς δ’ ἀγοραίους ἧττον ἢ ’κεῖνος ποιῶ.
I use the round smoothness of his mouth,
But I create cheap ideas less than he does.13
Another fragment might rely on a similar contrast. A passage on papyrus 
from Satyrus’ biography of Euripides draws on a lost comic scene where 
someone wants to measure Euripides’ tongue which generated speeches 
(ῥήματ’) in some fashion (fr. 656). The implied scenario indicates recogni-
tion of the effectiveness of Euripides’ speech but resistance to it as well.14
 In 411, Thesmophoriazusae found Aristophanes engaging in a much 
more extensive reflection on Euripides, taking appraisal of his plays from his 
 12. On Aristophanes’ Wasps, courts and democracy, with reference to Euripides’ Suppliants, see 
Mirhady (2009).
 13. Note the use of στόμα, “mouth,” rather than γλῶττα, “tongue,” on which see Chapter 2 
and the Appendix.
 14. Wilamowitz’ supplement, <ἐξεσ>μήχετο, followed by K-A, would make the metaphor “pol-
ishing” speeches, which fits well. Friedrich Leo (1960, 2.370) suggests that the imperfect tense implies 
Euripides is dead by the time of this statement, but such a conclusion is unwarranted. A variety of 
scenarios could explain the tense. For example, a character could be reporting an incident where 
someone used a quote from Euripides, and now the speaker says he wanted to measure out and cut 
Euripides’ tongue for supplying it.
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poorly received tetralogy of 415, Palamedes in particular, to his subsequent 
more romantic fare.15 As in the brief reference in Peace, legal trouble and the 
effectiveness of Euripides’ speech drive the plot of Thesmophoriazusae, and 
Aristophanes puts him at the nexus of democratic speech and tragedy, for 
his plays get him into legal trouble and prompt the women’s Assembly to 
convene in the play. While the content of Euripides’ plays, specifically their 
misogyny, spawns trouble, his style, as presented in the series of parodies, 
is entertaining. Aristophanes’ other play of 411, Lysistrata, while mention-
ing Euripides only in passing, may have set up the triangle that is central to 
Frogs. Elizabeth W. Scharffenberger finds Euripides recasting the reconcili-
ation scene from Lysistrata into his own scene of negotiation in Phoenician 
Women, between Polynices and Eteocles under the presiding Jocasta.16 In 
turn, T. Davina McClain finds Aristophanes in Lysistrata engaging repeatedly 
with Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes.17 If Aristophanes is invoking Aeschylus 
here, the specter of the venerable playwright would provide extra grist for 
Euripides’ mill in his reaction in Phoenician Women.
 Still, none of this, especially the silly but ultimately innocuous role in 
Thesmophoriazusae, accounts for Euripides as the villainous antagonist of 
Frogs who is entirely unworthy to make a grab for the throne of tragedy, who 
must be routed by Aeschylus (and is to be stomped by Sophocles should 
somehow Aeschylus not succeed, 792–94), and condemned to popularity 
among only the criminal deviants of the underworld. Given this sharp con-
trast between the portrayal of Euripides in Thesmsophoriazusae of 411 and 
in Frogs of 405, it is reasonable to believe that Aristophanes was prompted 
to reappraise Euripides during the intervening years, and it is worth explor-
ing what might have motivated Aristophanes to depict him as a villain. My 
particular answer to this problem will see it as a natural continuation of 
Aristophanes’ abiding interest in rhetoric, public speech, and his support 
for the deliberative power and sovereignty of the Demos. My argument 
develops in three stages: (1) a reconstruction, within the limits of the evi-
dence, of the plays Euripides produced since Thesmophoriazusae to which 
 15. The parody of Telephus (438 b.c.e.) might be the exceptional “golden oldie” in the set, but I 
wonder if Auge, which, on the basis of its metrical characteristics and content, belongs to Euripides’ 
late period, dates to 414–412 and could have made the story of Telephus seem more recent, since the 
infant Telephus was a focus of the plot of Auge. Auge might even belong to the season of 411, and then 
Aristophanes might be parodying Telephus to match Euripides’ then-current output, since he could 
not have parodied Auge itself. A fragment of Auge against tyranny (fr. 275, and see below) would be 
especially striking at this same time and parallel with Aristophanes’ stance.
 16. Scharffenberger (1995). On the date of Phoenician Women and political language in this 
scene, see discussion in the next section.
 17. McClain (1998).
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Aristophanes could have reacted; (2) an exploration of what, in terms of 
rhetoric and the democratic politics of 411–406, could have piqued Aris-
tophanes’ interest in what Euripides says about these matters in the plays 
since Thesmophoriazusae; (3) the conclusion that, while there can be no 
guaranteed simple answer for what prompted Aristophanes’ harsh appraisal 
of Euripides in 405, evidence from Frogs and Euripides’ late production is 
entirely consistent with Aristophanes now looking at Euripides as someone 
who had been appealing in his language but has betrayed the support of the 
Athenian democracy, just when tragedy was of paramount importance to 
the Demos. In this sense, in Aristophanes’ estimation, Euripides is a figure 
comparable to Cleon or any other despicable demagogue. 
EuRIPIdES And ThE 
RhEToRIC oF dEmoCRATIC AThEnS, 411–406
In Thesmophoriazusae, Aristophanes parodies two of Euripides’ plays from 
the previous year (412 b.c.e.), Helen and Andromeda. With Euripides dead 
by the season of 405, there were, at the absolute maximum, six seasons (411, 
410, 409, 408, 407, 406) during which new plays could have been per-
formed, plays that Aristophanes could not have known when he composed 
Thesmophoriazusae but could have had access to when he composed Frogs. 
Only one play has a precise date within this interval, Orestes in 408. This at 
least confirms that Euripides put on a trilogy during this period. The other 
plays of 408 are a matter of speculation. A scholiast on Frogs 52 seems to list 
three plays “produced more recently” (τῶν πρὸ ὀλίγου διδαχθέντων), 
that is, later than Andromeda of 412, and so these should fall into the period 
411–406: Hypsipyle, Phoenician Women and Antiope. Given that the scholiast 
had access to records with dates to be able to give the year of the Andromeda 
and was also able to cite three subsequent tragedies (not satyr plays), this 
note suggests that, adding in Orestes, Euripides had at least two tetralogies 
during this time frame, which is not unreasonable. Three tetralogies would 
have to represent an outside limit of Euripides’ productivity during this time 
frame, since it would entail nine new tragedies and three new satyr plays, 
averaging a production every other year, which, while not impossible, is a 
formidable number. In any case, there seems to be no particular reason to 
doubt that Phoenician Women and Hypsipyle belong to this period, whatever 
the number and makeup of the tetralogies.18 Frogs suggests familiarity with 
 18. Cropp and Fick (1985, 74–76) show that metrical criteria point to Antiope dating to earlier 
than 418, and some plot elements like the lurid revenge are familiar from the 420s. The characteriza-
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three of these late tragedies. Aristophanes mocks the poor actor Hegelochos 
(Frogs 304), who mispronounced a line of Orestes (279) at its performance, 
and part of Aeschylus’ parody of Euripidean lyric invokes lines from the 
Phrygian’s bizarre song (1347–49; cf. Or. 1431–33). Independently, Scharf-
fenberger and Ann C. Suter further argue that Aristophanes drew exten-
sively on Orestes in composing Frogs.19 E. K. Borthwick picks through the 
mashed-up references to Euripides’ Hypsipyle embedded in Frogs 1320–28.20 
Dover notes that, although the play under debate is Euripides’ Oedipus 
(Frogs 1184f.), there are similarities between Aeschylus’ characterization of 
Oedipus and that in Euripides’ Phoenician Women (1595–1614, delivered by 
Oedipus of himself ).21 Taken together, these references give some sense of 
which among the recent plays were available to Aristophanes.
 Euripides’ late plays have marked metrical features and repeated motifs, 
so several fragmentary plays are legitimate candidates for these final years 
as well. Of these, only Antigone and Polyidus can be securely identified as 
cited in Frogs (1182–87 ~ frr. 157–58, from Antigone, 1391 < fr. 170 from 
Antigone; 1476–78 allude to fr. 638 from Polyidus).22 In terms of topical-
ity, Christiane Zimmerman suggests that issues of exile and lack of burial 
would resonate in the years following 411. Thucydides associates the recall 
of exiles with the Five Thousand, the best Athenian government in his view 
(8.97.3), and recall of exiles remained a lively enough issue for Aristophanes 
to address it in Frogs. Zimmerman further points to provisions regarding the 
treatment of the oligarchic conspirators Archeptolemus and Antiphon for 
the controversy about burial.23 Although she raises the issue with regard to 
tions of speech come closest to what Aristophanes does in Clouds (see discussion of frr. 189 and 206 
in Chapter 3), and the instances of political rallying are similar to those of Suppliant Women. I suspect 
that the routine confusion of Antiope and Antigone is at work here. Cf. note 22 below.
 19. Scharffenberger (1998) and Suter (1997–98).
 20. Borthwick (1994, 29–37). Cf. the half-line quote from the Hypsipyle (fr. 763) at Frogs 64. A 
fragment of Aristophanes’ Lemnian Women (fr. 373) mentions Thoas, father of Hypsipyle,  and seems 
to allude to Euripides’ Iphigenia among the Taurians 30–33, and so could easily belong to this late 
period. For recent discussion of the date of IT, see Marshall (2009).
 21. Dover (1993, 336). Compare also Dionysus’ addled quotation of Euripides at Frogs 105 with 
Phoen. 602. If the fragments of Aristophanes’ Phoenician Women (frr. 570–76) were more helpful, we 
might be able to chart his response to Euripides’ play better. Similarly, while it is also easy to imag-
ine, given the relative rarity of treatments of the title character, that Aristophanes’ own Polyidus (frr. 
468–76) parodied or at least referenced Euripides’ play (frr. 634–45), the remains are even sparser and 
of little help.
 22. I believe that Antigone is in fact the play named in Σ Fr. 52, noted above, following the fre-
quent confusion of the two plays. The fragments of Antiope point to a play in the 420s (see note 18 
above and Chapter 3), and the fragments of Antigone point to a late play.
 23. Zimmerman (1993, 189–90). [Plut.] Mor. 833a (Lives of Ten Orators) says that they were 
executed and denied burial.
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Polynices in Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus, certainly Euripides’ Phoenician 
Women and Antigone would be stronger candidates as plays that address 
the issues, and closer in time. The fragments of Euripides’ Antigone do not 
provide any evidence for what the play may have said about Polynices’ exile 
or burial, but one passage does testify, unsurprisingly, that tyranny was a 
topic (fr. 172):24
οὔτ’ εἰκὸς ἄρχειν οὔτ’ ἐχρῆν ἄνευ νόμου
τύραννον εἶναι· μωρία δὲ καὶ θέλειν
< . . . >
ὃς τῶν ὁμοίων βούλεται κρατεῖν μόνος.
It’s not appropriate to rule, nor without laws should
there be a tyrannos. It’s stupid even to want
< . . . >
who wishes to have power alone over his peers.
 How this fragment fit into Euripides’ play is unrecoverable, although it 
likely refers to Creon. For commentary within Phoenician Women, however, 
context is available for a story about this same family and from this time 
period, although interpretation is still fraught with difficulty. Nevertheless, 
I will argue that, despite many inevitable uncertainties, on the core tenets 
of the Athenian democracy as Aristophanes defends it against the looming 
oligarchy, Euripides’ Phoenician Women is easily and reasonably read as sup-
portive. At key points in the play, Euripides promotes sagacious deliberation 
as good and tyranny as bad. These stances should not be taken for granted, 
for Euripides’ subsequent plays are not reticent about criticizing democratic 
deliberation.25
 Phoenician Women does not provide anything like a simple allegory of 
the Demos versus tyrants, but all the uses in the play cast the term tyrannos 
in a decidedly unfavorable light.26 In the prologue, when Jocasta narrates the 
family’s troubles, Laius is invoked among tyrannoi (40), when Laius’ chariot 
runs over Oedipus’ feet, leading to the patricide. The context certainly does 
not suggest that the appellation reflects well on the doomed ruler. Jocasta 
 24. I adopt Badham’s emendation at the end of the first line, for εἶναι νόμον in the MSS.
 25. For purposes of my thesis, of course, I posit this only from the ideological perspective pro-
jected in Aristophanes’ plays, whether Euripides and his audiences, ancient and modern, intend or 
agree with this perspective.
 26. On Phoenician Women against the backdrop of terms associated with tyranny in tragedy more 
broadly, see Seaford (2003, 110–11).
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later uses the term of Oedipus taking power at Thebes (51).27 Later the 
chorus of Phoenician women refers to the “tyrannical” line of Agenor as 
both their own ancestors and of the ruling house of Thebes (291–92).28 The 
remaining (much more pointed) uses come in the debate between Polynices 
and Eteocles. As Scharffenberger has observed, Euripides here invokes the 
victorious reconciliation (διαλλαγή) scene from Aristophanes’ Lysistrata. 
Although the meeting will turn out to be acrimonious and unsuccessful, 
the chorus calls on Jocasta to preside, as over an occasion of reconcilia-
tion between the two (καὶ μὴν Ἐτεοκλῆς ἐς διαλλαγὰς ὅδε / χωρεῖ . . . 
διαλλάξεις τέκνα, 443–45; invoked again by the chorus at 468).29 The 
attempt at reconciliation plays out in terms of Eteocles’ tyrannical rule ver-
sus Polynices. When Polynices registers his complaint that Eteocles has not 
handed over power as they agreed, he says Eteocles is holding onto his 
tyranny (τυρρανίδ[α], 483). Polynices refers to his own turn at governing 
with the comparatively unmarked term ἀνάττειν (477; cf. Suppliants 406, 
where it refers positively to governance by the Demos). By contrast, Eteocles 
is blunt in defending his desire for tyranny, saying he will pursue it high 
and low and considering it a very great benefit (503–8). He concludes by 
saying that he will hold onto his tyranny and is quite willing to do so by 
unjust means (523–25). Whereas Polynices’ speech garners praise from the 
chorus (497–98), Eteocles’ rant earns their condemnation (526–27) and a 
reproach from Jocasta that he should not pursue tyranny at the risk of his 
city (560–61). Instead he should pursue equality (ἰσότης ), since it fosters 
lawfulness (535–42; cf. Suppliant Women 430–37).30 Such sentiments would 
surely play well with a resurgent democracy.31
 27. Diggle, like many editors, deletes this line, but the case against it is not very strong. See 
Mastronarde (1995, 157–59). Deleting the line does not alter my broader argument.
 28. Diggle, like many editors, deletes these lines, and I am inclined to follow them. Nonetheless, 
Mastronarde (1995, 231–32) makes a case for retaining the couplet, so I include the lines here. As 
with line 51, deleting the line does not alter my broader argument.
 29. Scharffenberger (1995). Eteocles later refers to the negotiations as a failed reconciliation 
(515, 701). Line 375 would have Polynices also refer to reconciliation, but the line is certainly spuri-
ous.
 30. On the Sophistic intellectual currents in Jocasta’s speech, see Egli (2003, 198–202).
 31. For a survey of the history of how scholars have characterized Euripides’ relationship to the 
Athenian democracy throughout his career, see Michelini’s (1987, 28–30) overview of the topic prior 
to 1987; the work surveyed by Michelini is the relevant backdrop for Holzhausen (2003). The topic of 
Euripides’ and tragedy’s place in the sociopolitical environment of fifth-century Athens has produced 
lively debate. Gregory (2002) provides useful perspective on Goldhill (1990, revised from 1987), 
Griffin (1998) and Seaford (2000). Michael Mendelson (2002, 1–49) focuses on ways that gender 
permeates Euripides’ depiction of political issues and how it impinges on modern debates. Versnel 
(1995), Rhodes (2003) and David Carter (2004) each critique Goldhill along similar lines, that the 
institution of the City Dionysia was bound to the polis but not necessarily to a democratic polis. 
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 Polynices also comes in for criticism, but in terms amenable to patriotic 
Athenian democrats. Jocasta questions the sanctity of Polynices attacking 
his native land (568–85), hoping to avert such “glory” among the Greeks 
(576–77). The problem of Polynices’ awkward alliance with another city is 
earlier muted by his laments. It was only the gods or luck that brought him 
to Argos (413), he says. He is miserable and poor in exile (388–407; contrast 
the cowardly and wealthy Eteocles in 597) and misses free speech most of 
all (παρρησία, 391).
 Ultimately, the attempt at reconciliation fails (443–637), so disasters 
result. In a sense this is a tragic inverse of the dynamic that Aristophanes 
dramatizes. In comedy, successful deliberation or reconciliation leads to suc-
cess and prosperity. In Phoenician Women, failed deliberation and reconcili-
ation lead to death and destruction. While tyranny fades from the play as 
an explicit point of discussion, deliberation does not. Creon says victory 
consists entirely in good deliberation (καὶ μὴν τὸ νικᾶν ἐστι πᾶν εὐβου-
λία, 721), and pushes to get a skeptical Eteocles to consider all his options 
(722–23), but with limited success, and soon Creon again implores him to 
deliberate (βουλεύου δ᾽, ἐπείπερ εἶ σοφός, 735). The subsequent scene 
with Tiresias underscores that the tyrannical Eteocles, who would not delib-
erate, is not fit to rule. Tiresias has just assisted Athens to victory against 
the Thracians (852–57), but he does not consider Eteocles worth helping 
(865–66). Ultimately, he finds that the tyrannical line of Oedipus should 
not rule and does not even merit citizenship (τῶν Οἰδίπου/ μηδένα πολί-
την μηδ᾽ ἄνακτ᾽ εἶναι χθονός, 886–87).32
 Such hostility to tyranny is not unique here in Euripides. A passage from 
the Auge, another late play, would also fit well in an environment of the 
democracy under pressure from the looming oligarchy or under the restored 
democracy (fr. 275):33
κακῶς δ’ ὄλοιντο πάντες, οἳ μοναρχίᾳ
χαίρουσιν ὀλίγων τ’ ἐν πόλει τυραννίδι·
τοὐλεύθερον γὰρ ὄνομα παντὸς ἄξιον,
κἂν σμίκρ’ ἔχῃ τις, μεγάλ’ ἔχειν νομιζέτω.
Burian (2011) and David Carter favor the broad engagement of tragedy with political issues, although 
Carter (2007, 82–83) partitions Euripides’ late plays from discussion. All agree that Aristophanes in 
Frogs takes it for granted that Euripides’ tragedy was a cultural force. It is the specifics of Euripides’ 
impact that Aristophanes takes to task.
 32. Diggle and many editors delete these lines, but the grounds are ultimately weak. See Mastro-
narde (1995, 400–406).
 33. See above, note 15, on Auge possibly belonging to 414–411.
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Everyone should die cruelly who enjoys
monarchy or a tyranny of the few over the city.
The word “freedom” is worth everything.
Even if someone has little, let them believe they have much.
 Anthemic crowd-pleasing passages like these are in evidence for Eurip-
ides’ career at least as far back as the 420s (e.g., Suppliants),34 so they are 
not distinctive enough criteria for dating or assessing Euripides’ reaction to 
the particular environment after 411. Nor is there any evidence that Aristo-
phanes highlighted such material. While Frogs does have a decidedly explicit 
political component in assessing Euripides, nowhere does Aristophanes seize 
on such political cheerleading. He does seize on statements that came across 
as morally outrageous (on which, more in the next section), but not ones 
patently for or against democracy.
 Conversely, Euripides was experienced in offending the sensibilities of 
Athenian audiences. The revision of Hippolytus in the early 420s is perhaps 
the earliest documented example, but the best-attested case is his tetralogy 
of 415. While best documented today for its one surviving play, the clos-
ing tragedy, Trojan Women,35 it is Palamedes that receives the only direct 
comment of evaluation of any single play by Aristophanes, and it is nega-
tive, for in Thesmophoriazusae Inlaw refers to it as tedious and shameful 
(848).36 When Dionysus sarcastically calls Euripides a Palamedes in Frogs 
(1451), he characterizes Euripides’ ideas as clever but useless. While the frag-
ments of Palamedes are few, the reception of the play in antiquity suggests 
that Euripides construed Palamedes much as the character is found among 
intellectual and “Sophistic” writings. Gorgias’ defense speech of Palamedes, 
Alcidamas’ complementary prosecution speech by Odysseus, and other ref-
erences treat him as an intelligent benefactor who did not suffer fools, was 
framed by a ruthless Odysseus and convicted by the duped masses.37 The 
ancient account (introduction to Isocrates’ Busiris 24–30) that the death of 
Palamedes recalled the execution of Socrates is historically impossible, but 
it does reflect the sense of ancient readers that the character of Palamedes 
in the play came across as a persecuted intellectual. The few surviving lines 
 34. Seaford (2003). Cf. Sophocles frr. 14 (sometimes attributed to Euripides), 201b, 873.
 35. For a full treatment of Trojan Women in this context, see Croally (1994) and David Carter 
(2007, 130–39).
 36. For comparison and context of this sort of insult toward tragedians, see Kaimio and Nykopp 
(1997, 26–31).
 37. See Scodel (1980, 43–63, 90–93) on Euripides’ Palamedes within the tradition of Palamedes 
as intellectual and Sophist. Cf. Sutton (1987, 111–13, 133–42), who sees the play as supportive of 
Protagoras.
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cannot indicate how justified the designation of “frigid” was for the play 
(although the heavy-handedness of Trojan Women, for all its other merits, 
perhaps gives some idea what a chore the experience of the entire trilogy 
might have been), but it is not self-evident what could be “shameful” except 
the most noted travesty: that his death resulted from the vote, the collective 
judgment, of the foolish masses. For Aristophanes certainly, vigorous debate 
was one thing, but dramatizing the unfit collective judgment of the Demos 
would be quite another.
 It can seem facile to say that Euripides reacted to the poor reception 
of his tetralogy of 415 with a series of crowd-pleasing lighthearted dramas, 
but it is a characterization congruent with the plays, extant and fragmen-
tary, as we know them and with Aristophanes’ reaction. If, after 415 and 
before 411, Euripides produced just one tetralogy, that of 412 including 
Helen and Andromeda (and more so if he produced two tetralogies during 
these years, both dominated by similar fare), it is easy to read Thesmophori-
azusae as celebrating the rehabilitation of one of Athens’ favorite sons. After 
years of harsh dramas, Aristophanes and the rest of the Athenian audience 
will forgive his misogyny, he has put the ugliness of 415 behind him, and 
now everyone can enjoy his light touch, which Aristophanes had always 
acknowledged, without the ickiness. It may not speak well of Aristophanes 
as a literary critic, but there is no sense of irony in Thesmophoriazusae in this 
regard. But it does bring our search full circle back to the problem of why 
his portrayal of Euripides in Frogs is so different.
 If for Aristophanes and some substantial contingent of the Athenian 
theater-going public, with its heavy overlap with the constituency of the 
Athenian Demos, Euripides was enjoying a vogue by 412 and still some 
celebrity in 411, with the restoration of the democracy and its coming-out 
party in 409, it would be surprising if there was not expectation and hope 
of Euripides turning up with another set of crowd-pleasing hits. And he may 
have done so. The presentation in Phoenician Women of the plain-spoken 
Polynices driven to arms to cast out the tyrranical Eteocles would be a wel-
come pat on the back to the democratic forces, even as it acknowledges the 
pain of fighting kin. The play as a whole, while modern scholars are right 
to explore its intricacy and sophistication, can be enjoyed as a creative wild 
ride. The extensive remains of Hypsipyle seem comparably innocuous.
 But not all of Euripides’ late output is so appealing. Orestes has a quick 
line where Orestes praises Pylades’ loyalty over tyranny (1156),38 but, while 
the tragedy can again play as a fun romp, the curmudgeonly Euripides is evi-
 38. The Phrygian’s celebrated report refers to “tyrants’” homes (1456), which may or may not be 
especially marked, but at the very least there is nothing positive in the designation.
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dent. Scholars have rightly been frustrated in making sense of the demented 
deus ex machina by Apollo, the de-heroicizing of most of the characters and 
the simple nastiness and brutality of the action. Fred Naiden puts the trial 
of Orestes in this play in the context of Assembly trials in Athens.39 Such 
trials were extraordinary, but the decade prior to Orestes included high-
profile Assembly trials following the mutilation of the herms and the coup 
of 411. Thus the brutal and dysfunctional proceedings in Orestes’ trial spill 
over into critique of the Athenian Demos’ handling of such trials. Such a 
depiction of public deliberation and the mass judgment of the Demos (only 
nominally of Argos) once again would cross Aristophanes’ sensibilities. In 
the play, Tyndareus bluntly plans, before the “assembled mob of Argives” (εἰς 
ἔκκλητον Ἀργείων ὄχλον, 612), to provoke them to stone Orestes and 
Electra to death. Menelaus is himself morally compromised, but he offers a 
characterization of the Demos that is not refuted in the play (696–701):40
ὅταν γὰρ ἡβᾷ δῆμος εἰς ὀργὴν πεσών,
ὅμοιον ὥστε πῦρ κατασβέσαι λάβρον·
εἰ δ᾽ ἡσύχως τις αὑτὸν ἐντείνοντι μὲν
χαλῶν ὑπείκοι καιρὸν εὐλαβούμενος,
ἴσως ἂν ἐκπνεύσειεν: ἢν δ᾽ ἀνῇ πνοάς,
τύχοις ἂν αὐτοῦ ῥᾳδίως ὅσον θέλεις.
When the Demos feel their vim and vigor but fall into a rage,
it is like a raging fire to quench.
But if someone, when it stretches out,
relaxes and yields, they can seize the moment,
and he might be able to blow on it.
Then, when you approach the blasts,
you can easily get whatever you want.
Aristophanes had long acknowledged the volatile temper of the Demos, but 
he always dramatizes the judgment of the Demos as ultimately sound and 
a path to success and prosperity. Worse yet, Menelaus’ characterization is 
 39. Naiden (2010). Silva (2010) offers more general thoughts on the tensions in the trial. Barker 
(2011) analyzes the play in terms of political free speech and dissent in democratic deliberation.
 40. References to the δῆμος in Euripides are certain only here and in the political debate be-
tween Theseus and the Theban herald in Suppliant Women (351, 406, 425 and 442). The passage in 
which δῆμος appears in Andromache (700) is deleted by Diggle and most editors since Busche. The 
appearance of the word at IA 450 is uncertain (against the MS reading, Diggle and most editors follow 
a version quoted in Plutarch with ὄγκον instead). The two sententious fragments where it appears 
(frr. 92, 626) come from Stobaeus without context.
160 Chapter 6 
flattering compared to what happens when the Demos actually meets. The 
messenger reporting the proceedings portrays the assembly as a mob (884) 
initially divided about what was proper to do, but ultimately manipulated 
and subject to irrationality (866–956). Along the way, the messenger dis-
courses, with no sense of hope or optimism, on what a leader of the Demos 
should be like.41 The messenger is explicit that, at the Assembly, the sensible 
speaker (εὖ δοκῶν λέγειν, 943) failed to persuade, and the evil speaker 
won (νικᾷ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνος ὁ κακὸς ἐν πλήθει λέγων, 944).42 At no point in 
the play does Euripides follow up with a corrective or counterbalance to this 
characterization and account. Nothing in Phoenician Women matches this 
decidedly cynical depiction, and there is not enough in the remains of the 
fragmentary plays, but such cynicism is not without parallel in Euripides’ 
late plays. Iphigenia at Aulis dramatizes a similarly grim view of collective 
decision making in action.43 Although this play would not have been known 
or available to Aristophanes, it confirms that Euripides’ thought was leaning 
in this direction, so it is quite possible other plays staged with Orestes, or in 
this interval, contained similar affronts to the Demos.
 I have deferred the most problematic and controversial matter to the last: 
Euripides’ connection to Macedon and his composition for its monarch, 
Archelaus. The notoriously unreliable biographical tradition from antiq-
uity says Euripides left Athens, discouraged after the tetralogy of 408, and 
spent his last years in the court of Archelaus, producing a play that boosted 
the king’s genealogical credentials. Although modern scholars have mostly 
accepted the core of the narrative, S. Scullion has developed the argument 
that the story is bald fiction.44 Moreover, he argues that Archelaus was per-
formed in Athens and recognizably quoted in Frogs (1206–8). Scullion con-
siders it crucial for demolishing the story of Euripides leaving Athens and 
dying in Macedon that Aristophanes is silent about any such turn of events 
 41. From this passage, Hartung deleted lines 904–13 entirely, and in this he is followed by 
Diggle. Willink deprecates the whole passage but deletes only 907–13. The passage is old enough 
for 907–10 to end up quoted in Stobaeus, although this is of scarcely any value for determining au-
thenticity. The decision to excise the lines is purely aesthetic, and while editors have legitimate reason 
to feel that the lines are a bloated addition, I am ambivalent and undecided about whether they are 
genuine Euripides. A discourse on the proper role and characteristics of a προστάτης (911) is not 
out of place here. This and the reference to the unrestrained tongue (903; cf. the reference to Tantalus 
in line 10) make it feel just close enough to fifth-century usage that I do not feel confident that the 
passage is a later interpolation.
 42. Diggle adopts Wecklein’s χερῶν here, but, with Willink, I retain the MSS λέγων.
 43. See Michelakis (2006, 73–82) for a survey of the issues.
 44. Scullion (2003). Cf. Scullion (2006), where he argues further that the play was produced in 
a trilogy with Temenus and Temenidae; and Lefkowitz (2012, 99–100).
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in Frogs. If, however, as Scullion envisions, Euripides was commissioned by 
the Macedonian king to produce a laudatory trilogy, to be staged in Macedo-
nia, and Euripides also had it staged in Athens, one could just as reasonably 
expect some jab in Frogs about such a move. Indeed, there are many ques-
tions about how and why Aristophanes presents Euripides just as he does in 
Frogs. The argument from silence is not as strong as Scullion insists, and his 
scenario, while possible, is not necessarily any better a fit for the evidence 
than the traditional one.
 The remains of Archelaus itself do seem to confirm that Euripides made 
an effort to manipulate mythological genealogy to benefit the Macedonian 
monarch. Some sort of commission and performance in Macedonia seems 
logical even to Scullion. As for political content, extant fragments do include 
sententious comments mentioning the evils of poverty and tyranny on a level 
with the gods (frr. 248 and 250; cf. Sophocles fr. 88 on godlike tyranny 
and the corruption brought on by money), as well as the potential dangers 
of clever speaking (fr. 253).45 Without context, however, it is impossible to 
determine if these sentiments belong to a sequence favorable to the Demos, 
as in Phoenician Women (where Eteocles also says tyranny is godlike, 506) 
or unfavorable, as in Orestes (where clever speaking brings victory to the evil 
man).46 I posit, however, that whether Scullion is right or not about his sce-
nario, Euripides by this time represented something hostile ideologically for 
Aristophanes. If Euripides left for Macedon and wrote a tragedy celebrating 
the aristocratic genealogy of a monarch, when for the last several years he 
had been a celebrated favorite son and, at least looked upon as, a cheerleader 
for the democracy, such a move would certainly ring of a stinging reversal 
and betrayal. If Scullion is right, Euripides staged a play, maybe a trilogy, 
before the Athenians themselves, with this positive portrayal of a monarch, 
and the play was familiar enough for Aristophanes to make its opening 
lines the first to be demolished by the “little bottle of oil” (Frogs 1206–8). 
The combination of the cynical portrayal of the Demos in Orestes, favorit-
ism toward a Macedonian monarch and inference from Iphigenia in Aulis 
that Euripides’ bitterness toward democratic rule still held in his last days 
all suggest that in the years when the Athenian Demos ramped up its civic 
identification with tragedy, Euripides unpalatably turned on the Demos. 
Thus Euripides would have gone from hero to traitor in these years, and, to 
compound matters, the younger star of Thesmophoriazusae, Agathon, also 
 45. Duncan (2011, 78–82).
 46. Frr. 643–44 from Polyidus, on bad leadership of the city, present a similar problem, but the 
similarity makes me inclined to suspect it is a strong candidate to be parallel to the Orestes scenario.
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had departed Athens for Macedon (Frogs 83–84). This chronological pro-
gression explains one of most vexed problems of Frogs as well as the perplex-
ing emotional dynamic at the play’s climax.
EuRIPIdES In Frogs
τὰ μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, 
ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔνια καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἂν ᾖ ὕστερον καλὸν 
καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εἴρηται, “ἀλλ᾽ ἡδύ τοι 
σωθέντα μεμνῆσθαι πόνων.”
Memories are sweet not only of things that were sweet when they happened, 
but also some things that were not sweet, if later, after the fact, it is beauti-
ful and good. Whence it is said, “As you know, it’s truly sweet to remember 
pain after escaping it.” Aristotle, Rhet. 1.11.8.1370b1–4, quoting Euripides’ 
Andromeda (fr. 133)
In Frogs, Aristophanes seems to be taking a fresh account of Euripides’ career 
with, I will argue, more topicality and immediacy than has usually been 
granted.
 Early in the play, Aristophanes establishes the time frame for the pro-
gressive emotional dynamic he is going to present with regard to Euripides. 
Dionysus, in order to explain to Hercules why he is heading to the under-
world, speaks of his intense desire for Euripides, prompted by his reading 
Euripides’ Andromeda (52–54). The passage led a scholiast to ask, “Why not 
another of the more recently produced beautiful dramas, Hypsipyle, Phoeni-
cian Women, Antiope?” (διὰ τί μὴ ἄλλο τι τῶν πρὸ ὀλίγου διδαχθέντων 
καὶ καλῶν Ὑψιπύλην, Φοινίσσας, Ἀντιόπην;), since Andromeda was 
produced six years earlier. The question encapsulates what has become the 
most regularly debated problem of Frogs: why and how does Dionysus go 
from being an ardent admirer of Euripides to presiding ineffectually over 
a debate between Euripides and Aeschylus to finally choosing Aeschylus 
and rejecting Euripides? This transformation is the central movement of 
the entire play, so discussion most often embraces the idea of the unity of 
the play as a whole.47 Most scholars have sought this unity in the character 
of Dionysus himself, both as the character in Aristophanes’ play, usually 
merged with the ideal of comedy as a genre, and the broader multivalent 
 47. Segal (1961).
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associations of the god in Athenian cultural and religious life.48 Others 
have responded to the scholiast’s query by finding the story and drama 
of Andromeda an integral part of the unfolding of Frogs.49 Such readings 
expose much richness in the play and provide valuable observations about 
the interface between Aristophanes’ comedy and the vibrant emotional and 
political life of the Athenian polis.
 What I propose here does not supplant what Pavlos Sfyroeras and oth-
ers have contributed to our understanding of Frogs. Rather I argue that 
the fecundity of Aristophanes’ intertextuality with Euripides, tragedy more 
broadly and the ideology of the Athenian polis both broadly and deeply is 
anchored in a straightforward emotional trajectory, from carefree pleasure to 
confused disappointment to rejection, a trajectory with which the Athenian 
Demos would already have been familiar on account of Euripides. Aristo-
phanes’ dramatization extends beyond reenacting this emotional trajectory, 
for he sanctions the Demos’ rejection of Euripides in favor of reviving a 
playwright associated with Athens’ greatness, and does so in such a way that 
the resurrection of Aeschylus is not resorting to a figure from the remote 
past, but to a contemporary assertion of the Demos’ judgment about Ath-
ens’ civic identity. Aristophanes’ democratic credentials prime him to chart 
the Demos’ emotional progress in this way. Moreover, the political capital 
Aristophanes has established over the decades with the Demos means that he 
can also address the vexed problem of the Athenians exiled for their involve-
ment in the coup of 411. Aristophanes can appeal for their recall, and he 
will be crowned by the Demos for this, but in the context also of validating 
and reassuring the Demos of their judgment.
 As in nearly every reference by Aristophanes to Euripides, in Frogs there 
is a disjunction between the appeal of Euripides’ words and the icky content 
of what he says. The Andromeda prompts a desire in Dionysus’ heart (52–54, 
66–67), but Hercules insists that the Euripides that Dionsyus praises (in 
the form of references to Alexander, Melanippe the Wise and Hippolytus) is 
dreck (100–106). Dionysus even acknowledges that Euripides is bereft of 
moral reasoning (πανοῦργος, 80), in contrast to Sophocles, who is associ-
ated with good humor (εὔκολος, 82).50 So far, this is the Euripides of days 
past. If Euripides had betrayed the Demos before his recent death, the desire 
for Euripides from the days of Andromeda makes sense. The Andromeda 
 48. Lada-Richards (1999); Habash (2002); Silva (2007).
 49. Sfyroeras (2008) finds Andromeda providing a tragic counterpoint to comedy in the play and 
also bound up with the crucial issue of desire (πόθος) both in drama and in Athenian civic life.
 50. Bonanno (2005) suggests that adesp. 480 (Μουσῶν εὐκόλων ἀνθρήνιον), also of Sopho-
cles, is in fact a quotation from Aristophanes.
164 Chapter 6 
belonged to a period of Euripides’ popularity and before the horrific upheav-
als of 411–410. Hercules represents the perspective that Euripides was just 
terrible. Dionysus does not deny this, but he represents the appeal Euripides 
had, especially at the spike of his popularity ca. 412.
 After this initial exchange, there is much other comic business before 
Euripides again becomes the focus of attention, but once he is, the agon 
between him and Aeschylus consumes the remainder of the play (755–
1533).51 What topical political commentary there is in the play apart from 
the agon, then, comes in these intermediate acts. Two politicians stand out 
for the attention they receive in this part of the play: Archedemus and 
Cleophon. In a section of the second parodos, the chorus of initiates mocks 
Archedemus (416–21), who was prominent politically at the time (Xen. HG 
1.7.2) and noted here as leading the Demos (νυνὶ δὲ δημαγωγεῖ, 419). The 
attack is brief and general. Archedemus is “premiere in rottenness” (κἀστὶν 
τὰ πρῶτα τῆς ἐκεῖ μοχθηρίας, 421), but this is far from the harshest 
comment Aristophanes makes about political leaders.52 Archedemus had 
prosecuted the general Erasinides after the battle of Arginusae (for embezzle-
ment, before the scandal over the aftermath of the battle arose). Opposition 
to Erasinides, who had solid democratic credentials, would alone categorize 
Archedemus as someone who did not have the best interests of the Demos at 
heart, so the swipe here is not surprising.53 If Archedemus also participated 
in the prosecution of the generals, Aristophanes might have had additional 
motivation to swipe at him, given the positive references to the battle else-
where in the play (693–96).
 The parabasis begins with a difficult passage satirizing another prominent 
political leader, Cleophon. The chorus invokes a Muse to attend (676–85):
τὸν πολὺν ὀψομένη λαῶν ὄχλον, οὗ σοφίαι
μυρίαι κάθηνται
φιλοτιμότεραι Κλεοφῶντος, ἐφ᾽ οὗ δὴ χείλεσιν ἀμφιλάλοις
δεινὸν ἐπιβρέμεται
Θρῃκία χελιδὼν
ἐπὶ βάρβαρον ἑζομένη πέταλον,
κελαδεῖ δ᾽ ἐπίκλαυτον ἀηδόνιον νόμον, ὡς ἀπολεῖται,
κἂν ἴσαι γένωνται.54
 51. Arai (2004) reads the intervening scene of Dionysus and the Frog chorus (209–68) as an 
analogy for Athenian spectators in the Theater of Dionysus acting as judges.
 52. See, for example, Lys. 1160, where μοχθηρία means pathetic, obstructionist behavior, which 
would suit Archedemus as well.
 53. Cf. the brief swipe at Cleon and Hyperbolus in 569–70.
 54. I follow Dover, Sommerstein and others in printing κελαδεῖ from V et al. in 683, rather than 
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 . . . to see the great mob of folks whose wisdom
sits numbering in the thousands,
more worthy of honor than Cleophon, on whose double-babbling lips now
a Thracian swallow
rages fearsomely,
perched on a foreign leaf,
and cries a tearful nightingale’s tune, that he will die,
even if it’s a tie.
In part, the image incorporates the comic abuse that Cleophon’s mother was 
Thracian (cf. Plato Comicus fr. 61, from Cleophon; and Aeschines 2.76). 
Despite some uncertainties, the imagery certainly suggests Cleophon speak-
ing before the judgment of the collected Demos. Euripides and others use 
ὄχλος pejoratively of a mob not using intelligent judgment (see on Orestes 
above), but in Aristophanes the word can range from unmarked or neutral 
to implicitly negative. In this instance, however, Aristophanes expands the 
expression by explicitly filling his ὄχλος with wisdom, not just collectively 
but distributively, and superior to that of Cleophon, so he insures the term 
ὄχλος does not carry negative connotation here. Indeed, this is part of the 
point of the expression, using a term otherwise used disparagingly of the 
Demos, but casting it as part of a characterization that articulates the intel-
ligence of its members and its civic identity as a whole. By contrast, Cleo-
phon fits the mold of many who influence the Demos in a bad way. The 
incongruity of a bold noise from a swallow (δεινὸν ἐπιβρέμεται) is comic, 
but the image of an abrasive speaker is a familiar one from comic attacks 
on Pericles, Cleon, Hyperbolus (also with non-Greek speech) and others. In 
the climactic line, ἴσαι seems certain to refer to equal votes, but the context 
of the voting is not certain. Since Plato Comicus was competing against 
Frogs with his own demagogue comedy on Cleophon (frr. 57–64), a refer-
ence to the voting for comedies cannot be discounted. The statement that 
he will die in the event of a tie, if it is an ultimatum, also has parallels, such 
as Cleon’s threat not to speak anymore if the jury does not vote with him 
(Wasps 926–30), so perhaps the image plays on a sort of threat Cleophon 
would make in his public delivery. Such a threat would fit an address either 
before the Assembly or in a court trial. If the reference is to the Council, a 
rather different scenario may be intended.
 Sommerstein has argued that the encore performance of Frogs in 404 
was near in time to Cleophon’s trial before the Council and subsequent 
Fritzsche’s τρύζει, adopted by Wilson.
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execution.55 He further suggests that calls for Cleophon’s death in this pas-
sage and at the end of the play (1504) were at a minimum congruent with 
the desires of oligarchic activists to have Cleophon killed on the path to the 
next oligarchy and that it is worth considering whether Aristophanes could 
have been complicit in this movement. Sommerstein does give good reasons 
to suspect that the references to Cleophon in Frogs, especially the image of 
Aeschylus returning to Athens and insuring Cleophon’s execution (1504), 
fit the cultural moment when Cleophon was on or near trial, or convicted 
and awaiting execution. The cry for Cleophon’s death was not, though, as 
Sommerstein characterizes it, an exclusively oligarchic one. Two accounts 
survive of the machinations leading to Cleophon’s trial and execution, both 
from speeches ca. 399 regarding the prosecution of offenders for their role in 
the atrocities under the Thirty. One speech attempts to lay out a case against 
an informant named Agoratus, a prosecution that requires making as tight a 
connection as possible between the defendant and the oligarchs. The pros-
ecutor is at pains to argue that the Council of 405/4 was not a democratic 
body but dominated by oligarchs plotting the overthrow of the democracy 
(Lys. 13.20). To make this argument, the prosecutor describes the actions of 
the Council in that year in terms of their contrasting responses to Cleophon 
and Theramenes.56 In this version of events, Theramenes was abroad plot-
ting to bring home peace terms that would lead to the undermining of the 
democratic government. Cleophon opposed the peace, and so the oligarchic 
conspirators framed him and, after convicting him by irregular means, had 
him executed in order to remove one of the prominent advocates for the 
Demos (τοὺς τοῦ δήμου προεστηκότας, Lys. 13.7). On the basis of this 
narrative, it is easy to see Aristophanes’ hostile characterization in Frogs as 
an oligarchic shill. The other speech of 399 to narrate these events mud-
dies the waters considerably, however. Another speech (Lys. 30) prosecutes 
a certain Nicomachus, another oligarchic activist. According to this speech, 
Nicomachus crafted the legal language that enabled the oligarchic Council 
to judge Cleophon jointly with a jury and thus insure Cleophon’s conviction 
(30.11). To a reader of Frogs, this is surprising, because Aristophanes calls for 
death for both Cleophon and Nicomachus in the same passage (1504–6). 
If Aristophanes’ smears of Cleophon reflect oligarchic motivations, it is not 
evident why he simultaneously condemns one of their key operatives. The 
speech against Nicomachus also provides a broader perspective on Cleo-
phon. The speaker says there is universal agreement that Cleophon was 
 55. Sommerstein (2009, revised from 1993).
 56. On Theramenes in Frogs, see below.
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targeted by oligarchic forces for removal to further their own ends (30.12). 
The speaker is also aware, however, that members of the democratic jury 
still may not have a favorable opinion of Cleophon and so argues that, even 
if Cleophon was rightly condemned, the complicity of Nicomachus should 
not be forgiven (30.13):
εἰκὸς τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι καὶ ὁπόσοι ὑμῶν ἐνόμι-
ζον Κλεοφῶντα κακὸν πολίτην εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ 
ἀποθανόντων ἴσως τις ἦν πονηρός, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως καὶ διὰ τοὺς τοιού-
τους ὠργίζεσθε τοῖς τριάκοντα, ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ 
κατὰ στάσιν αὐτοὺς ἀπέκτειναν.
It is proper, gentlemen of the jury, to take this to heart, all of you who 
thought Cleophon was a bad citizen: that, although among those who per-
ished under the oligarchy there was perhaps a criminal, nevertheless on 
account of even these sorts of men, you were angry at the Thirty, because 
they performed executions not on account of any crimes, but in the interests 
of their faction.
The prosecutor here is acutely aware of the ambivalence of Cleophon’s repu-
tation in 399.57 On the one hand, as democratic Athenians tried to make 
sense of the rise of the Thirty, they recognized Cleophon as their last staunch 
defender and a victim of the machinations of the oligarchs. On the other 
hand, even with this rehabilitation of his reputation, some still reckoned him 
as deserving of his fate. He seems to have been in the unfortunate position 
of having been reckoned better off dead by both oligarchs and democrats. 
Later references indicate his reputation did not improve. A speech from a 
decade later or so cites him for his influence, and because his heirs inher-
ited nothing of his estate (Lys. 19.48), but there is no attempt to invoke his 
heroic defense of democracy or his victimization. Decades later Aeschines 
cites him as someone who led Athens to destruction at a time of crisis (2.76).
 Aristophanes composed Frogs without the benefit of hindsight, of course. 
As with the Sicilian expedition, Aristophanes was on the wrong side of his-
tory but consistent in his own position.58 The abuse of Cleophon could still 
 57. On Nicomachus’ career, see Shear (2011, 73–74, 79–84). Cf. Carawan (2010) on details of 
the charge in Lys. 30 against Nicomachus, esp. 89–93, which indicate that he was involved only with 
the oligarchy of the Thirty, not the oligarchic governments of 411.
 58. As it happens, Aeschines (2.76) pairs just these two failings (the Sicilian expedition and 
Cleophon) in Athenian history. Both mistakes would require broad-enough democratic support and 
also be ones the democracy acknowledged in retrospect. This would make Aristophanes a fairly typical 
democrat, though still an utterly singular author of comedy.
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in fact belong to Frogs’ initial performance in 405, rather than the revival 
in 404, as Sommerstein argues, and simply be ironically prescient in retro-
spect. Plato Comicus’ play Cleophon, in the same cohort with Frogs in 405, 
although the fragments are too meager for any meaningful reconstruction 
of its content, at least indicates there were grounds for ridicule and abuse 
already. If the comments about Cleophon do date to the encore of Frogs in 
404, when Cleophon was facing imminent execution, the simple fact of the 
Council being aligned against him may have been enough for Aristophanes. 
As I hope I have shown, Aristophanes is unwavering in his faith in the 
Council, and even if he was on the wrong side of history this time, it is not 
surprising that he would be aligned with the Council’s position.
 A swell of resentment against Cleophon would also make the passage sat-
irizing him rhetorically effective in its place. Since Aristophanes’ bold advice 
in the parabasis immediately follows, the satire on Cleophon serves, not in 
any technical, formal way, but in function, as a captatio benevolentiae for the 
spectating Demos.59 Aristophanes sides with the Demos’ anger toward Cleo-
phon, establishing that he recognizes the proper punishment of those who 
do not serve the Demos’ best interest. Then he can most effectively launch 
into advice that the Demos might at first not find readily acceptable.
 To begin his case in the parabasis, Aristophanes sounds the refrain in 
favor of good advice (686–87):
τὸν ἱερὸν χορὸν δίκαιόν ἐστι χρηστὰ τῇ πόλει
ξυμπαραινεῖν καὶ διδάσκειν.
It is just that a sacred chorus offer recommendations and
useful instruction to the polis.
Aristophanes itemizes his central recommendations in two sections (πρῶτον 
οὖν 687 . . . εἶτ᾽, 692). First he calls for the removal of “fears” (δείματα, 
688), presumably of prosecution and punishment for those under the stigma 
of the oligarchic coup of 411. Aristophanes shrewdly characterizes these 
men as those who slipped up because of the tricks of Phrynichus, who 
was a prominent democrat prior to his sudden prominent role with the 
 59. With good reason, no scholar has argued that the parabasis here conforms to canonical rhe-
torical practice. Neither Murphy (1938) nor Sousa e Silva (1987–88) even attempts to place any 
speech from Frogs into a schema, and Hubbard (2007) limits Frogs to claims about technical vo-
cabulary (on which, see the Introduction). That said, in technique this parabasis does exemplify how 
Aristophanes can employ methods of persuasion that were later catalogued and systematized. Lines 
686–87 below also follow a general principle the substance of which would suit a formal prooimion.
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oligarchy. Hence it is easy to envision these men as those who were lured 
by Phrynichus’ democratic credentials to participate in the oligarchy. Their 
allegiances could thus more easily appear to have been to the democracy at 
heart.60 The slipperiness of political allegiance is a constant theme among 
prominent Athenians between 411 and 405 and then in the aftermath of 
the Thirty. The wrath of the Demos against those perceived as disloyal could 
be lethal. Aristophanes had been aware of, and had commented on, the 
destructive anger of the Demos as far back as Acharnians, and he carefully 
calibrates his comments on complicated issues throughout Frogs. He satirizes 
Cleophon, touches on Theramenes, who perhaps more than anyone played 
both sides of the fence during these years (533–41), and, even with these 
acknowledgments, praises inclusiveness. He praises the decision to grant 
slaves citizenship for fighting in the navy and asks that Athenians who could 
serve the polis at least as well have the opportunity to do so (692–96). The 
chorus calls on the Demos to cast aside its anger, in the name of its sage 
nature (ἀλλὰ τῆς ὀργῆς ἀνέντες, ὦ σοφώτατοι φύσει, 700), and says 
shared struggle should be enough to recognize mutual kinship and citi-
zenship (701–2; cf. Lys. 1129–34 for another statement of shared kinship 
among adversaries).61 The judgment of the Demos is wiser than Cleophon 
or any other popular leader, after all, and should be able to distinguish good 
citizens (τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθοὺς, 719) from the rotten 
(τοῖς πονηροῖς, 725) as they do coins, and posterity will recognize the 
Demos’ sanity (705), and the wise will recognize even the Demos’ suffering 
accordingly (735–37).
 This parabasis has received much attention ever since antiquity because 
of the notice that it garnered Aristophanes a civic crown bestowed upon 
 60. See Shear (2011, 64) for the use of Phrynichus as a posthumous scapegoat for the oligarchy 
of 411.
 61. The antode (706–17) makes an attack, the understanding of which is hampered by uncer-
tain identification of its target. The verses mock a certain Cleigenes as a disgusting bath attendant, 
doomed to meet a bad end. The rareness of this name increases the likelihood that this man is to be 
identified with the Cleigenes of Halae (PA 8488; LGPN 1), who served as secretary on the Council 
in 410/9 (IG I3 375.1). In this capacity, his name appears at Andocides 1.96, in the quotation of a 
law that made legal the killing of officeholders under an oligarchic regime at Athens. Circumstan-
tially this would associate him with the harsher elements of the restored democracy. In addition, 
Schwartz and others have emended the name “Cleisthenes” (MSS) to Cleigenes at Lysias 25.25. The 
defendant in this speech cites Cleisthenes/Cleigenes as an opportunistic prosecutor, i.e., a sycophant, 
who enriched himself in the aftermath of 411. On the context for such statements, see Christ (1998, 
72–117). If these plausible, but not certain, identifications are correct, Aristophanes singles out a 
notorious sycophant who took advantage of the Demos’ pain and anger in the aftermath of 411. 
In this way, the attack on Cleigenes would be a logical interlude between epirrhema (686–705) and 
antepirrhema (718–37), both of which advise the Demos to follow its better instincts rather than an 
aggressive manipulator like Cleigenes.
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him by the Athenian Demos. One of the strands of this notice is preserved 
in the Life, and while there are many reasons for suspecting the content of 
the Life, Sommerstein has shown that the notice all but certainly goes back 
to an authentic Athenian decree.62 The passage specifically quotes the lines 
from the parabasis about advising the city and says Aristophanes received 
the crown for support for the Demos against tyranny (32–35). The Life rou-
tinely extrapolates material from the plays to create biographical narrative, 
but the words of the parabasis and the play in general are hardly so blunt 
as to prompt this sort of statement, so it must rely on either the text of the 
decree or statements elsewhere in lost plays. At a minimum, it vitiates claims 
that Aristophanes reads like a supporter of oligarchy.63
 As noted, Frogs, and the parabasis in particular, acknowledge the slip-
periness of political allegiances and the anger of the Demos, as well as its 
capacity for making a sound judgment over the long run. Issues of betrayal 
and the need for the Demos to make a sound judgment about its future 
direction bring us back to the central conundrum of the play, reintroduced 
in the scene immediately following the parabasis: what is one to make of 
Euripides?
 Immediately following the parabasis, and after some banter between 
Xanthias and another slave, comes the setup for the agon.64 When bustle, 
shouting and verbal wrangling are heard (θόρυβος καὶ βοὴ / χὠ λοι-
δορησμός, 757–58), the cause turns out to be Aeschylus and Euripides. 
There is factional strife (στάσις, 760) among the dead. All these terms are 
consistent with the image of verbal wrangling in the political arena (see the 
Appendix), so the description paves the way for the ensuing debate to be one 
of central significance for the Demos. It turns out that there is a throne for 
tragedy in the underworld, and its resident is supported in the Prytaneum 
(764), the latter component a direct parallel to an honor a living citizen of 
Athens can receive. Aeschylus holds this honor, and Sophocles, when he 
arrives, graciously acknowledges Aeschylus’ place there (788–89). Euripides, 
however, stakes a claim, but the narrative reflects the ambivalent response to 
Euripides everywhere in Aristophanes. The criminal element in the under-
world (a crowd, πλῆθος, 774, not the Demos) is taken in by Euripides’ 
 62. Sommerstein (2009, revised from 1993) suspects it is awarded by the oligarchic Council for 
comments against Cleophon, and on balance he finds Aristophanes’ portrayal of the polis as inimical 
to the democracy. Cf. Sommerstein (2005) and Lefkowitz (2012, 104–10).
 63. Sidwell (2009, 41–44) argues that the decree was not prompted by the parabasis in particular 
but in recognition of Aristophanes’ longtime service to the democracy, and prefers the recognition of 
Aristophanes and the encore of Frogs to have taken place in 403. Cf. Pritchard (2012, 24–26).
 64. On the identity of Xanthias’ interlocutor here, see Dover (1993, 50–55).
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verbal gymnastics (τῶν ἀντιλογιῶν καὶ λυγισμῶν καὶ στροφῶν, 775) 
and in their madness (ὑπερεμάνησαν) reckons him very wise (κἀνόμισαν 
σοφώτατον, 776). Now bolstered in this way, Euripides makes for the 
throne, as if somehow he did not initially consider himself so worthy but 
was motivated by the reaction of his fans.
 The political terminology resumes. Xanthias immediately expects that 
the Demos will react angrily and stone Euripides (κοὐκ ἐβάλλετο, 778), 
just as the angry chorus of Acharnians intends to do to Dicaeopolis when 
they hear of his treason (Ach. 236), and as Tyndareus plans to inspire the 
Assembly to do in Euripides’ Orestes (612–14). Instead of venting their 
notorious anger, however, the Demos calls for a referendum on the matter 
(779–80):
μὰ Δί᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δῆμος ἀνεβόα κρίσιν ποιεῖν
ὁπότερος εἴη τὴν τέχνην σοφώτερος.
Not at all. Instead the Demos called out for a judgment
about which one was the wiser in their profession.
Aristophanes thus acknowledges but subverts the harsh appraisal of the 
Demos’ judgment dramatized in Orestes (and which he dramatized him-
self two decades earlier). The surface appeal of Euripides is once again not 
to be denied, but conflict arises when it comes to the content, the wis-
dom, of what he says. The contest will play on this disjunction repeatedly, 
but there is more to be explicated from this passage. While there is always 
ambivalence about Euripides, the harshness of the scenario here is unique. 
In Acharnians and Thesmophoriazusae, Euripides is a distinctive and bizarre 
artist, but ultimately innocuous. In Frogs he is a villain, an antagonist to 
the rightful ruler, Aeschylus, and additionally opposed by Sophocles, who 
serves as a sort of second to Aeschylus. At the concept of Euripides taking 
the throne, the Demos is expected to vent its rage as it would toward a trai-
tor. Why? I argued earlier in this chapter that the harsh view of Euripides 
results from a perception that Euripides turned traitor against the democ-
racy subsequent to the season of 409, when tragedy was so important to 
the Demos’ renewal following the coup of 411. In the past, Euripides had 
been overtly patriotic about Athens (e.g., in Heracleidae and Suppliants of 
the 420s). The Thesmophoriazusae indicates that, following the poor recep-
tion of his tetralogy in 415, Euripides rose to popularity again by 412. It is 
this rehabilitation that Dionysus happily remembers early in the play, when 
he is reading Andromeda. Since then, whether it was Orestes, Archelaus or 
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more likely some combination of these plays, statements and actions (some 
of which are not recoverable now), Euripides betrayed the Demos in the 
sense that he was supposed to celebrate the restored democracy as a favored 
son but offered satirical critique instead and even praise of a non-Greek 
monarchy. Accordingly, Aristophanes refers to the expected response from 
the Demos: anger. His faith and support of the Demos, however, mean that 
he dramatizes instead debate and deliberation about Euripides and about 
what tragedy means to the Demos under these circumstances. The lengthy 
agon tackles many technical and superficial qualities of tragedy, and under-
mining Euripides’ appeal in these regards is key to insuring his loss in the 
contest, but overall the contest reads effectively as a referendum before the 
Demos, exploring the issues set before the Athenian democracy, about what 
tragedy will mean, and what composer of tragedy will represent them. That 
author will prove to be Aeschylus, but Aristophanes also knows that this is 
a problematic proposal. Much of what Aristophanes says about Aeschylus 
and Euripides makes sense, if the Athenian Demos is in 405 wrestling with 
how best to promote a tragedian and tragedy as the face of its civic identity. 
Broadly, Euripides has superficial appeal, but ultimately the content of his 
plays lets the Demos down. Aeschylus is imperious at a superficial level, but 
ultimately the proper choice because he pulls the Demos in the direction 
of Athens’ greatness.
 Aristophanes had incorporated the nucleus of this contrast between 
the two authors already in Clouds. When Strepsiades asks his son to recite 
a passage from Aeschylus, Pheidippides describes Aeschylus as a premiere 
poet, but bombastic and incoherent (1364–67). Pheidippides follows up 
by reciting Euripides instead, a speech reportedly about incest (1371–72). 
That Aeschylus is difficult to comprehend and that Euripides can be shock-
ing and subversive seems to be uncontroversial, and it is hardly a prob-
lematic statement even among modern admirers. Aristophanes’ project in 
Frogs is more problematic, however. Aeschylus will need to be politically 
appealing, and the undeniable appeal of Euripides’ technique must be put 
in its place.
 Making Aeschylus politically palatable is a not unproblematic process 
that Aristophanes makes unfold over the course of the agon. He seems to 
recognize that Aeschylus is perceived as inaccessible, so he begins with this 
problem and steadily brings Aeschylus to the fore as the agon goes along. 
So, when the contest is first being set up, Aeschylus rejects the Athenian 
Demos as judges (οὔτε γὰρ Ἀθηναίοισι συνέβαιν᾽ Αἰσχύλος, 807), but 
later passages will bring him ever closer to the contemporary world of the 
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Demos. Still, back when the contest begins, Aeschylus refuses to speak at 
all, and, once he does, after being provoked by Euripides, Dionysus has to 
talk him down off of his anger (856–59):
σὺ δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὀργὴν, Αἰσχύλ᾽, ἀλλὰ πραόνως
ἔλεγχ᾽, ἐλέγχου: λοιδορεῖσθαι δ᾽ οὐ πρέπει
ἄνδρας ποιητὰς ὥσπερ ἀρτοπώλιδας·
σὺ δ᾽ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ πρῖνος ἐμπρησθεὶς βοᾷς.
Aeschylus, not so angry. Just gently
question and cross-examine. It’s not appropriate for poets to wrangle 
like some bread sellers.
You shout right away like an oak tree on fire.
Shouting (βοᾷς) and wrangling (λοιδορεῖσθαι) are typical of political 
debate that does not constitute meaningful deliberation (see the Appendix), 
and suggest the demagoguery of a leader like Cleon. In calming Aeschy-
lus down, then, Dionysus is treating him the way Aristophanes treats the 
Demos, acknowledging the anger but pushing him toward calmer discus-
sion. As it is, the Demos in the play is already calling for rational debate 
and judgment, so Dionysus is encouraging Aeschylus to participate on the 
Demos’ terms, which in turn makes Aeschylus more palatable and acceptable 
to the real-life Demos, present in the form of the spectators in the theater. 
By the end of the agon, this appeal is successful, and Aeschylus is the better 
adviser and deliberator. By contrast, at the start of the agon Euripides iden-
tifies himself as the “stronger” of the two (κρείττων, 831) and Aeschylus 
calls him a “collector of mouthings” (στωμυλιοσυλλεκτάδη, 841), but to 
no particular effect.65 As the agon unfolds, Aristophanes makes Aeschylus 
more and more a figure suitable to represent the democratic Demos and 
edges Euripides outside the realm of acceptability.
 The change begins in the initial exchanges between the two contestants. 
Euripides begins by characterizing Aeschylus’ dramaturgy as deceptive and 
hollow (908–13). When Dionysus interjects that he enjoys Aeschylean 
silence over modern chatter (τῇ σιωπῇ . .  . νῦν οἱ λαλοῦντες, 916–17), 
Euripides calls him stupid (ἠλίθιος, 918), but the implicit defense of chatter 
foreshadows the weakening of Euripides’ position. Aeschylus in the mean-
 65. Cf. Chapter 3 on κρείττων and the more positive “mouth,” rather than a tongue, at the root 
of this word.
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time again stews in silence and barks out occasionally, replicating his earlier 
anger. By contrast, Euripides is still able to lay claim to the rational refuta-
tion the Demos and Dionysus called for (922).
 As the focus shifts to Euripides’ own dramaturgy, however, the momen-
tum shifts, as do the politics. Euripides makes an unrefuted claim about how 
he slims down bloated tragedy, but then there is trouble. He trumpets the 
characters who speak for him (949–50):
ἀλλ᾽ ἔλεγεν ἡ γυνή τέ μοι χὠ δοῦλος οὐδὲν ἧττον,
τοῦ δεσπότου χἠ παρθένος χἠ γραῦς ἄν.
And more the woman spoke for me, and the slave no less
than the master, and the girl and the old woman.
Such inclusiveness, in and of itself, is a virtue in Aristophanes. His plays 
have all these characters speaking out prominently and often with benefit 
for the polis, but Euripides’ following claim, that he acted democratically 
(δημοκρατικὸν γὰρ αὔτ᾽ ἔδρων, 952) gets him in trouble, and Dionysus 
rebukes him (953–54):
  τοῦτο μὲν ἔασον, ὦ τᾶν.
οὐ σοὶ γάρ ἐστι περίπατος κάλλιστα περί γε τούτου.
  Now sir, let that one go.
In your case, it’s not the best idea to pursue that.
If Aristophanes had any desire to, he could easily have incorporated quotes 
from Euripides from various stages of his career that trumpet the virtues of 
democracy. As I have argued, however, at this particular time Euripides was 
suffering the reputation of having betrayed the democracy, and Aristophanes 
was not inclined to dispute the point. With this crucial barrier quickly but 
solidly established, Euripides’ credentials continue to erode. He immedi-
ately claims another problematic achievement, teaching people to babble 
(λαλεῖν ἐδίδαξα, 954), which he had implicitly defended a little earlier. 
Aristophanes has Aeschylus readily assent to his claim, of course, because 
this is the sort of unhelpful talk that consumes public discourse without 
helping the Demos render its better judgment. Euripides digs himself deeper 
as he takes credit for having people question and pursue trivialities in a 
passage that culminates in taking credit for the politicians Cleitophon and 
Theramenes (967). Dionysus spins out a joke about Theramenes’ uncanny 
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knack for coming up like a rose no matter the smelliness of his surroundings 
(968–70). Theramenes’ history with the Four Hundred could hardly make 
him seem democratic, even if he managed to avoid serious trouble up to 
this point.66 Likewise, Cleitophon’s efforts to further the coup of the Four 
Hundred (Arist. Ath. Pol. 29.3) could not give him a reputation as a useful 
advocate for the Demos, even if he managed to avoid outright condemna-
tion. No ancient reference to Cleitophon suggests any democratic sympa-
thies.67 And yet the sort of duplicity that enables men like Theramenes and 
Cleitophon to be oligarchic supporters and yet survive under the restored 
democracy is what Aristophanes links to Euripides, for, after Dionysus’ inter-
jection, Euripides immediately takes credit for teaching them this type of 
reasoning (971–74).
 With Euripides’ democratic credentials shredded, the next exchange 
focuses on poets’ ability to make better citizens (1009–10). This round 
(1010–98) goes easily to Aeschylus, who cites plays that fostered the war-
riors of the days of Athens’ greatness in empire. Euripides is reduced to 
offering feeds that allow Aeschylus to expound on the superiority of his 
position. Aeschylus comes off as the one who inspires greatness in citizens, 
while Euripides’ characters lead to immoral behavior and difficulties for the 
democratic government, such as the wealthy finding ways to dodge litur-
gies (1065–66). Again among the charges is λαλιά, the empty babble that 
takes up time and distracts even the rowers in the fleet from their duties 
(1069–73; cf. the Appendix).
 The choral interlude that follows offers a reminder that the stakes in 
this choice are high (1099–1100) and reiterates the faith in the spectators 
(τοῖς θεωμένοισιν, 1110) to make wise decisions. In setting up the contest, 
there was the expectation that the Demos would proceed with a vengeance, 
but they called for judgment about the wisdom of the two playwrights. 
Aeschylus was skeptical about the Athenians’ capacity to judge the poets, 
but now the chorus assures Aeschylus that the spectators are themselves wise 
(θεατῶν γ᾽ οὕνεχ᾽, ὡς ὄντων σοφῶν, 1118). Thucydides once made 
his Cleon chastise the Demos in the Assembly for being mere “spectators 
of speeches” (see the Introduction), but now Aristophanes appropriates the 
image, as he does for the ochlos (mob). They are spectators of speeches, but 
they have the wisdom to handle sophistication and will make the right 
judgment.
 66. See Harding (1974) for the vicissitudes of Theramenes’ reputation in the fourth century.
 67. Cleitophon later belonged to the oligarchic faction that supported the Thirty (Ath. Pol. 34.3), 
and Plato (Rep. 340a–b) has him attempt to support Thrasymachus’ contention that justice consists of 
the weak obeying the will of the stronger. Cf. [Plato,] Clit. 410e.
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 With the basic political point made, the next three stages of the debate 
maintain suspense by turning to technical aspects of dramaturgy: prologues 
(1119–1250), lyrics (1261–1364) and the “weight” of their verses (1371–
1410). Although Aristophanes normally acknowledges the superficial and 
stylistic appeal of Euripides, in these contests Euripides at best comes off at 
a draw (prologues and lyrics) or at a loss (the weighing), thereby negating 
his greatest asset. When Dionysus returns to the matter of making judgment, 
he is divided, because he reckons one playwright wise and enjoys the other 
(τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι σοφὸν, τῷ δ᾽ ἥδομαι, 1413). Since wisdom was 
the original criterion for judgment (766, 776, 780), the contest should be 
over, but Aristophanes wants to explicate on the nature of this wisdom at 
issue, so Dionysus recapitulates the situation (1418–21):
ἐγὼ κατῆλθον ἐπὶ ποιητήν. τοῦ χάριν;
ἵν᾽ ἡ πόλις σωθεῖσα τοὺς χοροὺς ἄγῃ.
ὁπότερος οὖν ἂν τῇ πόλει παραινέσειν
μέλλει τι χρηστόν, τοῦτον ἄξειν μοι δοκῶ.
I came down for a poet. What for?
So the city can be saved and put on its choruses.
So, whichever one will provide the city
some useful advice, I think I’ll take.
The merging of the purpose of saving the polis and putting on its festivals 
makes all the more topical sense, since the democracy invested heavily in 
its identity through the production of tragedy. Aristophanes returns explic-
itly to the substantive political advice to be gleaned from each tragedian. 
Dionysus first asks about Alcibiades. After each contestant gives answers, 
Dionysus finds himself in the familiar quandary of one speaking wisely and 
one clearly (ὁ μὲν σοφῶς γὰρ εἶπεν, ὁ δ᾽ ἕτερος σαφῶς, 1434), although 
wisdom is still supposed to be the criterion.68 The second round of question-
ing finds Dionysus sarcastically referring to Euripides as a wise Palamedes, 
which would relegate him back to his unpopularity in 415. Despite extended 
interrogation, Aeschylus actually does not give out his exact wisdom for 
saving the city, but it is not necessary. Aeschylus has long been the winner. 
 68. Lines 1431–32 are a notorious crux, in that either Aeschylus’ lines appear in doublet form 
(probably reflecting different versions in the original performance and in the encore) or  the lines rep-
resent the marginal intrusion of a quotation from a similar line from Eupolis’ Demes. Neither solution 
affects my reading, but see note 70 below on the indirect association with Pericles. See Dover (1993, 
372) for the best overview of the issue.
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It has just been Aristophanes’ suspense that has dragged it out. To cap off 
the choice, Euripides protests, and Dionysus rebukes him with his notori-
ous line, “My tongue swore” (ἡ γλῶττ᾽ ὀμώμοκ᾽, 1471), once again, and 
for the final time, invoking the tongue as the sophistic vehicle of unhelpful 
speech. Euripides has effectively been no more than a demagogue who fills 
up time with, at best, innocuous verbiage and, at worst, socially subversive 
ideas.
 The chorus now celebrates the victory of substance over style. Blessings 
come to the man who benefits his citizens, family and friends (1482–90). 
There is in fact no graceful appeal (χαρίεν, 1491) in composing tragedy 
using the babble (λαλεῖν) of Socrates, a reference to Euripides’ style.69 Pre-
ferring such drivel to art is insane (παραφρονοῦντος, 1498). Ultimately, 
Aeschylus wins on both style and content. Aeschylus is to rise to modern 
Athens to save it with the content of his ideas (γνώμαις, 1502), while 
Euripides remains in the underworld, a moral nitwit, liar and clown (ὁ 
πανοῦργος ἀνὴρ / καὶ ψευδολόγος καὶ βωμολόχος, 1520–21), forever 
blocked from the throne of tragedy by Sophocles. The chorus echoes the 
blessings, including peace, that Aeschylus will bring to the city.
 With this resurrection, Aristophanes completes the emotional journey 
he initiated early in the play, when Dionysus was reading Andromeda and 
yearning for Euripides, longing for the time, years earlier, before the oligar-
chic revolution, when Athens and its drama seemed more confident and 
enjoyable. In the dark days that followed, comprising revolution, bloody 
restoration of the democracy, the vicissitudes of the Peloponnesian War, 
the losses of Agathon, Euripides and Sophocles, the Demos reacted, often 
rashly, to the difficulties as the Athenians struggled militarily, politically, and 
with the future of its treasured cultural creation, tragedy. Aristophanes gives 
the Demos its due in recognizing the tumult and pain of these years, natu-
rally looking back at better days, but he uses his decades of political clout 
to advise the Demos to settle down, render sensible judgments as specta-
tors and find better models than Euripides to aspire to. While the agon of 
Frogs shares many formal characteristics with that of Clouds, the resurrec-
tion of Aeschylus here has its closest parallel in the rejuvenation of Demos 
in Knights, and they share the return of Athens’ golden, pre-Periclean age 
of successful imperialism, peace and wisdom.70 This is the cultural ideal in 
 69. Cf. Aristophanes fr. 392 and Callias fr. 15, as well as Teleclides frr. 41–42, which link Socrates 
and Euripides.
 70. Sidwell (2009, 44, 293–95) tries to maintain a chain of associations from Aeschylus to Peri-
cles to Eupolis, all ironically satirized as antidemocratic. Even though there has been, ever since antiq-
uity (notably at Valerius Maximus 7.2), a tradition associating Aeschylus with Pericles, Aristophanes 
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all of Aristophanes’ plays, and, although there is a foreboding awareness in 
Frogs of the looming catastrophe, there is nothing ironic or less than ideal-
istic in restoring Aeschylus. Aeschylus himself was some fifty years dead, but 
the revival of productions of his plays provided cultural continuity, and, for 
Aristophanes, a sustained link to the best of democratic Athens.
never praises Pericles or the Periclean age. For Aristophanes, Athens’ greatness lay in its pre-Periclean 
empire. Aeschylus is victorious, but the metaphor of the lion cub alone is sufficient to invoke Aeschy-
lus (Ag. 717–36), and Dionysus’ response (1434) that Aeschylus spoke wisely (σοφῶς) and Euripides 
clearly (σαφῶς) indicates that there is little or nothing to be gained from trying to generate specific 
policy from Aeschylus’ enigmatic profundity, to say nothing of aligning him with Periclean war policy 
from twenty-five years earlier, which Aristophanes was quite willing to mock in other plays (see Chap-
ters 2 and 3).
More than a decade intervenes between Frogs and the next extant comedy. 
That these were the years of the tyranny of the Thirty and the more expansive 
reincarnation of the Athenian democracy makes it all the more regrettable 
that there is so little to reconstruct of comedy’s characterization of this dif-
ficult but fascinating period. Legal speeches of the time testify to continuing 
debate about how to deal with the legacy of the Thirty, both in terms of 
appropriate punishment and how to properly understand the development 
of the regime (Lys. 13 and 30), but also how to vet the future participants 
in the democracy (Lys. 25).
 The most intriguing topical comic fragments from the period belong to 
Archippus, and these all shade into issues of politics and rhetoric. The title 
of Archippus’ Donkey’s Shadow was proverbial for a dispute over something 
trivial, and all references to the saying appear in the context of Athenian 
courts, so perhaps the play also had a forensic context, but the fragments 
(35–36) are unhelpful.1 Another of Archippus’ comedies, Fish, seems to have 
 1. See Wasps 191 and Σ for an aetiology of the phrase, a story also found in [Plut.] Mor. 848ab 
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ἔστιν δ᾽ ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων οἷον ἐκκλησιαστής.
A man at the Assembly is a judge of what will happen in the future.
  —Aristotle, Rhet. 1.3.2.1358b4–5
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satirized the political machinery of Athens. One fragment complains about 
the double jeopardy officeholders face with their audits (fr. 14); another has 
an orator addressing the (chorus of?) fish, not with the customary address 
of a jury as ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, “gentlemen of Athens,” but with the more 
context-appropriate ἄνδρες Ἰχθύες, “Gentlemen Fish” (fr. 30). Yet another 
writes up a mock peace treaty between the Athenians and the fish (fr. 27).2 
It would be fascinating to know, then, how Archippus handled one of the 
key figures in the aftermath of the tyranny of Thirty in 403, when he staged 
Rhinon, but the remains (frr. 42–44) are unhelpful.
 When Aristophanes surfaces again with extant plays, his approach to the 
political environment and the role of rhetorical speech within it displays 
some continuity, but the differences are more marked. The chain to the 
glorious past of Athens that Aristophanes fervently clung to in Frogs now 
seems broken. Given the broader context, this is not surprising. Ober has 
demonstrated that the period 403–322 b.c.e. for the Athenian democracy 
marks a new, ideologically coherent era deserving its own synchronic study.3 
Thus, the plays of this period merit a separate study to analyze fully how 
Aristophanes’ last two extant plays fit into the intellectual milieu of the 
fourth century, as he pursues new ways to envision the political and cultural 
landscape. I offer only a few comments outlining this approach. In many 
ways, it is remarkable how radically and energetically Aristophanes works to 
articulate a new, progressive vision of Athens, given that he seems to have 
forsaken the optimistic idealization of Athens that propelled nearly all his 
plays of the fifth century.4
 Assemblywomen, of the late 390s, already benefits from progressive schol-
arship about its vision of democratic culture in its early renewal, along with 
the role of rhetorical speech in the public arena.5 Rothwell finds the pro-
tagonist Praxagora the very embodiment of a new articulation of persuasion 
(peitho).6 She is a successful rhetor who leads the contingent of women in 
the Assembly on a new venture for Athens’ civic community and opens up 
a new space for effective rhetorical speech to benefit the Athenian Demos. 
On the other hand, the range and domain of her reforms bespeak a cynicism 
or lack of faith in current institutions not found in the fifth-century plays.7 
(Lives of Ten Orators), where Demosthenes employs it.
 2. Cf. Rothwell (2007, 126–28).
 3. Ober (1989, 36–38).
 4. See Zumbrunnen (2012, 99–122) for a fresh look at these issues.
 5. Ober and Strauss (1990, 264–69).
 6. Rothwell (1990).
 7. For Aristophanes’ vision in Assemblywomen compared to Plato’s political vision in Republic 5, 
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Aristophanes’ vision is, if anything, more radically inclusive, egalitarian and 
democratic, perhaps the most hopeful scenario the comedian can offer in 
Athens’ depressed situation.
 In Wealth, of 388, Aristophanes offers another total re-creation of the 
Athenian polis by redistributing wealth based on merit, and the time- 
honored institutions of the democracy have barely any relevance this time. A 
range of “political” readings of the play have been proposed over the years, 
from the “ironic” reading to the dark readings that expose the ideologi-
cal irrationality of Athens to deeply cynical charades.8 Subsequent readings 
have found more positive elements in its literary technique and sociologi-
cal foregrounding of desire.9 Sommerstein’s earlier reading of the play as a 
somewhat hard-edged defense of the poorest of the democracy’s supporters 
comes closest to continuity with the Aristophanes I propose in this book.
 Interestingly, somewhere in this period, Aristophanes himself served in 
the institution he had so long championed, the Council (IG II2 1740.24 = 
T9 PCG = Ath. Agora XV.12.26). It is tempting to speculate that this service 
and the radical politics of his last plays are related. Serving on the Coun-
cil could have been discouraging and led him to believe deeper structural 
change was needed, perhaps explaining why in the late plays the Council no 
longer factors in social reform or provides stability. Conversely, Aristophanes’ 
increasingly committed politics focusing on social reform might have con-
tributed to his pursuing and being selected by his tribe to serve. While such 
scenarios remain entirely speculative, his service at this time, as Sommerstein 
points out, means that Aristophanes passed his dokimasia, and the audits of 
other litigants at the time demonstrate that his past behavior, especially his 
loyalty to oligarchy or democracy, would have been an issue.10 Perhaps it was 
problematic, but those insisting that Aristophanes espoused an antidemo-
cratic line for decades must reckon how and why Aristophanes then served 
in one of the bastions of the democracy at a time when the democracy was 
vigilant about who participated, and anyone linked to oligarchy was vulner-
able politically and in court.
 Another consequence of the coherent ideological landscape Ober charts 
for 403–322 is the development of the focused use of formal rhetoric. As 
Ober argues, formal rhetoric developed in this period as the established 
see now Tordoff (2007). Cf. Reinders (2001, 243–79).
 8. Sommerstein (1984) surveys the ironic readings, such as Konstan and Dillon (1981). For an 
even more cynical reading, see Olson (1990).
 9. Sfyroeras (1995); McGlew (2002, 174–91).
 10. Sommerstein (2009, 5 n. 15; revised from 1993).
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medium of communication between the democratic body and the elite sub-
population of Athens, the means by which each party continually renegoti-
ated their relationship, but with the Demos holding the ultimate authority 
of interpretation.11 In a sense, Aristophanes was on the wrong side of history 
yet again. He had repeatedly characterized and dramatized the develop-
ment of technical speech as a drag on the democratic deliberative process, 
but it in fact became the efficient means of maintaining stability. There 
is perhaps some hint that Aristophanes is aware of this growing reality in 
Assemblywomen, with its speech by Praxagora before the Assembly, and in 
Wealth, in the debate between Poverty and Chremylus, each allowing con-
siderable development of organized speech and developed argumentation in 
ways that actually forward the positive goals of the protagonists to benefit 
Athens.
 Even so, it is a long way from the formal rhetorical devices systematized 
by Aristotle and others later in the century. Later comedy would respond 
to these developments. Specific philosophical schools, and sometimes the 
speech habits of their students, are recognized.12 Eventually a passage full 
of technical rigmarole will hit the comic stage (Cratinus Jr. fr. 7, of the 
Pythagoreans):
ἔθος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, ἄν τιν᾽ ἰδιώτην ποθὲν
λάβωσιν εἰσελθόντα, διαπειρωμένοις
τῆς τῶν λόγων ῥώμης ταράττειν καὶ κυκᾶν
τοῖς ἀντιθέτοις, τοῖς πέρασι, τοῖς παρισώμασιν,
τοῖς ἀποπλάνοις, τοῖς μεγέθεσιν νουβυστικῶς.
This is their character: if they catch some ordinary person coming along, 
they test his strength in argumentation, assault and batter him with antith-
eses, conclusions, balanced clauses, digressions, quantities enough to stuff 
your brain!
Comedy gradually proceeds from reacting to and reflecting formal rhetoric 
until plays incorporate speeches that later students will recognize as models 
to be emulated. In the Roman world, Quintilian recommends a half dozen 
plays of Menander that contain speeches that are both prime specimens of 
rhetoric and whose content benefits the orator in training (10.1.69). Much 
to the exasperation of the staunch Atticist Phrynichus a century later, a 
 11. Ober (1989).
 12. See Olson (2007, 227–55) for a survey.
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certain Balbus of Tralles was known to prefer Menander over Demosthenes 
(Epit. 394 Fischer = Menander T119 PCG).
 While Aristophanes would be crucial for Atticists as a source of unim-
peachable Attic vocabulary, and he would win points for style, it has only 
been in modern scholarship that he has been credited with formal construc-
tion of speeches following precepts neither he nor his contemporaries knew. 
While the basis for such work is understandable, we can now securely say 
that Aristophanes in fact opposed and attacked the early developments that 
would blossom in the generations after his lifetime into formal instruction 
in rhetoric. In the fifth century he supported, even as he criticized, the 
democracy of Athens, which in the fourth century, in a way that would 
likely have surprised and perhaps disturbed him, thrived by appropriating 
the very type of speech he despised.
 In any case, Aristophanes’ legacy and determination to dramatize the 
importance of public free speech certainly continued. Some sources in antiq-
uity said that the fourth-century comic playwright Nicostratus was a son of 
Aristophanes. As it happens, in one brief passage surviving from his com-
edies (fr. 29), a character quotes a line from Euripides (οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις 
πάντ᾽ ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ, “No man is completely happy,” fr. 661.1 Sthene-
boea), the same line that Aristophanes’ own version of Euripides used in des-
peration when trying to avoid Aeschylus’ little bottle of oil (Frogs 1217–19). 
It is ironic in one way that Aristophanes in Frogs disparages a playwright 
when, six years earlier, one of his characters, Inlaw, invoked freedom of 
speech under the democracy (παρρησία, Th. 541) to defend Euripides. 
But freedom of speech has been the more enduring legacy of Aristophanes. 
Another stray line of Nicostratus champions the idea as if to pick up where 
Aristophanes’ career leaves off (fr. 30, first line unmetrical):
ἆρ’ οἶσθ’ ὅτι τῆς πενίας ὅπλον ἐστιν ἡ
παρρησία; ταύτην ἐάν τις ἀπολέσῃ,
τὴν ἀσπιδ’ ἀποβέβληκεν οὗτος τοῦ βίου.
Don’t you know that the weapon against poverty
is freedom of speech? If you lose that,
then you’ve lost the shield of your life.
Perhaps then, in the end, as caustically as he sometimes used language, at 
his core Aristophanes believed in freedom of speech as a shield rather than 
as a weapon, and so he perennially objected to the use of language to harm 
the Demos while he himself sought to shield the Athenian democracy, to 
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protect it, so that better, wiser natures would render sound judgment, and 
its citizens would enjoy a success and prosperity approaching the fantastic 
worlds he was able to create on stage before the Demos. Such sound judg-
ment, of course, had to include the spectators in the theater voting Aristo-
phanes’ comedies, which dramatized these worlds, first prize.
This appendix collects and catalogues references to “rhetorical” language, its practitioners 
and its contexts in fifth-century Greek comedy. In the main text, many of the subjects 
of these entries are discussed in the context of a chronological progression. Here, entries 
group all the relevant citations by subject for ease of consultation and reference.
 This catalog comprises three categories. (1) The first section catalogues terminol-
ogy in comedy that designates or characterizes “proto-rhetorical” language in the fifth 
century, i.e., the language that later came to be reckoned as the beginnings of formal 
rhetoric. By “proto-rhetorical,” I mean language that comedy singles out for its unortho-
doxy (and usually its ethical dimension as well), but which was not yet focalized in the 
discipline later known as “rhetoric” (cf. the Introduction). (2) The next section catalogues 
references to speakers and theoretical explorers of language, including those who later 
come to be reckoned the pioneers of rhetoric. These practitioners include individuals 
and groups, sometimes named and sometimes not, from politicians who had to deliver 
public speeches as part of their activity to philosophers who contributed to the debate and 
development of rhetorical theory. (3) The last section lists and summarizes passages that 
describe or dramatize institutions associated with the theory and practice of rhetoric in 
the political arena (the Assembly, Council, and courts), as well as training or philosophi-
cal mechanisms for transmitting and advancing the intellectual exploration that would 
become formalized as rhetoric. References to political and philosophical institutions fo-
cus on how comedy depicts their relationship to rhetoric, but other references to them in 
comedy are cited as necessary to provide context for the depictions of these institutions 
more generally.
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 The few relevant references to comedy and rhetoric from Sicily in the fifth century and 
its reception in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries are presented in their entirety and 
discussed in Chapter 1, and so are not repeated here.
ChRonologICAl lImITS FoR old ComEdy And RhEToRIC
Since antiquity, scholars have divided the history of Greek comedy into Old, Middle and 
New. These are not hard, fixed categories, and some fragments cannot be comfortably 
placed under just one of these rubrics, but the distinction remains helpful, and the histori-
cal periods underpinning these categories are meaningful for the debate about the devel-
opment of rhetoric, so the nomenclature is used here. For the purposes of this book and 
this appendix, Old Comedy covers Athenian comedy belonging to the fifth century down 
to 403 b.c.e. Ancient testimony says comic productions at Athens were institutionalized 
in the 480s, and any history of comic performance prior to that is opaque to us now. 
Scarcely any fragments point to events prior to the 440s, so all the material presented here, 
although some of it cannot be dated, is overwhelmingly likely to belong to the second half 
of the century. It was during this same time frame that traditionally the first precepts of 
formal rhetoric were developed by the intellectuals now known as the Sophists, and the 
phenomenon spread through the cultural and political life of Athens.
terminology
Consistent with recent research into the development of early rhetorical theory, the re-
mains of Old Comedy do not include the word ῥητορική or any of the formal terms 
canonized in the curriculum of rhetoric from the late fourth century onward, such as 
names for parts of speech.
 Listed in (Greek) alphabetical order below are entries for the terms (and clusters of 
related terms) attested in Old Comedy for designating or characterizing “proto-rhetorical” 
language in the later part of century, terms which, for purposes of comedy, took place 
mostly in public, political settings.
ᾄδειν: A snatch of dialogue from Aristophanes’ Farmers (fr. 101) says that “singing” can 
mean a poor defense in court.
Α. καὶ τὰς δίκας οὖν ἔλεγον ᾄδοντες τότε;
Β. νὴ Δία· φράσω δ’ ἐγὼ μέγα σοι τεκμήριον.
ἔτι γὰρ λέγουσ’ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καθήμενοι,
ὅταν κακῶς τις ἀπολογῆται τὴν δίκην·
ᾄδεις.
A. So did they speak their cases by singing them that time?
B. By Zeus, yes! I’ll give you real proof:
The old men sitting (on a jury) still say,
when a defendant presents his case poorly,
“You’re singing!”
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  No other extant passage uses the phrase this way, but the term does appear in 
some brief jokes with forensic contexts (Wasps 100–101, 268–70, 815–17; Birds 39–
41).
ἀδολεσχεῖν: This is a strong term for verbal blather. Eupolis has a line addressing a σο-
φιστής (see the entry for this term below), probably sarcastically or ironically, to teach 
ἀδολεσχεῖν (fr. 388). Eupolis also applies ἀδολεσχεῖν to Socrates (fr. 386; cf. be-
low under “Practitioners”). A fragment of Aristophanes references Prodicus (fr. 506; 
cf. below under “Practitioners”) with respect to the corrupting influence of someone 
engaged in ἀδολεσχεῖν.1 Strepsiades uses it twice when deliberating with “Hermes” 
to determine his revenge on the residents of Socrates’ Phrontisterion (Clouds 1480, 
1485). Hermippus fr. 21 has λεπτολογία, “refined talk,” glossed as the equivalent 
of ἀδολεσχεῖν.2
ἀντίθετον: This word, attested only once (Aristophanes fr. 341), comes the closest of any 
term to matching its meaning, if not its exact form (later ἀντίθεσις), in later techni-
cal vocabulary. Only the reference to Agathon confirms that its meaning seems the 
same as later (καὶ κατ’ Ἀγάθων’ ἀντίθετον ἐξυρημένον, “and a shaven antithesis 
in the manner of Agathon”), since antitheses were a hallmark of his style (cf. under 
“Practitioners”).3
βοᾶν: This is a regular word for shouting, but it frequently occurs in the context of po-
litical deliberation and thus in contexts where proto-rhetorical language also appears. 
Shouting can be a legitimately aggressive tactic, e.g., at Ach. 38, where Dicaeopolis will 
shout down anyone at the Assembly who refuses to deliberate about peace, and Ach. 
711, where Thucydides son of Milesias could once have outshouted his prosecutors 
(cf. under “Practitioners”). More often shouting is unproductive, e.g., at Ach.185–86 
and 353 (of the hostile chorus of Acharnians), Kn. 286 (Paphlagonian will shout 
down the Sausage-Seller), 311 (the chorus of Knights refers to Cleon’s shouting), 728 
(Demos responds to the noise of the Paphlagonian and Sausage-Seller), Wasps 471 and 
750 (Bdelycleon responds to Philocleon’s cries of anguish), 921 (Philocleon says the 
case cries out clearly for conviction), 1228 (Bdelycleon says Philocleon will be shouted 
down by Cleon at a banquet), and 859 (Dionysus tries to convince Aeschylus to re-
spond to debate, ἐλέγχου, calmly instead of shouting).4 Other nonverbal body noises 
can be associated with this sort of unproductive dialogue, such as farts and snores 
(πέρδεται and ῥέγκεται, Kn. 115) or clearing the throat (χρέμπτεται, Th. 381).5 
Whereas the standard term for responding in a debate is ἀντιλέγειν and engaging in 
 1. See Chapter 4, 117 for this fragment. 
 2. Cratinus fr. 342 similarly applies ὑπολεπτολόγος to Aristophanes for resembling Eurip-
ides.
 3. The fragment is problematic and the subject of some debate. Karachalios (2006) argues that 
it is not a fragment of the lost Thesmophoriazusae at all, but a gloss reference to the extant one. If he is 
right, this unique instance of ἀντίθετον in the fifth century would disappear.
 4. Frogs 779, where the Demos calls for a contest between Aeschylus and Euripides, plays 
against the stereotype of the angry Demos by having the group call for judgment (see Chapter 6).
 5. Major (2002) has fourth-century parallels for farting as oratory.
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conversation διαλέγεσθαι, a participant should also “listen back” (ἀντακούειν),6 but 
the counterpart to shouting is open-mouthed gaping, which Aristophanes repeatedly 
criticizes among the citizen Demos (Ach. 105, 635; Kn. 651, 755, 1119, 1263; Wasps 
695, 1007; and cf. Chapter 3).
βροντᾶν: Thundering is a metaphor found in comedy to describe some speakers (most 
notably Pericles). O’Sullivan attempts to make a case that it is a technical term (1992, 
107–10), but Willi (2003) has refuted this conclusion (cf. the Introduction).
γλῶττα: The tongue, as the organ of speech and synecdoche for language, generates its 
own group of metaphors.7 The comic playwright Plato offers praise of the tongue (fr. 
52):
γλώττης ἀγαθῆς οὐκ ἔστ’ ἄμεινον οὐδὲ ἕν
 . . . 
ἡ γλῶττα δύναμιν τοὺς λόγους ἐκτήσατο,
ἐκ τῶν λόγων δ’ ἅττ’ αὐτὸς ἐπιθυμεῖς ἔχεις.
There’s not a thing better than a tongue when it’s good.
 . . . 
The tongue provides power for words,
And from the words you have what you desire.
 Cratinus offers a similar evaluation of the tongue (fr. 128):
ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί’ οὐκ οἶδ’ ἔγωγε γράμματ’ οὐδ’ ἐπίσταμαι,
ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ γλώττης φράσω σοι· μνημονεύω γὰρ καλῶς.
Well, by Zeus I don’t know my letters and I can’t think,
But I’ll just speak to you from the tongue, because I remember just fine.
 Context is not available for either of these fragments, but in the extant plays, or where 
the context or tone is evident for a fragment, the tongue regularly implies negative 
or less-than-candid speech.8 Another passage from the comic playwright Plato (fr. 
176) is typical, where a speaker says one thing in his mind while he does another 
with his tongue (νοεῖ μὲν ἕτερ’, ἕτερα δὲ τῇ γλώττῃ λέγει). Cratinus sarcastically 
 6. As the speaker in Crates fr. 45 commands someone to do; cf. similar commands in Euripides 
at Supp. 569 and Hec. 321 and adesp. 572, where λεσχαίνειν is equated with διαλέγεσθαι.
 7. See Rosenbloom (2009, 200–209) for a rich discussion of orators’ tongues in fifth-century 
literature, although he does not specifically recognize that γλῶττα tilts toward the negative in dra-
ma. Fr. 233 (Banqueters) seems to use γλῶττα in its later technical meaning of “gloss,” but this 
mostly likely reflects the usage of Galen (our source for the fragment), rather than an early attestation 
of this meaning.
 8. The only positive compound of the tongue occurs at Knights 782, where Demos was able 
to provide greatness for striking up with the tongue (μεγάλως ἐγγλωττοτυπεῖν) after Mara-
thon. More than a century later, Philemon offers this positive statement (fr. 24): πρόχειρον ἐπὶ τὴν 
γλῶτταν εὐλόγῳ τρέχειν, “running to the tongue is handy for the sensible.”
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refers to Pericles as “the greatest tongue of the Greeks” (μεγίστη . . . γλῶττα τῶν 
Ἑλληνίδων, fr. 324). Another fragment of Cratinus might elaborate on what Pericles 
can do with his tongue (from Dionysalexandros, possibly Athena’s offer in the parody 
of the judgment of Paris):
 γλῶττα´ν τε σοι
δίδωσιν ἐν δήμῳ φορεῖν
καλῶν λόγων ἀείνων,
ᾗ πάντα κινήσεις.
. . . gives you a tongue of beautiful eternally flowing words to bring to 
the Demos with which you will move them all. (fr. 327 = Olson B16; cf. 
Pericles under “Practitioners” below)
  Another fragment (adesp. fr. 213) offers the compound neologism γλωσσο- 
κηλο-κόμπης, “charming with a noisy tongue.” Dicaeopolis refers to a tongue-lashing 
from Cleon (Ach. 380). The Sausage-Seller’s unsavory credentials include an effec-
tive tongue (Kn. 637). He also invokes the image of the city gagged speechless by 
Cleon’s tongue (351–52). The Cloud chorus predicts Strepsiades will be able to fight 
with his tongue (Clouds 419), a talent Strepsiades himself admits he needs (792) and 
later relishes (1160). Kreitton Logos promises Pheidippides a small tongue (1013) 
but threatens that Hetton Logos would make him have a big one (1018). Hetton 
Logos himself endorses the tongue (1058). The Wasp chorus urges Philocleon to use 
his whole tongue in defense of jury service (Wasps 547). The Bird chorus sings a song 
of “tongue-bellies” (Birds 1694–1705), which hinges on the Athenian obsession with 
court drama and cites specifically Gorgias and Philippus (see the entries under “Prac-
titioners”). Agathon’s song makes InLaw think of tongue-gagging (Th. 131).
  Of course the most notorious tongue is that of Euripides’ Hippolytus (612, ἡ 
γλῶσσ’ ὸμώμοχ’, ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος, “My tongue swore, but my heart is un-
sworn”), which Aristotle reports was even used against Euripides in a court case (Rhet. 
3.15.8.1416a28–34). Aristophanes turns this line on Euripides himself, in passing at 
Th. 176 (cf. Frogs 102), and crucially at Frogs 1471 (cf. Euripides’ invocation of the 
tongue at 892, the chorus’s response about wild tongues at 898 and earlier of Euripides 
at 828; Socrates invokes the tongue at Clouds 424). Elsewhere Aristophanes speaks of 
measuring the tongue Euripides used to “wipe out speeches” (ῥήματ’ <ἐξεσ>μήχετο, 
fr. 656).9
  In a potentially related metaphor, licking sometimes appears, providing a variant 
and twist on the negative activities of the tongue. At Kn. 103 and 1094 and Wasps 904, 
licking is equivalent to embezzlement. Two phrases without context could belong to 
this cluster of metaphors. At adesp. fr. 328, ἐλλείχοντα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, “licking on 
the Athenians,” is glossed as referring to what incorporated citizens (πρόσγραφοι) 
do, on the analogy of licking honey, in order to appear as citizens. Also, adesp. fr. 438 
glosses φοινικελίκτην καὶ λόγων ἀλαζόνα as a deceitful speaker.10
 9. See Chapter 6 n14 for more on this fragment.
 10. I wonder if φοινικελίκτης (“red-licker”?) does not carry an obscene sense. Cf. Henderson 
(1991, 186) on cunnilingus, with Eupolis fr. 60, Storey (2003, 88–89), Kn. 1285 and Σ Peace 883.
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  By comparison, στόμα, “mouth,” is benign.11 Consequently, Aristophanes uses 
στόμα to refer to the positive things he takes from Euripides (fr. 488), and he has 
sweet honey bedew the mouth of Sophocles (fr. 598).12 Phrynichus has the braggart 
Aeschines (not the famous orator) admire the mouth of Dionysus (fr. 10).
  Diminutives and compounds of στόμα, however, always have negative connota-
tions, and Euripides is usually involved. Euripides accuses Aeschylus of an ungated 
mouth (Frogs 838). Aeschylus calls Euripides a mouthing-collector (Frogs 841). In 
Frogs, the chorus says Euripides has a “mouth-working tongue” (Frogs 826–27) and 
that both have powerful mouths (880). For the consistently pejorative uses of στω-
μύλλω and related words, see Ach. 429 (Dicaeopolis of Euripides), 579 (Dicaeopolis 
to Lamachus, a parody of Euripides?); Kn. 1376 (followers of Phaeax); Clouds 1003 
(Kreitton of Hetton Logos); Peace 995 (Greeks mouthing each other in war), Th. 
461 (chorus on the Garland-Seller), 1073 (Inlaw and Echo); Frogs 92 (“worse than 
Euripides”), 841, 1069, 1160 (Aeschylus of Euripides), 1071 (Aeschylus of punks), 
1310 (Aechylus parodying Euripides), 943 (Euripides of his own writing); and adesp. 
fr. 115 dub. (στωμυλῆθραι δαιταλεῖς, “mouthy banqueters”).
  On the other hand, φωνή, “voice,” is neutral and unmarked. See, e.g., Kn. 
637–38, where the Sausage-Seller need only refer to his “effective tongue” (γλῶτταν 
εὔπορον) for it to be awful, but he has to specify “shameless” to indicate his voice has 
a negative quality (φωνήν τ’ ἀναιδῆ; cf. 218 for another example).
εἰκός: This key term is associated with the “Sophistic” movement at the end of the fifth 
century for arguments using probability, which were a hallmark of fifth-century think-
ers and speakers engaging in the new, rational means for constructing arguments.13 
Consistent with Old Comedy’s antagonistic stance toward the new intellectuals and 
their distinctive language, comic idiom uses εἰκός in its value-laden, more traditional 
senses of “normal” or “proper.” Thus Pherecrates deploys the term in a fragment prob-
ably spoken by a young man to an elder, perhaps his father, that “it is proper [εἰκός] 
for me to be in love, but past your season” (fr. 77). Cratinus says the tragedian Aces-
tor will get a beating unless he tidies up his business, where εἰκός could yield either 
sense, but certainly there is some hint of propriety (“he deserves it”). In the context 
of natural phenomena, it means activity that is natural or normal, as in the action of 
plants (Aristophanes fr. 572) and thunder (Clouds 393). Otherwise, propriety, not 
probability, is always the key. A chorus asks whether it is proper that Thucydides son of 
Milesias (cf. under “Practitioners”) should be hounded by prosecutors (Ach. 703), for 
example. Even Pheidippides after his training with Hetton Logos uses an argument of 
propriety, not probability (Clouds 1418), and Strepsiades concedes it in these terms as 
well (1439). There is no evidence of a probability argument in comedy, even in parody.
 11. Plato, Theaetetus 142d illustrates the more positive στόμα: Eucleides, to express that he could 
not recite something from memory, says: οὔκουν οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος· ἀλλ’ ἐγραψάμην . . . 
ὑπομνήματα . . . ἀναμιμνῃσόμενος ἔγραφον, “No, definitely not from memory [lit., “from the 
mouth”], but I wrote down what I remembered . . . and drawing on my memory wrote it out.” 
 12. The mouth on occasion can be a potential source of trouble. The mouth does need to be 
restrained in situations calling for holy silence (Kn. 670, 1316; Th. 40). The mouth of the sycophant 
Nicarchus should be arrested (Ach. 926).
 13. See Schiappa (1999, 36) on this term in early rhetoric and some scholars’ speculative use of 
it. Cf. Tindale (2010, 69–82).
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ἐλέγχειν: In Clouds, Hetton Logos announces he will “cross-examine” Kreitton Logos 
(1043) and later, after defending the tongue (see above), invites Kreitton Logos to 
“refute” him in turn (μ’ ἐξέλεγξον εἰπών, 1062). The Paphlagonian engages in 
questioning of Sausage-Seller (Kn. 1232), and the men’s chorus urges the Proboulos 
to pursue thorough cross-examination of Lysistrata (Lys. 484). The contest between 
Aeschylus and Euripides in Frogs is first described as a ἔλεγκον τῆς τέχνης (786). 
Dionysus tells Aeschylus to ἐλέγχειν instead of being angry (857). Euripides several 
times engages in it (894, 908 and 922) and offers that spectators of his plays could ex-
amine what he said, so he had to be honest (960–61). Despite the negative association 
of elenchus in the fourth century and later, in Frogs it thus seems like a more civilized 
process of cross-examination.14
ἐπός: This is the most precise term for an individual word, although colloquially it can 
refer to a saying or remark (cf. the entry for ῥῆμα below). Dionysus describes the 
analysis of Euripides’ prologues as προλόγων τῆς ὀρθότητος ἐπῶν, “the correct-
ness of your prologue words” (Frogs 1181). The comic poet Phrynichus mentions τῇ 
διαθέσει τῶν ἐπῶν (“the arrangement of words,” fr. 58), but there is no context to 
help define the phrase precisely. Eupolis (fr. 326) sets διάθεσιν ᾠδῆς, “arrangement 
of song,” in opposition to the traditional form (ἀρχαῖον). Given that there was decid-
edly a move toward “new music” by the end of the fifth century, perhaps Phrynichus’ 
fragment refers to an analogous phenomenon in prose.15
καιρός: This word for “the right time” is attested to have been of great interest to Gorgias 
(82 B13 DK), but little detail survives. Aristophanes uses the word, but never in the 
context of anything philosphical, argumentative or oratorical.
κράζειν: Much like βοᾶν (above), κράζω and related words mean “to shout or scream.” 
This cluster of words can refer to oratory or wrangling in political debate. Cleon’s 
screaming is pervasive in Knights (256, 284, 487, 863, 1018), and he will continue 
screaming even after being cast out of the city (1403). Aristophanes invokes Cleon’s 
screaming two years later in the parabasis of Wasps (1287), where the chorus of Cleon’s 
wasp supporters also screams, but this is just as likely because they are aggressive (226) 
or threatened (415) as because they are associated with courts. Similarly, the chorus 
of Acharnians initially screams (Ach. 182), and later Thucydides son of Milesias could 
have outscreamed his prosecutors (711; cf. under “Practitioners”). Finally, in Peace 
(637), generic orators rouse the people with their screaming.
λαλεῖν: In succeeding centuries, this word becomes an ordinary one for talking, but in 
the fifth century it retains its sense of empty chatter or small talk. Eupolis succinctly 
summarizes λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνώτατος λέγειν, “superb at chatter, incapable 
of speaking” (fr. 116). This is the idea behind Paphlagonian Cleon’s dismissal of an 
amateur speaker who chatters (Kn. 348; cf. 295). Aristophanes does not distinguish 
 14. Aristophanes fr. 257 uses the term, but it lacks context.
 15. See Csapo (2004) on the political dimension of the “New Music,” although he does not 
discuss this fragment in particular.
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types of chatter, so the idea gets applied to many speakers and situations.16 Among 
them, a scholiast reports Aristophanes describing Gorgias and Philippus as λάλοι (fr. 
118, but there is no certainty that the scholiast uses Aristophanes’ exact wording). 
Aristophanes links Socrates to such chatter (Frogs 1492). Since Euripides receives as 
much criticism for being a sophist (in the modern sense) as anyone in Greek comedy 
(see “Practitioners” below), it is unsurprising that his tragedies are not just λάλοι but 
“chatter around” (περιλαλούσας, Aristophanes fr. 392) and elsewhere need more 
salt and less chatter (Aristophanes fr. 595; cf. fr. 158 for the salt metaphor). Euripides 
in Frogs asserts that he promoted chatter (Frogs 954), and Aeschylus is happy to agree 
(955, 1069, where also note the pairing of λαλία and στωμυλία). Dionysus finds 
Aeschylean silence preferable to other playwrights’ chatter (917). In Clouds, Kreit-
ton Logos complains about young men chattering (931, 1053), and later the chorus 
characterizes Pheidippides’ upcoming speech as chatter (1394). In Acharnians, people 
are chattering in the Agora instead of at the Assembly (21). Aristophanes’ use of the 
related words καταλαλεῖν (fr. 151) and λάλησις (fr. 949) is also recorded.17
λέγω/λόγος: These and related terms are broad, multivalent words and concepts that the 
ancient Greeks themselves discussed, debated and redefined constantly for centuries, 
and have consequently had full-length modern studies devoted to them.18 As such 
they go well beyond the limits of stable, controlled technical vocabulary and beyond 
the reach of the catalog here.19
ληρεῖν: This word refers more strongly to verbal nonsense than λαλεῖν. While Euripides 
admits to λαλία, he denies ληρεῖν (945), although both he and Aeschylus accuse 
each other of it (923, 1136, 1197). The choruses of both Clouds (359) and Frogs 
(1497) link Socrates to this nonsense.
λοιδορεῖν: This word covers a range of harsh exchanges, from mean-spirited arguing, to 
arrogant disdain to harsh (yet righteous) advice (cf. the ironic definition at Kn. 1274). 
It characterizes the bickering Logoi in Clouds (934), the argument between Strepsia-
des and Pheidippides (Clouds 1353) and the start of trouble between Aeschylus and 
Euripides (Frogs 757, along with θόρυβος and βοᾶν), although Dionysus will say 
such bickering is not appropriate for them (857). Like βοᾶν, it can be a legitimately 
aggressive tactic, as at Ach. 38, where Dicaeopolis will shout down anyone at the 
Assembly who refuses to deliberate about peace. It is, of course, an activity of Cleon 
(Peace 656), even when he is exiled at the end of Knights (1400).
 16. See Willi (2003, 168–69) for the gender associations Aristophanes links to this cluster of 
words.
 17. Aristophanes otherwise uses λαλεῖν in contexts not connected with proto-rhetoric or its 
usual contexts. For other instances of λαλεῖν in comic fragments, where the context is unclear, or at 
least there is no indication of political or philosophical content, see Pherecrates frr. 2, 70, 138; Strattis 
fr. 54; adesp. 1005.
 18. For studies with particular relevance to Old Comedy, see O’Regan (1992), Schiappa (2003, 
esp. 87–116, 157–89) and Freydberg (2008).
 19. Chapter 3 discusses the logoi of Clouds and notes the unique use of legontes as “orators” in 
Peace (635).
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  θόρυβος is a more general word for chaos and hubbub, but no surviving comic 
passage uses it specifically of an angry group at assembly or deliberations.
προοίμια: Proemium, as a designation for the initial section of a formally organized 
speech, does not appear until the fourth century. In the fifth century, the word refers 
to greetings. Its single attestation in surviving fifth-century comedy (Knights 1353) 
conforms to standard fifth-century usage (cf. the Introduction and Chapter 3 on 
Knights).
ῥῆμα; This noun refers to an utterance or unit of speech, generally more than individual 
words. Thus Aeschylus in Frogs refers to analyzing each of Euripides’ ῥήματα “by the 
word” (κατ’ ἔπος, 1198; cf. entry on ἔπος above), and in the contest of scales, a ῥῆμα 
equals a single line of verse to be weighed (Frogs 1379). It is the more common term 
used when the character of a speaker’s language is to be described, whether it is Ionic 
pronunciation (Peace 521), the bloated style of Aeschylus (Frogs 940) or “prettied up” 
(ῥήματα κομψά, Aristophanes fr. 719).20 A ῥῆσις refers to a passage or speech and 
does not carry any particular evaluative connotation.21 By contrast, diminutive ῥημά-
τια are linked in a pejorative way with creative speakers (e.g., Euripides at Ach. 447 
and Peace 534; Hetton Logos at Clouds 942; fear-mongering threats at Wasps 668). Cf. 
the entry under “Practitioners” for ῥήτωρ.
τεκμήριον: Hubbard cites ὑποτεκμαίρῃ (Aristophanes fr. 205) as an example of techni-
cal vocabulary with regard to rhetoric, but no evidence (no pun intended) supports 
his assertion.22 Neither the noun nor the verb is restricted technical vocabulary, and 
neither is limited to forensic or rhetorical contexts (e.g, at Wasps 76, the verb τεκμαί-
ρεται is used of a medical diagnosis).
Miscellaneous TerMinology froM fragMenTs
Even with the helpful editions of Rusten and Storey, the fragments of Old Comedy are less 
accessible than the complete plays of Aristophanes.23 For convenience and reference, then, 
I collect here the remaining notable references to speech and language in the fragments of 
fifth-century comedy.
 A passage in Eupolis’ Marikas gave an ancient commentator reason to reference Cleon 
sputtering in Knights (παφλάζειν, fr. 192.135–36; cf. Knights 919 and Peace 314 for 
the same metaphor). In Pherecrates fr. 56, an unidentified speaker is silent, until the 
verbal torrent has poured out. Another voice breaks out sharply and loudly (Pherecrates 
fr. 153). In Phrynichus fr. 3 (= Olson J14), an old man fears younger men who scratch up 
 20. Cf. adesp. fr. 442 ψυχροκομψεύματα, “cold and prettied up,” perhaps of speech; for “cold” 
speaking, see Th. 170 (of the tragedian Theognis), 848 (of Euripides’ Palamedes), and Theophilus fr. 4 
(of rhetores).
 21. If the gloss cited at Crates fr. 59 does belong to Old Comedy, it is the earliest use of ῥῆσις in 
comedy, apparently meaning a decree of some sort.
 22. Hubbard (2007); cf. the Introduction.
 23. Rusten (2011) and Storey (2011).
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their elders with words, although they speak sweetly (τούτοις οἷς ἡδυλογοῦσι μεγάλας 
ἀμυχὰς καταμύξαντες). Syracosius yaps like a puppy when he speaks at the bema 
(Eupolis fr. 220; cf. the barking at Wasps 904).The longest fragment from Aristophanes’ 
first play, Banqueters (205), hinges on the issue of orthodox language.24
 Another fragment (fr. 233) features part of the same debate, but about words in older 
authors such as Homer and Solon, still a type of discussion associated with the new intel-
lectualism in the idea of analyzing language.
 Because many fragments derive from lexicographers hunting for rare words, a happy 
number of creative neologisms referring to language survive. Euripides’ skill is στρε-
ψιμάλλος, “wool-tangled” (Aristophanes fr. 682).25 Cratinus coins λυπησιλόγος as 
someone who causes pain with their words (fr. 381), and describes running down someone 
with words like running over them with a horse (fr. 389 ἐφιππάσασθαι λόγοις). Such 
might be the goal of a politician engaged in knock-down politics (πολιτικοκοπεῖν in San-
nyrio fr. 7 and glossed at Plato fr. 113 as λοιδορεῖν and κωμῳδεῖν). Suetonius (adesp. 
frr. 930–31) collects several heavy compound creations used to characterize busybodies in 
the Agora, some attested from Aristophanes’ extant plays but some not known from other 
comic remains, including πολυκαλινδήτους, “lots of rolling.” It is important to keep in 
mind that these more isolated items could apply equally well to speakers or situations quite 
apart from those using formal rhetoric (e.g., to a lyric poet).
practitioners
Comedy devotes at least as much time and effort to characterizing the speakers and theo-
rizers of language as to the language itself. This section on people has two parts. The first 
has entries for terms that label a class of speakers, including those who might not be defined 
by being such speakers, but who form groups typically employing such language. The sec-
ond part proceeds alphabetically through the individuals cited in comedy in this connec-
tion. In comedy, proto-rhetorical language was to be found primarily in public, political 
environments, so this section overlaps with discussions of political leadership or creatures 
of the political environment.26
ἀλαζών: This is a strictly pejorative term, “faker,” which in the fifth century is applied 
to a range of characters employing pretentious quackery, but all of whom use decid-
edly verbal trickery, whereas in later periods it is used of a wider range of braggarts 
and fools.27 The residents of Socrates’ Phrontisterion are such fakers (102, naming 
Chaerephon, and see individual entry below on Socrates, and 1492; cf. 449). Eupolis 
uses it of Protagoras (fr. 157; see below). Other practitioners include Cleon (Kn. 269, 
290, 902, the last with him on the receiving end from the Sausage-Seller). Dicaeopolis 
calls out several of them (63, 87, 109, all of an unnamed ambassador, 135 of Theorus), 
 24. See Introduction and Chapter 2 for more discussion.
 25. See Chapter 6 n11 for more on this metaphor. 
 26. See Connor (1971, 108–19) for the history of ῥήτωρ and δημαγωγεῖν in the politics of 
Athens in the last third of the fifth century. See the discussion in Chapter 3 for the third term Connor 
discusses, προστάτης τοῦ δήμου, “protector of the people.” For a similar account of συνήγορος, 
see L. B. Carter (1985, 120–25).
 27. MacDowell (1990).
 Appendix 195
including a generic one who speaks δίκαια κἄδικα to swindle rural folk (371–73). 
Adesp. fr. 438 mentions a λόγων ἀλαζόνα (“faker in his words”), and Cratinus 
might, appropriately enough, pair it with κόμπος, “noise” (fr. 375). Euripides applies 
the label to Aeschylus, somewhat ironically, of his silences (Frogs 919).28
ῥήτωρ: This term is etymologically related to ῥῆσις (see the entry under “Terminology” 
above), and this origin may explain its usage, insofar as it refers to someone publicly 
engaged in policy debate.29 The word has a different range from English “orator” (as 
a professional speaker or someone especially skilled in delivering speeches), often cor-
responding more to “politician” in the sense of someone whose occupation involves 
regular debate in public, political institutions. Aristophanes places them in the courts 
(Ach. 680) and in the Assembly (Ach. 38; Kn. 1360). A passage from Banqueters (fr. 
205) links them directly with strange, new phrasing. Otherwise, they come in for gen-
eral abuse as politicians (Kn. 358, 423–26; Th. 530; Frogs 367). Similarly, references 
to ῥήτορες in fragments of Old Comedy do not mention them in the act but refer to 
them more as a species.30 
  Although the word ῥητορική derives directly from this term, there is no reference 
to it or to any technical skill or training for rhetores.31
σοφιστής: Studies have established that, by the fifth century, this word refers broadly to 
performers and to those who have some prestige for their wisdom. In Old Comedy it 
never refers to the intellectuals now known as the Sophists.32 For example, Cratinus 
calls a group of poets a swarm of σοφισταί (fr. 2). Eupolis applies it to a rhapsode 
(fr. 483). Plato the comic poet wrote a play titled Σοφισταί, in which he identifies 
Bacchylides (a flute-player, not the choral poet) as a σοφιστής (fr. 149). A σοφιστής 
is addressed in Eupolis, but given parallel usage, this is most likely someone who in 
modern terms would be identified as a poet or performer (fr. 388). In the complete 
comedies, the word appears only in Clouds. According to Socrates, the Clouds nourish 
“sophists” (331), probably meant in the most general way. Hetton Logos promises to 
make Pheidippides a sophist (1111), i.e., to make him smart and accomplished. Later, 
the chorus uses the term ironically of Strepsiades (1309). Athenaeus records that the 
term was also a widespread one for comic performers (14.621d–e), but it is not clear 
to what time period he refers.
συνήγορος: A few passages use the term συνήγορος, a legal advocate in the courts. 
In comedy, there seems to be little difference between a ῥήτωρ and a συνήγορος, 
except that συνήγοροι are more specifically aggressive prosecutors. Indeed, one frag-
ment mentions both ῥήτορες and συνήγοροι, without any indication that they are 
meaningfully different groups (Aristophanes fr. 205.6–9). The συνήγορος at this 
time was associated with young, aggressive prosecutors, a group likely, as comedy 
 28. In a nonrhetorical, but still verbal, sense, it is used of deceit through oracles (Peace 1045, 
1069 and 1121 of Hierocles; Birds 983) and of Meton (Birds 1016).
 29. Connor (1971, 116 esp. n. 51); and cf. Crates fr. 59.
 30. See Chapter 2 for more references and dicussion.
 31. For the public, political ramification of the training in Clouds, see Chapter 3.
 32. Kerferd (1950).
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depicts them, to use the new dubious style of speaking to achieve their ends. The cho-
rus at Acharnians 703–18 describes a chattering (cf. λαλεῖν under terminology) pros-
ecutor of this sort, and one more fragment (Aristophanes fr. 424) assumes the idea.33 
In Knights, Agoracritus asks the rejuvenated Demos how he will handle a bomolochic 
prosecutor, and Demos responds that he would hurl one to his death (1358–63).34
  Below is an alphabetical list of historical individuals either (1) linked to the histo-
ry and development of rhetoric and mentioned in fifth-century comedy35 or (2) men-
tioned in comedy in connection with the new intellectualism or because their speech 
characterized them in some fashion. In general, the entries focus on references ger-
mane to these areas, so that passages without any discernible connection to language 
are omitted.36 This list also does not include poets mentioned in connection with their 
poetry unless they also are linked to progressive, proto-rhetorical language.37
•	 Aeschines (PA 337, PAA 114830; not the famous orator): Aeschines is linked 
to hyperbolic speech at Phrynichus fr. 10; Wasps 459 and 1243 (cf. Wasps 325, 
1220; and Birds 823).
•	 Agathon (PA 83, PAA 105185): Like Euripides, this tragic poet was mocked for 
his novel and experimental work on the tragic stage. A long scene in Aristo-
phanes’ extant Thesmophoriazusae satirizes his effeminacy and creative process 
(1–294).38 A fragment from Aristophanes’ other Thesmophoriazusae (fr. 341) 
mentions κατ’ Ἀγάθων’ ἀντίθετον ἐξυρημένον, “a shaven antithesis in the 
manner of Agathon,” referring both to the tragedian’s effeminacy and his ver-
bal style influenced by Gorgias.39
 33. See Chapter 3, 97–98 for details. 
 34. The chorus of Wasps makes a passing mention of a συνήγορος as an aggressive prosecutor 
(482). The position of συνήγορος changed in the coming years, but a fragment from the third cen-
tury suggests their reputation only worsened:
   μόνῳ δ’ ἰατρῷ τοῦτο καὶ συνηγόρῳ
  ἔξεστιν, ἀποκτείνειν μέν, ἀποθνῄσκειν δἐ μή.
  It’s possible only for a doctor and a synegoros
  to commit murder and not die for it. (Philemon Jr. fr. 3)
 35. Where applicable, for each name I include PAA numbers, cross-references to Diels-Kranz 
(DK) and to Radermacher’s Artium scriptores (AS). Of those who could have overlapped with the peri-
od being surveyed, the following have left no trace in comedy: Antisthenes (AS 19), Cephalus (AS 18), 
Critias (DK 88, AS 17), Corax and Tisias (AS 2), Empedocles (AS 1), Erginus (AS 5), Evenus (AS 20), 
Hippias (DK 86, AS 11), Licymnius (AS 16), Nicias of Syracuse (AS 4), Polus (AS 14) and Theodorus 
(AS 12). The remains of Greek Old Comedy are far too sparse to make any substantive claims from 
the silence about these individuals, a number of whom are shadowy figures even in broader contexts.
 36. For more comprehensive references, see Sommerstein (1996) and Storey (2011, 3: 453–58). 
On the other hand, I have endeavored to be as thorough as possible about references in fragments, 
since these are more difficult to research.
 37. For discussion and debate about broader issues with respect to the way Aristophanes makes 
comedy of historical individuals, see Ercolani (2002) and Saetta Cottone (2005).
 38. See Given (2007) for a careful analysis of this scene and its role in the play as a whole.
 39. This fragment is problematic and part of recent debate about the date of the lost Thesmo-
phoriazusae and how it fits into the career of Agathon. See Butrica (2001, 2004), Austin and Olson 
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•	 Alcibiades (PA 600, PAA 121630): The notorious and charismatic Alcibiades 
represented much of what was upsetting to comic poets (and others) about 
the young generation of intelligent but unusual speakers. He was known for, 
apparently in a positive way, a distinct lisp when he spoke (mocked at Wasps 
42–45). One fragment mocks Alcibiades’ son (also named Alcibiades) for 
emulating his father, including his lisp (Archippus fr. 48). Much earlier, in 
427 b.c.e., Aristophanes (fr. 205, cf. pp. 40–41) includes Alcibiades among 
the notorious speakers emulated by a young delinquent. Plutarch states gener-
ally that Alcibiades was an able speaker and that comic poets testified to his 
being a very powerful one among the rhetores (adesp. fr. 695, δυνατὸς ἦν 
εἰπεῖν . . . τῶν ῥητόρων ὁ δυνατώτατος). The reference to him as an ag-
gressive synegoros in Acharnians (716) fits this generalization, but most extant 
references to him in comedy focus on other aspects of his reputation.40 One 
fragment (Eupolis fr. 385) blends Alcibiades’ excesses with the boldness of his 
speech and assertions:
(Αλκ.) . . . ὃς δὲ πρῶτος ἐξηῦρον τὸ πρῷ ’πιπίνειν.
(A.) πολλήν γε λακκοπρωκτίαν ἡμῖν ἐπίστασ’ εὐρών.
(Αλκ.) εἶεν· τίς εἶπεν “ἁμίδα, παι” πρῶτος μεταξὺ πίνων;
(B.) Παλαμηδικόν γε τοῦτο τοὐξεύρημα καὶ σοφόν σου.
Alcibiades: . . . and who was the first to invent drinking in the 
 morning?
B: You sure set up a lot of ass-hollowing for us when you 
 invented that.
Alcibiades: OK. Who was the first to say “Boy! Pisspot!” right in 
 the middle of drinking?
B: That invention is just like Palamedes, so clever of you.
Whereas in Aristophanes fr. 205 an unusual word is linked to Alcibiades, here 
a drunken Alcibiades on stage himself lays claim to innovation, both in action 
and in a new saying. The respondent’s citation of Palamedes provides an indi-
rect link to the new intellectualism.41
(2003–4) and Karachalios (2006). Athenaeus comments that Plato also mocked Agathon’s balanced 
clauses and antitheses: χλευάζει τε τὰ ἰσόκωλα τὰ Ἀγάθωνος καὶ τὰ ἀντίθετα (187c). See 
Dover (1980, 123–24) for analysis of the way Plato represents these traits, with parallels from Gor-
gias’ funeral oration (B6 DK), in Agathon’s speech at Symp. 194e–97e. An unattributed fragment of 
Aristophanes, but possibly also belonging to the other Thesmophoriazusae, attributes the phrase “light-
bringing fir torches” to Agathon (πεύκας . . . φωσφόρους, fr. 592.35 = TrGF 39 15).
 40. See Gribble (1999, 74–79) for a survey of the depiction of Alcibiades in comedy. Some 
scholars have hunted for a number of further allusions to Alcibiades in comedy, but see the cautionary 
notes of Storey (2003, 194), Dover (2004) and Olson (2007, 218).
 41. Palamedes has some associations with the new thinkers through Gorgias’ speech on Palam-
edes, and Euripides’ play about him seems to have portrayed him as a condemned intellectual (frr. 
578–89, esp. 578 on his inventions) and was staged in 415 (cf. Chapter 6). If Eupolis fr. 385 belongs 
to Baptai, it could belong to near or after the time Euripides’ play was staged; cf. Storey (2003, 
108–10, 355). In the next century, the trope of “inventor” appears often in comic fragments, on 
which, see Hunter (1983, 162).
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•	 Antiphon (PA 1304, PAA 138625; R 10; cf. DK 87): Antiphon the Rhamnu-
sian, the first orator whose works survive, and leader of the oligarchic Four 
Hundred who briefly ruled Athens in 411, was mentioned by the comic play-
wright Plato in his Pisander for his greed (φιλαργυρία, fr. 110). Philostratus 
(Lives of the Sophists 1.15.2) adds that comedy attacked Antiphon as a devi-
ous legal expert who provided, at great cost, speeches composed contrary to 
justice, especially for those with risky cases (τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος ὡς δεινοῦ 
τὰ δικανικὰ καὶ λόγους κατὰ τοῦ δικαίου ξυνγκειμένους ἀποδιδομένου 
πολλῶν χρημάτων αὐτοῖς μάλιστα τοῖς κινδυνεύουσιν).42
•	 Callias (PA 7826, PAA 554500): Callias, son of Hipponicus, in comedy was 
notorious for wasting the resources of his very wealthy family. This image 
played some role in Aristophanes’ Horai (fr. 583) but probably not a central 
one. Eupolis’ Kolakes was set at Callias’ house and dramatized the decadence 
at length. Later sources testify also to Callias’ reputation for supporting and 
housing the famous intellectuals of his day. The fragments of Eupolis’ Kolakes 
(421 b.c.e.) are consistent with these accounts, naming Protagoras, Alcibiades, 
Chaerephon and possibly Socrates among the guests.43
•	 Cleon (PA 8674, PAA 579130): Cleon dominated politics in Athens from the 
death of Pericles (the earliest reference to him, Hermippus fr. 47, cites Cleon’s 
opposition to Pericles during the first two seasons of the Peloponnesian War) 
until his own death in 422 b.c.e. (Eupolis fr. 211 and Peace 269–70 note his 
death; adesp. 846 notes this and the subsequent rise of Hyperbolus to promi-
nence). Aristophanes pursued him relentlessly on stage, devoting virtually all 
of Knights and much of Wasps to him. Jokes about him turn on everything 
from his appearance (Cratinus fr. 228 on his face, eyebrows and μανία, “mad-
ness”) to his profession of tanner (adesp. fr. 297). His harsh manner of speak-
ing was another regular target. Aristophanes literally makes him a barking 
dog in Wasps, and this idea probably lies behind the comic playwright Plato 
calling him Cerberus (fr. 236). One fragment ridicules him for publicly hail-
ing χαῖρε, “Hello! Rejoice!” while he was actually hurting the city (Eupolis fr. 
331 = Olson E17). Another criticizes the lack of free speech (ἰσογορία) under 
him (Eupolis fr. 316 = Olson E18).44
•	 Cleophon (PA 8638, PAA 578250): A difficult passage in Frogs (676–85) 
satirizes Cleophon as a foreigner, perhaps including a characterization of his 
speaking style (see Chapter 6 for discussion).
•	 Demostratus (PA 3611, PAA 319245): Aristophanes in Lysistrata (391–97) de-
picts him as a raving speaker, possibly reckoned as “Bouzyges,” who helped 
 42. Scholars remain divided about whether this Antiphon is Antiphon “the Sophist” (DK 87). 
Gagarin (2002) and Pendrick (2002) each summarize the position of the two camps. Cratinus men-
tions an Antiphon son of Lyconides (fr. 212), certainly different from the Rhamnusian, but who 
cannot be securely identified with any other “Antiphon.”
 43. Storey (1985 and 2003, 179–97).
 44. The fragmentary commentary on Eupolis’ Marikas mentions Cleon παφλάζειν, “sputter-
ing” (fr. 192.135–36, probably citing the parallel at Knights 919). For a reconstruction of the feud be-
tween Aristophanes and Cleon, along with helpful surveys of relevant bibliography, see Storey (1995) 
and Olson (2007, 210–13).
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lead Athens into the disastrous Sicilian expedition. Two fragments of Eupolis’ 
Demes mention a speaker as “Bouzyges,” one (fr. 103) of someone sarcastically 
identified as the best speaker after Pericles, and another (fr. 113) as shouting 
like Bouzyges. These two fragments may refer to Demostratus, but the iden-
tification is uncertain.45
•	 Diopeithes (PA 4309, PAA 363105): This man, known from a reference in 
Plutarch’s biography of Pericles as a prosecutor of atheists and intellectu-
als, is cited by a scholiast to Birds 988 as a ὑπομανιώδης ῥήτωρ, “slightly 
mad rhetor,” in Telecleides (fr. 7) and likewise παραμαινομένῳ, “raving,” in 
Amipsias (fr. 10), with a couplet from Phrynichus (fr. 9) describing him as a 
frantic runner with a tambourine. Most references also link him to oracles, 
but Wasps 380 urges the jury-addicted Philocleon to inhale the spirit of Dio-
peithes, suggesting that he was a vigorous prosecutor, so perhaps his frantic 
activity was notable in court.46
•	 Euathlos (PA 5238, PAA 425665; R 6): A scholiast says that this aggressive 
prosecutor, known from Aristophanes’ Acharnians (703–12), Wasps (590–93) 
and Holkades (fr. 424), was also cited in Cratinus’ Thrattai (fr. 82) and Plato’s 
Peisander (fr. 109), but gives no further information. His nickname of “ar-
cher” would seem to place him with those using aggressive new language (with 
words as his arrows), but the available references do not elaborate.
•	 Euripides: Chapter 6 discusses Euripides, but included here are a few comic 
references of a more technical nature. Cratinus charges Aristophanes himself 
with writing like Euripides, using the charged vocabulary associated with the 
new intellectual speech (fr. 342 = Olson B41):47
 τίς δὲ σύ; κομψός τις ἔροιτο θεατής.
ὑπολεπτολόγος, γνωμιδιώκτης, εὐριπιδαριστοφανίζειν.
 “And who are you?” some shrewd spectator may ask.
A rather pretty-worded, platitude-pursuing Euripidaristopha- 
  nizer.
Aristophanes himself responds to the comparison (fr. 488):
χρῶμαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στόματος τῷ στρογγύλῳ,
τοὺς νοῦς δ’ ἀγοραίους ἧττον ἢ ‘κεῖνος ποιῶ.
I employ the smooth roundness of his style,
But I have less crude ideas than he does.
 45. Storey (2003, 135–36).
 46. On Diopeithes’ political career, see Connor (1963, 115–18); and on the hyperbehavior of a 
prosecutor at court, cf. Syracosius running around the bema like a puppy in Eupolis fr. 220. 
 47. Bakola (2010, 24–29) discusses how Cratinus distances himself from, and aligns Aristo-
phanes with, sophistic doctrine here.
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Note that Aristophanes uses στόμα, “mouth,” here for what he appropriates, 
rather than the more abusive “tongue” (see the entry above in “Terminology”). 
The στόματος . . . στρογγύλῳ may also pick up on a running joke about 
Euripides’ fondness for sigma sounds. The comic Plato parodies a very sigmatic 
line from Euripides’ Medea (ἔσωσά σ,’ ὡς ἴσασιν Ἑλλήνων ὅσοι, “I saved 
you, as all the Greeks know,” 476) by saying, ἔσωσας ἐκ τῶν σίγμα τῶν 
Εὐριπίδου, “You saved us from the sigmas of Euripides” (fr. 29).48 Elsewhere 
Aristophanes economizes the connection between Euripides’ tragedies and the 
new intellectualism by having Socrates ghostwrite them (fr. 392), again using 
vocabulary associated with the new slippery style (for περιλαλούσας, see on 
λαλεῖν above in “Terminology”):49
Εὐριπίδῃ δ’ ὁ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιῶν
τὰς περιλαλούσας οὗτός ἐστι, τὰς σοφάς.
Composing tragedies for Euripides
that are clever and chatter around.
•	 Gorgias (DK 82; R 7): The famous speaker is linked with Philippus at Wasps 
421 and Birds 1701, where a scholiast says Aristophanes also mentioned Gor-
gias as a babbling rhetor (λαλὸς ῥήτωρ) in Farmers (fr. 118), but offers no 
details.50
•	 Hyperbolus (PA 13910, PAA 902050): Apparently entering politics at a rela-
tively young age (Cratinus fr. 283 and Eupolis fr. 252), Hyperbolus was per-
ceived as the immediate successor to Cleon (adesp. 846) in 422 b.c.e. until his 
ostracism in 415. Hyperbolus was a popular target in comedy, being the prin-
cipal target of at least three plays, Eupolis’ Marikas, Hermippus’ Artopolides 
and Plato’s Hyperbolus.51 Unlike slippery, sophisticated speakers, Hyperbolus 
was mocked for not sounding like an Athenian and thus immediately as a 
non-Greek (e.g., a Phrygian in Polyzelus fr. 5). Rather than unusual phras-
ing or vocabulary (such as is cited in Aristophanes fr. 205), attacks focus on 
specific quirks of pronunciation: a stuttering δοκικῶ for δοκῶ (Hermippus 
fr. 12), loss of “i” in δῃτώμην for διῃτώμην and loss of “g” in ὀλίον for 
ὀλίγον (Plato fr. 183 = Olson E24).52
 48. Eubulus fr. 26 (= Olson D11) from the next century has a similar joke; Clayman (1987) 
demonstrates that the perception is based on some famous lines, not a widespread trend in Euripides’ 
style.
 49. Teleclides frr. 41 (= Olson F5) and 42 and Callias fr. 15 (= Olson F3) are cited together 
by Diogenes Laertius (2.18) as passages asserting that Socrates contributed to Euripides’ writing, 
although he does not explain the connection of Callias fr. 15 with Euripides (which mentions only 
Socrates by name); cf. Olson (2007, 178).
 50. See the Introduction and Schiappa (1999, 85–152) for Gorgias’ role in pre-Aristotelian rhe-
torical theory.
 51. See Olson (2007, 214–15) for a survey.
 52. Cf. Pherecrates fr. 11 on Lycurgus (grandfather of the canonical orator) perceived as Egyptian 
in a corrupt passage that might comment on his diction (λέξεις).
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•	 Lysistratus (PA 9630, PAA 618290): Lysistratus is cited among the speakers 
linked to unorthodox language in Aristophanes fr. 205. There may be multiple 
men named Lysistratus referred to by Aristophanes in various plays and by 
Antiphon and Andocides in speeches, but there is no definitive way to separate 
them or establish them under a single identity.53 None of the other references 
play on his manner of oratory or speaking.
•	 Pandeletus (PAA 763615): Named at Clouds 924, where Kreitton Logos char-
acterizes Hetton Logos as “munching Pandeletian platitudes from a little bag” 
(ἐκ πηριδίου γνώμας τρώγων Πανδελετείους), Pandeletus, according to 
the Suda, was in Cratinus’ Cheirones (fr. 260), but there are no details. He is 
also characterized in the Suda entry as an active prosecutor, perhaps a hint at 
Cratinus’ characterization.
•	 Pericles: See the section on Pericles in Chapter 2 for comic references to Peri-
cles during his lifetime, and Chapter 4 on Eupolis’ Demes for the famous lines 
praising him (fr. 102).
•	 Phaeax (PA 13921, PAA 911410; R 13): At Knights 1377–80, the followers of 
Phaeax are characterized by a half-dozen newly coined adjectives in -ικός:54
σοφός γ’ ὁ Φαίαξ δεξιῶς τ’ οὐκ ἀπέθανεν.
συνερτικὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ περαντικός,
καὶ γνωμοτυπικὸς καὶ σαφὴς καὶ κρουστικός,
καταληπτικός τ’ ἄριστα τοῦ θορυβητικοῦ.
That really wise Phaeax avoids death so cleverly.
because he’s cooperative, conclusive, 
idea-impressitive, clear, strikitive, 
and most repressative of the provocative. 
Whether this characterization was meant to reflect the speaking style of Pha-
eax himself is uncertain. Plutarch says that Phaeax was inferior to Alcibiades as 
a speaker and explains: ἐντευκτικὸς γὰρ ἰδίᾳ καὶ πιθανὸς ἐδόκει μᾶλλον ἢ 
φέρειν ἀγῶνας ἐνδήμῳ δυνατός, “for he seemed affable and persuasive in 
private more than capable in public debate” (Alc. 13.1–2). He then quotes a 
succinct line from Eupolis (fr. 116, quoted above with regard to λαλεῖν) that 
implies Phaeax was better at small talk than speech making.
•	 Philippus: A scholiast says Aristophanes mentioned this babbling rhetor (λα-
λὸς ῥήτωρ) in Georgoi (fr. 118; linked with Gorgias at Wasps 421 and Birds 
1701), but offers no details, and this may not be the exact wording used by 
Aristophanes.
•	 Prodicus (DK 84, R 8): In Aristophanes fr. 506 (quoted above), either a book 
or Prodicus or someone of the ἀδολεσχῶν has ruined someone. Storey sug-
 53. MacDowell (1971, 238).
 54. See discussion Chapter 3, 81.
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gests the teacher of grammar and music (fr. 17) in Eupolis’ Aiges, Prodamus, 
could be meant to evoke Prodicus.55 The chorus of Clouds refers to Prodicus’ 
intelligence, but not in terms of his verbal ability (360–61). Papageorgiou 
(2004b) argues that the moral dimension of the two Logoi in Clouds is derived 
from Prodicus’ parable of Virtue and Vice.56
•	 Protagoras (DK 80, R 3): Like Plato’s dialogue about him, the one comedy in 
which we know Protagoras had some importance, Eupolis’ Kolakes, has him at 
the house of Callias (see above). Two fragments mention him (frr. 157–58):
ἔνδον μέν ἐστι Πρωταγόρας ὁ Τήϊος,
ὃς ἀλαζονεύεται μὲν ἁλιτῆρος
περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, τὰ δὲ χαμᾶθεν ἐσθίει.
Inside is Protagoras of Teos,
who is an accursed faker
about cosmic matters but eats earthly things.
πίνειν γὰρ αὐτὸν Πρωταγόρας ἐκέλευ’, ἵνα
πρὸ τοῦ κυνὸς τὸν πλεύμον’ ἔκπλυτον φορῇ.
For Protagoras ordered him to drink, so that
he would have his lungs washed out before the Dog [i.e., before 
the star Sirius rose].
Other than referring to his being an ἀλαζών, these two fragments do not 
address Protagoras’ importance for the development of rhetoric. An indirect 
link between Protagoras and comedy is found in Plato, who has his caricature 
of Protagoras cite Pherecrates’ Savages in arguing about the teachability of 
ἀρετή, “excellence” (Prot. 327c = T2 in PCG). This Protagoras says that even 
the most unjust person, raised among laws and fellow humans (νόμοις καὶ 
ἄνθρωποις), is more civilized than those lacking in education, courts and 
laws (μήτε παιδεία μήτε δικηστήρια μήτε νόμοι), such as the savage chorus 
of Pherecrates’ play. It is possible that Plato makes this link because the play 
made some association with Protagoras’ anthropological theories, but there 
is no specific evidence. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the importance of 
Kreitton and Hetton Logos for understanding Aristophanes’ reaction to Pro-
tagoras.
•	 Socrates: Athens’ most famous and notorious intellectual seems to have been a 
relatively popular target on the comic stage.57 As far as his language or proto-
rhetoric, the most blunt criticism of him in comedy comes from Eupolis (fr. 
386 = Olson F1), but the context is unknown:
 55. Storey (2003, 70–74).
 56. Papageorgiou (2004b).
 57. For broader and more detailed analyses of Socrates in Greek comedy, see Patzer (1994), Noël 
(2000), Mitscherling (2003) and Cavallero (2007).
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μισῶ δὲ καὶ <τὸν> Σωκράτην
τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην,
ὃς τἆλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν,
ὁπόθεν δὲ καταφαγεῖν ἔχοι,
τούτου κατημέληκεν.
And I hate Socrates,
the blathering beggar,
who’s thought about various things,
but to where to get something to eat,
he’s paid no attention.
The criticism here targets the disjunction between Socrates’ intellectual in-
terests, expressed verbally through ἀδολεσχία (see “Terminology” above), 
and basic nutritional needs, much as do Eupolis’ references to Protagoras (frr. 
157–58; see the entry above).58 As with Pericles, the posthumous tradition 
seems different, in this case with a reference to one of his accusers (adesp. 
940, probably Meletus, cited in the fifth century by Sannyrio fr. 2 for being as 
emaciated as a corpse):
κεῖται δ’ ὁ τλήμων τὸ στόμα παρεστραμμένος,
ὃ τὸν διάμορφον Σωκράτην ἀπώλεσεν.
He lies still now, the wretch, perverted in the mouth
which destroyed the polymorphous Socrates.
Thus Socrates, after all his talk (or blather) is ruined by a mouth, however, 
rather than a type of tongue.
•	 Syracosius (PA 13041, PAA 853435): Scholars most often discuss Syracosius 
for his reputed role in censoring comic speech, but the scholiasts’ information 
about his supposed legislation could well derive from comedy, although even 
if so, it tells us little new about how comedy portrayed him.59 
•	 Teleas (PA 13500, PAA 878910): Cited for his shiftiness in Birds (168–70), in 
the comic playwright Plato (fr. 176), Teleas says one thing in his mind while 
he does another with his tongue (νοεῖ μὲν ἕτερ’, ἕτερα δὲ τῇ γλώττῃ λέγει; 
cf. above in “Terminology”).
•	 Theogenes (Theagenes? See Storey [2003, 147–49] on the multiple candidates 
with whom this individual might be identified): In Eupolis (fr. 135), a Theo-
genes is noted to have the nickname καπνός, “smoke,” because he promised 
much but did not deliver. At Aristophanes fr. 582 and Eupolis fr. 99.5–10, he 
 58. See the entry on Euripides for his collaboration with Socrates (Aristophanes fr. 392; Callias 
fr. 15; Telecleides frr. 41–42).
 59. See Ercolani (2002) for debate and further references.See Chapter 4, 116–17 for Syracosius 
as orator in Eupolis fr. 220. 
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is satirized for excessive farting, which for other speakers can designate fatuous 
oratory.60
•	 Theramenes (PA 7234, PAA 513930): Theramenes is targeted in Frogs (533–41, 
967–70) for his slippery political activities, where Euripides claims him as a 
student. In later antiquity (e.g., Cicero, De or. 2.93), rhetorical works were 
attributed to Theramenes, but these are of doubtful authenticity.61
•	 Thrasymachus (R 9): Thrasymachus is cited for an unusual phrase (Aristo-
phanes fr. 205), but Storey (1988) argues that this is not the famous Sophist.
•	 Thucydides son of Milesias (PAA 515450): Aristophanes twice cites Thucydides 
on the occasion of his failed defense in court late in life (Ach. 703–12; Wasps 
946–48). The passage in Acharnians makes explicit that he had been a power-
ful speaker in court (cf. the entries for shouting and screaming above), but 
there is no more information about his style. Since Aristophanes is using him 
as an example of the good old days, it is unlikely he would have been linked to 
the progressive “proto-rhetorical” language.62
institutions
Aristophanes dramatizes directly or reports explicitly on the three main institutions of the 
Athenian democracy—the Assembly, the Council and the courts—and projects an anxiety 
about the role of the new style of speech in each of them. This final section outlines the 
dramatizations of activity in these areas and collects comic fragments that provide hints 
that other comedies dramatized the proceedings in these institutions as well.
asseMbly
•	 Acharnians: The play opens with a failed meeting of the Assembly (1–173), in-
cluding examples of public language (not so much proto-rhetorical as political 
humbug). The policy speech that Dicaeopolis could not deliver at the meeting, 
he delivers to the hostile chorus of Acharnians (496–555).
•	 Knights: As the play begins, Cleon (as Paphlagonian) dominates the Assembly 
(305). Later, Demos presides over an Assembly debate between Cleon and the 
Sausage-Seller (752–972).63
•	 Wasps: In the prologue, the slave Sosias has a satirical dream about the As-
sembly, which he and Xanthias interpret (31–51). It includes references to the 
speaking styles of Cleon and Alcibiades.
 60. Major (2002).
 61. Dover (1993, 261).
 62. See Olson (2002, 252) for a survey of what is known of Thucydides’ life.
 63. Rhodes (2010) analyzes how these scenes match up to historical information about the pro-
ceedings of the Assembly.
 Appendix 205
•	 Eupolis’ Demes: One section of the lengthy papyrus fragment (99.23–34) re-
fers to action in the Assembly, but interpretation is difficult.64
•	 Birds: The birds hold something of an assembly to hear Peisetaerus’ proposal 
(431–637), which is the most ambitious and successful bit of persuasive delib-
eration in extant comedy.
•	 Lysistrata: The Proboulos briefly recalls an incident in the Assembly from a 
few years earlier, when Demostratus supported the Scilian expedition, while 
women shrieked inauspiciously during a celebration of the Adonia (388–97). 
Lysistrata later refers to failed activity in the Assembly as motivation for the 
women’s activism (507–25).
•	 Thesmophoriazusae: This play features an extensive and detailed dramatization 
of the Assembly.65 The women hold an assembly, complete with the longest 
continuous speeches in extant comedy (295–573).
•	 Frogs: The Demos in the underworld calls for judgment on Aeschylus and 
Euripides, perhaps in a manner suggesting Assembly trials (779–80). 
council
•	 Knights: In this play, control of the Athenian democracy by demagogues in-
volves dominating both the Assembly and the Council (166–67, 363, 395–96, 
475–79, 774–76). The Sausage-Seller reports the dysfunctional debate before 
the Council between himself and the Paphlagonian (624–82), which features 
much of the shouting typical of comedy’s characterization of the language and 
deliberations of public debate.
•	 Peace: Since the play celebrates the return of success and prosperity, it does not 
dramatize a dysfunctional Council but indicates its future in a peaceful Athens 
(894–908). Trygeaus is to return the divine Theoria to the Council (713–18), 
which he does in extraordinary fashion by presenting her to the Bouletikon in 
the theater, where the real-life Prytaneis were seated (887, 905).
•	 Lysistrata: The central antagonist in the play is the Proboulos, whose very office 
represented a restriction on the Council’s authority. He is routed by Lysistrata 
and the women (387–610), and later in the play a representative of the Coun-
cil is to be chosen for the peace negotiations (1011–12).
•	 Thesmophoriazusae: The Council is closed (79), but the women’s assembly re-
ceives its proposal from the Council (372–75). Later, a Prytanis arrives to 
arrest Inlaw for invading the assembly, acting on the authority of the Council 
(943).
 64. Storey (2003, 149–60).
 65. Haldane (1965) analyzes how these scenes match up to historical information about the 
proceedings of the Assembly.
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courTs
•	 Acharnians: In the parabasis, the chorus laments the situation in the courts 
where aggressive young prosecutors pummel venerable citizens (676–718). 
The metaphors of the youths’ language as weaponry indicate a link of the new, 
proto-rhetorical language with this sort of prosecution.
•	 Knights: Control of the Athenian democracy by demagogues involves domi-
nating the courts (307, 973–84), but Demos will liberate the courts when he 
is rejuvenated (1316–18).
•	 Wasps: The bulk of this play turns on jurors and courts (1–1002) and includes 
a satirical domestic trial of a dog (764–997), whose mock proceedings include 
fragmented speeches by the prosecution and defense. Scholars’ attempts to 
make these speeches conform to structural principles of the fourth century do 
not hold up (see Chapter 3), but the proceedings do give a sense of comedy’s 
ridicule of forensic practice.
•	 Peace: Euripides is briefly linked with courts (532–34).
•	 Birds: The chorus sings a song that hinges on the Athenian obsession with 
court drama (1694–1705). The song’s “tongue-bellies” indicate language and 
speech are central to this obsession (cf. the entry on the tongue under “Ter-
minology”).
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As it happens, virtually all the references among comic fragments that pertain to proto-
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